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Abstract
This thesis is an attempt to discover ways of assessing the cognitive claims made on the 
basis of charismatic experience.The thesis argues that the charismatic movement is an 'enthusiastic’ movement, in the older seventeenth and eighteenth century sense of the word.
According to writers such as Locke, Edwards, Leibniz, Wesley and Swift, the essence of enthusiasm is a substitution of reasonable assessment in favour of claims to be the recipient of divine revelation. The thesis argues that it is this distinctive epistemology that is also the starting point and determining feature of many parts of the modern charismatic experience.In order to assess the charismatic movement, one must consequently focus on this 
determining epistemology. Its other features are implications, or symptoms of this 
essential trait.To effect this analysis, the thesis sifts through the available epistemological options and concludes that the best available means of achieving this is by the use of a 'cumulative case' argument. The complexity of this process is significantly increased 
because the competing theories involved are based in different paradigms. Although it is not easy to do, it is possible in principle to make a rational choice between competing paradigms, again by the use of a cumulative argument.The thesis illustrates the necessity of cumulative argumentation by demonstrating 
the equivocal results of attempting to assess charismatic experience on the basis of a 
single criterion of assessment. This is important to note because a significant proportion of the contemporary literature written both in support of and in opposition to charismatic experience does not allow for the necessity of cumulative argument, and is consequently undermined by the conclusions of the thesis.A number of criteria are suggested which can aid in making a judgment between 
different theories in the context of charismatic experience. These are more commonly used in epistemology, but it is original to apply them to charismatic experience.The thesis is also original in its main thrust, which is an attempt to assess the epistemology of charismatic experience. This central quest is the result of another 
significant aspect, which is to demonstrate the notable similarities between 'enthusiasm' and charismatic experience, thereby opening up a whole body of older literature which is 
directly applicable to the charismatic movement.The use of a cumulative 'case argument' has become more widely accepted in the field of epistemology, and in some attempts to assess religious experience in general, but it is unique to apply this specifically to charismatic experience.
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Preface
This is a personal thesis which arose out of my own confusion. This confusion resulted from having been a minister in a charismatic Church where there was a need to assess the claims of putative prophecy, and to interpret the physical manifestations associated 
with charismatic experience. It was written in order to find a way in which to resolve 
my own questions which were raised by these issues and to discover how such experience should be understood. This is not a work that can be detached from my own 
views or experience.The search to resolve these issues has not been undertaken in order to justify a 
previously held position, but to find out how things really are. Consequently it has been 
disturbing to write because the issues on which it impinges affect the foundations of my entire belief system, and this system has been turned upside down by writing the thesis.Although the thesis may appear to be critical of charismatic experience, this is because I believe that in order to preserve that which is of value in a context of this kind, 
there is a need to be ruthless in cutting out the nonsense. If the charismatic movement is not able to do this, then there are strong historical grounds to suppose that the good will 
be driven out by the bad with resultant disillusionment and confusion.The relevance of the work is illustrated by the fact that as this preface is being written parts of England are experiencing what is called the 'Toronto Blessing'. This is 
precisely the kind of experience for which this thesis should be able to provide the means 
of assessment.
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Introduction
He that would seriously set upon the search of truth, ought in the first place to 
prepare his Mind with a love of it. For he that Loves it not, will not take much pains 
to get it; nor be much concerned when he misses it. ^
John Locke
One of the most striking features of the charismatic movement which has influenced 
the church to such a large extent during the second half of the twentieth century, is its 
diversity of theology and experience. During the first half of the century charismatic 
experience was more straightforward, with the dominant model of practice and 
theology being derived directly from traditional Pentecostalism. This resulted in an 
easily definable theology, which predicted specific experiences; conversion, Baptism 
in the Spirit, and then as a sign, speaking in tongues and other gifts of the Spirit.^ 
This would also broadly typify the early charismatic writers, such as Dennis Bennet 
and Arthur Wallis.
However, the significant problems raised by this traditional Pentecostalism, in 
terms of questionable exegesis, shallow theology and dubious implications of these 
doctrines, have led to dissatisfaction with this approach. Consequently the 
theological interpretation of Pentecostal experiences has been modified to a 
considerable degree by writers such as David Watson, Michael Harper, and Tom 
Smail.3 They typify what became known as 'Neo-Pentecostalism', and it was this 
that became more typical of charismatic theology through the seventies. Part of this 
development was a social shift, and so a charismatic is playfully, but accurately, 
described by Dr A.Walker as 'a middle class Pentecostal'.^
1 Locke, John An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (Oxford University Press, 1991), XIX, 
section 1. (Page 697). Introduction to tlie discussion 'On Enthusiasm'.
2 Article seven of the Assemblies of God Statement of Fundamental Truth states: 'All believers are 
entitled to and should ardently expect and seek the promise of the Holy Spirit and fire, according to the 
command of our Lord Jesus Christ. This was the normal experience of the early Christian Church. 
With it comes the endowment of power for service and life, the bestowing of gifts and their uses in the 
work of ministry (Luke 24:49; Acts 1:4-8; 1 Corinthians 12:1-31). This experience is distinct from 
and subsequent to die experience of new birth (Acts 8:12-17; 10:44-46; 11:14-16; 15:7-9). With the 
Baptism of the Spirit come such experiences as an overflowing fullness of the Spirit (John: 37-39; Acts 
4:8), a deeper reverence for God (Acts 2:42; Hebrews 12:28), and intensified consecration to God and 
dedication to his work (Acts 2:42), and a more active love for Christ, for his word, and for the lost 
(Mark 16:20).'
Regarding Baptism in the Spirit in the book of Acts, Selwyn Hughes argues that Tn five out 
of five cases it is clear that all spoke with tongues some time after receiving the Spirit. ' Ye Shall 
Receive Power (Crusade for World Revival, date not available).
3 For example, Watson, D. I Believe in the Church, (Hoddei, 1978). Harper, Michael The 
Beginning, (Hodder, 1965). Small, T.A. Reflected Glory, (Hodder, 1975).
4 Small, T; Walker, A and Wright, N. Charismatic Renewal, The Search for a Theology, (SPCK, 
1993), page 40.
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Subsequent to this we have been offered a 'Third wave’ model which has 
developed through the 'Vineyard Fellowships' who follow John Wimber's teaching.^ 
This has been associated with an increasing variety of interpretive theology, as well 
as a dramatic increase in the physical phenomena typifying charismatic experience. 
During 'times of ministry' one can observe trembling, crying, laughing, screaming, 
falling to the ground, people with sensations of heat and cold, and so on.®
This wide variation in almost every area of theology, experience, and style 
has created something of a supermarket level of choice within the charismatic 
movement. For example, the focus on tongues associated with Penecostalism has 
been replaced by a focus on healing. There is a wide variety of manners of healing; 
healing of memories, bodies, and a variety of ways of going about this, laying on of 
hands, calling for the elders, anointing with oil, large healing meetings, many 
differing demonologies which influence the way both physical and mental health is 
viewed.'^
There is a diversity in theology, and in the popular understanding of 
experience. 'Baptism in the Spirit', which was viewed as a necessary second stage of 
initiation by traditional Pentecostals, has gathered a variety of alternative
5 Cf. Springer, Kevin (editor) Riding the Third Wave, (Marshall Pickering, 1987).
6 Dr. David Lewis wrote an extensive report on a Wimber conference held at Harrogate on 3-6th 
November 1986. This report was published in the form of a book, Healing: Fiction, Fantasy or Fact, 
(Hodder, 1989). One chapter in this report is on 'Physical and Spiritual Phenomena'. A questionnaire 
which Dr. Lewis distributed asked the respondents to indicate which of the following phenomena they 
had experienced. 1,890 were returned.
a) Tingling in your hands
b) Hand or arm shaking
c) Stiffening of your body
d) Weeping
e) Laughing
f) Fluttering of your eyelids
g) Falling over
h) Screaming or shouting
i) Hot areas on your body
j) Changes in your breathing 
k) Behaviour resembling 'drunkenness'
1) Other (please specify/
The 'Other' category included Electricity over the head, Electricity in legs, a force field running up 
and down the body, and aura of tremendous power, waves of cold, sensations of weight in parts of the 
body, head being pushed back, out of the body experiences, visions of Angels, experiences that seem 
demonic, Stigmata, and about eighty other phenomena, (page 185).
7 For example, Kuhhnan, K I Believe in Miracles, (Lakeland, 1963). Burton, W.F.P.
Following, (Coverdale, 1973). Stapleton, Carter Ruth, The Gift of Inner Healing, (Hodder, 1976). 
Hearing, Trevor Supernatural Healing Today, (Logos, 1979). Dr. C. Peter Wagner How to have a 
Healing Ministry, (Monarch, 1988). Masters, Peter TTie Tfea/tng (Wakeman, 1988).
White, John When the Spirit Contes With Power, (Hodder, 1988). Lewis, Dr.David,
Healing .'Fiction, Fantasy or Fact, (Hodder, 1989). Payne, Leanne, The Healing Presence, (Kingsway, 
1990).
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descriptions; being ’slain in the Spirit', 'receiving the Spirit', the 'second blessing', 
'receiving the Spirit of adoption', or the 'fullness of the Spirit'.
There is an application of aspects of Old Testament theology such as, 
'claiming the land', walking around cities, 'curses and blessings’, and illness being 
attributed to sin inherited from parents.*
There are differing personalities involved in leading and teaching, each with 
their own distinctive styles, styles which are not always compatible. The new ideas 
of such people are all easily accessible through the explosion of Christian literature, 
in the form of books and magazines, and 'tape ministries', as well as at the Christian 
conferences such as Spring Harvest or Downs and Dales week. The 'Downs' and 
'Dales' conferences drew people primarily from the emerging house churches, but 
Spring Harvest draws a cross section from all denominations. All of this has a 
dramatic effect on members of the local Church, as the members' ideas are not 
primarily shaped by the pastor, but by these diverse sources.
There is a strong cross denominational aspect, which has added to the 
diversity in styles of worship, as the charismatic forms have been adapted to differing 
Church cultures. The charismatic movement has crossed denominational boundaries 
between protestant sects. There has also been an extensively developing Catholic 
charismatic movement.®
This diversity is magnified by an inter-continental mix of ideas in which the 
English Church is influenced by other parts of the world. There are numerous 
American writers and preachers with their own Western emphases, often advocating 
wealth and success as being indicators of God's b l e s s i n g . On the other side of the 
world are people such as Paul Yonggi Chow in Korea who is minister of the 'biggest 
Church in the world' and an advocate of his own brand of Pentecostalism which 
includes such ideas as imagining specific items during prayer as a means of getting 
what is desired.
Clearly there is a tremendous diversity within the charismatic movement, and 
one of the consequences of this, is that to describe a person as being 'charismatic' can
8 For Example, Prince, Derek From Curse to Blessing, (Derek Prince Ministries, date not cited in 
this work)
9 A 1979 Gallup poll commissioned by Christianity today magazine, indicated that 18% of US Roman 
Catholics over the age of eighteen consider themselves charismatics. In the same poll, among 
Lutherans, Methodists, Baptists, and Presbyterians, from 16%-20% considered themselves 
charismatics. According to David Barrett in The World Christian Encyclopedia, over 11,000,000 
people today are practising members of the charismatic renewal.
10 For Example; Copeland, Kenneth Voice of Victory magazine (Kenneth Copeland Ministries). 
Copeland's The Winning Formula describes itself: Learn how to live life at its height by using God's 
winning formula in the affairs of your life.' (Kenneth Copeland Ministries).
11 For example, Cho, Paul Yonggi The Creative Ability of your Words. Essay in Wise, Robert et 
al. The Church divided, (Bridge Publishing, 1986).
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mean so much that is not only varied, but even contradictory, both in experience and 
theology; that it is therefore in danger of becoming a meaningless description.
In spite of this confusion, the word 'charismatic' is deliberately included in 
the title of the thesis, and it is this complex mix of 'charismatic' experience and 
theology which we are aiming to assess. We are not dealing any longer with a 
situation where there is a single and easily definable theology and experience, but 
with a bewildering breadth and variety, which leads to a mix of what could be 
described from any point of view as being good and bad. It is a mix which is 
extremely difficult to define and sift. In fact, it is the vagueness of definition and the 
sheer diversity of experience within the movement, which creates the need for this 
thesis to be written.
In order to scrutinise this mix, there are difficult questions which need to be 
answered. What are the distinguishing marks of experience which comes from God, 
as opposed to that which does not? Can one ever know that an experience did in 
reality have its source in God? Underlying this is the more basic question of how to 
verify any sort of religious interpretation of experience.
The issue we are aiming to resolve is 'How one can assess the claim that a 
person has encountered God in charismatic experience?' This is one of the themes 
taken up by Jonathan Edwards in The Religious Affections; What are the 
distinguishing marks of a work of the Spirit of God?, What is the nature of true 
r e l i g i o n ? i 2  We will be using the works of Jonathan Edwards as a frequent reference 
point for a number of reasons.
1. One advantage is that Edwards presided over a Church which would be 
described as charismatic in modern t e r m s . T h i s  gives the issues that he faced and 
wrote about direct relevance to the present attempt to understand charismatic 
experience, as he had to cope with a similar mix of experiences.
2. Not only is Edwards' work directly relevant to the current charismatic 
movement, but his thought is also uniquely perceptive on this theme; He has been 
described as America's greatest theologian, and even greatest philosopher. It is 
helpful to be guided by such a talented mind, and by one that has put extensive effort 
into understanding and sifting 'religious affections'.
3. While we will refer to other writers, there is such a wide body of literature 
associated with 'revivals', 'enthusiasm', 'charismatic experience' and forms of 
mystical experience, that to cover every person who has discussed these issues would 
be impossible in a work of this length. This does not harm the present thesis
12 Edwards, Jonathan The Religious Affections, (Banner of Truth, 1961), page 15.
13 This assertion is contentions, but it will be subsequently justified as we discuss the nature of 
charismatic experience.
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however, as its theme is primarily an epistemic evaluation, rather than a survey of 
Church history. This can be achieved without reference to the entire spectrum of 
examples.
4. Starting with a writer from the eighteenth century allows us a measure of 
escape from the current paradigm, by allowing questions and criticism from a 
different age to influence our assessment of the present. This provides a healthy 
objectivity.
5. One of the distinguishing features of Edwards' work is that he straddles 
the balance between reason and emotion with such delicacy. It is the loss of such 
balance that creates so much of the division associated with Revival, and preserving 
an equilibrium in this context is a feat which is rarely achieved for long.
If it were possible to find agreement on what criteria ought to be used to 
assess such experience, this would provide an excellent basis for agreement on both 
sides of the charismatic / non-charismatic divide. Using the work of a person who 
has achieved this balance in the past is a good starting point to address the same issue 
in the present.
6. Edwards was writing during the age of enlightenment, with thinking 
shaped by such writers as Locke and Baxter. It tends to make his work ruthlessly 
rational and objective. The effect of this approach, when it is applied to the current 
charismatic movement, is unusual, because it provides an objective grid which has 
the ability to push through a movement which is distinguished by a swampy and 
confusing subjectivity, and to sift out the good from the bad. Although we will 
certainly have much to say that is different from Edwards, his work provides perhaps 
the most valuable attempt to assess charismatic experience that has yet been written.
7. Edwards gave priority to the assessment of religious experience because he 
was aware of how crucial the answers to these questions were, and of how much 
damage could be done if they were not dealt with properly. Indeed, he attributed the 
eventual disintegration of the revival in New England primarily to this failing:-
It is by the mixture of counterfeit religion with true, not discerned and distinguished,
that the devil has had his greatest advantage against the cause of the kingdom of
Christ all along hitherto. It is by this means principally, that he has prevailed against
all revivings of religion that ever have been since the founding of the Christian
Church. 14
One has good historical grounds to expect the same disintegration, if the current 
charismatic movement does not find adequate criteria to assess its claims.
The intention throughout this thesis is to refer to books of all standards which 
are relevant to the issue, as this is the only way to reflect truly the wide diversity
14 The Religious Affections, page 17.
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within the movement. Some of the more superficial books need to be considered in 
the thesis because they constitute a primary source. This is what the charismatic 
movement is saying about itself, and it would be a serious omission to neglect such 
evidence. Many are significant, not because they are written by brilliant minds, but 
because they are widely read and believed. This is where their importance lies, and 
this is what makes them worthy of study.
This is not a piece of sociology, nor anthropology, nor psychology, nor 
church history, though these fields contribute to discussion and they will be used to 
illustrate the central argument of the thesis which is focused on charismatic 
epistemology.
To use an analogy, the aim is to draw a map of the territory, and to outline 
the main features. If one does want to assess cognitive claims which are made on the 
basis of charismatic experience, then these are the cul-de-sac, these are the dangerous 
areas, these are the best roads, and these are the kind of guide-lines which will help 
to get through to a justification of one's views. In order to demonstrate the relevance 
of these issues, they will be illustrated with reference to a variety of charismatic 
experiences, but the aim is to look for the means of assessment, and not primarily to 
assess.
This is important because, as will become evident, by its very nature, this 
movement is in a state of rapid and continuous change. Consequently, if one were to 
write a straightforward assessment of a particular part of this movement, then one has 
done a piece of work which is of limited value because by the time it has been read, 
it will already be out of date. This makes it particularly significant to discover how 
such experience should and should not be assessed in principle, because, if it can be 
done, this would leave the reader with the means of evaluating continually whatever 
charismatic experience presents itself, however varied its form.
Consequently, it is not a thesis which is committed to any particular claim, or 
section of the charismatic movement. It is written with a theoretical passion, and its 
commitment is not to 'prove' one particular view point, but to find out how things 
really are. In an analysis of charismatic experience, such a starting point is essential, 
because, as will be ascertained, there are significant obstacles to a simple search for 
truth in this context.
At times this emphasis on what is true can appear destructive, because it 
means undermining interpretations of experiences which are of great significance to 
people. However, this must still be done. Firstly, because its primary aim is to 
search for the means of distinguishing those beliefs about charismatic claims which 
are true, from those which are false. There is no intention of defending misguided 
beliefs for fear of being offensive or hurting people's feelings. This would be a
18
misleading distraction in an attempt at epistemology. Secondly, this apparent 
destructiveness is quite superficial. In the long-term the wisest course is to avoid any 
false belief, because the safest way to prevent disillusionment, is to ensure that one 
does not take on beliefs which are illusory.
This distinction between reality and illusion is not made as rigorously as it 
ought to be in the current charismatic movement. For example, in personal 
conversation with those who have been involved in Wimber conferences, estimates as 
to what percentage of putative religious experience is rather of a purely psychological 
nature, are put at between 75% - 90%. It would be interesting to discover on what 
basis such a figure is reached, but leaving this issue aside, the concern remains that 
an acceptance of this undistinguished mix of experience is sometimes seen as being 
permissible. There is a strong historical precedent to suppose that this is a seed 
which could easily grow into widespread disillusionment within this movement.
And by what is seen of the terrible consequences of this counterfeit religion, when 
not distinguished from true religion, God's people in general have their minds 
unhinged and unsettled in things of religion, and know not where to set their foot, or 
what to think or do; and many are brought into doubts, whether there be anything in 
religion; and heresy and infidelity and atheism greatly prevail.^®
Consequently, demonstrating that a person does not know that which he thought he 
did know is to make a positive step closer to wisdom. It clears the ground to make 
way for genuine knowledge. To paraphrase both Russell and Wittgenstein, any wall 
which is parted from the truth must be pulled down. The thesis inevitably involves 
an amount of such demolition, but this is of itself both useful and important.
We will also endeavour to move beyond demolition work to see if it is 
possible to build an overtly constructive epistemic framework which could support 
genuine interpretation of charismatic experience. Whether this is possible or not 
remains to be seen. If it is not, then we may be forced to share a conclusion with 
The Tractatus that:-
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
15 Ibid, page 20.
16 McGuinness, Brian Wittgenstein: a Life (Duckworth, 1988), page 100.
17 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by Pears, D.F. and 
McGuinness, B.F. (Routledge, 1993), page 74.
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Chapter I 
The Nature of Charismatic Experience
Introduction
What is called 'charismatic’ in the present day is part of a long strand of apparently 
common experience which reaches back into the New Testament. Those who 
approve of such experience describe it as 'refreshment' 'renewal', 'revival', 'the 
movement of the Spirit', or 'restoration of the Church'. Those who dislike what they 
observe (or hear about), call it 'emotionalism', 'enthusiasm', or even 'occult'. It 
consists of such a wide variety of experience and theology that labels verge on being 
meaningless and it is sometimes difficult to see what holds it together at all.
Consequently we must begin an attempt at assessment by defining what kind 
of experience we are aiming to assess. In order to do this it is helpful to put 
charismatic experience into its historical context to see if we can learn from the 
experience of previous generations. Similarities with the phenomena of Revivals, for 
example, have often been debated, and there are some apparent family connections 
with this area of experience. The possibility which is to be explored here however, is 
that the experience of 'enthusiasm' (in the seventeenth and eighteenth century sense 
of the word) could be the charismatic movements closest ancestral relative. The 
word 'enthusiasm' itself was first coined in the context of religious fervour in 
reference to the 'Anabaptistical Sect' of Nicholas Stork of Silesia.^
A comparison between charismatic experience and enthusiasm needs to be 
made with care because enthusiasm, in this sense, is a loaded term to use. It has the 
negative implication of irrationality and delusion in one's religious beliefs. It is not a 
term that one would have applied to one's own religious group because it was a term 
of abuse.
For example, Charles Wesley was described as an enthusiast by other writers; 
'Nonsense and enthusiasm', was Henry Fielding's summary of M e t h o d i s m .  ^ He
1 Susie I. TuckQi Enthusiasm, a Study in Semantic Change, (Cambridge, 1971), page 15.
2 Fielding, Henry Joseph Andrews', Owen, T.E. Methodism Unmasked, {London, 1802).
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would not have accepted this description himself however, because according to 
Wesley 'Every enthusiast, then, is properly a madman'.*
Enthusiasm, in general, may, then, be described in some such manner as this; A 
religious madness arising from some falsely imagined influence or inspiration of 
God; at least, from imputing something to God, which ought not to be expected from 
him.4
Dr.Johnson's dictionary defines enthusiasm as follows:
(1) A vain belief of private revelation; a vain confidence of divine favour,
(2) Heat of imagination; violence of passion,
(3) Elevation of fancy; exaltation of ideas.*
On the definition of 'enthusiastic' Johnson writes that the enthusiast is 'Persuaded of 
some communication with the Deity'.® According to George Hickes in 1680, 
enthusiasm is a 'demonic spirit' which needs to be exorcised.^
There were numerous movements which were described as being enthusiastic, 
during the time of Wesley and Dr. Johnson and some of them do appear to have a 
family resemblance to the charismatic movement. The problem is that combined with 
this similarity there is also so much variety within these movements, so that they are 
as difficult as the current charismatic movement to define in a precise way.
This difficulty in finding a precise definition is discussed in the opening of R 
Knox's book Enthusiasm.
I have called this book 'Enthusiasm', not meaning thereby to name (for name it has 
none) the elusive thing that is its subject. I have only used a cant term, pejorative, 
and commonly misapplied, as a label for a tendency.*
An enthusiastic movement could be described as a 'tendency', or a collection of 
tendencies, but the vagueness of this description creates difficulties in its analysis. 
There is a wide diversity of seemingly disconnected elements, and one is forced to 
make uncomfortably general statements about varying degrees of tendency, in 
different parts of a movement.
Having said this however, it is still possible to make meaningful general 
statements about such movements, because the entire and apparently confused jumble
3 Wesley, John Sermons, Vol I 'The Nature of Enthusiasm' (London, 1825), page 467. (Preached 
in 1750).
4 Ibid, page 468.
5 Cited in: Enthusiasm, A study in Semantic Change, page 17.
6 Cited in ibid, page 17.
7 Cited in ibid, page 30.
8 Knox, R.A. Enthusiasm, a Chapter in the History of Religion, (Oxford, 1950), page 1.
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of tendencies and experiences, do combine to form a remarkably recurrent situation 
throughout church history. This would suggest that something common to all triggers 
these movements and also holds them together.
The pattern is always repeating itself, not in outline merely but in detail.®
What is this pattern like? According to Knox it consists of the following traits, 
The enthusiastic movement will claim to be restoring the primitive spirituality of the 
Church, but is usually denounced and opposed, both by the mainstream of the 
Church, and by those with no spirituality of any sort. Almost always there will be 
schism which creates rival groups and prophets. Eventually the movement will be 
absorbed into the institutional as the initial fervour dies out.
Enthusiastic spirituality is described as 'Ultraspiritualism' by Knox, by which 
he means that the supernatural becomes an expected part of everyday life. One 
aspect of this is that total transformation of the personality is expected as the norm, 
rather than the exception.
There is a single-minded desire to live a life of 'angelic purity', which tends 
towards a separation from all 'worldly' amusements. In the situation where a group 
develops the idea of its own impeccability:
actions which bring damnation to the worldling may be inculpable in the children of
light. We must be prepared for strange alterations of rigourism and anti-
nomiamsm 11
The main stream of religion is condemned as being an affair of simply outward form 
and ordinances, whereas authentic Christianity is now being restored as an affair of 
the heart through the enthusiastic group, who claim direct and immediate access to 
God. The inward experiences of peace, joy and assurance are craved for, and 
expressed in simple 'heart worship'. There is consequently a distinctly subjective 
emphasis.
According to Knox the implications of enthusiasm go even deeper than this, as 
at its root is a different theology of grace. The traditional doctrine sees nature as 
being perfected in eternity, whereas enthusiastic grace is rather less patient and 
expects heaven on earth. The saved man considers himself to have entered a new 
order of being, and to possess a whole new set of faculties or 'gifts', which allow a 
direct insight into God's will.
9 Ibid, page 1.
10 Ibid. This section is based on a summary of the traits outlined in Knox's authoritative book, page 
1- 8 .
11 76M, page 2.
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"David must not wear the panoply of Saul". Especially, he decries the use of human 
reason as a guide to any sort of religious trutli.^^
The enthusiast claims to have a new status and authority in the Kingdom of God, and 
this creates a distinct separation between the ’elect', and the 'sons of perdition'. 
There will be a reluctant submission to what are considered as sinful worldly 
governments, but at the same time, 'always the enthusiast hankers after a theocracy.' 
A group of people will sometimes separate themselves into the wilderness and set up 
a theocracy of their own.
The enthusiast often has a conviction that the second coming is shortly to be 
expected. Another trait is an experience of 'ecstasy', and a host of accompanying 
abnormal phenomena.
We read of people breaking out into unintelligible utterance, or utterance identified 
by expert evidence as a language unknown to themselves; of remaining destitute of 
their senses in a holy trance, or, more often, shaken by convulsive movements from 
head to foot, for hours at a time. The unbeliever hesitates whether to explain all this 
as hysteria or as diabolic; the faithful are puzzled, some inclined to welcome and 
some to reprobate it. But, whatever the explanation, beyond doubt the phenomena 
occur; we should throw over all belief in human evidence if we denied it.
These are the main traits of enthusiasm. Here are some some examples of 
movements which fall into this pattern.
The Montanist movement of the second century was one of the earliest. It 
was a movement in reaction against (what Montanus saw as) the dead spirituality of 
the early Church. It aimed to reinstate the gifts of the Spirit, it had its own strong 
leaders, and inspired the kind of opposition from mainstream Christianity that 
enthusiasts always experience.
For example, Hippolytus criticised the Montanist prophets for an over 
dependence on claims that they were the recipients of direct revelation.
But they magnify these wretched women above the Apostles and every gift of grace, 
so that some of them presume to assert that there is in them something superior toChrist. 14
12 Ibid, page 3.
13 Ibid, page 4.
14 Hippolytus, Rffutation of all Heresies, WlU. 19. 1-3. Q\itdmANewEusebius,pdLgQlVl. 
Impartial examination of the views of the Montanists is hampered because most of what is known of 
them comes from their opponents.
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The movement seems to have sunk into confusion along with its erroneous prophecies 
of the imminent return of Christ.
Knox includes the Donatists in the list of enthusiasts, with their distinctive 
doctrines, lust for martyrdom and intense dislike of the Church of Rome.
Many of the Catholic saints have been described as ’extravagant enthusiasts' 
by writers such as Warton in The Enthusiasm of the Church o f Rome, (1688). 
According to Warton, these saints believed themselves to be in direct communication 
with God and claimed to be able to perform miracles, but they were simply 
demonstrating 'the exercise of a blind enthusiasm'. Warton considers that Saint 
Ignatius, Thomas a Kempis and Francis of Assisi would fall into this category, 
because of their claims to special revelation and for their 'folly' of supporting the 
doctrines of Purgatory and Transubstantiation.
The Anabaptists were another group who were described as enthusiasts on the 
grounds that they were
A sect of people that thought themselves inspired with a Divine spirit, and to have a 
clear sight of all things which they believed^ ^
The Anabaptists experienced violent opposition from the mainstream Church, they 
depended on direct revelation as a source of direction for their movement, and had 
many other enthusiastic traits.
Following the reformation there was an explosion of movements which were 
described as enthusiastic; Jansenism, Quietism, Malaval, Petrucci, Molinos, The 
French Prophets, Methodism, etc.
What is difficult for the average twentieth century person to appreciate is the 
impact that these movements had on society in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The society was still largely 'Christian', at least in a broad sense that the 
culture was shaped and affected significantly by the Church, rather than the church 
being a peculiar minority enclave. Consequently, enthusiastic movements were 
discussed in all parts of the country, and in all parts of society. There are essays and 
books on the theme written by a wide variety of people which include journalists, 
philosophers, theologians, ministers, and belle lettristes.i^
15 Ibid, page 15
16 For example:
Sir William Temple, Essay Upon Heroic Virtue, (1690);
Dryden, translating St. Evermond's essays, (1692); Swift, The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit. 
George Lavington, The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compar'd.
George Eliot, Adam Bede, Scenes of Clerical life, Coleridge, The Friend, ed. Barbara books (1969),
1. 432.
Daniel Defoe, The Review, V I11, 94.
William Tong, The Nature and Consequences of Enthusiasm Considered, (1720).
Chauncey, A Caveat Against Enthusiasm.
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Perhaps the most perceptive discussion of enthusiasm was written by John 
Locke in the Essay concerning human understanding, (1698). According to Locke, 
enthusiasm:
which though founded neither on reason, nor Divine Revelation, but rising from the 
Conceits of a wormed or overweening Brain, works yet, where it once gets a footing, 
more powerfully on the Perswasions and Actions of Men, than eiüier of those two, or 
both together:
Locke is concerned about the detachment from reason, which he considers to be the 
crucial issue in understanding the nature of enthusiasm.
Every conceit that thoroughly warms our fancies must pass for an inspiration, if there 
be notliing but the strength of our perswasions, whereby to judge of our perswasions; 
if  reason must not examine their truth by something extrinsically to the perswasions 
themselves, inspirations and delusions, truth and falsehood, will have the same 
measure, and will not be possible to be distinguished.^^
In the literary world, Jonathan Swift wrote a satirical essay on enthusiasm entitled A 
Discourse concerning the Mechanical Operation o f the Spirit, in A  tale o f a Tub. Its 
central image is of an enthusiast being lifted to heaven on an ass.
instead of the term. Ass, we shall make use of gifted, or enlightened teacher; And 
the Word Rider, we will exchange for tliat of Fanatic Auditory, or any other 
Denomination of the like import.
Seasonable Thoughts.
John Owen, A Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit, (1674)
Edwards, The Religious Affections.
Thoughts on the State of Religion.
John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
Richard Baxter, The Certainty of the World of Spirits, (1691).
Thomas Ludlam, Four Essays, (1797).
John Milton, Defensio Pri/m (1650-1).
Defensio Secunda (1653).
Henry Moore, Enthusiasmus Triumphatus.
George F. Nott, Religious Enthusiasm Considered, (1803).
T.E. Owen, Methodism Unmasked, (1802).
Joseph Priestly, Institutes of Natural Religion, (1782).
Alexander Pope, Letters, World Classics, (1960).
Shelley, Preface to the Revolt o f Islam, (1817).
John Wesley, An Answer to the Rev. Mr Church's Remarks, (1745).
Journals.
Letter to the Author of the Enthusiasm of the Methodists and Papists Compar'd, (1750).
Sermon on Enthusiasm, (1750). Sermon XXXll in Standard Sermons.
17 Locke, John An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (Oxford University Press, 1991), 
XIX, s7, 25.
18 Ibid, XIX, sl4, 30.
19 Swift, Jonathan A Discourse Concerning the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, in A tale of a 
Tub (Oxford, 1920), page 267.
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Swift considers that enthusiastic belief is as justifiable as the belief that other planets 
are inhabited, and with the belief in 'the squaring of the circle’ He states that 
enthusiasm is 'A lifting up of the Soul or its Faculties above Matter', and that this is 
normally seen to be achieved through three 'mechanisms'.
1. 'Prophecy or Inspiration' which is the 'immediate act of God'
2. Possession, which is the 'immediate act of the Devil'.
3. Natural causes 'strong Imagination, Spleen, violent Anger, Fear, Grief, Pain, and 
the like'.
Swift intends to take a fourth less well understood mechanism, and argues 
facetiously that 'it is purely an Effect of Artifice and Mechanic Operation'.^i In 
other words enthusiasm is a deliberate deception.
Moving forward to 1802, the discussion continues. For example, in Religious 
Enthusiasm considered in Eight Sermons by Frederick Nott BD there is a collection 
of sermons which were preached before the University of Oxford.^^
Nott considers enthusiasm to be:
that self sufficient Spirit, which, placing tlie conceits of human fancy on a level with
real inspiration, has ever proved by its very fruit, tliat it is not of God.^^
He more generously than some writers, attributes the main cause of enthusiasm, to 
'an heated imagination', rather than the work of the d e v i l .
It is important to note that the term 'enthusiasm' has gradually changed in 
meaning over the centuries. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the word had 
become ambiguous as to whether it implied approval or disapproval. It had also 
diverged from the religious context and had begun to be used in application to 
literature and politics. By the time we reach 1964, 'enthusiasm' has lost its negative 
connotations, and the OED defines it more straightforwardly as 'ardent zeal’.
What 'enthusiasm' refers to in this thesis however, is a label for the numerous 
movements which have the tendencies we have outlined above. What is summarised 
here is a small sample of the extensive literature on the subject.
It is enthusiasm in this sense that is explored by Knox in Enthusiasm. The 
accuracy of his description of the nature of 'enthusiasm' is confirmed by the many 
such movements throughout Church history which can be recognised because they
20 Ibid, page 268.
21 Ibid, page 269.
22 Nott, F.N. Religious Enthusiasm Considered in Eight Sermons, (Oxford, 1803) (British Library).
23 Ibid, page 6
24 Ibid, page 35
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have the same recurring jumble of tendencies. Consequently it is possible to use this 
generally accepted analysis as a useful base line to see if the current charismatic 
movement ought to be described as 'enthusiasm', and therefore put into this historical 
context. Knox consistently resists the attempt to assess the experience and 
phenomena he d esc rib es ,b u t in our case, the thesis is attempting to discover the 
means of assessment. A description of enthusiasm is only the starting point.
The thesis gathers together diverse aspects of the charismatic movement, some 
of which may appear incompatible with each other, in respect of their theology. It is 
still acceptable to consider them to be connected however, because there may be the 
underlying pattern of an 'enthusiastic' movement which holds these traits and varying 
theologies together. Perhaps not all of these traits are represented in each particular 
group, and certainly not to the same extent, but each has found its expression in some 
aspect of the charismatic movement.
We will also be referring to 'revival' as being enthusiasm. This could be 
questioned; however, each revival has been described by its opponents in this way, 
and as will become evident 'revivals' do have enthusiastic traits. Whether they are 
inspired by God or not is not the issue at this point.
'Enthusiasm' is the term we are suggesting may be a description of the 
charismatic movement. We will therefore compare the current charismatic movement 
with the traits of 'enthusiasm' as outlined by Knox, and determine whether this is 
indeed an acceptable term to apply.
25 Knox, Enthusiasm, page 385.
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1. The movement claims to be restoring the primitive spirituality of theChurch.
The Waldenses 'ambition was to live the Sermon on the Mount; they would 
have no treasure on earth, they contested the right of the secular powers to inflict 
capital punishment, they would take no oatlis.^^
The desire to restore the primitive spirituality of the early Church permeates the 
charismatic movement. Its aim is to be like the Church of the New Testament in its 
simplicity, commitment, radicalism and power.
The most extreme current expression of this trait comes from the Restoration 
movement. Table 1 (page 28) is taken from 'Restoration' ma g a z i n e , a n d  is 
essentially a claim not just to restore the primitive spirituality of the Church, but to 
surpass it. The Restoration view of Church history is that it took a sharp nose dive at 
the end of the New Testament canon. After a brief attempt at rousing itself under the 
Montanists, it hit rock bottom by AD 600, and stayed there until the Reformation. 
The church is seen as having fallen into the error of abandoning scripture, and having 
taken on superstitious sacramental doctrines which distorted the gospel. In short, the 
Church fell into error and the power of the Spirit was withdrawn.
According to restorationism, a variety of movements have gradually restored 
parts of what the Church has lost. For example. Scripture was recovered through the 
Reformation and baptism through the Anabaptist movement. Religious fervour is 
restored at differing times, and groups such as the Methodist, Brethren, and Salvation 
Army created stepping stones towards the ultimate movement at the end of time.
That Restorations churches....are seen as the foci of God's final chapter in the history 
of His people-and thus the whole world-can be seen in the list of recovered truths of 
the twentieth century as declared in Restoration magazine.^*
Although this is the extreme end of the spectrum, the concept of restoring the 
primitive chureh in some form does permeate the whole charismatic movement. It is 
fundamentalist in its attitude to the Bible, and critical of the mainline Church, firstly 
for taking on unbiblical traditions, which in their view should be rejected on the
26 M d, page 105.
27 Restoration, magazine (1983, Nov/Dec), page 40. Restoration magazine is the official magazine 
of the nationally influential 'Bradford' house churches. This group own the publishers 'Harvestime', 
and are the originators of the Dales Bible Week. They are led by Bryn Jones and have had a reputation 
for controversially authoritarian Elderships.
28 Walker, A. Restoring the Kingdom, (Hodder, 1989), page 142. This book is written by a former 
Elim Pentecostal who eventually converted to Greek orthodox. It is written with unusual fairness, and 
what distinguishes it is that it is generally held to be accurate by all sides. It is an unusually reliable 
source of information in this context.
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grounds that they are not taught in the New Testament. Secondly for ignoring parts 
of the Bible which are of a more charismatic nature, such as 1 Corinthians 14, or for 
spiritualising passages which are literal descriptions of miraculous events.
This particular trait gives impetus to the resurgence of spiritual gifts, and the 
particular emphasis on healing which permeates the whole movement. They are 
practised because they are part of the New Testament Church. As with all 
enthusiastic movements, the charismatic movement is claiming to restore the 
primitive spirituality of the Church.
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29 For example, Restoration magazine, (September/October, 1985), page 13 features discussions on 
the role of the Apostle, Restoration (March/April 1987), page 30. Article entitled 'Ruled by tlie 
Word’ by Matthew, David. Canty, George The Practice of Pentecost, (Marshall Pickering, 1987), 
page 107.
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2, The movement is denounced and opposed by the mainstream of thechurch.
They grew also (many of them) very loose, and degenerate in tlieir practices (for 
their opinions will certainly produce a filthy life by degrees); as no Prayer in their 
Families, no Sabbath, insufferable Pride, frequent and hideous Lying;
Charles Chauncey.^®
Such persons as refused to obey these orders (of Gastaldo, an officer of the 
state of Lucema) and were found beyond the prescribed limits, would incur the 
penalty of deatli, and the confiscation of all their property, unless within tlie next 
twenty days they declared that they were Catholics, or had disposed of their property 
as such.
This theme of opposition will be explored more thoroughly in the next chapter. For 
the moment all we need to point out is that this is a feature of the contemporary 
charismatic movement. It lives in uneasy tension with the mainstream Churches, 
often with mutual distrust and misunderstanding. Part of the Church wishes to pull 
back and retain traditional forms of worship, and the other wishes for the spontaneity 
and freshness of the new. The main-stream denominations write cautious, and 
sometimes threatened documents on the new movement, with accusations of splitting 
Churches, theological naivete, exaggerated subjectivity, or even h e r e s y . 32
Given nothing but the claims of movements such as the Restoration House 
Church briefly outlined above, a defensive reaction comes as no surprise. The 
Restorationist views constitute an aggressive dismissal of the mainstream Church. 
This is bound to create a reaction which is given extra force in a situation where the 
house Churches are seen as poachers of traditional Church members. In one example 
the house church established itself next door to a church which had lost a significant 
proportion of its members to this new g r o u p .33 In such a situation, the charismatic 
movement becomes a very personal and imminent threat. The doctrine of the 
Baptism in the Spirit is implicitly threatening because it divides Christians into two 
defined camps; those who have this experience and those who do not. The alterations 
in worship are also an implicit criticism of how things have been done previously. A 
threatened reaction to this House Church culture is quite predictable.
It would however, be unfair to say that the charismatic movement is always 
opposed by mainstream denominations. In England a common reaction has come to
30 Chauncey, Seasonable Thoughts, page xxiii. Comments on enthusiasts.
31 Willyams, Jane Louisa A Short History o f the Waldensian Church, (London 1855). A 
proclamation by Gastaldo who was an officer of the state of Lucema.
32 For example, Fiddes, Paul S. Charismatic Renewal, A Baptist View, (Baptist Publications, 1980). 
Craston, Collin (editor) The Charismatic Movement in the Church of England, (CIO, 1981).
33 Ibid, page 272.
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be an absorption of the aspects of the new which are seen as helpful; such as the new 
music, or the emphasis on using the gifts of all the believers, rather than just centring 
on the minister. The degree of opposition, however, is roughly in proportion to the 
level of radicalism in the movement, an antagonistic reaction becomes inevitable with 
more developed enthusiasm. The more different it is from the traditional, the harder 
it will be to accept new views and to cope with change. Consequently there is a 
sympathetic attitude towards the moderate aspects of charismatic experience.
it is my experience that many Christians outside the kingdom are not so much
censorious as curious. 34
When there are more extreme views, however, the argument becomes more vicious. 
According to Restoration magazine, for example, denominations are 'made up of 
people who are not Christian at a ll',35 they are 'apostate', 'out of step with the 
Spirit', and 'failing to repent'.36 On the other hand, the charismatic movement is 
described by Peter Masters as:
surely one of the greatest triumphs of Satan our malicious e n e m y . 3 7
If the degree of opposition is a reasonable test of how radical a movement is, then it 
is significant that there is little opposition from outside the Church, perhaps apart 
from parents concerned for their children.3* This reflects the reality that the 
charismatic movement has not had a significant effect outside the Church. Even with 
this proviso, however, it is still justifiable to argue that the charismatic movement is 
often opposed by the mainstream Church.
34 Ibid, page 294.
35 Ibid, page 142
36 Ibid, page 140.
37 Masters, Peter The Healing Epidemic, (Wakeman, 1988), page 12.
38 Restoring the Kingdom, page 266.
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3. The movement becomes schismatic.
No one is unaware of the schism, after the consecration of Caecilian, was
effected at Carthage through a certain mischief making woman named Lucilla It
was said that she kissed a bone of some martyr or other-if he was a martyr-before she 
received the spiritual food and drink. Having then been corrected for thus touching, 
before she touched the sacred chalice, the bone of a dead man (if he was a martyr, at 
least he had not been acknowledged as such), she went away in confusion M l of 
wrath....
Ill this way it came to pass that at the time the schism was brought to birth 
by the anger of a disgraced woman, was fed by ambition, and received its strength 
from avarice.
Opatus 39
This enthusiastic schismatic tendency is also evident in the charismatic movement. 
Splits permeate it back to its roots in pentecostalism, which was itself divided into 
various sects, such as Elim and Assemblies of God. Classical Pentecostal churches 
also lived with a sharp distinction between mainline churches and themselves. Their 
doctrine implied fundamental inadequacies in those who had neither been 'baptised in 
the Spirit', nor 'spoken in tongues'. These implications were not lost on the other 
denominations.
It continues to be a common criticism, that charismatic experience leads to 
division in churches, for example:
The Report notes that people who have received 'charismatic renewal' will sometimes
separate themselves off into their own groups.''*®
Even where a Church does not split, there is still an inbuilt division between those 
with a 'charismatic experience', and those without. This leads to different 
spiritualities, and consequently, even though they may meet in the same Church, 
there is still a breach between the two groups.
Within the charismatic movement there is also a variety of strong figures, 
whose style, emphases, and doctrine are not always compatible. Each has its own 
following, often becoming popular for a few years, before fading from popularity, as 
the next set of ideas arrives.
The house church movement at the radical end of the spectrum proves to be 
the most divisive and vehement accusations of church splitting are aimed at the 
'Bradford' house churches. They have themselves been afflicted by internal 
divisions, beginning with what has been described as the division between 'R l ',  and
39 Opatus, On the Schism of the Donatists, I. 15-19. in New Eusebius, page 314.
40 Charismatic Renewal, a Baptist View, (1980, B.U), page 13.
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'R2', in 1976.41 Each of these early sects has also had subsequent division. On top 
of these Bradford groups there are also many other independent house fellowships 
which have developed in England, estimated at about 100,000 in 1984.42
For these house churches, there is no difficulty in separating from the 
traditional churches. Indeed, true believers really ought to leave the 'old wineskins', 
in the form of dead denominations; as one of their songs puts it 'The Spirit won't be 
hindered by division',43 God has finished with, and departed from such structures.
There are many reasons for this pervading pattern of division in the 
charismatic movement including, the lack of structure, strong personalities, strongly 
held beliefs, the extreme nature of the claims made for charismatic experience, and a 
subjective basis for authority. It takes powerful leaders to keep people together 
within such a framework, as it has a confused system of authority combined with 
claims to absolute truth.
It would be interesting to explore the reasons for this divisiveness in detail, 
however this would distract from the argument at this point. What must be noted is 
that in its divisiveness, then, the charismatic movement can be described as 
'enthusiastic'.
41 Restoring the Kingdom, page 103 ff.
42 Methodist Recorder, (9th Feb, 1984). Some of the new groups of house churches are: The 
'Fullness group' so called because of the title of its mag^ine. Gerald Coates is their most public 
figure. The Chard Group from Somerset led by Ian Andrews and Sid Purse which is strongly sectarian 
and disciplinary. Pastor North's groups around north London led by Wally North who takes the 
Wesley and Finney views on holiness and perfectionism.
Cf, Craston, Collin (editor) The Charismatic Movement in the Church of England (CIO, 1981), page 
64 ff. Each of these groups has had further division or disintegration since the early eighties.
43 Mission England Praise, song number 88.
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4. The Supernatural becomes an expected part of life.
Some of them leaped up many times, men and women several feet ffom the 
ground; they clapped their hands with the utmost violence; they shook their heads, 
they distorted their features, they threw their arms and legs to and fro, in a variety of
postures; they sung, roared, shouted, screamed with all their might The person
of the house was delighted above measure, and said, Now is the power of God come 
indeed.
John Wesley.44
The very word 'charismatic', or 'gifts of grace' contains this sense of the imminence 
of the beyond; of grace impinging on human experience through the 'gifts of the 
Spirit*. In this sense 'supernatural' describes, for example, direct revelation where 
God is seen as speaking through 'tongues', 'interpretation' and 'prophecy', to the 
extent that 'thus saith the Lord' is added to the end of an utterance. The sense of 
having direct revelation from God, tends towards an attitude where decisions 
increasingly need direct guidance from God to be made.
The other gifts are all seen as supernatural, such as 'healing' or 'miracles'.45 
According to the charismatic movement these ought to be a part of the life of every 
church. Different gifts have been given a central place at different times. For 
example, the Pentecostal Church considered that tongues was an essential sign of the 
Baptism in the Spirit; healing is currently emphasised by large areas of the 
charismatic movement. More recently prophecy has become increasingly accented, 
as a result of groups such as the 'Kansas City Prophets'.46 Two examples will 
illustrate the expectation of the supernatural.
(A ) S u p e r n a t u r a l  H e a l i n g
There is a distinct emphasis on supernatural healing throughout the charismatic 
movement, taking the form of claims to both physical and emotional healing. Illness 
is part of the kingdom of Satan, and therefore to be opposed; it is never God's will 
for his people to be ill. This is a common assumption of the entire spectrum of the 
movement.
One of Satans most effective works is disease Regardless of the cause, though,
Christians have power over disease.4?
44 Wesley Journal, (Moody press, date not cited in this work), 11/8/74.
45 Canty, George The Practice of Pentecost, (Marshall Pickering, 1987), page 95.
46 This American based group became associated with John Wimber, and have led conferences 
throughout Europe and the USA.
47 Wimber, John Power Evangelism, (Hodder, 1985), page 101.
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God wants us well, and does everything he can to ensure it.4*
At first sight this would appear to be an area of difference between the charismatic 
movement, and previous 'enthusiastic' movements. Certainly as far as the New 
England Revival is concerned, there is very little reference to healing. It was not an 
issue, because the main sign that the Spirit was at work in an ill person was not that 
the person was healed, but that he remained faithful through suffering until death.
Formerly there was a longing to die with something of impatience; but lately, since 
that resignation forementioned, about three years ago, an uninterrupted entire 
resignation to God with respect to life or deaüi, sickness or health, ease or pain, 
which has remained unchanged and unshaken, when actually under extreme and 
violent pains, and in times of threatenings or immediate death.4^
This is an important difference in expectation but it does not indicate a discontinuity 
with 'enthusiasm'. Anticipating healing is a particular way of expecting the 
supernatural to be a part of normal life.
(b )  S u p e r n a t u r a l  d e m o n i c  a c t i v i t y
Another aspect of this supernatural immanence, is the emphasis put on the demonic 
by the charismatic movement.
There are two equal and opposite errors into which our race can fall about the devils.
One is to disbelieve in their existence. The other is to believe, and to feel an 
excessive and unhealthy interest in them. They themselves are equally pleased by 
both errors and hail a materialist or a magician with the same delight. 5®
One must suspect that the charismatic movement often falls into the latter of these 
two errors;
For those who are dispdsed to accept the reality of the power of darkness it then 
becomes possible to be drawn into a world which has its own form of credibility and 
consistency which cannot for title most part be verified. The possibilities for 
credulity are enormous. It becomes difficult to disentangle fact from fantasy.5*
48 Carey, George The Practice of Pentecost, (Marshall Pickering, 1987), page 182. This book is 
written from the stand-point of traditional Pentecostalism.
49 Thoughts on the Revival, page 378.
50 C.S. Lewis, The Screwtape letters, (Fount, 1979), page 9.
51 Wright, N. The Fair Face of Evil, (Marshall Pickering, 1989), page 14.
  _
35
This supernatural demonic concept can become an all pervading way of thinking 
which attributes that which is strange, to the direct intervention of God or to Satan. 
There are no neutral areas, but two kingdoms at war with each other; all events have 
a moral and spiritual dimension. It is a variation of a 'God of the Gaps' thought 
pattern which attributes unexplained (and much explicable) phenomena, to the 
supernatural. In this case, however, it is more of a 'Devil of the Gaps' who is 
conjured up as an explanation of areas of experience which are not understood.
The effect of this is that mental states, illness, and all kinds of common events 
in every area of life are considered to be capable of being influenced by the demonic. 
If one is tired, it is 'the spirit of tiredness' which needs to be cast out; a hard going 
service in a church needs 'the spirit of heaviness' casting out; a murderer is 
influenced by the 'Spirit of murder', and so on.52 Anger, sin, and unforgiveness are 
entry points for 'demonization'.53 Both people and every-day inanimate objects can 
be carriers of demons. Superman is a Satanic substitute for Jesus, as are 'Super Ted* 
and 'He Man'. Incredibly, tooth-fairies, Teddy Ruxpin, My Little Pony, and Care 
bears are all children's toys which have been seen by some as being demonic.54
Some groups begin with the assumption that all Christians are 'demonized' by 
many different demons. According to Peter Horrobin these demons enter through the 
eyes,55 through any form of sin,56 through inheritance from parents,57 through 
emotions,58 through the area one lives in,59 or through Church,6® etc. This leaves 
no neutral areas of life which are free from the influence of the supernatural in the 
form of demons. Even if one is unaware of it, this supernatural influence is seen as 
shaping, and infiltrating a person's life.
It would be grossly unfair to attribute these more extreme views to the whole 
charismatic movement, though it is still true that in less extreme form there is a 
widespread emphasis on the demonic. What is common throughout is a way of 
thinking which emphasis a day-to-day supernatural experience, the 'Natural 
Supernatural', to quote John Wimber.®* In this sense, the charismatic movement can 
be described as 'enthusiastic' because it expects the supernatural to be part of 
everyday life.
52 For example, Allan, John Dealing with Darkness, (Edingurgh, 1986). Perry, P.L. Deliverance, 
(Ix)ndon, 1987), page 44-70.
53 Various Authors John Wimber, Friend or Foe, (St. Mathias Press, 1990), page 17.
54 All of these examples are in a tract from 'Upper room tracts', (Great Yarmouth, 1989).
55 Horrobin, Peter Healing Through Deliverance, (Sovereign World international, 1991), page 105.
56 Ibid, page 94.
57 Ibid, page 89.
58 Ibid, page 90.
59 Ibid, page 94.
60 Ibid, page 99.
61 Wimber, J. Signs and Wonders, tape 5 (Vineyard Ministries).
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5. Total transformation of the personality is expected as the norm.
Many notoriously vicious persons have been reformed, and become externally quite 
new creatures. Some that are wealthy, and of fashionable, gay education; some great 
beaus and fine ladies, that seemed to have their minds swallowed up with nothing but 
the vain shows and pleasures of tlie world, have been wonderfully altered, have 
relinquished these vanities, and are become serious, mortified and humble in their 
conversation.
Jonatlian Edwards. ®2
Transformation of the personality has always been a Pentecostal theme, and a central 
claim for the 'Baptism in the Spirit'. There are many paperbacks produced with 
testimonies to increased joy, peace, happiness, assurance, healing and so on. The 
pattern of such books is to tell what happened personally and then attempt an 
explanation in terms of the work of the Spirit. ®3 This stress on alteration of the 
personality is such a central theme of the charismatic movement that it is accused of 
using experience to justify theology, and of being an experience in search of a
theology. ®4
(a) As this emphasis on the transformed personality has developed in the 
charismatic movement, it has manifested itself in unusual ways, and physical 
transformation has also come to be expected as the norm. One should be exercising 
the same ministry as Jesus when it comes to healing, and indeed, doing greater 
works.®5 According to some writers such as Urquhart and Paul Yonggi Cho, healing 
is a 'right' which every Christian can 'claim'.6®
(b) The same thinking is sometimes extended to material well-being, and so in the 
'prosperity' movement, it is seen as God's intention for his children to have the best 
of everything, physical, emotional and material; all these areas are to be transformed. 
This is the norm which God prefers, and departures from this are the result of failure, 
or sin on the part of the individual.®7
62 Thoughts on the Revival, page 374.
63 For example, Bennett, D.& R. Nine O ’clock in the Morning, (Logos, 1974). Urquhart, C 
When The Spirit Comes, (Hodder, 1974). Bearing, Trevor Exit the Devil, (Logos, 1976)
64 An accusation attributed to Packer, J. in: Small, T. Walker, A. and Wright, N. Charismatic 
Renewal, The Search for a Theology, (SPCK, 1993), page 49.
65 John 14:12.
66 For example, Urquhart, Colin AnythingYouAsk,(flQààet,\91^). Cho, Paul Yonggi The 
Creative Ability of Your Words, essay in: Wise, Robert et al The Church Divided, (Bridge 
Publishing inc, 1985), page 108.
67 Many examples of this can be found in Kenneth Copeland's Voice of Victory magazine.
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(c) Another common example of a claim to achieve personality transformation is by 
the 'healing of memories'.®8 it is a good example to consider, as it has the usual 
charismatic assumption that God's will is always to transform people into physically 
and mentally healthy, happy, and psychologically well-adjusted people. If there is no 
physical healing, this is sometimes explained by invoking a supplementary hypothesis 
that the illness is the expression of emotional trauma, and that this must be healed 
first.
When we speak of inner healing, we refer to tlie experience in which the Holy Spirit 
restores health to the deepest area of our lives by dealing with the root cause of our 
hurts and pain. In prayer for physical healing we are often concerned with the 
symptoms of the real need. Deep hurts and fears often manifest themselves 
physically as back aches, headaches, skin rashes, asthma, and other illness'. Wlien 
we pray for healing of physical symptoms, we often see no change because we are 
praying for and expecting God to heal the symptom rather than to make us whole.
We must realise that it is God's will for us to be whole and understand that our 
Father really desires to heal our attitudes. ®9
There is an assumption that God wants all Christians to have a standard level of 
personality and psychological smoothness. Whether this is justified or not is a 
separate issue; at this point what should be noted is that transformation of the 
personality (and the body) is perceived to be the norm.
There are then, differences in emphasis when the charismatic movement is 
compared with other enthusiastic movements, but the differences are superficial. 
The same underlying trait which is to expect transformation of the personality is 
evident. This trait does appear to be moulded by particular cultural influences before 
being absorbed into the charismatic movement. This cultural influence is evident, for 
example, in the widespread use of psychiatric language, aims, and therapeutic 
models. This essential characteristic of enthusiasm is still prevalent, however; 
transformation of the personality is expected as the norm.
68 Stapleton, Ruth Carter The Gift of Inner Healing, (JA.oCi6&r, 1976).
69 Ibid, page 9.
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6. A single minded desire to live a life of 'angelic purity', which tends towards a separation from all worlmy' amhsements.
There is a strange alteration almost all over New England amongst young people...
(they forsook) their frolicking, vain-company keeping, night-walking, their mirth and 
jollity, their impure language, and Lewd songs. In vain did ministers preach against 
those things before, in vain were laws made to restrain them, and in vain was all the 
vigilance of magistrates and civil officers; but now they have almost every where 
dropt them as it were of themselves. And there is a great alteration amongst old and 
young as to drinking, tavern-haunting, profane speaking and extravagance in apparel.
Jonathan Edwards.7®
After being deeply convinced of inbred sin, particularly of pride, anger, 
self-will and unbelief, in a moment they feel all faith and love, no pride, no self-will, 
no anger; and from that moment they have continual fellowship with God.
John Wesley.2*
Most enthusiastic movements are typified by a stress on holiness, particularly the 
revivals surrounding Wesley, Whitfield and Edwards. Whether this holiness is 
achieved or not, is a separate issue, but a stress on and desire for holiness has often 
gone along with enthusiasm from the seventeenth century, through the 'Keswick' 
experience and into the present day.
As one would expect, this was also part of the Pentecostal claim for the nature 
of baptism in the Spirit.
With the Baptism of the Spirit come such experiences as an overflowing fullness of 
the Spirit (John:37-39; Acts 4:8), a deeper reverence for God (Acts 2:42; Hebrews 
12:28), and intensified consecration to God and dedication to his work (Acts 2:42), 
and a more active love for Christ, for his word, and for the lost (Mark 16:20). 72
This doctrine implies that holiness is the sudden result of a second experience;
A crucial theme of holiness teaching is that tliere is available to believers, for them to 
possess immediately, a spiritual condition which is distinct from secular existence 
and markedly like the ideal life portrayed in the New T e s t a m e n t .  ^ 3
Charismatic churches have not been noted for holiness which is expressed in a 
concern for practical social issues, such as third world poverty, or altering injustice in 
western society. Charismatic holiness tends to be of a more introverted form. It is a 
spirituality which turns its back on the world, an attitude which is the consequence of
70 Thoughts on the Revival, page 374.
71 Wesley, Journals, 29/11/61.
72 Assemblies of God, Statement of Fundamental Truth, (Date and publisher not availible).
73 Angel, Gervais Delusion or Dynamitel (MARC, 1989), page 21-22.
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a theology which sees the world as the kingdom of Satan. This world is what one is 
being saved from, one’s neighbours are enemies of the kingdom, and Christians are 
soldiers who fight those who are not for the Gospel. It is a holiness which will 
consequently consist, of purity in thought, of avoiding 'demonic influences' and 
steeping oneself in Christian literature and music; of the passive virtues of not doing 
or thinking the wrong things, and of feeling the right things. It is an introverted and 
subjective concept of being holy.
Though there do not seem to be any particular examples of groups which 
would claim 'impeccability', the stress on holiness is another 'enthusiastic' trait 
which, though of an introverted pattern, does still form a part of the charismatic 
movement and marks it out as being enthusiastic.
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7. A restoration of religion as an affair of the heart, as opposed to the outward form of traditional religion.
I was to bring them off from all the worlds fellowships, and prayings, and singings, 
which stood in forms without power; that their fellowship might be in the Holy 
Ghost and in the Eternal Spirit of God; that they might pray in the Holy Ghost and 
sing in the Spirit and with the grace that comes by Jesus.
George Fox. 74
It may well be the case that religion does deteriorate into outward formalism; 
certainly it was a recurring theme of the Old Testament Prophets. However, the 
purpose at this stage is not to assess the acceptability of such spirituality, but to 
observe that an attempt to restore the religion of the heart is another trait which links 
the charismatic movement with 'enthusiasm'.
One of the central foci of the charismatic movement is on the affairs 'of the 
heart', beginning with 'Baptism in the Spirit'. It is a movement in reaction to, (what 
is considered to be), the dead external formalism of mainline denominations, and so 
its thinking and worship became dominated by internal conviction. Just as the 
Brethren began in reaction against Anglican doctrine and liturgy, so the charismatic 
movement reacted against externals, such as buildings, or written liturgy, and these 
became comparatively irrelevant; what matters is how one feels about God.
This emphasis on the 'religion of the heart' is expressed in charismatic 
worship. What distinguishes these choruses from traditional hymns is an emphasis on 
feeling rather than theological content; when compared to hymns, they are intensely 
subjective. They are written to express a felt love for a personal God who has 
dramatically changed the worshippers. There is therefore an intimacy reflected in the 
music.
'I love you lord and I lift my voice, '
'Father God I wonder how I managed to exist without the knowledge of your 
parenthood and your loving care. '
'Father we love you,'75
Simply to look down the contents of a charismatic chorus book reveals that the 
largest section of songs will begin with T ,  or 'we'; they are characteristically 
intimate, personal, emotional, and subjective.
Charismatic renewal has a focus on the worship of the heart, and this creates 
an emotional intensity in worship. It is this, rather than particular musical styles, that 
makes its style of worship distinctive. It is another link between enthusiasm and the 
current charismatic movement.
74 Cited in: Hodgkin, Thomas George Fox, (Methuen, 1906), page 35.
75 Songs of Fellowship, (Kings way, 1985)
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8. The impatience of Enthusiastic Grace.
'And if your faith be true, it will give you victory over sin and the devil, purify your 
hearts and consciences (for the true faith is held in true conscience), and bring you to 
please God, and give you access to him again. ' But they could not endure to hear of 
purity, and of victory over sin and the devil; for they said they could not believe that 
any could be free from sin on this side of the grave.
George Fox.7®
The immanence of grace is one of the fundamental traits of an enthusiastic 
movement. Much is expected in this world, in terms of transformation of the 
personality; sense of well-being; material, social, mental and emotional prosperity. 
God is 'restoring the kingdom' on earth.
There are many examples of this impatience. The following quote is from an 
article entitled 'The right to choose', and tells the story of a couple who's son was 
seriously injured in a shooting incident. After casting out the 'Spirit of Death':
"The lord told me to lay hands on him and pray. I put my hands on his 
chest, and Linda put her hands on his head. The attendant squeezing the breatliing 
bag looked at me, and I could read her expression-"Don"t you realize he's dead?
There's nothing you can do ....’
"I didn't pray loudly or boldly. My voice was shaky. I said "Father, in the 
name of Jesus, we claim total healing for our son. We will not accept anything less, 
not because of who we are, but because of what your word says. We are standing on 
your word. "
"Then I talked to Satan. I took authority over him in the name of Jesus, and 
I called his assignment on my son null and void. "77
What should be noted are the assumptions that perfect healing is a right which can be 
demanded, and that it can be expected immediately. The thrust of the article is that 
the Christian has the right to this at all times. All facets of Gods Grace are for now, 
and one need wait for nothing.
Another example of impatient grace is an interpretation of the section of the 
'The Lords Prayer' which says 'thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven'. On the 
basis of this it is argued that all of that which occurs in heaven is therefore the will of 
God on earth.78 As there are no tears, crying, pain or illness in heaven, it must be 
God's will that none of these things should occur now on earth. Therefore we should 
expect everything that is true of heaven to be true of life on earth. Clearly there are 
glaring problems with this view, not the least being the reality of death. However, at 
present we are simply observing traits, and this is one example of 'impatient grace' 
which links the charismatic movement to enthusiasm.
76 Hodgkin, Thomas George Fox, (Methuen, 1906), page 36
77 Voice of Victory magazine, volume 16, number 6, page 10.
78 Mth 6:10.
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9. A set of gifts which allow a direct insight into God's will, with an accompanying degrading of hnman reason.
These things I did not see by the help of man, nor by the letter, though they are 
written in the letter, but I saw them in the light of the Lord Jesus Christ, and by his 
immediate Spirit and power, as did the holy men of God by whom the Holy 
Scriptures were written.
George Fox.79
Reason is lost upon them, they are above it; they see the light infused into their 
understandings, and cannot be mistaken.
John Locke.*®
There are two issues contained in this heading. One is the reliance on direct 
revelation, and the other is the degradation of reason. However they are so closely 
linked together in an enthusiastic movement, that it is more convenient to discuss 
these two traits in conjunction.
The degradation of reason will be examined in detail in the next chapter 
because of its crucial importance to understanding charismatic experience. What 
should be noted here is that this is a distinct trait which typifies the whole spectrum 
of the charismatic movement, to varying extremes.
One example of this is in Wimber's approach to healing which depends on 
being able to hear directly what God wants to do in any particular situation.
The only way, then, that one can believe God will heal in a given situation is to be 
told by God that this time he will heal; that is to his glory. We must depend on 
words of knowledge to provide us with the faith that God will heal.**
This dependence on immediate revelation is directly linked to a departure from 
reason, because one would be foolish not to submit limited human reason to, (what 
are perceived to be,) instructions given by God. Though such a claim to knowledge 
constitutes a circular and unverifiable argument, it does have its own internal logic, 
and this is why these two elements are always linked. Consequently the following 
statement from the same Wimber conference in Sydney, Australia, is predictable.
'God wants to woo us ffom our minds to our Spirits', you must, 'Watch out for 
evaluating what is going on with your mind*.*2
79 George Fox, page 35.
80 Ibid, page 430.
81 Wimber Friend or Foe, page 14.
82 Ibid, page 21.
43 ■ ''H"'
The preference for direct revelation at the expense of reason is another enthusiastic 
trait which is evident in the charismatic movement. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to 
say that this is the fundamental trait of enthusiasm, and becomes the primary basis of 
its distinctive message. As we shall see it is the key to understanding the whole 
development of enthusiasm. *3
The following passage from Healing through deliverance is a good illustration 
of the p r o c e s s . *4 I t  concerns a discussion on whether a Christian can have demons or 
not.
Xu the middle of the debate this lady got up, came to the front, took over the 
microphone and ended the discussion with one of the most profoundly brief 
statements on the subject I have ever heard. 'Now listen' she said 'I’m your church 
secretary. I've been born again five years, and I didn't think I had a demon, but I 
did. And now I don't, so there!'. With that she returned to her seat and saved the 
whole meeting hours of fruitless theological discussion! Christians certainly can, and 
do, have demons.*®
The demonic raises many questions, but the point to note here is the basis on which 
the issue of whether Christians can have demons is resolved. Reasoned reflection is 
considered to be 'fruitless theological discussion', and the justification of the 
theology is existential.
If our theology is inconsistent with the reliable experience of committed Christians 
who are ministering under the Lordship of Jesus Christ, and whose work is not in 
conflict with scripture, then we must re-assess the understanding we thought we had 
in such matters!*®
Horrobin (consistent with this basis), goes to extremes, and develops a complex 
doctrine of demons and their work, beginning with the Bible, but going well beyond 
this, based on the authority of what he claims are conversations with demons during 
exorcism.
These particular views of demonology are by no means held throughout the 
whole charismatic movement. Even so Horrobin still gives particular expression to a 
general tendency, which is to give definitive authority to experience of 'revelation' in 
preference to reason, and that is quite fundamental to all areas of enthusiasm and the 
charismatic movement.
I
83 This suggestion is argued in more detail in Chapter II.
84 The ideas expressed in this book are written by an ex-university lecturer. He runs two conference 
centres, and his views are also equated with an American called Bill Surbrizki, who speaks at large 
international conferences. They are influential views within the Charismatic movement.
85 Horrobin, Peter Healing through Deliverance, (Sovereign World, 1991), page 87.
86 Ibid, page 82.
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10. The Enthusiast has a New Status and Authority.
Sometimes it (enthusiasm) appears in their imaginary peculiar intimacy with heaven.
They are, in their own opinion, the special favourites of God.
Charles Chauncey.*7
A sense of status and authority is expressed in the charismatic movement; the 
charismatic Christian can consider himself not only a member of the chosen race and 
the kingdom of God, but that he is also on a different spiritual plane than traditional 
Christians.
There has been a gradual change in the style of worship as a result of this 
concept of status. Songs from within the movement express an exalted position. 
There is an emphasis on sonship, 'Royal sons of a royal king', 'You are a royal 
priesthood, a holy nation’, and so on. ** The pattern of worship has developed 
into a form where one stands to sing and pray, and this is seen as an expression of 
authority. The believer has the right to stand in the presence of the King. One ought 
not to 'grovel and beg' in prayer, but to claim with the authority to which one has a 
right.
Don't just beg for what you need, give the word.*^
This trait is a particular feature of Wimber's style, one should stand to pray, use 
authority, expect God to act then and there. 'When are you going to use your 
authority?' was claimed to be God's message to Wimber.9® This theological shift has 
expressed itself in a curious change in hand movement in worship over the last ten 
years. Hands used to be raised with palms upwards in charismatic worship as a 
symbol of receiving from God. However, although they are still raised, increasingly 
they have turned round to face people, because the believer has come to see himself 
as a person who exercises authority and power. He stands before God, and channels 
spiritual power. As in all enthusiastic movements, the believer comes to see himself 
as having a unique status and authority.
One reason for this sense of status and authority is rooted in the way that the 
relationship between Jesus and the Spirit has come to be understood. The power 
which was exercised by power is seen as a gift of the Spirit. Because all Christians 
have also received the same Spirit, then they also are able to be like Jesus, not only
87 Caveat Against Enthusiasm, page 4.
88 Songs of Fellowship, (Kingsway, 1985)
89 The healing Epidemic, page 33.
90 Ibid, page 43.
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in character, but in ability; they are to exercise the same authority that Jesus had 
over demons and illness, in fact going on to do even greater works. Indeed, this 
doctrine has been emphasised to such an extent, that some charismatic theology has 
been criticised for devaluing the ontological uniqueness of Jesus, on the grounds that 
he can come to be seen merely as the prototype charismatic. Wimber has been 
criticised for this, because his view is that Jesus was only able to do miraculous 
works after the descent of the Spirit and that he was in some ways as dependent on 
the Spirit as are his followers.®* This verges on an adoptionist christology. Even 
Tom Smail, who is a writer with more theological credibility than Wimber, falls into 
this trap:
He is the receiver of the Spirit, üie original prototype to whom the Father has given 
the Spirit without measure (Jn 3:34), He is the original and we are the copy.®^
According to Muhlen, Jesus is the 'Original charismatic', and consequently his 
followers should seek to be as filled with the Spirit as he was, because then they will 
do the works he did.
One difficulty with this line of thought is that it devalues the understanding of 
the divinity of Jesus.®3 The point to note is that it can also have the converse effect 
on the human side, in that it creates an increased sense of authority and status in the 
believer, because the believer comes to be, in particular areas, a coequal with Jesus.
The charismatic movement shares the enthusiastic trait of procuring a new 
sense of status and authority for the believer.
91 Wimber Friend or Foe, page 51. This criticism is unfair at this point, as Wimber is careful to see 
this not as an ontological identity, but as a functional one. Jesus acts in obedience to the Father in the 
power of the Spirit, and so does die believer. To say that he was dependent on the Spirit in the essence 
of his divinity devalues his ontological uniqueness, to say that he was dependent on the Spirit in the 
performance of miraculous works does not.
92 Tom Smail is aware of this danger, and says that such christologies have never 'been able to 
establish his uniqueness in the way the New Testament requires, or to maintain anything but a 
quantitative distinction between him and us'.
93 J.D. Dunn states that the Spirit empowered and possessed Jesus to a unique and powerful degree, 
and that what 'we call the deity of Christ, was no more andho less that the Spirit of God in him'.
This leads him to the point of denying any ontological identity with the Father, and so he states that 
'his 'divinity' means his relation with the father as son, and the Spirit of God in him. ' From
a basis like this, whatever claims may be made for the uniqueness of Jesus, he will remain different in 
degree only, and lose any ontological uniqueness. The roll of the baptism of Jesus in such 
theologies is significant, and at times they are verging on an adoptionist christology.
.. J:.
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11. Always the enthusiast hankers after a theocracy.
Forward, forward, strike while the fire is hot! Don't let your sword become cold or 
blunt! Smite, cling, clang on Nimrod's anvil; cast their towers to the ground! as long 
as they remain alive you can never rid yourselves of the fear of men. No one can 
speak to you of God as long as they reign over you. Forward, forward, while is still 
day; God is leading you, follow, follow.
Thomas Muntzer.®^
The desire for theocracy has recently emerged in the radical house church movement.
In the Restoration Churches claims are made not only to belong to the Lord's army, 
but also to be subjects of the King in a theocratic state. Theocracy is not unique in 
Protestant history, but it is rare in the modem world.®®
This desire is evidenced in the 'theocracy of apostles',®® and also in the degree of 
ordering and control which is exercised over the lives of believers, to the extent of 
determining the jobs, upbringing of children, and even decoration of the houses of 
the members.®7 There have also been moves towards establishing schools for the 
children of the church.
The elders of the House Church movement have had extensive control over 
the lives of the members of their groups, (although this has been curtailed over the 
last few years). In principle, though, it is not the elders who rule. They are 
considered to have been put into authority by God, and therefore represent divine 
authority. It is an idea that was given increasing prominence in the house church 
movement in the late seventies.
At least in some parts, then, the charismatic movement hankers after a 
theocracy.
94 Stayger and Packull (Ed.) The Anabaptists and Thomas Muntzer (Kendal/Hunt, 1980), page 124.
95 Restoring the Kingdom, page 128.
96 Ibid, page 128.
97 Cf. Restoration Magazine, (July/August, 1986).
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12. A group will sometimes retreat into the wilderness to set up its ownsociety and sub culture.
Until recently few charismatic groups had literally gone off to the wilderness to be a 
separate society. It is however becoming evident, for example in the developing 
'Celtic' brand of spirituality, which brings with it a desire for the monastic.®*
Even without a physical separation from the world, however, a detachment 
from society can be achieved quite effectively without a geographical move. The 
members develop their own culture which underlines their distinctive beliefs. This 
involves a distinctive use of language; and words such as 'teachings' or 'giftings', 
'Times of sharing'; or use of the 'charismatic subjunctive', 'would have you to 
know', 'would say to you', and so on; all reveal a distinct charismatic church 
culture.
The more radical a person's charismatic faith is, the more their lives will be 
entirely focused on charismatic Christian music, books, events, language, 
conversation, and people. One could have holidays at Christian holiday camps and 
conferences, read charismatic novels, have charismatic decorations in the house, and 
charismatic car stickers on the back of the car. The desire for life beyond this can 
vanish before a tide of single-minded enthusiasm, and one would be hard pushed to 
find much literature from outside the church group in the homes of the more extreme 
members of a charismatic church.
This trait is also evident in the theological and historical awareness of many
groups.
They not only reject the scholarship of modernist theologians, but they are not, on 
the whole versed in issues of hermeneutics, historical criticism, or demythologising 
tenets.®®
The overall effect of this is to create as effective an isolating 'wilderness', in a 
cultural sense, as would be achieved by a move to some remote part of the 
country.*®®
It is fair to conclude that the enthusiastic trait described as 'a separation from 
general culture' is present in the charismatic movement.
98 For example, the 'Nether Springs' community at Hetton Hall, Alnwick, in Northumberland.
99 Ibid, page 130.
100 It ought to be pointed out that there is one sense in which tlie movement is not detached from 
general society, and that is in its relationship with the Spirit of the age. This does not imply structural 
links with 'New Age' elements, or to tlie 'alternative therapy’ scene, indeed these movements are 
generally seen as the work of Satan; (eg. What is the New Agel, (Hodder, 1990), page 196). It does, 
however, seem to fit in with the same trends which have led to these movements popularity. Indeed, it 
fits into some fashionable trends of society with uncomfortable ease, in the areas of alternative therapy, 
reaction against rationalism, and revival of mysticism. This is a stark contrast to the eighteenth 
century revivals, which were extreme in their 'enthusiasm' in the middle of the age of reason.
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13. A conviction that the second coming is shortly to be expected.
When the Turk comes, the people will flee into the forests and hide themselves. But 
those who have bound themselves to Christ through die sign [of Baptism] shall flee 
into the wilderness, and into Hungary. Then, if this judgement takes place, those 
who have accepted the covenant will root out all those who survive the Turks. Soon 
after Christ will come and the last day. It is twenty-two months before the last day 
comes.
Hans Huber, 1521}^^
Whatever you may think of yourself, you have certainly a heated imagination. 'Tis 
too evident to be denied that you too often take the motions of your own mind, for 
divine communications. A fragrant instance of this, you gave your hearers not long 
since, when you told them, it was impressed upon your mind, that the day of 
judgement was at the door, and you were as sure of it as of some things you flien saw 
with your eyes. A thousand enthusiasts have deluded themselves and otiiers with the 
same impression, looking upon it as a revelation from God;
Charles Chauncey.^®^
This conviction that the second coming was shortly to be expected was a trait of the 
New England revival, and Edwards expected the start of a 'latter day glory' which 
Edwards argued would be centred in America. The roots of this idea are in an 
interpretation of the Bible which anticipates that the second coming of Jesus will be 
preceded by a huge outpouring of the Spirit. Edwards (rather unwisely!), pinned this 
outpouring down as occurring in America, partly on the questionable grounds of 
Isaiah 60:9; 'Surely the Isles shall wait for me, and the ships of Tarshish first, to 
bring my sons from far. '
It is exceeding manifest that this chapter is a prophecy of the prosperity of the 
Church ill its most glorious state on earth, in the latter days.
Tliis prophecy therefore seems plainly to point out America, as die first fruits of that 
glorious day.
101 Klaassen, Walter Anabaptism in Outline, Selected Primary Sources, (Herald Press, 1981), page 
321.
102 Chauncey, in a letter to Mr. James Davenport.
pastor of the church at Southold at Long Island, now Boston, July 17th, 1742. Stored on microfilm at 
the British Library.
103 Thoughts on the Revival, page 381.
104 Jbid, page 381.
105 Ibid, page 382.
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Some variation on this eschatological theme is the usual accompaniment of 
'enthusiasm'. It has recently occurred among the 'Kansas City Prophets', who 
became associated with John Wimber, and have led large conferences in England. 
They expected an 'end time Revival' to begin in England in October 1990, and came 
over from America to be a part of it. They have been described as 'The Omega 
Generation', as a result of considering themselves as the beginning of the last 
generation before the second coming,
As we have seen, an imminent expectation of the second coming is also an 
element of the Restoration movement. It is essentially pre-millenial in character, and 
sees itself as the 'Latter day rain' of the Spirit.
The essential tlirust of their adventism, however, is the establishment of a mighty 
kingdom of God prior to the return of Christ.
Perhaps there is a psychological impetus at work here, and it is the sense of an 
immanent experience of God within the movement, which makes the parousia seem 
to be such an imminent event. The parousia is simply more believable within the 
fervour and 'day to day supernatural' of an enthusiastic movement unhindered by the 
cynicism which can come from a wider knowledge of church history.
This expectation can also function as a motivating force within enthusiasm. 
This is evident within the Restoration movement. Rather than the second coming 
being a dogmatic line to which everyone must hold:
Its significance lies in the vision of Church life and kingdom order that the 
eschatology inspires. The eschatological vision has not been added to Restorationism 
after it became established: it preceded the movement and provided the motivating 
force for the establishment of the Restoration kingdom(s).^^®
This eschatological expectation links the current charismatic movement to enthusiastic 
movements.
106 See for example: Equipping magazine, (Vol. 4, no. 1/ winter 1990), page 19. Also 'Introducing 
Prophetic Ministry', (Special UK Edition, Fall 1990), page 4. This magazine is published by 
Vineyard Ministries International, which is the organisation associated with John Wimber.
107 Restoring the Kingdom, page 137.
108 Ibid, page 138.
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14, The movement is accompanied by a host of abnormal phenomena.
I had an opportunity to talk with him (Whitfield) of those signs which have so often 
accompanied the inward work of God. I found his objections were chiefly grounded 
on gross misrepresentations of matter of fact. But the next day he had an opportunity 
of informing himself better: for no sooner had he begun (in the application of his 
sermon) to incite all sinners to believe in Christ, than four persons sank down close 
to him, almost at the same moment. One of them lay without either sense or motion.
A second trembled exceedingly. The third had strong convulsions all over his body, 
but made no noise unless by groans. The fourth equally convulsed, called upon God 
with strong cries and tears. From this time, I trust, we shall all suffer God to carry 
on His own work in the way that pleaseth Him.
John Wesley.
There are many descriptions of such abnormal phenomena from various parts of the 
current charismatic movement. For example, Dr Philip Seldon described a scene in 
1990.
The manifestations of the Spirit seemed to be less in evidence than tlie reports of 
previous conferences, but fliere were those who fell over, cried, screamed, laughed, 
appeared hysterical etc.^ ^®
Another example comes from Dr. Peter Masters, who is opposed to the charismatic 
movement.
If he (the devil) can reduce a congregation of born-again people to superficial 
emotionalism, mystical mutterings, trembling and weeping, experiencing of physical 
sensations, clapping and dancing and banal repetitive singing, then he will rob God 
of worship and render the church offensive to Him. ^  1
Dr. David Lewis wrote an extensive report on a Wimber conference held at 
Harrogate on 3-6th November 1986. This report was published in the form of a 
book, Healing: Fiction, Fantasy or FactA' '^  ^ One chapter in this report is on 'Physical 
and Spiritual Phenomena'. A questionnaire which Dr. Lewis distributed asked the 
respondents to indicate which of the following phenomena they had experienced. 
1,890 were returned.
a) Tingling in your hands
b) Hand or arm shaking
c) Stiffening of your body
d) Weeping
109 Wesley Diary, 7/7/39.
110 Wimber Friend or Foe, page 34.
111 Ibid, page 17,
112 Lewis, Dr. David Healing: Fiction, Fantasy or Fact, (Hodder, 1989). Also cited in 
Introduction, footnote 6.
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e) Laughing
f) Fluttering of your eyelids
g) Falling over
h) Screaming or shouting
i) Hot areas on your body
j) Changes in your breathing 
k) Behaviour resembling 'druukeimess' 
1) Other (please specify)^^^
The 'Other' category included electricity over the head, electricity in legs, a force 
field running up and down the body, and aura of tremendous power, waves of cold, 
sensations of weight in parts of the body, head being pushed back, out of the body 
experiences, visions of angels, experiences that seem demonic, stigmata, and about 
eighty other phenomena.
The most recent outbreak of these phenomena is described as the 'Toronto 
Blessing' which has spread from the 'Airport Church' in Toronto, through some 
London churches and to different parts of the UK. These events have been reported 
in the national press on frequent occasions. At Digby Stuart Roman Catholic 
College, for example:
People were bouncing, convulsing, trembling, laughing, crying and falling over.U^
The same events as have occurred in enthusiastic movements are still occurring, and 
still inspiring the same violent reactions as they have done throughout the 
generations. They will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, and as we 
progress, we will attempt to find ways of assessing these phenomena. What should 
be noted here is that they are a part of the current charismatic movement, as they 
have been of all other enthusiastic movements before.
113 page 169.
114 Ibid, page 185.
115 Baptist Times, (1st Sept, 1994), page 2.
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Conclusion
It is acceptable to conclude that some parts of the charismatic movement can be 
described as 'enthusiastic'. It is important to make this point, as many evangelical 
writers have such a romantic vision of the perfection and power of past 'revivals', 
particularly those in the eighteenth century, that they would not equate 'enthusiasm' 
or present day charismatic experience with them. Granted, they are different in 
degree, and in the extent of their influence, and yet there are notable similarities. 
They develop in the same way, they are all composed of the same essential elements, 
inspiring the same opposition from the main-stream church. There are particular 
cultural influences which change the apparent shape of the current movement; 
however the charismatic movement can still be understood properly as a 
manifestation of 'enthusiasm' in the way that the revivals were understood by their 
critics.
We have done enough to show that the comparison between the charismatic 
movement and enthusiasm is not just a superficial resemblance. The differences 
between them are superficial, while the similarities are in the form of basic traits. 
'Resemblance' would be to weak a word to use because what we have is 'identity'.
This in itself opens up exciting possibilities, as it is possible to use the wide 
body of literature written on enthusiasm as a means of aiding understanding of the 
current charismatic movement. It is possible to discover, for example, what John 
Locke's view on the charismatic movement would be. This makes it unfortunate that 
the chapter 'On Enthusiasm' in Locke's Essay is omitted from some abridged modern 
versions, because this implies that enthusiasm is an irrelevant anachronism which 
does not enter into discussion in modern t i m e s . I n  a church context, 'enthusiasm' 
is as relevant today as it was in 1690.
We will be able to define and understand the movement more sharply through 
the next chapter as we explore the difficulties raised as we attempt to determine how 
this kind of experience could be assessed.
116 For example, the Everyman edition of The Essay.
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Chapter II
Difficulties of Assessing Charismatic Experience,
Introduction
Having established that the charismatic movement is in continuity with enthusiastic 
movements we can move on to consider some of the difficulties which need to be 
overcome if this bundle of traits called 'charismatic' or 'enthusiastic' experience is to 
be assessed. These difficulties will also clarify our understanding of the nature of 
charismatic experience. The first two difficulties under discussion are more general 
problems which are created more by personalities than by theological or 
epistemological issues. They are useful to explore because they reinforce the 
similarities between the charismatic movement, revival experience and enthusiasm 
and also because these factors have an important impact on the kind of criticisms 
that are made of charismatic experience. The last three difficulties reach the heart of 
the epistemic issue which needs resolution: if a person claims that he has had an 
experience of God, how can one tell if he really has or has not?
Iti
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1. It is difficult to assess charismatic experieuce in a fair way because enthusiasm is always accompanied by fierce opposition, and consequently suffers unfair and distorted criticism.
Opposition has accompanied every enthusiastic movement since the beginning of 
Church history. The opposition comes from two directions:
Almost always the opposition is twofold; good Christian people who do not relish 
an eccentric spirituality find themselves in unwelcome alliance with worldlings who 
do not relish any spirituality at all.^
Such opposition occurred as far back as the Montanist movement, indeed, virtually 
all that is known about the Montanists was written by those who denounced them as 
heretics. 2
The New England Revival also inspired hostility from its opponents. 
Chauncey argued in Seasonable Thoughts on the State o f Religion in New England, 
that the revival could not be a work of Grace, because there was no evidence of love 
in those who were involved.^ Rather, Chauncey considered there to be ungracious 
fighting between factions, and condescension towards those outside, or:
that spirit of rash, censorious and uncharitable Judging, which has been so prevalent 
in the land.^
Chauncey cites many examples of this 'uncharitable' attitude in a section of quotes 
from what such and such ministers said in sermons, or what one person heard 
another say. There is clear evidence of friction between those involved in the 
revival and those who were outside. For example.
eg. Mr J.D—t fay,
(on Monday last)
That most of the clergy of the town of Boston were unconverted, and that if tibiere 
were a bowl of poison which would destroy their bodies, he would advise any of his 
dearest Friends to drink it, as soon as go and hear them, or either of them.^
Such an attitude is hardly conducive to fair and constructive assessment. This 
mutual antagonism is one of the more destructive elements which links the current 
charismatic movement with other enthusiastic movements through history.
1 Knox, R.A. Enthusiasm, (Oxford, 1950), page 1.
2 Cf. Stevenson, J. A New Eusebius, (SPCK, 1977), page 114ff.
3 Chauncey, Charles Seasonable Thoughts on the State of Religion in New England, (Boston, 
Rogers and Fowle, 1743).
4 Ibid, page 140.
5 Ibid, page 166.
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For example, in our own century, tongues have been described as 'Satanic 
gibberish', and Pentecostal Church services as 'the climax of demon worship'. 
G.Campbell Morgan described the Pentecostals as 'the last vomit of Satan' and R.A. 
Torrey accused them of being 'founded by a Sodomite'.^
A contemporary example of this kind of vitriol, can be found in the work of 
Peter Masters. The tone and content of his writing is uncannily similar to that of 
Chaunceys.
Many in the charismatic fraternity have gone over to ideas and practices which come 
straight from pagan religions, and large numbers of young and impressionable 
believers have been spiritually corrupted in the process. Leading healers have arisen 
who unite the subtle tricks of the theatrical hypnotist with ancient occult techniques 
in their quest for results, and multitudes follow them.^
This is one of the greatest triumphs of Satan, our malicious enemy, whose aim is to 
bring into ridicule the Gospel of Christ. Satan is behind charismatic extremists ®
Masters continues throughout his book criticising every aspect of the charismatic 
movement, and includes personal attacks on people such as John Wimber.
His conversion (described on a Signs and Wonders cassette tape) does not sound like 
the experience of a person under conviction, whose heart opens to an awareness of 
personal sinfulness, and then to glorious Gospel light. He tells of how he became a 
Christian while bawling hysterically in response to his wife's conversion. ®
There is some acceptable criticism in Masters book, but the problem is that it is 
written with such venom that whether it contains acceptable criticism or not, it is 
inconducive to reasonable and persuasive assessment. If a person feels the same 
antagonism as Masters, then they will be confirmed in this view, not by a balanced 
appraisal, but by generalisations and parody. If a person disagrees, then the 
ungracious tone is more likely to create a reaction against the criticisms contained in 
the book, the good along with the bad. All that is achieved is further polarisation.
If we are to assess charismatic experience, then, we need theological tools 
more delicate than the sledge-hammer. We also need to understand and overcome 
this mutual antagonism which invariably accompanies the various movements of 
'enthusiasm', as it is a significant hindrance to a fair assessment.
6 Cited in, White, J. When the Spirit Comes With Power, (Hodder), page 40-41.
7 Masters, P. The Healing Epidemic, (Wakeman, 1988).
8 Ibid, page 13.
9 7&W, page 41.
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What are the reasons for the development of this suspicion and hostility? It is 
useful to take time to consider this question, as the answers to it shed light on the 
nature and context of enthusiastic movements.
(a) T h e  con c ept  o f  tw o  tier  C hr istia n ity  w hich  is c h a r ac ter istic  of
ENTHUSIASM IS INHERENTLY THREATENING.
The focus of enthusiasm is on experience, and this creates a sense of separation 
between those who have the experience, and those who have not. The words to 
describe this experience may change; in the New England revival it was 
'Awakening', for Wesley's followers it was 'Sanctification', and for the 
Pentecostals, it is 'Baptism in the Spirit'; but the two tier concept of Christianity 
remains constant. This creates tension.
This division between Christians is one of the awkward implications of the 
classical Pentecostal doctrine of 'Baptism in the Spirit' which has led 'Neo- 
Pentecostal' writers to develop doctrines which blur this distinction into a less 
blatantly two-stage form.^®
Jonathan Edwards fought against the same difficulty in New England, and 
wrote a classic section on the danger of spiritual pride, as this was seen as one of the 
great dangers of the R e v i v a l . H o w e v e r ,  one must suspect that it was an 
impossible fight for him, or for anyone else, to win. Even if a person is well 
motivated and managing to avoid spiritual pride, there is an inherent division 
between Christians in the notion of distinct charismatic experience. This separation 
is evident in Edward's description of the New England Revival's effect.
A sense of the black ingratitude of true saints, as to coldness and deadness in 
religion, and their setting their hearts on the things of this world, has overcome the 
bodily frame. There was an experience of great longing that all the children of God 
might be lively in religion, fervent in their love, and active in the service of God; 
and, when there have been appearances of it in others, rejoicing so in beholding the 
pleasant sight, that the joy of soul has been too great for the body.
Edwards describes a person who has been catapulted into a whole new dimension of 
spirituality. However, there is an implicit criticism which is that: 'unless you have 
experienced the same as me, your faith is not 'lively' or 'fervent' enough'.
It may be true that the church does need reviving, but the point here is that, 
irrespective of the intrinsic value of the experience, this is a situation which can
10 Such as Small, T. E jec ted  Glory, Green, Michael I Believe in the Holy Spirit.
11 Edwards, Jonathan Thoughts on the Revival, (Banner of Truth, 1990), page 399ff.
12 Ibid, page 377.
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bring the worst out of people. A two tier spirituality can create pride on the inside 
of the movement, and induce a threatened adverse reaction from those who are 
outside. There are people who are 'in' , and people who are 'out', but ought to be 
'in'. This is inevitably threatening, and threatened reactions do not lend themselves 
to unbiased assessment.
(b )  M u t u a l  a n t a g o n i s m  i s  c a u s e d  b e c a u s e  ' e n t h u s i a s t i c * m o v e m e n t s  a r e  i n
R E A C T IO N  TO  IN ST IT U T IO N A L  R E L IG IO N .
This reaction against the institutional is one of the constant distinguishing features of 
enthusiastic movements.
...it seems to me that the enthusiast will always react against any form of 
institutional religion, whether it be Catholic or Protestant, and there is no 
Christianity with a hundred years of history that does not come, to more or less a 
degree, institutional.^^
The Montanists reacted in this way, disillusioned with the institutionalised nature of 
the C h u r c h .  4^ xhe same was true of the Vaudois, who broke away from the Catholic 
Church, as well as people such as the Methodists who (reluctantly) broke away 
from the Church of E n g l a n d ,  I n  current times, the house church movement has 
broken away from denominational structures which it sees as being 'old wineskins', 
or else constituted of people who have chosen rather to 'remain in the wilderness' 
than to enter 'the promised land'. God is 'moving on', and it is up to those who are 
'walking in the Spirit' to follow, or else be left behind. There is a 'restoration' of 
the true Church occurring.
Such thinking contains overt and implicit criticism, and creates a situation 
which is bound to provoke antagonism. On the 'enthusiastic' side, there is a 
conviction of having discovered the way that a true church should be, as opposed to 
the old structures which have putatively grieved the Spirit. One is thankful to have 
escaped the denominations, and feels pity, or else smug superiority towards those 
who remain. On the institutional side, people tend to feel threatened by the new 
movement with its new leaders and irritated by the attitudes they perceive in the 
adherents, (real or imagined). The reaction frequently is to take delight in the 
downfalls, and to find as much fault as possible with the new movement.
Edwards described this same tendency in 1735. People were:
13 Knox, Enthusiasm, page 590.
14 A New Eusebius, page 114ff.
15 Knox, Enthusiasm, page
16 Walker, W. A History of the Christian Church, (T & T Clark, 1918), page 517ff.
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abundant in insisting on and setting forth the blemishes of the work; so as to 
manifest that we rather choose and are more forward to take notice of what is amiss, 
than what is good and glorious in the work. Not but that the errors committed 
ought to be observed and lamented, and a proper testimony borne against them, and 
the most probable means should be used to have them amended; but insisting much 
upon them, as though it were a pleasing theme, or speaking o f them with more 
appearance of heat of spirit, or with ridicule, or an air of contempt, than grief for 
them, has no tendency to correct the errors; but has a tendency to darken the glory 
of God's power and grace appearing in the substance of the work, and to beget 
jealousies and ill thoughts in the minds of others concerning the whole of it.^^
This delight in running down the new movement allows pride to compete with pride. 
To denigrate the movement creates a degree of self justification, and enables the 
institutional to feel superior to the shallow, frothy, emerging movement. The 
institutional side accuses the enthusiasts of knowing nothing of Church history or 
theology, and accuses them of parasitism for taking members from the institutional 
Church, which it is so keen to criticise. Enthusiastic pride competes with 
institutional pride. The results are defensive attitudes, with mutual criticism, 
suspicion and antagonism,
Edwards considered this to be one of most destructive errors which attend a 
revival of religion.
The first and worst cause of errors, that prevail in such a state of things is spiritual 
pride. This is the main door by which the devil comes into the hearts of those who 
are zealous for the advancement of religion. It is the chief inlet of smoke from the 
bottomless pit, to darken the mind and mislead the judgement,
The result of all of this when it comes to the assessment of experience is hidden 
motives. Both sides have a strong bias against the opposition which does not tend 
towards fair treatment for either.
(c) D iffer en c es in  styles  of w o r sh ip  create  strong  rea c tio n s  in  pe o p l e .
This reaction against different forms of worship is predictable because criticism of 
worship has continued, at least from the time of King David who's wife disliked his 
dancing before the Ark,i^ and on through Mary who is criticised for pouring 
perfume onto the feet of Jesus.20 Criticism of worship continued in the Church at
17 Thoughts on the Revival, page 390.
18 Ibid, page 398-399.
19 2Sam6:12ff.
20 John 12.
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Corinth, and on into the Iconoclast controversy, and the R e f o r m a t i o n . I n  
Edward's time these same tensions arose.
Another thing that some have found fault with is abounding so much in singing in 
religious meetings.^^
There is a curious reversal in one of todays tensions, in that Edward's faced criticism 
for 'making use of hymns of human composure', as opposed to exclusive use of the 
Psalms. 23
In the present day, the complaint is that simple choruses, (which are often 
drawn directly from the Psalms and Prophets), have a lack of theology in 
comparison to the 'depth' contained in hymns. There are strong feelings about 
doing away with the organ as the primary accompaniment to worship, and replacing 
it with a 'worship group' which will consist of people with a variety of instruments. 
In Victorian times the reverse situation occurred, and the objection to change was 
that church orchestras were being replaced by pipe o r g a n s .24
The issue of change in worship becomes particularly sharp when there is the 
impact of an enthusiastic movement because parts of its worship will not only be 
different, but will be disturbing to those who are more used to the order of a 
traditional church service. This factor created criticism and conflict in New 
England, and was described by Chauncey:
Another bad thing, I must not omit to mention, is, the confusion that has been so 
common, of late, in some of our hours of worship.25
This 'confusion' consisted of 'shrieking, screaming, talking and praying, laughing, 
kissing, singing, jumping up and down, clapping hands', embraces by different 
sexes'.26 Chauncey's eighteenth century sentiment is echoed in detail by Masters in 
the twentieth century, who describes charismatic worship as being a ploy of the devil 
'to destroy all true worship', and 'render the church offensive to Him'. This is 
achieved through repetitive singing and exciting emotional sensations which are 
irreverent and irrational. 22
21 Cf, for example, Dowley, Dr. Tim (editor) The History of Christianity, (Lion, date not 
available), page 244-251. Latourette, K.S. A History of Christianity, (Eyre and Spottiswoode 
Limited London), page 292-297.
22 Edwards, Thoughts on the Revival, page 396.
23 Ibid, page 396.
24 Described in George Eliot's Scenes of Clerical life, 'Amos Barton', (Penguin, 1973).
25 Chauncey, Seasonable Thoughts, page 207.
26 Ibid, page 208.
27 The Healing Epidemic, page 16.
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The point to note is that differences over worship create strong feelings, and 
because enthusiastic movements bring their own distinct forms of worship, this will 
inevitably create powerful reactions in people and be an area of conflict with 
institutional religion.
(d ) E n th usiastic  m o vem ents br in g  w ith  them  an  ex per ienc e  o f  unusual
POWER, WHICH force  A REACTION IN PEOPLE. THIS IS FREQUENTLY ONE OF FEAR.
This fearful reaction is one that goes back to the beginning of the Church. The book 
of Acts describes people who were reluctant to join the disciples because of fear.2» 
Fear has been a normal reaction to enthusiasm throughout Church history, and been 
inspired by Montanist prophecy, 'Camisard child prophecy, Janetist convulsions, 
Methodist swoonings and Irvingite g l o s s o l a l y ' . 2 9  Given the dramatic nature of the 
phenomena which accompany enthusiasm, this reaction is no surprise,
Edwards described these powerful phenomena as follows:
Extraordinary views of divine things, and the religions affections, were frequently 
attended with very great effects on the body. Nature often sunk under the weight of 
divine discoveries, and the strength of the body was taken away. The person was 
deprived of the ability to stand or speak. Sometimes his hands were clenched, and 
the flesh cold, but the senses remaining. Animal nature was often in a great emotion 
and agitation, and the soul so overcome with admiration, and a kind of omnipotent 
joy, as to cause the person, unavoidably, to leap with all the might, and joy in
mighty exultation. 3®
Experience of this kind creates opposition. In Edwards case this came particularly 
from Chauncey, who described the 'Horrible scene' of these 'strange effects upon 
the body',
such as swooning away and falling to the ground, where the persons have lain for a 
time, speechless and motionless; bitter shriekings and screamings; convulsion like 
tremblings and agitations, strugglings and tumblings, which, in some instances have 
been attended with indecencies I shan't mention ; None of which effects seem to 
have been accidental, nor yet peculiar to some particular places or constitutions; but 
have been common all over the land 3i
28 For example, Acts 5:5; 5:11; 19:17.
29 Knox, Enthusiasm, page 588.
30 Edwards, Thoughts on the Revival, page 376.
31 Chauncey, Seasonable thoughts, page 77.
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If we compare all of this with John White's descriptions of a 'Wimber' meeting we 
also see terror, fear, tears, trembling, shaking, laughing and falling to the ground.32 
The same objections to all of this crop up again too.
If he (the devil) can reduce a congregation of bom-again people to superficial 
emotionalism, mystical mutterings, trembling and weeping, experiencing of physical 
sensations, clapping and dancing and banal repetitive singing, then he will rob God 
of worship and render the church offensive to Him. 33
There should be no doubt that unusual phenomena occur 'we should throw over all 
belief in human evidence if we denied it '. 4^ Whatever the explanation of these 
phenomena may be, what must be noted here is that this kind of unusual experience 
is an element of an enthusiastic movement which forces people to react. It is a 
significant cause of fear, and of opposition to the movement as a whole.
Mutual antagonism lives with enthusiasm, and this is built into the fabric of 
the situation to such an extent that it can never be fully overcome. Enthusiasm is too 
different, too dramatic, too much in reaction to the institutional and too sensational 
in its claims, for it ever to have a smooth relationship with the rest of Christianity, 
or indeed with the rest of society.
This is significant in our search for acceptable means of evaluating 
charismatic experience, because the experience under assessment is set in a loaded 
context, where both the supporters and the opposition come from extreme, 
defensive, and biased positions. This is evidenced throughout the history of 
enthusiastic movements in the harshness of the criticisms made by both sides. It is 
important to be aware of this, and then to seek means of assessment which can avoid 
this danger by being as objective as they possibly can be, because the situation itself 
has inherent difficulties which mitigate against balanced and fair minded appraisal.
32 White, John. When the Spirit Cotnes, page 84-104. See also Chapter I, part 14 of this thesis 
(page 50) for an outline of the phenomena observed by Dr. David Lewis.
33 The Healing Epidemic, page 17.
34 Knox, Enthusiasm, page 4.
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2. Enthusiasm brings an inherent tendency towards credulity, and therefore ought to be consciously committed to careful assessment.
Enthusiasts are characteristically reluctant to engage in a critical analysis of what is 
occurring and this particular problem is crucial to understanding enthusiasm. This 
reluctance was noted as a general tendency by Knox.
More generally characteristic of ultraspiritualism is a distrust of our human thought- 
processes. In matters of abstract theology, the discipline of the intellect is replaced 
by a blind act of faith. In matters of practical deliberation, some sentiment of inner 
conviction, or some external 'sign' indicative of divine will, claims priority over all 
considerations of common prudence. 35
The word ’enthusiasm' has developed in meaning over the centuries, but this 
irrational implication remained intact through to the nineteenth century. It is 
possible to go slightly further than Knox and argue that irrationality in religious 
beliefs was considered to be what makes an enthusiast by definition. This is 
suggested by the varied dictionary definitions of enthusiasm. For example, in 'A 
new general English dictionary' (1744):
the word is generally applied to those persons, who pretend to have divine 
revelation to support some monstrous, ridiculous, or absurd notions in religious 
matters, and thereby takes away both reason and revelation, m d  substitutes in the 
room thereof the groundless fancies and obstinate result of self-willedness, by using 
extravagant gestures and words, pretending to things not only improbable but also
impossible. 36
The heart of the criticism implicit in the word 'enthusiasm' is that it is a falsely 
based, unreasonable, and groundless conviction about a religious experience.
Chauncey made the same criticism of the New England Revival, denouncing 
what he saw as excessively emotional aspects of it, on the grounds that 'God doth 
work upon us as men, and in a rational way'.32 He objected to the lack of a 
reasoned assessment of experience and check on emotion. To his credit, Edwards 
accepted the best parts of Chauncey's criticism, and absorbed them into his own 
writings on the revival.
They looked upon critical enquiries into the difference between true grace and its 
counterfeits, or at least being very busy in such enquiries and spending time in 
them, to be impertinent and unreasonable; tending rather to damp the work of the 
Spirit of God than to promote it; diverting their ownminds and the minds of others, 
as they supposed, from that to which God at such an extraordinary time did loudly
35 Ibid, page 585.
36 Tucker, S.l. Enthusiasm: A Study in Semantic Change, (Cambridge, 1972), page 16. (My italics)
37 Charles Chauncey, Seasonable Thoughts on the State of Religion in New England.
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call them more specifically to attend. The cry was, Oh, there is no danger, if we 
are but lively in religion and full of God's Spirit and lively of faith, of being misled!
If we do but follow God there is no danger of being wrong! Let us press forward 
and not stay and hinder the good work by spending time in these criticisms and 
carnal reasonings! This was the language of many, until they ran on deep into the 
wilderness, and were caught by the briars and thorns of the wilderness.^*
That a movement is criticised because it is unchecked by reason is predictable during 
the age of enlightenment, and it is therefore even more significant that the same 
criticism was made of the Montanists in AD 220.
and they do not judge whatever statements are made by them according to reason; 
nor do they give heed unto those who are competent to decide; but they are 
heedlessly swept onwards, by the faith which they place in these impostors.39
The same criticism has continued to be made through the centuries and into the 
current charismatic movement.
They say that believers must be prepared to surrender rational control in order that 
they may be open to direct divine activity in both worship and Christian service 40
Most charismatic healing meetings now begin with strenuous efforts to help people 
to surrender their rational control m d  behave in a completely uninhibited way. Tlie 
goal is that worshippers should be "open' to accept anything that happens, no matter 
how strange, inexplicable or bizarre it may be.—Rational control must at all costs 
be swept away because nothing which occurs must be impeded, tested or evaluated 
by the intelligent mind, versed in the Word of God. 41
This conflict between enthusiasm and rational criticism of experience has such a 
continuous line through enthusiastic movements, that it is unlikely to be coincidental. 
It spans the history of the church, and touches such a wide variety of cultures and 
world views, that it is not possible to see this trait as being merely the product of a 
particular paradigm. It suggests that there is an intrinsic leaning towards credulity at 
work in an enthusiastic movement.
What are the reasons for this general suspicion of reason, and the resultant 
subjugation of rational assessment? We will consider some of the causes which are 
evident in the charismatic movement.
38 Cited in Wright, Nigel The Theology and Methodology of Signs and Wonders, (Unpublished 
essay, date not available).
39 A New Eusebius, page 114. (My italics).
40 The Healing Epidemic, This book contains distorted criticism, gross parodies of charismatic 
writers and is an unreliable source of information. It is only included because of the recurrence of 
this same criticism.
41 Urquhart, Colin Anything You Ask, (Hodder, 1979), page 182. (My italics).
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(A) S u spic io n  of  r ea so n  is created  by  a  distorted  d efin itio n  o f  fa it h .
An example of a distorted definition of faith can be found in the books of Colin 
Urquhart, where faith is treated as a mental effort to which God must respond if one 
fulfils the right conditions and tries hard enough to believe.
One of Urquhart's books, Anything you ask describes a difficult path, where 
a person must ensure that they manage to keep the right level of belief, without 
being distracted by questions, and making sure that he believes the right things in the 
right way, while claiming the right promises. In particular it is important to shut 
ones mind to any doubts as these often have their origin in Satan. 42 If a person does 
this properly, then God is bound by his promises to give whatever is claimed.
There is no point in having our heads in a cloud of spiritual unreality. If the words 
that Jesus speaks are true then they can be tested by experience and found to be true!
The difficulty is that often there seems to be a confrontation between the words of 
Jesus and our experience. When that happens, which is true?
The problem is not so clear cut as that. The confrontation is not really 
between what Jesus says and our experience. It is between 'faith' and our 
experience. God's promises will never fail, when they are b e l i e v e d . 43
When you ask, you are to believe that you have already received the answer to your 
prayer.
Jesus wants you to approach your Father with confidence; not expecting any answer, 
but believing that He will do what you ask.
Faith is a continuous attitude of believing until the answer is seen 44
The effect of developing this state of mind, is that in order for 'faith* to be truly 
effective, it must be as unquestioning as it can possibly manage. 'Faith ' is put into 
opposition to criticism, reason, questioning, and doubt, and the quality of faith 
becomes inversely proportional to the evidence.45 To question, would be interpreted 
as 'negative talk and ideas, always grumbling and complaining', which are 
destructive to faith.46
This is a barbed world view, in the sense that when one begins to think in 
this way, all views which differ from one's own can be put down to 'attacks of 
Satan' which are intended to undermine faith. This effectively locks a person into a 
way of thinking which excludes objective checks. Questioning becomes the
42 Ibid, page 101.
43 Ibid, page 91.
44 Ibid, page 106 & 108.
45 Cf. Chapter VI, section C, page 257ff of thesis.
46 Anything You Ask, page 100.
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antithesis of faith, while credulity becomes an integral, and essential part of faith. 
One can ask critical questions or one can have faith, but one can not do both. This 
creates a powerful resistance to assessment.
(b ) T he  charism atic  m o vem ent  beg a n  in  rea c tio n  to  a  per c eiv ed  o ver­
em ph a sis  ON d o c tr in e , AND IS THEREFORE IN DANGER OF PUTTING AN OVER­
EMPHASIS ON EXPERIENCE.
This reaction against doctrine tends to create an inclination towards anti- 
intellectualism. Theological questioning becomes associated with a dead orthodoxy, 
and with people who are considered to know nothing of the power of the Spirit, 
Lack of theological background, and lack of preparation for preaching become a 
virtue, and the emphasis is put on the immediate inspiration of the Spirit. The 
preference for directly inspired knowledge forms one of the characteristics of any 
enthusiastic movement.
The enthusiast, however, supposes himself in possession of knowledge, the fanatic 
of directions, immediately (and miraculously) communicated to him from God 
himself; but neither of them produce any credentials to establish their c l a i m . 4 2
The emphasis lies on a direct personal access to the author of our salvation with 
little of intellectual background. 48
A direct indication of the Divine will is communicated to him at every turn, if only 
he will consent to abandon the arm of flesh'- Man's miserable intellect, fatally 
obscured by the fall. 49
In the context of the New England Revival, Chauncey said of those involved that:
they deny the necessity of human learning, as a qualification for tlie work of 
ministry 50
The same trait is currently evident in an attitude to the Bible which emphasises 'what 
the Spirit is saying today' rather than exegesis of its precise meaning and 
application. It is another element of a reaction against rational thought.
Restorationists, like all fundamentalists, counterbalance their literalness with wide 
use of typology, analogy, and ingenious speculation. 51
47 Ludlam, Thomas. Cited in Tucker, Enthusiasm: A Study in Semantic Change, page 18.
48 Knox, Enthusiasm, page 2.
49 Ibid, page 3.
50 Seasonable Thoughts, page 207
51 Restoring the Kingdom, page 130.
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Within the charismatic movement there is the usual enthusiastic claim to be a 
recipient of direct revelation, which is given priority over human understanding.
(c) T h e  w a y  in  w hich  som e  spiritu al  g ifts are  pr ac tised  m akes it  only
POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO BE TESTED IN A SUBJECTIVE WAY.
For example, if a person 'speaks in tongues', it requires an immediate interpretation. 
Because there is no cognitive content which can be rationally understood, if one 
intends to assess the 'tongue' one is forced back to dependence on ones feelings, 
hoping that they represent 'discernment'. The assessment is subjective, and 
unverifiable.
This difficulty in assessment is not confined to the charismatic movement, as 
it is a particular, and rather sharp example, of an issue which is raised by the whole 
doctrine of revelation. How does God reveal himself? How could one distinguish 
genuine revelation, from non-genuine?
In a charismatic context, however, such a decision becomes an immediate 
issue, often demanding an instant response. If a person believes that God is guiding 
by an internal impulse in some way, then they are forced into a quick judgment on 
whether some putative revelation is in reality from God, and this must be done 
without much in the way of objective testing.
We may talk in rather exalted terms about the guidance of the Holy Spirit and the 
way he prompts our actions; but we need to remember that quite often obedience to 
the Holy Spirit's promptings is really a question of 'playing our h u n c h e s ' . 5 2
The same tendency also reared its head in the New England revival, and was heavily 
criticised by Chauncey.
Impulses and impressions, which have prevail'd among too many; their aptness to 
take the motion of their own minds for something divinely extraordinary, or to put 
those constructions upon common occurrences, which there is no ground for but in 
their own imaginations. 53
Whether these impulses are nothing but imagination is the question which needs to 
be answered. The point here is that by its very nature, reliance on claimed 
revelation as a source of authority has such inbuilt problems in assessment that it 
would seem to demand a degree of credulity.
52 Magdalen, Margaret Renewal magazine, (July, 1990)
53 Restoring the Kingdom, page 100.
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(d ) T h ere  is a  reluc ta n c e  to  q u estio n , because  th e  c h a r ism atic  m o vem ent
MAKES ITS PRIMARY APPEAL TO THE EMOTIONS, RATHER THAN TO THE MIND.
This focus on the emotional life is illustrated in the wide varieties of 'healing 
ministries' which focus on mental well being; 'healing' of memories, 'healing' of 
homosexuality, the importance which is given to emotional states such as 
peacefulness and joy, and so on.
The function of some spiritual gifts is considered to be a way of by-passing 
the conscious mind, in order to get in touch with sub-conscious feelings. This is 
how 'slaying in the Spirit' is often interpreted, along with the gift of tongues.54
The most distinguishing feature of charismatic worship is the emotional 
content of the music; the songs which come out of the movement are 
characteristically intimate, emotional, and subjective. They provide a useful means 
of getting a sense of the ethos of a movement.
The same emotional emphasis was dominant in Edwards' day, and defended 
by him at length.
But yet it is evident that religion consists so much in affection, as that without holy 
affection there is no true religion; and no light in the understanding is good which 
does not produce holy affection in the heart: 55
The point is not to argue that being 'emotional', or even extremely emotional, is 
intrinsically wrong, but to point out that giving the emotional priority over reason, is 
a tendency within any enthusiastic movement. The charismatic movement makes its 
strongest appeal to the emotions, rather than to the mind, and thus critical reflection 
can become a side issue in the face of emotional intensity.
(e) T h e  central  focus  of  th e  C harism atic  m o vem ent  is o n  ex per ienc e  rather
THAN THEOLOGY.
The former issue is one example of a broader, and more fundamental aspect of 
charismatic renewal, which is that the central focus is on experience, rather than 
theology. In this sense, it is an existential movement, with theology following in the 
wake of experience.
There is diversity within the charismatic movement, but it is this focus on the 
immediate experience of God that is one of the strongest links between these diverse
54 For Example: Double, Don 'Slain in The Spirit'. Article in Renewal magazine, (No.80, April, 
1979). Cho, Paul Yonggi Prayer, (Word books, 1985), page 127.
55 Religious Affections, page 48.
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elements. It appears to be the commonly accepted situation of experience in search 
of a theology. This is put with more precision by Tom Small:
Dr James Packer once described the charismatic renewal as being a movement 
looking for a theology. If he has said that it was a movement desperately in need of 
a theology, I would have agreed with him straight away - but, looking for a 
theology, how I wish it were true!56
There have been some theologians who have written about charismatic experience, 
particularly in a Roman Catholic context, Mlihlen being one of the best. In England 
however, apart from JD Dunn, theologians have not concerned themselves much 
with the charismatic movement, and the charismatic movement has not been widely 
involved with the t h e o l o g i a n s .5? Again, Tom Small:
I can remember in the mid-1970s, in my early days with the Fountain Trust, if  you 
said the word 'theology' in a gathering of charismatic clergy, the chief reaction 
would be a scornful titter, as If they were saying, 'Now that we have been renewed 
in the Spirit, we do not need to bother with that sort of thing any more'.58
The same is true of the relationship between the charismatic movement and 
philosophy. While Locke and Leibniz were concerned about enthusiasm, writers 
such as Ayer, Quine and Chisholm have had no interest in such issues. There is also 
little evidence of a concern for philosophical epistemology on the part of those who 
make claims to knowledge and call themselves charismatic.
Within the charismatic movement reason and theology may be used in 
defence of an interpretation of experience, but essentially the experience has priority, 
and is justification in itself. It would be unfair not to point out that this can also be a 
common general trait of evangelicalism generally, 'You ask me how I know he 
lives. He lives within my heart'.59 However we should expect a focus on 
experience to have particular emphasis within the charismatic movement, because it 
is a trait which has always been a strong aspect of enthusiasm.
It is found by abundant experience that those who are led away by impulses and 
imagined revelations are extremely confident; tliey suppose that the great Jehovah 
has declared these and those things to them; and having his immediate testimony, a 
strong confidence is the highest virtue. Hence they are bold to say, I know this or 
that-I know certainly-I am as sure as that I have a being, and the like; and they 
despise all argument and inquiry in the case.®®
56 Smail, T. The Cross and the Spirit'. Essay in Smail, T. Walker, A. and Wright, N. 
Charismatic Renewal, The Search for a Theology, (SPCK, 1993) page 49.
57 Dunn, J.D.G. Baptism in the Holy Spirit, (SCM, 1970).
Dunn, J.D.G. Jesus and the Spirit, (SCM, 1970)
58 Ibid, page 49.
59 Scripture Union Choruses, (Lowe and Brydone, 1964), number 526.
60 Religious Affections, page 102.
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This existential basis of certainty is the issue here because it is a basis for knowing 
which relegates critical reflection to a secondary place.
Edwards was so disturbed by this trait, he argued that it is essential to lose 
this confidence in experience, to avoid running into heresy and unbridled 
enthusiasm. This abandonment of confidence in one's own experience:
is what all the most glorious hypocrites, who make the most splendid show of 
mortification to the world, and high religious affection, do grossly fail in.^i
Curiously, in current times, the exact opposite path is suggested by Wimber. 
Because experience is so convincing, his suggestion is that the experience of healing 
should be the primary basis of evangelism, and so 'programme evangelism' is 
rejected in favour of 'power evangel ism'.62 Rational checks are deliberately 
subdued, because they are seen as being inhibitive to the experience of God. The 
essence of his argument is that one must escape from the limited, rational, Western 
world view by making a 'paradigm shift', as this will free one to experience 
supernatural power.63 His justification for this subjugation of reason is partly 
Biblical, but also pragmatic, in that he argues that evangelism is considerably more 
effective when it is used in third world cultures.64 Wimber argues that the reason 
for this evangelistic success is that non-westerners are uninhibited by rational 
restrictions,65 and are therefore open to supernatural experience, such as healing.66
This provides two quite contrary positions on the relationship between 
experience and reason. Experience is so convincing, that according to Wimber 
reason should be subdued, so that experience is enabled to persuade. According to 
Edwards, experience should be subdued as a basis of confidence, because it will 
mislead with a falsely grounded sense of certainty. Edwards, describes the effect 
that this trust in experience has on believers:
they have looked upon it (supposed revelations) as a sure promise from the most 
high, which has made them most ridiculously confident, against all manner of 
reason to convince them to the contrary, and all events working against them. 6?
61 Cited in Cherry, Conrad; The Theology of Jonathan Edwards, (Gloucester, Mass, Peter Smith, 
1974), page 172.
62 Power Evangelism, page 56.
63 Ibid, page 74ff.
64 Ibid, page 49.
65 It would be a distortion of Wimber's view to suggest that he wishes to reject all aspects of 
rationality, his aim is to reject the elements of a western paradigm which would exclude the 
supernatural (ibid, page 75f). All that is being pointed out is that this effectively makes reason 
secondary to experience.
66 Ibid, page 59. The whole book argues this position.
67 Religious Affections, page 102.
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Edwards has the more persuasive arguments on this issue. If experience is 
unchecked by reason, it could lead one to be more open to God, at least if a person 
were to happen on to a 'genuine' experience, even though their understanding of it 
was misguided. This would simply be a lucky shot in the dark. However, it also 
leaves one open to any form of experience whatever its source, as well as being 
unprotected from heresy, or nonsense, or able to test by objective truth. It is 
consequently a short step from here to a superstitious and pre-enlightenment world 
view, with no measured distinction between faith and stupidity, and nothing to 
distinguish between good or bad experience, nor to prevent the good from being 
driven out by the bad. The subjugation of reason in favour of experience by 
Wimber inevitably leads to a situation where there are inadequate objective checks 
on the way that experience is understood.
Conclusion of Parts 1 and 2.
Charismatic experience has diverse forms, and is difficult to define, but it is crucial 
that this mix should be properly understood and assessed. If it is not, then there are 
strong historical grounds to suppose that the good will be driven out by the bad, with 
consequent confusion and disillusionment. This is bad for the whole church, 
charismatic or not. Failure to distinguish between what should be kept and what 
should be rejected is the primary cause of the eventual disintegration of an 
enthusiastic movement
The task is especially difficult because there are particular factors which 
mitigate against fair assessment in this context. Enthusiasm is based in experience, 
and experience is almost invariably equivocal. The strength of opposition which 
arises in response to an enthusiastic movement leads to polarised positions and 
vicious criticism. This means that assessment is frequently offensive, or defensive, 
but almost always, biased.
Another difficulty in assessment is that the focus on experience, if left 
unchecked, will naturally lead towards a subjective concept of truth. This in turn 
gives critical reflection a secondary roll, and an uphill struggle in the face of 
overwhelmingly convincing experience. It is therefore instinctively credulous, and 
in constant need of rational assessment. The task is difficult, but it is crucial to 
develop criteria which are capable of providing a fair criticism.
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3. It is difficult to assess charismatic experience because experience isalmost invariably equivocal
In all my life I have met only one person who claims to have seen a ghost. And the 
interesting thing about the story is that that person disbelieved in the immortal soul 
before she saw the ghost and still disbelieves after seeing it. She says that what she 
saw must have been an illusion or a trick of the nerves. And obviously she may be 
right. Seeing is not believing.68
This is a useful example of what occurs when a person is confronted with an unusual 
experience. He interprets what he sees in the light of what he believes, and rarely 
does a person interpret what he believes in the light of what he sees. This form of 
hypothesising is essential if we are to retain any form of coherent understanding of 
what we experience. If we did not think in this way, then the whole framework with 
which we interpret the world could be upset by every unusual occurrence, say, for 
example, when a magician brings a rabbit out of thin air. It would be insane to be 
so easily persuaded. This process implies that seeing is not believing. What we see, 
and what we believe are different.
This relationship between belief and evidence is illustrated by Quine in a 
discussion on the value of conservatism in the choice of a hypothesis.
There could be such a case when our friend the amateur magician tells us what card 
we have drawn. How did he do it? Perhaps by luck, one chance in fifty two; but 
this conflicts with our reasonable belief, if all unstated, that he would not have 
volunteered a performance that depended on that kind of luck. Perhaps the cards 
were marked; but this conflicts with our belief that he had had no access to them, 
they being ours. Perhaps he peeked or pushed, with help of a sleight-of-hand; but 
this conflicts with our belief in our perceptiveness. Perhaps he resorted to telepathy 
of clairvoyance; but this would wreak havoc with our web o f  b e l i e f .  69
There is a justifiably intransigent view of reality at work here which is attempting to 
understand an unusual occurrence. The same process operates with enthusiastic 
experience. Say, for example, one heard that a person had suddenly got out of a 
wheelchair and started walking, claiming that he had been healed miraculously. 
There are many possible interpretations of this experience. If one has a strong 
charismatic belief, then the inclination will be to say that this was caused directly by 
God. If one were opposed to the use of charismatic gifts, but still within a Christian 
paradigm, then one may attribute the 'healing' to Satan's deception. If one were 
unsure of the nature of what occurred, (either believing, or with no belief in God), 
then what has occurred could be described as false diagnosis, spontaneous remission.
68 Lewis, C.S. Miracles, (Collins, 1980), page 7.
69 Quine and Ullian The Web of Belief, (Random House, New York, 1978), page 67.
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exaggerated reporting, my eyes deceived me, a con trick, and so on. A person with 
Humean persuasions would dismiss the ‘miracle’ on the grounds that there is always 
far more evidence to disbelieve a reported miracle than to believe. Even if one 
could not find any alternative rational explanation, then this failure to explain could 
be attributed to limited human understanding of the working of the mind and body. 
One day we will have a proper scientific explanation. The meaning and cause of the 
experience are equivocal.
St. Paul suffered the effects of this ambiguity in his unsuccessful attempts to 
preach at Lystra.^o He and Barnabas healed a 'cripple', but the response from the 
locals was not to see this as a sign which pointed to Jesus. Instead they incorporated 
what they saw into their own world view and concluded that Paul and Barnabas must 
be Hermes and Zeus. The next stage, when the onlookers had been persuaded of an 
alternative interpretation by some Jews from Iconium and Antioch, was to stone Paul 
and Barnabas. This was hardly the desired effect that the miracle was intended to 
create.
This illustrates again that one's interpretation and understanding of 
experience is not only influenced, but is frequently determined by one's 
presuppositions. Experience therefore can not be understood properly in isolation 
from theology or philosophy. What one believes before an experience will, in most 
circumstances, determine what one believes afterwards. The experience itself is 
equivocal.
A charismatic example of this process would be an ill person who claims that 
the mental torment he is suffering is being caused by demonic oppression. One way 
to assess this claim would be to start with the belief that there are no such things as 
demons. One must dismiss therefore the ill person's diagnosis as, say, the product 
of a superstitious world view; an expression of his unbalanced mind and an 
unhealthy psychological state. The charismatic view point is ruled out from the 
start. On the other hand, if one does believe in demons who do directly inflict such 
oppressive mental states on individuals, then the disturbed person could possibly be 
correct in his understanding.
Which of these two interpretations of the evidence is correct will depend 
firstly on whether there are, in reality, demons who afflict people, or not. The 
possibility that the cause was demonic would be ruled out if one has atheistic 
presuppositions. The charismatic believer, however, considers that demonic activity 
is a possibility, and is confirmed in this view by the evidence of his own mental 
anguish. Which of the two options a particular person chooses as the explanation 
will be determined by which beliefs he brings to the experience.
70 Acts 14:1-20.
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This implies that there is a whole context of understanding which needs 
assessment along with the particular experience. In the case of charismatic 
experience the complexity of the task is compounded by the fact that the varying 
interpretations of events are not straightforwardly different theories, but can be 
situated in contradictory paradigms, theistic or atheistic. As one attempts 
assessment, one therefore is forced away from what seemed like a straightforward 
experience, into an assessment of a person's whole view of reality. A materialistic 
or theistic view of existence? Are there supernatural beings called demons, or are 
there not? To choose the correct explanation of the experience means also choosing 
the correct paradigm.
This is a crucial issue with many implications which we must attempt to 
resolve. There are many ways to interpret experience, and the complexity of this 
issue creates a significant difficulty in assessment, because it is so easy to evaluate 
on the basis of equivocal evidence, and in a way which is dominated by ones own 
assumptions.
This needs to be pointed out because the intricacies of this issue do not seem 
to be widely appreciated in much of the literature which is concerned with the 
charismatic movement. This lack of understanding is evidenced in the kind of 
arguments which are used in support and in opposition to charismatic experience.
A charismatic interpretation of events claims support on grounds such as the success 
of physical healing; experience of psychological well being, physical manifestations 
in worship, material prosperity, gifts of the Spirit, etc. etc. However, although they 
are being used in some contexts as though they are individually reliable indicators of 
a work of the Spirit, they are all ambiguous 'signs’ which point in at least two 
directions at once, and often in many more. The same events may be reinterpreted 
in reductionist terms as being hysterical behaviour, the product of sexual frustration, 
caused by brain washing techniques, self delusion, hypersuggestibility, or mental 
instability. Experience alone is an equivocal criterion which provides an unreliable 
indication of an encounter with God.
Charismatic experience is consequently being both opposed and supported on 
the basis of unjustified, superficial and misleading criteria. It is therefore important 
firstly, that these simplistic mistakes should be pointed out, and then secondly if it is 
possible, something more reliable should be put in their place which can do justice to 
the complexity of the issues involved. An experience in isolation from an 
interpretive framework is equivocal, and how an experience is understood is related 
to a whole view of reality. The difficulty we must face up to is to define the way in 
which these two elements are related.
    . _  ----
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4. How can one distinguish between genuine and false ’revelation'?
If an enthusiast has a revelation from God then he ought to submit to it. This is 
reasonable, as it would be foolish to prefer limited human understanding over 
something which has been revealed by an omniscient and infallible God. This is 
why the enthusiast is so certain in his faith; he believes what he says because he is 
sure that his beliefs have been revealed to him by God.
The question raised by this, though, is how can one know which revelations 
are given directly by God and which are not. This was noted by John Locke as the 
crucial issue facing enthusiasm:
The question then here is: how do I know that God is the revealer of this to me, tliat 
the impression is made on my mind by his Holy Spirit, and that therefore I ought to 
obey it? If I know not this, how great soever the assurance is that I am possessed 
with, it is groundless, whatever light I pretend to, it is but enthusiasm.^^
There seems to be a need for some standard which must be applied to 
experience/ revelation from another authority, and to which that 
experience/revelation must submit. According to Locke, experience and revelation 
have to be interpreted by reason, because reason is a God-given faculty which ought 
always to be used in this context.
If he (God) would have us assent to the truth of any proposition, he either evidences 
that truth by the usual methods of natural reason, or else makes it known to be the 
truth which he would assent to by his authority, and convinces us that is from him, 
by some marks which reason cannot be mistaken in. Reason must be our last judge 
and guide in everything.
However, if the enthusiast is a conveyer of divine revelation then his words 
represent absolute authority. The problem is that if this is so then how could such an 
absolute authority be verified except with reference to itself? According to Karl 
Barth
God's revelation has its reality and truth wholly and in every respect....within itself.
Only by denying it can we wish to ascribe to it a higher or deeper ground. 
Obviously the adoption of revelation from the vantage of such a ground, different 
from it and presumably superior to it, eg. and affirmation of revelation in which a 
man previously set up his conscience to be a judge of it; can only be achieved by
denying revelation.
71 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Chapter ixi, slO page 701.
72 Ibid, Book IV, chapter ixi, s l4  (page 704).
73 Cited in Mitchell, B, The Justification of Religious Belief, (Macmillan, 1973), page 143 From 
Bartli, K, Church Dogmatics 1/1 page 350.
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This was written as a defence of revelation which came through Jesus, but the 
principle of Barth's argument is still applicable to our discussion in this context. If 
Barth is right, then there is little that can be said to the enthusiast who claims 
revelation, except perhaps to see if his words are contradicted by the words of Jesus, 
or by Biblical revelation. There is no way that it could be externally assessed on 
other grounds such as reason, and therefore the attempt of this thesis is a denial of 
revelation as a source of truth, and a waste of time.
If this attitude were adopted, however, it would leave no external means of 
assessing conflicting claims to revelation and has extreme difficulties in practice, 
because it effectively provides intellectual support for the contradictory claims of 
enthusiasts.
Every conceit that thoroughly warms our fancies must pass for an inspiration, if 
there be nothing but the strength of our perswasions, whereby to judge of our 
perswasions; if reason must not examine their truth by something extrinsical to the 
perswasions themselves, inspirations and delusions, truth and falsehood, will have 
the same measure, and will not be possible to be distinguished. '^^
The difficulty which consequently needs to be overcome if we are to assess 
charismatic experience, is (a) to contradict Barth, and much twentieth century 
theology by attempting to justify the assessment of claims to absolute authority, and 
(b) if this can be done consistently, to find some extrinsic criteria on which the 
assessment could be based.
74 Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, chapter ixi, sl4 , (page 704).
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5. The problem of the criterion
An attempt to justify one's beliefs using some extrinsic criteria may sound simple, 
but in practice it touches on a basic problem in epistemology.
The traditional approach to the issue of determining what can be known has 
taken the form of a foundational structure. This has constituted the dominant 
epistemic model in western philosophy, from Descartes and Locke; and on through 
the work of Hume. It also underlies the work of Russell and Ayer in the twentieth 
century.
In recent years, however, it is an approach which has been increasingly 
rejected, (a) because these foundational truths have turned out to be rather less self 
evident or incorrigible than they seemed to be and (b) because many apparently quite 
justifiable beliefs fail to reach this standard.
This has led to considerable turmoil within epistemology, because there is no 
consensus on which models could provide a satisfactory belief system, or agreement 
on where the starting point could be to provide such a structure for thought, nor 
agreed criteria which could resolve this problem. There is effectively an impasse 
throughout the field.
This is closely related to the theological stream of thought which sought to 
argue from supposedly incorrigible foundations that it is reasonable to believe in 
God. This attempt to justify Christian belief goes back at least as far as Aquinas and 
the 'five proofs' of God's existence, and continued to dominate scholastic thought in 
the middle ages.
Apart from seeking to answer objections, however, demonstrating that belief 
in God has rational foundations has not been so dominant in theology since those 
pre-reformation times, because of the reformers antipathy to this approach, and also 
in the wake of Immanuel Kant's work. Indeed, in the twentieth century, 
foundationalism in the form of natural theology has been rejected outright, (even 
aggressively) by theologians such as Bultmann, Barth and Niebuhr.
If you really reject natural theology you do not stare at the serpent wiüi the result 
that it stares back at you, hypnotises you, and is ultimately certain to bite you, but 
you hit it and kill it as soon as you see it^ ^
These theological issues mirror the current problems in epistemology. This is 
because the scholastic approach was determined by a particular method which was
75 Barth, Karl Natural Theology. Cited in Abraham, William J. An Introduction to the Philosophy 
of Religion, (Prentece Hall inc., 1985), page 78.
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used to determine what ought to be counted as knowledge. Claims to know were 
built on a putatively rational foundation. The approach of Barth was the reverse, as 
he began with knowledge that has been revealed by God, and submitted rational 
methods to what was 'known'.
The nature of the philosophical issues which underlie this debate, are focused 
rather succinctly into two questions by Chisholm.
We may distinguish two very general questions. These are, "What do we know?" 
and "How are we to decide, in any particular case whether we know?" The first of 
these may also be put by asking "What is the extent of our knowledge?” and the 
second by asking, "What are the criteria of knowing?
If one knew the answer to either one of these questions, then it would seem quite 
possible to go about finding an answer to the other. The difficulty, however, is that 
if we have no answer to the first question, then there would seem no way of 
answering the second. And if we have no answer to the second question, then there 
would seem no way of answering the first.
It is such an intransigent problem, that Chisholm states
"The problem of the Criterion" seems to me one of die most important and one of 
the most difficult of all the problems of philosophy. I am tempted to say that one 
has not begun to philosophise until one has recognised how unappealing, in the end, 
each of the possible solutions is.^^
In the context of this thesis, this implies that there are no generally accepted criteria 
which can be applied specifically to the kind of religious experience we are 
discussing and used to assess a cognitive claim which is made on the basis of that 
experience. Consequently if we intend to use some external criteria as a means of 
assessing charismatic experience, then we will need to discover and justify our own 
approach to what constitutes warranted belief in the context of charismatic 
experience.
76 Chisholm, R.M. Theory of Knowledge, (Prentice-Hall inc, 1977), page 120.
77 Chisholm, R.M. The problem of the Criterion - The Aquinas lecture, 1973. (Marquette 
University Press, 1973), page 1.
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Implications of Chapters I and II
A . T h e  C harism atic  m o vem ent  c an  be  d escr ibed  as  an  enthusiastic
MOVEMENT,
The word 'enthusiast' has become ambiguous in terms of approval or disapproval. 
However, this eighteenth century label 'enthusiasm' is a useful description of these 
many movements, as it implies a subjugation of reason as a source of knowledge, in 
favour of a supposedly self evident experience. This is also tendency throughout the 
charismatic movement. When a group of people consider that claimed experience of 
God is the source of authority as opposed to reason then that group can be called 
'enthusiastic'.
Due to lack of space, our survey of such movements is limited, and there are 
doubtless differences between these varied movements; in the historical settings, 
experience of the people involved, difference of emphases, difference in impact, and 
so on. This does not undermine the comparison, however, as there are still striking 
areas of similarity. Indeed, the fact that the traits discussed above do recur in such 
differing settings, cultures, and eras of history makes the evident similarities 
between them even more curious and in need of explanation. The onus is on the 
reader if it is to be demonstrated that the differences are of such significance that the 
comparison is meaningless.
Even if it were to be conceded that these movements are so different that they 
were unconnected to the charismatic movement it would not destroy the main thrust 
of this thesis. This is because the aim is to establish how in principle amorphous 
enthusiastic or charismatic experience of any sort could be assessed. However, it is 
helpful to see that such experience has been and still is a significant part of church 
history, and that it is important to assess it with care. The context provides useful 
insights into how charismatic experience may be appraised, and also indicates the 
kind of dangers to be aware of in an attempt at assessment.
B . T he  ch arism atic  m o vem ent  is in  rea lity  a  series o f  m o v e m e n t s .
This would be a more accurate understanding of what is occurring at present. There 
are numerous forms of 'teachings’, which come and go; often associated with strong 
'charismatic' figures. Initially charismatic experience took the form of 
Pentecostalism, this moved on to 'Neo-Pentecostalism'; and developed from there, 
with leaders coming into fashion for a few years and then fading in influence. The
I
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idea of ’authority' with elders and apostles became an issue for a while as a result of 
the modern House Church movement .Hea l ing  remains central, and yet takes on 
differing approaches. Initially there were Pentecostal healing crusades, then Neo-
Pentecostal c r u s a d e s . ' P r a i s i n g  God for all things' was a subsequent idea, then 
'healing of memories', followed by Wimber.®® Leanne Payne's style is a current 
model which is becoming prominent, as Wimber seems to be fading from view.^i 
The 'Toronto Blessing' provides dramatic current instances of the phenomena of 
enthusiasm.
The music of the movement develops just as quickly, with songs becoming 
soon too dated to use in worship. It has to move fast to keep up with changes in 
theology.
What are the reasons for this rapid change?
(a) There could be a cultural influence at work which mirrors a society that is 
used to rapidly changing fashions and styles in every area of life. An unchanging 
form of worship and understanding would be an anomaly in the twentieth century. 
Rapid change could therefore reflect a degree of conformity to the Spirit of the age
Communications are more developed than in the past, with an explosion of 
Christian books, magazines and conferences. As a result, one is aware of 
charismatic claims from all parts of the world, and one wonders why all these 
exciting reports of the miraculous are not occurring in one's own church. The effect 
of this is to create a sense of dissatisfaction about, or at least a longing for, what can 
seem to be a form of Christianity that has got it right, in some part of the world. 
This awareness helps create a desire for something different and new.
(b) There is also a theological impetus to this rapid change, particularly in the 
doctrine of revelation, as effectively, the Bible is not the entire source of authority 
where charismatic gifts are used. While the Bible is generally seen as being the 
basic standard, more than this is needed because the question is often asked, 'what is
78 Cf. Restoration magazine, (Harvestime 1985). September/October 1985, which has a number of 
articles on 'Apostles: Key Men for Today'.
79 For example, Kuhlman, K I Believe in Miracles, (Lakeland, 1963). Burton, W.F.P.
Following, Coverdale, 1973). Stapleton, Carter Ruth, The Gift of Inner Healing, (Hodder, 1976). 
Dearing, Trevor Supernatural Healing Today, (Logos, 1979), Wagner, Dr. C.Peter How to have a 
Healing Ministry, (Monarch, 1988). Masters, Peiet The Healing Epidemic, (Wakeman, 1988). 
White, John When the Spirit Comes With Power, (Hodder, 1988). Lewis, Dr.David, Healing: 
Fiction, Fantasy or Fact, (Hodder, 1989).
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God saying to this g e n e r a t i o n ? T h e  story of the Exodus is given prominence, and 
God is 'moving on', it is up to his people to follow where he is leading. 
Consequently, there are books which develop an elaborate system of 'ministry', in 
the form of healing, dealing with demons, evangelism, and so on.*^ These start with 
the Bible, but go beyond this into new ideas. The Bible is a base for, but is not seen 
as an exhaustive revelation, and so there are few theological limits to the shape or 
doctrines of the movement.
(c) The most fundamental cause of this rapid change, however, is philosophical, as 
the existential nature of the charismatic movement means that its theology is 
continuously developing in the light of experience. As we have argued, experience 
is equivocal or ambiguous, and consequently, it can point in numerous directions, 
effectively leaving scope for endless development in interpretation. There is no limit 
to the experiences on which one can focus, and on the interpretations of them which 
can be incorporated into the theology of the charismatic movement. This allows the 
retention of the basic enthusiastic qualities, while providing the capacity of a 
chameleon to adapt to different backgrounds. This is why we can observe distinct 
parallels in the basic traits of different historical movements.
The effect of all this is to create a rapidly developing series of movements. 
The particular churches which have managed to keep the impetus of charismatic 
experience going over an extended period of time, have been able to surf on the top 
of each new wave of ideas, but manage to mount the next wave, before the former 
one hits the rocks and dies. Consequently, the basic elements of enthusiasm remain, 
but are given fresh and recurrent impetus, from a variety of new experiences, 
personalities, and doctrines. These also alter the superficial structure of the 
movement.
C . E nthusiasm  h a s  a  sing le  fundam ental  c a u se .
The impression these movements give at first sight is of a jig-saw which seems to 
assemble itself repeatedly, using the same essential pieces. This pattern may vary in 
size, and be assembled in differing locations and times, but it is essentially the same 
picture. To see it like this, however, would be somewhat bizarre; jig-saws do not 
generally assemble without a cause, and so we are led to questioning what it is, that 
creates this pattern.
82 Cf. Restoration, November/December, 1985.
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Perhaps there is a clue to the reasons for this repeated pattern in that the 
majority of enthusiastic movements were cradled in Reformation P r o t e s t a n t i s m .  
Could it be that 'enthusiasm' is simply the result of returning to the Bible as sole 
authority, subjugating reason and tradition to it, and attempting to build a 
spirituality, which is as it was in the beginning? This is certainly the claim of many 
'enthusiasts', and would conveniently link in the Montanists who aimed, in an earlier 
generation, to return to the days of the Acts.
This is attractive, as all of the elements we have discussed could be explained 
as originating in an attempt to be true to the New Testament, in all its vigour and 
supernatural power. However, while this offers a partial explanation for some 
enthusiastic movements, it is not enough in itself.
Firstly; numerous movements aim to live according to the Bible, but do so 
without taking on the character of enthusiasm, there must therefore be other 
element(s) at work. Indeed, those who oppose enthusiastic movements, from within 
the church do this primarily on the basis of Biblical authority. One can reasonably 
conclude that something else distinguishes the non-enthusiast from the enthusiast, at 
least in the way a person interprets the Bible. Secondly; there are enthusiastic 
movements which do not maintain a 'fundamentalist' attitude to the Bible, (such as 
Quietists,*^ or Manicheans A particular approach to the Bible is therefore not a 
fundamental cause of enthusiasm.
Knox gives us a hint that the primary cause is rooted in a way of knowing.
Basically it is the revolt of Platonism against the Aristotelian mise en scene of 
traditional Christianity. The issue hangs on the question whether the divine fact is 
something given, or something to be inferred. Your Platonist, satisfied that he has 
formed his notion of God without the aid of syllogisms or analogies, will divorce 
reason from religion; it is a faculty concerned with the life of the senses, and 
nothing assures us that it can penetrate upwards; he is loth to theologise.*^
To typify platonism as being anti-rational is rather a caricature; however if this is 
taken to refer to an intuitive insight into truth, then we can see what Knox means by 
this statement. One can forgive Knox's use of words here, and retain the sense of 
his analyses without his particular way of expressing it. This provides a valuable 
insight into enthusiasm. Existentialism verses rationalism may be a better 
description, or experience verses theology; subjective truth verses objective; 
knowing a person rather than knowing about a person; I thou or I it.
84 Knox: Enthusiasm, page 5.
85 Ibid, page 260ff.
86 Ibid, page 92.
87 Ibid, page 579.
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In other words, we are back into this basic tenet of enthusiasm discussed 
earlier; in essence, it is a reaction against a logical, rational approach to God. The 
ultimate is discovered in experience rather than in rational thought. John Locke's 
definition of enthusiasm contains this essential enthusiastic concept of knowledge.
(enthusiasm), laying by reason, would set up revelation without it. Whereby in 
effect it takes away both reason and revelation, and substitutes in the room of them 
the ungrounded fancies of man's own brain, and assumes them for a foundation both 
of opinion and conduct.*®
This enthusiastic response to reason was at work throughout the 'revivals' of the 
eighteenth century, echoing the contrast between Plato and Aristotle, and 
anticipating Kierkegaard's reaction against enlightenment rationalism in favour of 
personal truth.
This concept of knowledge is enough of a starting point to generate all the 
other elements of enthusiasm. It is the key to understanding the recurrence of this 
mix. There is a reaction against the institutional church with its 'dead' doctrine and 
rationalism. Reason is limited, even mistrusted, and essentially subjugated in favour 
of claims to have revealed truth which is the product of an immediate experience of 
God. The enthusiast is experiencing direct revelation in the form of an 'inner light', 
or the 'gift of prophecy', or words of knowledge'. Such people prove difficult to 
argue with, because their views are held with the conviction that they have divine 
authority.*^
Those who oppose enthusiasm argue using the Bible, and/or, with reason, but 
to no effect, as the enthusiast has a different, and existential way of knowing. 
Consequently, there are books which argue against the charismatic and say that his 
theology is unbiblical, or unreasonable; but the enthusiast answers 'but I know this is 
true, I experienced it'. In other words, there is a basic difference in authority. The 
former wishes to assent to a proposition in the form of doctrine, the latter wants to 
have an experience of direct revelation.
With this focus on experience as a source of certainty and authority, there is 
a stress on internal feelings, and on the transformation of the personality. The 
traditional Christian writes books on doctrine which seek to understand God through 
reasoned analysis of the Bible; (systematic theology and objective truth). The 
enthusiast, however, writes numerous books of 'testimonies' about experience, and 
then seeks to justify these claims so that others can share the same experience. The 
former emphasises doctrinal truth, the latter focuses on transformation of the 
personality.
88 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, page 429.
89 Ibid, page 582.
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This leads to distinct change in forms of worship as they swing towards the 
subjective. Consequently the criticism is made that charismatic hymns do not have 
the depth of theological truth that traditional hymns have (Objective concept of truth, 
with God revealed in rational propositions, analogies, and doctrines). The enthusiast 
replies that these new songs express how he feels about God, and that he experiences 
God in worship. (Subjectivity in reaction). The former wants to sing about truth, 
the latter wants to experience truth as he sings.
If our hypothesis is correct, we ought to suspect that this subjugation of 
reason in favour of experience could also be the cause of the host of abnormal 
phenomena which accompany enthusiasm. It is possible to argue that the phenomena 
associated with enthusiasm are the product of hypnotic techniques which depend for 
their effect on by-passing the rational, critical faculty of the mind.^®
All of this apparent power and direct experience of God creates a sense of 
separation and authority; the enthusiast knows God, has direct communication with 
him, and even speaks with divine authority. This creates an inclination towards a 
theocracy. Why should one submit to the will of a 'fallen' government when one 
has direct access to God?
When it comes to exegesis, the traditional approach is to understand the 
literal meaning of the text, find out what it meant in its day, and explain what it 
means to today's society. It is revealed truth which is rationally discussed. This, 
however, is not enough for the enthusiast, as he wants to know what God is saying 
today through this particular passage, sometimes irrespective of what it used to 
mean. This leads to speculative and subjective interpretations of the Bible, and also 
to a preference for speaking without notes, as this is generally considered to be more 
directly 'inspired'. The former does an exegesis and understands rational truth 
derived from past revelation, but the enthusiast wants an immediate experience of 
revelation. Platonism in preference to Aristotelianism if we use Knox's terms.
The overall effect of these features, is so dramatic, disturbing, threatening to 
the institutional, and comparatively radical that it invariably leads to opposition and 
distrust from outside.
Problems usually arise because such a subjective basis of authority proves 
difficult to lead and to control; there are limitless directions in which it could go. 
This is given extra sharpness through a devaluation of an objective authority which 
could be appealed to in a doctrinal dispute. One person feels that God is saying 'do 
this', and the other says 'do that'; but the problem is that there is no higher authority 
than divine authority, and both are convinced that this is what their own views 
represent. This creates a need for strong leaders (Apostles and Elders in the case of
90 See appendix II, page 302ff.
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the current movement), but even these will not hold things together. There will 
eventually be schism within the groups under their own 'charismatic' leaders, who 
have their own particular styles and doctrines. Each considers his own view to be 
justified by the experience it represents.
As ususal, when it comes to experience, what one believed before usually 
determines what one believes afterwards, and the direction from there on. 
Enthusiasm can consequently end up in a wide variety of different forms; 
evangelical, mystical, monastic, antinomian, or rigorist. Someone who begins with 
a 'fundamentalist' attitude to the Bible, will end up as an evangelical enthusiast; a 
Catholic may find that his enthusiastic experiences lead to a deeper reverence for 
Mary; a mystic will find inner light as a guide. In a former generation Wesley 
thought that his antinomianism was validated by the effect of his preaching, and 
Whitfield thought that his Calvinism was justified by the phenomena that 
accompanied his preaching.
The outer shape and colour of the movement is therefore moulded by the 
enthusiasts' varying preconceptions, but the trigger, which will develop the essential 
traits of enthusiasm, is pulled when Platonism reacts against Aristotelianism.
Enthusiasm is therefore better thought of as of a plant which can grow given 
the right conditions, rather than as a jig-saw. An existential approach to truth, in 
reaction to a cerebral, institutional religion, is the starting point. When this is 
combined with a desire to return to the primitive spirituality of the church and with a 
'charismatic' leader who is strong enough to lead people through the process, it is 
enough to set the process in motion, which leads to evangelical enthusiasm.
If we test this against a modern enthusiastic movement, we can see this 
process at work. In the 'Wimber' movement, we have a strong leader whose 
starting point is a rejection of what is described as a rational western world view, on 
the grounds that it is unchristian and inhibiting to spiritual life and power. Subjective 
truth reacts against the objective:
The conception of tmth proper to the Christian mind is determined by the 
supernatural orientation of the Christian mind....truth is supematurally grounded: it 
is not manufactured within nature.
This is added to a desire to return to the life of the early church by taking the Bible 
literally without filtering it through a rationalistic framework.
91 Wimber Power Evangelism, page 80.
85
Even as a successful pastor, I remained uneasy, always sensing the gap between the 
early disciples' experience as they spread the gospel of the kingdom of God, and 
what my congregation experienced.^^
From this starting point, Wimber emphasised a message that one ought to see the 
same healing in the present day church, as at the beginning, and stuck with it until 
dramatic things began to happen. All of the other enthusiastic traits look after 
themselves from this point forwards.
D . T h e  r elatio n sh ip  betw een  th ese  tw o  w ays op  k n o w in g .
This relationship is a massive issue which impinges on many significant areas of 
thought, the nature of truth, existential or objective, along with all the theological 
implications of this, such as the place of propositional revelation, and the experience 
of God.
As we have argued, the essence of the difference between traditional 
Christianity, and enthusiastic belief, lies in their varying ways of knowing. The 
former putting the stress on rational, propositional, doctrinal truth, and the latter 
putting the stress on experience in the place of objectivity.
It should be noted that it is a stress, rather than an absolute difference, 
because both sides have aspects of the others focal emphasis in them. The traditional 
Church has the experience of conversion, worship, joy, prayer, and so on. The 
charismatic movement develops doctrines on the basis of the Bible which are used in 
support of its experience. The situation resulting from this is consequently not one 
of two wholly separate systems of thought, but rather one of two poles with a 
gradation of attitudes between. Neither side attains the (normally impossible) state 
of being purely objective, nor purely subjective; and both sides being weakened if 
they neglect what is helpful in the other.
The difference is therefore not absolute, but there is a difference of priority. 
For traditional evangelicalism, it is biblical revelation reasonably assessed which is 
the arbiter of claims to know, and the basis for determining which experiences 
should be expected. For the enthusiast this is reversed, experience is subsequently 
justified, and theology modified in its light.
The significance of this order is that there comes a point where experience 
becomes authoritative, and it is at this point that we have the beginning of 
enthusiasm. It runs parallel in this respect with liberal approaches to theology, 
which will allow doctrine to be altered if it seems unreasonable. For the enthusiast.
92 Ibid, page 15.
93 Wimber, John Signs and Wonders, tape, (Vineyard Ministries, date not cited), number 1.
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experience performs the same function, as it becomes the primary basis of the 
knowledge of God. The Bible is filtered through experience; and reason, where it 
is used, is used in justification of a view which begins existentially. Therefore it 
could be justly described as an 'existential liberalism', as opposed to a 'rational 
liberalism', because in both cases, something other than Biblical revelation is given 
primary authority.
This does, however, imply that it is unjustified to dismiss the charismatic 
movement as being dualist in its concept of truth. Firstly, because there is a 
gradation of attitude rather than an absolute distinction between objective and 
subjective truth; but secondly because each of these views do have their own 
internal consistency. If one assumes that the Bible is inherent revelation, then one is 
forced to submit one's limited understanding to words which come from God. This 
is not dualism, it is a distinction between what is considered to be absolute revealed 
truth, and human ability to know the truth. Enthusiastic epistemology has its own 
admittedly circular, but nevertheless consistent structure. The question it must 
answer is how the initial claim to be the recipient of direct revelation could be 
justified.
Conclusion
Enthusiasm, then, has the character of a repeated mix of elements, but it is a mix 
which is explicable, because it is created from a single starting point. By definition, 
enthusiasm begins when experience is given priority over reason as the basis of 
truth. Revelation and truth are consequently considered to be primarily subjective. 
This is the fundamental characteristic of enthusiasm, and is a trait which is evident 
enough in the charismatic movement for it to be classed as enthusiastic.
This starting point is, ironically, the beginning of its own destruction, 
because the lack of objective control on its development, means that it is generally 
unable to resist the pull into the dominance of subjective truth. Its theology and 
experience consequently have the capacity to grow and mutate malignantly; 
eventually destroying the movement itself.
If we are to assess charismatic experience, then it is this central epistemology 
which ought to be our focus. The other traits of enthusiasm are comparatively 
superficial in that they are symptoms of a way of knowing. It is a distinctive 
epistemology which is the essence of enthusiastic belief.
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Chapter III
Principles for Interpreting Charismatic Religious Experience. 
Sifting Through the Options.
Introduction
The term 'religious experience' is applied to an extraordinarily wide jumble of 
experience. It is used to describe 'enthusiastic' visions, emotional upheaval, feelings 
of awe, a 'sense' of God's presence, physical sensations, deep convictions and 
beliefs, mysticism, or a sense of the numinous. Inner consciousness of guilt or 
forgiveness are each described as 'religious experience', as is physical healing, a 
sense of moral duty, near death experiences or simply a response to music, or 
attendance at church. Indeed any experience seems to be capable of a religious 
interpretation.
For many people life is one vast religious experience. Many people view almost all 
the events of their life not merely under their ordinary description but as God’s 
handiwork. For many people, that is, very many of the public phenomena of life are 
viewed religiously and so constitute religious experiences o f the first type. What is 
seen by one man simply as a wet day is seen by another as God's reminding us of his 
bounty in constantly providing us with food by means of his watering plants. What 
is seen by one man as merely a severe illness is seen by another as God's punishing 
him for the sins of his youth. That God is at work is no inference for these men by 
what seems (epistemically) to be happening. ^
Some people claim to have an experience of God which is directly communicated to 
the mind or emotions, and others have a religious encounter through the senses; 
touch, smell, sight, taste and hearing. Sometimes it is a purely emotional 
phenomenon, and at other times there is a didactic content.
'Enthusiasm' is one collection of religious experiences which form a part of 
this wide Christian history. The experience of the enthusiast is characteristically that 
of being confronted by something of overwhelming significance and power, 
something which seems to have come from outside the natural world. It presents 
itself to the subject as being self authenticating, and with such force that the 
individual is unable to doubt either the reality of what has occurred, or his own 
interpretation of it. He simply 'knows', and what's more, is often certain.
1 Swinburne, R. o/God, (Oxford, 1979), pages 252-253.
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Thus far we have been able to link the experiences of the 'enthusiast' with the 
current charismatic movement. The similarity between the two is not just a 
superficial resemblance, because both are shaped by the same deep rooted and 
determining feature, which is a distinctive epistemology. To paraphrase Locke, there 
is a substitution of reason by claims to revelation.^ This is the epistemological heart 
of enthusiastic belief^ and this is also what must be assessed if charismatic experience 
is to be interpreted properly.
There are parts of the charismatic movement which differ from 'enthusiasm' 
in that they give experience less over-riding authority. However, the kind of 
assertions which are to be appraised here are the true enthusiastic ones which begin 
with a claim to experience God, and on the basis of that, subdue all claims to 
knowledge to this experience.
This varied mixture of phenomena and interpretation creates an almost endless 
stream of questions. Is it possible for a person to experience an infinite God? How 
could God be confined to an experience? How could one be aware of an 'object' so 
vast and transcendent?, or conversely how could one not be aware of an 'object' so 
vast and transcendent? How could one be aware of an experience apart from through 
sensory input? How does God make himself 'felt'? How can information about him 
be picked up and processed? How should such experience be understood? What is 
the relationship between experience and interpretation? Should religious experiences 
be classed as basic perceptions? Could any experience not have been caused by an 
omnipotent God? How should belief relate to experience?
It is quite impossible to answer all of these questions in the space of a short 
thesis, and so we are focusing on one crucial question. Suppose a person claims to 
be encountering God in their experience, how could it be known whether he really is?
This question contains an implicit assumption that there are two distinct 
aspects of a religious experience which need to be examined, and these also need to 
be related to each other in a satisfactory way.
(a) The first distinct aspect is the uninterpreted, raw, or basic subjective 
emotional/physical experience of the person.
(b) The second aspect is the implication or conviction that there is some actual object 
involved with this in the outside world. What does this experience imply? How 
should it be understood?
2 Locke, John An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (Oxford University Press, 1991), XIX, 
section 1. (Page 697ff).
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The crucial nature of this distinction between the objective and the subjective 
and the difficulty of distinguishing between the two aspects is illustrated by Hobbes.
For if a man pretend to me, that God hath spoken to him supematurally and 
immediately, and I make a doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can
produce, to oblige me to believe it......
For to say that God hath spoken to him in Holy Scripture, is not to say God 
hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the prophets, or of the apostles, 
or of the church, in such manner as he speaks to all other Christian men. To say he 
hath spoken to him in a dream, is no more than to say he dreamed God spake to him; 
which is not of force to win belief from any man, that knows dreams are for the most 
part natural, and may proceed from former thoughts; and such dreams as that, from 
self conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a man's own godliness, or 
other virtue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary 
revelation. To say he hath seen a vision, or heard a voice, is to say, that he hath 
dreamed between sleeping and waking: for in such a manner a man doth many times 
naturally take his dream for a vision, as not having well observed his own 
slumbering. To say he speaks by supernatural inspiration, is to say he finds ardent 
desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which he can allege no natural 
and sufficient reason. So that though God Almighty can speak to a man by dreams, 
visions, voice, and inspiration; yet he obliges no man to believe he hath so done to 
him that pretends if; who, being a man, may err, and, which is more, may lie.^
There is a distinct difference between the statements 'God spoke to me in a dream', 
and 'I dreamt God spoke to me'. The former assumes the intervention of an 
objective God in the dream, the latter implies a purely subjective experience which 
does not entail the existence or intervention of any external being. The problem we 
are facing is how to decide which of these two possibilities is occurring in a specific 
instance: suppose a person claims to be encountering God in their experience, how 
could it be known whether he really is?
In this section we will be sifting through the possible epistemological options 
which could be used to resolve this question. This claim to knowledge is central to 
enthusiasm, and this is what must be assessed if it is to be appraised properly.
3 Hobbes, Thomas Leviathan. Taken from The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, {London, XS39), 
pages 361-362. (My italics).
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1. Enthusiasm and strict rational proof
It ought to go without saying that one should not claim rational proof in a strict sense 
for one's interpretation of a religious experience. In practice, however, it does need 
to be said because we are examining a context where people talk of 'unassailable 
proof and claim to know with certainty.
There are a number of reasons why it is not possible to provide strict rational 
proof for one's interpretation of a charismatic experience.
(a) There are alternative explanations to choose from, often dependent on 
fundamentally different ways of looking at the world. This creates the particular 
problem of attempting to talk across a gulf created by differing presuppositions. In 
such a setting, it is not even possible to agree on what all the facts are, even before 
these 'facts' are interpreted in a specific way.^
(b) On top of this, if one is attempting to examine a subjective experience, it is 
practically impossible to demonstrate, in anything approximating to a conclusive 
manner, what is the precise cause of such experience. We do not have perfect access 
to the mind, nor is there anything but a very incomplete understanding of what it is 
or how it functions. The nature and the cause(s) of such experience are therefore 
uncertain and inaccessible,
(c) By the time one comes to understand an experience, the experience is a historical 
event, and history can only yield results which are, at best, tentative, and open to 
revision. In so far, therefore, as an understanding of an experience is based on a 
historical event, it can never achieve certainty.
(d) One is also dealing with the evidence of a witness, as the observer, or the subject 
of an experience. A witness can always be questioned and doubted, and therefore 
such evidence could never be in principle beyond disconfirmation.
(e) An attempt to argue that God was the cause of an experience, presupposes that 
the existence of God has been demonstrated. This in itself has not been done in a 
rigorous way; certainly the traditional arguments for the existence of God are all 
questionable in a variety of ways.
4 These issues are discussed in detail in chapter IV, page 16Iff.
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Even though these objections could be met to some extent, they are enough to 
show that a claim to divine inspiration of an enthusiastic experience could not be 
proved in any strict sense. The result of this, is that if an enthusiast claims to 'know' 
with certainty, then in the generally accepted sense of the word, he is deluded. Even 
if he is right in what he believes, he has no grounds to claim rational certainty for his 
claims to knowledge on the basis of strict rational proof.
To be fair, however, points (a) - (d) are not just applicable to theistic 
understandings of events, as they would also be applicable to any other definite 
interpretation of experience, (such as a psychological or sociological understanding of 
an occurrence). No-one could justifiably claim to have rational proof for their 
particular interpretation.
It is also true that each of these five reasons why rational proof could not be 
provided, would also imply that a specific interpretation of charismatic experience 
would be equally difficult to disprove rationally. One could argue against a claim to 
certainty per se, but given the nature and inaccessibility of the data, it would be 
equally difficult to prove that a specific understanding was false, (at least, excluding 
hopeless internal inconsistency).
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2. Enthusiasm and 'methodism'.
There is a need for some other approach than an attempt to 'prove' a particular 
interpretation of a charismatic experience. Are there some other methods available? 
In this section 'methodism' is being used in the way in which it was used by 
Chisholm in The Problem o f the Criterion.^ This is with the sense of an 
epistemology that gives priority to criteria which determine what can and can not be 
known, as opposed to a 'particularist' method which begins with a claim to know and 
then develops criteria which fit in with the way that reality is putatively known to be. 
Empiricism and Rationalism are both fitted into this 'methodist' category by 
Chisholm because he maintains that they begin with criteria, and these are used to 
assess the epistemic status of particular beliefs. What can be known is determined by 
a method.
One example of this approach is in the work of John Locke. His 'method' 
was to see the way in which a claimed case of knowledge is derived from sensations, 
and if it is to be considered credible, then it must be in a proper relationship with 
sense experience.
It must be said that there is far more to Locke's epistemology than pure 
Empiricism and 'Methodism'. Along with the empiricist presuppositions Locke also 
has strong rationalist elements in his writing. The development of his case in The 
Essay was also intended to gain credibility by fitting in with seventeenth century 
views about what is knowledge. This is a 'Particularist' approach working along 
with 'Methodism'. Locke's epistemology is therefore rather more complex than 
these two simply polarised categories may imply. However, the main point still 
holds good, and Chisholm is right to point out that Locke does make progress 
towards knowledge by beginning with a criterion, and this criterion is used to assess a 
claimed case of knowledge. This is his method.
Locke applied his epistemological tests specifically to enthusiastic claims, and 
they failed to meet his standards for knowledge. The thrust of Locke's argument is 
that the enthusiasts' claims to be recipients of prophecy and to encounter God in 
their experience should not be accepted, because there is not sufficient evidence to 
justify the belief that this is what has really occurred. In the absence of supporting 
evidence, whatever the content of such experience and 'revelations' may be, there are 
no grounds for believing that they do have divine origin. This is the reason 
enthusiastic propositions were dismissed by Locke:
5 Chisholm, R.M. TTze TraWew Crfrerion, (Marquette University Press Milwaukee, 1973).
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Enthusiasm fails of evidence, that the Proposition is from God.®
Locke allows for the possibility of divine revelation in principle, but contends that 
such revelation will be accredited by other features.
The following passage is in the context of a discussion on the science of 
action; Locke argues that there are two ways of developing a moral doctrine. One is 
on the basis of principles of reason, and the other is to derive the doctrine from 
divine revelation. Here Locke is referring to the New Testament as an example of 
divine revelation. I
But the truth and obligation of its precepts have their force, and are put past doubt to 
us, by the evidence of his mission. He was sent by God: and his miracles show it; 
and the authority of God in his precepts cannot be questioned. Here morality has a 
sure standard, that revelation vouches, and reason cannot gainsay, nor question; but 
both together witness to come from God, the great law-maker. And such an one as 
this, out of the New Testament, I think the world never had, nor can any one say, is 
any where else to be found.^
Here Locke argues that what has been revealed by Jesus is genuine revelation on the 
grounds that it has been attested by the miraculous acts of Jesus. The evidence for 
this is so strong that its verity is ’put past doubt'.
This is just one application of Locke's main point however, because the final 
decision on whether any particular claim should be considered as true revelation can 
only be made by reason. It is reason that requires adequate evidence if it is to give 
assent.
Revelation must be judged of by reason. He, therefore that will not give himself up 
to all the extravagances of delusion and error must bring this guide of his light within 
to the trial. God when he makes die prophet does not unmake the man. He leaves all 
his faculties in their natural state, to enable him to judge of his inspirations, whether 
they be of divine origin of no. When he illuminates the mind with supernatural 
light, he does not extinguish that which is natural. If he would have us assent to the 
truth of any proposition, he either evidences that truth by the usual methods of 
natural reason, or else makes it known to be a truth which he would have us assent to 
by his authority, and convinces us that it is from him, by some marks which reason 
cannot be mistaken in. Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything.®
This priority which Locke gives to reason is also evident in Book IV in the chapter on 
'Faith and Reason’.
6 Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding, page 431.
7 Locke Wbrfcs, VII, page 140. Cited in: Yolton, John W The Locke Reader, {Cwihndge, 1977), 
page 219.
8 Locke Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book IV, chapter xix, section 14, page 432.
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...no Proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the Assent due to 
all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge. Because this would 
be to subvert the Principles, and Foundations of all knowledge, Evidence and Assent 
whatsoever: And there would be left no difference between Truth and Falsehood, no 
measures of Credible and Incredible in the World, if doubtful Propositions shall take 
place before self-evident; and what we certainly know, give way to what we may 
possibly be mistaken in.^
The section following this argument in The Essay is the chapter 'On Enthusiasm', and 
it applies this theory of revelation attested by 'marks which reason cannot be 
mistaken in', to enthusiastic belief. Consistent with what has preceded this chapter, 
Locke's main criticism of enthusiastic epistemology is that it is a substitution of 
reason in favour of revelation. If Locke is right to argue that reason is the main test 
of revelation, then in rejecting the primacy of reason the enthusiast has been left with 
no means of establishing the truth of any revelation, and no means of distinguishing 
the true from the false.
It is not the principle of claiming to know on the basis of revelation from God 
that is questioned by Locke at this point. Rather the inquiry is centred on the same 
question at issue here; i.e. if a person claims that their words have been revealed by 
God, how could one know whether they were from God or not?
In theory revelation is capable of supplying 'Assurance beyond Doubt, 
Evidence beyond Exception'.^®
The reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such an one, as cannot deceive, 
nor be deceived, and that is of God himself. This carries with it Assurance beyond 
Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called by a peculiar Name, Revelation, 
and our Assent to it, Faith: which as absolutely determines our minds, and as 
perfectly excludes all wavering as our Knowledge it self; and we may as well doubt 
of our own Being, as we can, whether any Revelation from GOD be true. So that 
Faith is a settled and sure Principle of Assent and Assurance, and leaves no maimer 
of room for Doubt or Hesitation. ^  ^
There is, however a significant proviso on this certainty, and it is this proviso which 
distinguishes Locke's 'certainty' at this point from enthusiastic certainty:
Only we must be sure, that it be a divine Revelation, and that we understand it right: 
else we shall expose our selves to all the Extravagancy of Enthusiasm, and all the 
Error of wrong Principles, if we have Faith and Assurance in what is not divine 
Revelation. And therefore in those Cases, our Assent can be rationally no higher 
than the Evidence of its being a Revelation, and that this is the meaning of the 
Expressions it is delivered in.^^
9 Ibid, book IV, chapter xviii section 6 page 692. (My italics).
10 Ibid, book IV, chapter xvi, page 667.
11 Ibid, book IV, chapter xvi, page 667.
12 Ibid, book IV, chapter xvi, section 14, page 667. (My italics).
  ■ \
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To summarise Locke's main criticism of enthusiasm: the enthusiast substitutes a 
claim to revelation in the place of reason. However, because reason is the primary 
test of what should be considered as revelation, the enthusiast thereby loses both 
reason and the capacity to recognise true revelation. Because of this substitution, he 
has failed to meet the standards of 'empiricism* as developed by Locke.
This is not the last word on the issue, however, because there are significant 
difficulties with empiricist criteria for determining what counts as even a reputable 
claim to knowledge. These criteria were given such dogmatic authority that 
according to Hume, if one were to find a book in the library that did not conform to 
the empirical criteria, then it should be discarded:
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; 
let us ask. Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?
No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and 
existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but 
sophistry and illusion.
The epistemological difficulties inherent in this attitude are already well documented, 
and so we will simply mention two which are especially significant, and of particular 
relevance to this thesis.
The first is a problem with the empiricist criteria themselves, as they are very 
broad and far reaching, yet at the same time could be accused of being arbitrary 
because of the problem in defining how they are generated. The difficulty is that 
Locke never did explain precisely how he arrived at these criteria. Exactly what their 
relationship to the sensations should be is consequently open to question.
This is a strange starting point for a method which proceeds so cautiously and 
meticulously from there on, as it is difficult to see what reasons could be given to 
justify the use of these particular criteria rather than some others. The criteria do not 
meet their own standards.
The second is a problem in the application to reality, because so much is 
excluded from the system that there is little of any value left. It becomes impossible 
to be sure whether sensations even represent any external reality. All that one can 
know is that one has certain sensations here and now.
The empiricist criteria were pushed to extremes by Hume, and when this was 
done it became obvious that when treated as the sole arbiters of what can be known, 
they provide no basis for believing much that would seem to be evidently acceptable. 
They would exclude, for example, belief in the existence of body, or any other
13 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, (Oxford University Press, 1990). 
Sect. XII, Part III, page 165.
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physical things such as houses or trees; even less atoms and sub atomic particles or 
other minds. If one is ruthlessly consistent with the empiricist criteria, it even 
becomes inconsistent to believe in cause and effect.
It is consequently not just enthusiasm that fails to reach empiricist standards 
because the same is true of many other beliefs which would seem to be quite 
justifiable under normal circumstances. Hence, to say that enthusiastic belief does 
not live up to such criteria is not enough to determine conclusively the epistemic 
status of enthusiasm. The empiricist criteria themselves would seem to be inadequate 
as a means of establishing what can be known. s
,1
.,-4
If rationalism is considered to be another form of 'methodism', then one finds 
that there are analogous problems here too. Rationalism at this point is being used in 
the narrower sense of the word as referring to a group of 17th and 18th century 
philosophers who are typically represented by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. One 
could characterise this kind of rationalism as the belief that it is possible to obtain an 
understanding of the nature of what exists by reason alone. One has a faculty of 
intuition which enables one to 'see with the eye of the mind'. This faculty provides 
'clear and distinct perceptions' which can supply knowledge which is beyond doubt, 
(at least if God exists in perfection and is of 'being no d e c e i v e r ' ) . Rationalism has 
a concept of knowledge which forms a single system, deductive in character and all 
inclusive. Everything is in principle explicable.
Descartes is considered to be the first modern Rationalist. As a 
mathematician his ambition was to introduce into philosophy the rigour and clarity of 
mathematical thought. In order to do this he set out to doubt everything in the hope 
of arriving at something indubitable on which his philosophy could be built. This 
was what he claimed to have achieved in his famous 'cogito ergo sum'; because to 
doubt one's own doubting would be absurd. This was the foundation on which he 
aimed to deduce other propositions, each following with the same self-evidence. For 
the most part Descartes argued for the view that 'ideas' are innate, and that they
could not be derived from experience, or 'sensation'. This is why rationalism is 
normally seen as being in opposition to empiricism. Descartes' views would also be 
a denial of enthusiasm with its basis in experience.
Spinoza and Leibniz adopted the same epistemic structure as Descartes, 
although they started in different places. Rather than beginning with the existence of 
self, Spinoza began with the existence of the universe, or 'substance' as he called it.^ ®
14 For example, Descartes, R. The Principles of Philosophy, 'Human Knowledge', XLV (Everyman, 
1986), page 182.
15 Cf. Hampshire, Stuart Spinoza, (Pelican, 1957), page 67ff,
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Leibniz began by distinguishing those truths which are 'necessary* from those which 
are 'contingent', and built from there,i®
Leibniz specifically addressed enthusiasm in New Essays on Human 
Understanding. In it he begins with a summary of Locke's views on this issue by 
putting Locke's words into the mouth of 'Philalethes'. 'Theophilus' replies with the 
views of Leibniz as follows:
Todays 'enthusiasts' believe that they also receive doctrinal instruction from God.
The Quakers are convinced of this, and their first systematic writer, Barklay, claims 
that they find within themselves a certain light which itself announces what it is. But 
why call something 'light' if it doesn't cause anything to be seen? I know that there 
are people with that cast of mind, who see sparks and even something brighter; but 
this image of corporeal light, aroused when their minds become overheated, brings 
no light to the mind.^®
Leibniz outlined some of the phenomena which are interpreted by enthusiasts as 
indications that their experience is a real encounter with the divine. Interestingly all 
of these criteria were also mentioned by Chauncey and Jonathan Edwards who wrote 
in the context of American Enthusiasm within twenty years of Leibniz's comments.
Some half-wits, when their minds become over-heated, become worked up, form 
conceptions wldch they did not previously have; they become capable of saying 
things which strike them as very fine, or at least lively; they astonish themselves and 
others with this fecundity which is taken to be inspired. They posses this ability 
mainly in virtue of a powerful imagination aroused by passion, and a fortunate 
memory which has copiously stored the turns of phrase of prophetic books which 
they are familiar with through reading or through hearing them talked about.......
And I know a visionary who rests his claim on his capacity to speak and pray aloud 
almost all day long without tiring or running out of words. There are people who, 
after practicing austerities or after a period of sorrow, experience a peace and 
consolation in the soul; this delights them, and they find such sweetness in it that 
they believe it to be the work of tlie Holy Spirit.
Leibniz points out the ambiguity of such means of assessment. He also outlines some 
examples of enthusiastic conviction; a woman who claimed to be able to dictate 
words which came from Jesus, a man who was convinced he was immortal, a variety 
of prophecies that turned out to be erroneous, and so on. Interspersed between these 
anecdotes one can gather the means of assessment that Leibniz was suggesting.
16 Leibniz, G.W. Philosophical Writings; 'Necessary and Contingent Truths' (circa 1686), 
(Everyman, 1987), page 96,
17 Leibniz, G.W. New Essays on Human Understanding (Cambridge, 1981). Book IV, chapter xix, 
page 503.
18 Ibid, book IV, chapter xix, section 505.
19 Ibid, book IV, chapter xix, section 506.
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Sometimes Leibniz proposes that an alternative interpretation may be 
preferable:
It is certainly true tliat the contentment we find in contemplating God's greatness and 
goodness, and in carrying out his will and practicing the virtues, is a blessing from 
God, and one of the greatest. But it is not always a blessing which needs renewed 
supernatural assistance, as many o f these good people claim?-^
Leibniz gives some examples of prophecies which have turned out to be false. If this 
falsehood can be demonstrated then one has effectively provided a means of external 
assessment:
When these people are sincere in their behaviour they are hard to bring around; 
sometimes having all their schemes go to ruin sets them straight, but often this comes 
too late.^*
Pointing out a contradiction with other enthusiastic claims to revelation is also 
suggested by Leibniz as a means of persuading the enthusiast to abandon his v i e w s .22 
Leibniz accepted Locke’s central argument that revelation can only be accepted as 
being true if it is accompanied by marks which reason cannot be mistaken in, such as 
miracles.
The way these people clash with one another should further convince them that tlieir 
alleged 'inner witness' is not divine, and that other signs are required to confirm
it Their disputes show, at the least, that their inner witness needs outer
verification if it is to be believed, and they should have to work miracles before ttiey 
would deserve to be accepted as inspired prophets. Still, such inspired utterances 
could bring their proofs with them; this would be the case if fiiey truly enlightened 
the mind through the important revelation of some surprising tnith which was beyond 
the powers of the person who had discovered it, unless he had help from outside.23
Leibniz has written his own (rather loosely constructed) comments on Locke's Essay, 
and added some examples of enthusiastic experience. He seems to agree with all 
points of Locke’s analysis and criticism of e n t h u s ia s m .2 4  Locke has such strong 
rationalist elements in his work, that on this issue he has written the strongest 
available rationalist approach to enthusiastic belief.
20 Ibid, book IV, chapter xix, section 506. (My italics)
21 Ibid, book IV, chapter xix, section 506.
22 This is an interesting point because it is similar to the approach taken by N.Wolterstorff, i.e. an 
attempt to demonstrate that enthusiasm could be shown to be an unreliable method of belief formation. 
The point about contradictory revelations is made by Flew in God and Philosophy. A. God
and Philosophy, page 127).
23 Ibid, book IV, chapter xix, section 507.
24 This agreement illustrates incidentally the artificiality of classing Locke as an 'Empiricist' who is 
polarised from 'Rationalism'.
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In the case of both rationalism and empiricism, the status of a claim to 
knowledge is determined by a particular method, and they both make similar 
criticisms of enthusiasm.
The confidence that rationalist principles had in reason and proof tended to be 
exclusive, because claims not based on rationalist principles would be considered as 
being based on false premises, and so could not constitute knowledge. Consequently 
rationalism excludes other claimed ways of knowing, such as empiricism would 
allow. It would also be a denial of mystical experience, claims to revelation, 
intuition and so on. Each of these ways of 'knowing' would be ruled out because 
they were not built on incorrigible foundations, and they did not conform to the 
rationalist methods. According to rationalism, none of these alternatives should 
claim to provide knowledge because this 'knowledge' would be based on sense 
experience, which would rule out the claim in principle. Enthusiastic belief which 
was rooted in experience, and substituted reason in favour of claims to revelation 
would be nonsensical as far as rationalism was concerned.
As with empiricism, however, this is not the last word on the issue because 
there are also significant problems with rationalist epistemology. There is a long 
history of challenges to rationalism from empiricists such as John Stuart Mill, and 
from logical positivists such as A.J.Ayer and Rudolph Carnap. Rationalism is 
criticised through linguistic analysis. The possibility of being certain of any 'truths' 
has been widely attacked. The rationalist rejection of knowledge which comes from 
experience seems to be out of touch with reality. The concept that ideas are innate 
has been questioned by Leibniz on the grounds that 'innate' ideas do not manifest 
themselves before experience. So much apparent 'knowledge' is excluded that a 
question is raised about the acceptability of rationalist methods.
Consequently it is not just enthusiasm which fails to meet rationalist criteria 
for determining what can be known, and failure to satisfy rationalist requirements is 
not enough to determine conclusively the epistemic status of enthusiasm.
There is another use of the term 'rationalism' which is relevant to this thesis. 
This is not meant in the sense that Descartes, Spinoza, or Leibniz were rationalists, 
but in a broader sense in which superstition, prejudice, habit or other unreliable 
methods of belief formation, are rejected in favour of subjecting ideas to a reasonable 
appraisal. If one were to take such a rationalist approach to religious experience, 
then the onus is on the philosopher or theologian to determine, as far as he can, 
whether there is adequate evidence to justify a religious claim.
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For example, if a rationalist were to hold justifiably a theistic belief, then he 
would need to answer many questions satisfactorily. Is the concept of God coherent? 
What reasons are there for such belief? What are the arguments against theistic 
belief? After sifting through the evidence he comes to a decision whether, on 
balance, the case for God's existence is strong enough to warrant its acceptance.
A good recent example of this kind of approach can be found in Richard 
Swinburne's three books, The Coherence o f Theism, The Existence o f God and Faith 
and Reason?^ He briefly summarises his method of approach in the introduction to 
The Existence o f God:
The book is written in deep conviction of the possibility of reaching fairly well 
justified conclusions by rational argumenfi^
According to Swinburne the existence of God can be supported through rational 
argument, but only up to a limited point.
I shall, however, argue that although reason can reach a fairly well justified 
conclusion about the existence of God, it can only reach a probable conclusion, not 
an indubitable one. 22
The implications of this with regard to Christian faith are explored by Swinburne in 
his later book Faith and Reason.
Although Swinburne is discussing the rationality of believing in the existence 
of God, the methods used to explore this issue are still applicable to a search for ways 
to assess enthusiastic belief, because in both situations one is making a choice to 
interpret reality in a theistic or non theistic way. In choosing theism over atheism a 
person is attributing a specific cause to the existence of all that is, and in choosing 
enthusiastic belief over any of the alternatives, one is attributing the cause of a 
particular experience directly to God. The question raised in both situations is how 
such a claim can be justified, and the epistemology of each choice is analogous to the 
other.
Such rationalist approaches to religious belief have been criticised recently 
because of their 'classical foundationalist' epistemology. The same criticism is also 
applicable to the empiricism of Aquinas and Locke, because both rationalism and 
empiricism have a 'foundationalist' structure to their epistemology. This structure
25 Swinburne, R. The Coherence of Theism, (Oxford, 1977). 
Swinburne, R. The Existence of God, (Oxford, 1979). 
Swinburne, R. Faith and Reason, (Oxford, 1981).
26 The Existence of God, page 1.
27 Ibid, page 3.
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commits a person to the thesis that it is unreasonable to believe in God unless the 
hypothesis that there is a God, is supported by evidence in the form of facts which 
are less open to question than theistic belief itself. These facts must be supported by 
other facts which in turn justify their acceptance. This process continues until one 
reaches a layer of facts which require no other support, because they are considered 
to be inherently incorrigible or self-authenticating. This is a layer of basic belief.
Those who oppose such an approach, however, have no difficulty in 
demonstrating (a) how problematic the concept of incorrigible data is, and (b) how 
difficult it is to define what should constitute a basic belief. This seriously 
undermines the basis of foundationalist epistemology.
For example, A.Plantinga criticises rationalist epistemology in the context of 
discussing 'foundationalism'. He defines foundationalist criteria in a doubly 
universal way:
(18) For any proposition A and person S, A is properly basic for S if and only if A is 
incorrigible for S or self-evident to S.
But how could one know a thing like that? What are its credentials? Clearly 
enough (18) isn’t self-evident or just obviously true. But if it isn't, how does one 
arrive at it? What sort of arguments would be appropriate? Of course a 
foundationalist might find (18) so appealing, he simply takes it to be true, neither 
offering argument for it, nor accepting it on the basis of other things he believes. If 
he does so, however, his noetic structure will be self-referentially incoherent. (18) 
itself is neither self-evident nor incorrigible; hence in accepting (18) as basic, the 
modem foundationalist violates the condition of proper basicality he himself lays 
down in accepting it. 2*
Rationalism is also criticised by writers such as Nicholas Wolterstorff on the grounds 
that it gives an unrealistic description of the way in which people develop and 
maintain their religious beliefs. Beliefs do not march before totally detached and 
neutral thinkers, who determine the value of the evidence for and against each 
proposition, giving their assent to them with a strength which is proportional to the 
evidence. As a rule, the believer is brought up in a system which believes in God, 
and accepts this in the way in which he accepts many other beliefs which have been 
nurtured by his home and culture. For a person to assess all their beliefs in a 
thoroughly rationalist way would take many lifetimes, and is simply not possible for 
the individual to achieve.
There are significant problems with each of these forms of 'methodism'. 
Rationalism and empiricism both begin with criteria to determine what can be known, 
and then run into apparent difficulties in the application of their criteria to reality. 
We will need more than these methods if we are to be able to assess the claims to 
religious experience made by the enthusiast.
28 Nous, vol XV, (Nous Publications, 1981), page 49.
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29 Moore, G.E. Philosophical Studies, cited in Theory of Knowledge, page 120,
30 Much of the argument on these issues is contained in; Plantinga, A. (Ed) Faith and Rationality, 
(Notre Dame, 1983).
;;3. Enthusiasm and 'Particularism' |
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Rationalism and Empiricism have led to conclusions such that no one accepting them 
will behave in a way which is consistent with that acceptance. Dissatisfaction with 
this situation has led to attempts to resolve the problem by beginning at the opposite 
end of the quandary. Rather than using a particular method as the arbiter of what is 
known, one could begin with what is 'known', then develop criteria which will 
provide conclusions that fit in with the way we 'know' reality is. It is an approach 
taken by Thomas Reid in the eighteenth century, also by G.E.Moore, and more 
recently by Chisholm. It is described by the latter as 'common-sensism'. 
'Particularism' is a way forward that is also accepted and applied to theological 
issues, by writers such as Farrer and Plantinga.
:
There is no reason why we should not, in this respect, make our philosophical 
opinions agree with what we necessarily believe at other times. There is no reason 
why I should not confidently assert that I do really know some external facts, 
although I cannot prove the assertion by simply assuming that I do. I am, in fact, as 
certain of this as of anything and as reasonably certain of it.29
This is a promising approach which attempts to derive criteria of knowing by 
accommodating criteria to prior assumptions about what one does 'know'. This also 
involves a rejection of scepticism, because in this way one can assume that one's 
knowledge goes beyond that which is directly evident or a priori.
One group of modern theological and philosophical writers who fall into this 
'particularist' category are especially significant in our examination of enthusiastic 
epistemology; Plantinga, Wolterstorff, Alston, Farrer, and others. Their thought is 
linked firstly by a rejection of 'classical foundationalism'. A second connection 
between them is a refutation of the 'evidentialist challenge' to religious belief; a 
rejection of the notion that religious belief is not acceptable unless it is justified by 
adequate evidence. A third link is, (what is described by Plantinga and 
Wolterstorff), as 'Calvinist epistemology' or 'Reformed epistemology', which is the 
view that theistic belief can be justified in the absence of any evidence whatsoever.3o 
In order to clarify the direction of this section, briefly, the core of this 
'particularist' argument is as follows. Belief in God is properly 'basic', and therefore 
needs no support from other evidence. The same is true of a statement such as 'I feel f
____________________________
i
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pain', which can justifiably be accepted without external support from evidence or 
rational argument. The person who claims to have had an experience of God is in a 
similar epistemic position to the person who feels pain, and should normally be 
believed because: (a) the experience of God can be considered as a basic perceptual 
practice, and (b) beliefs based on such perception ought to be treated as being 
innocent until proved guilty.
If one were going to challenge such a claim to have experienced God which 
was justified on the basis of direct perception, there would seem to be two possible 
ways forward.
(a) The first way would be to explore the possibility of some other evidence 
which could demonstrate that the God a person claimed to perceive was not in reality 
there at the time of the experience.
(b) The second way to challenge this claim would be to argue that there is 
evidence to show that some other factor was the cause of a particular experience.
As regards the first possibility there are severe difficulties because there are 
no disconfirming observations that could be made. What observation could be made 
which would demonstrate that an invisible God was not there at a particular time? 
The other major problem that needs to be faced if one intends to refute such a claim, 
is that because God is omnipresent, then the only way of showing that he was not 
there at the time, would be to demonstrate that he does not exist. If this can not be 
done then it is always possible that it was God who brought about a particular 
experience and was a real percept to the subject.
Such an argument for the non-existence of God is hardly generally available, 
and if a person fails in this first task he is forced to accept the second challenge. This 
means arguing that some alternative to a theistic interpretation is the most plausible of 
the available options. But this also raises difficulties.
But if there is a God, he is omnipresent and all causal processes only operate because 
he sustains them. Hence any causal processes at all which bring about my experience 
will have God among their causes; and any experience of him will be of him as 
present at a place where he is. And so if there is a God, any experience which seems 
to be of God, will be genuine - will be of God.^^
The difficulties in challenging the fideistic position seem to leave it in command of 
the field, indeed it could seem to be unassailable. Theism does not need any 
inductive justification, it is beyond disconfirmation, it ought to be believed even in 
the absence of empirical evidence, and any possible objection to this belief seems to 
be poisoned with foundationalism.
31 The Existence of God, page 270.
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What makes such argumentation so important in this thesis is that it has a 
striking similarity to the way in which enthusiastic claims to knowledge are justified. 
It is important that we consider it in some detail. If such an argument does provide 
an acceptable means of determining which beliefs are justifiable, it would also seem 
to offer a support for enthusiastic claims to knowledge. When using this 
'particularist' criterion, enthusiasm fares better than it does when tested against 
empiricism or rationalism. Indeed, this approach is essentially the same structure as 
that of enthusiastic epistemology, in that it begins with 'knowledge', and then adjusts 
its criteria in a variety of ways by testing them against what is 'known', and adjusting 
these criteria accordingly. In the case of the enthusiast it is a rather crude 
adjustment, normally involving ignoring reasonable argument on the grounds that it 
must be submitted to 'revelation'. It is similar, however, in that the enthusiasts 
theistic beliefs are considered to be basic. An enthusiastic context also creates an 
unusual degree of certainty, but essentially it has the same epistemic framework. If 
we apply the phraseology of Chisholm to it, it is 'particularist'.32
This would help us to understand the debate between Locke and the 
enthusiasts, as they represent two systems of thought which have fundamentally 
different starting points. They inevitably reach contradictory conclusions because 
they begin with opposite presuppositions. An enthusiast would have no reason even 
to listen to Locke's arguments, because he already 'knew' what was true. Locke 
would find enthusiasm wholly unacceptable because its claims to knowledge were not 
supported by adequate evidence. The enthusiast begins with a definition of the extent 
of his knowledge, and the empiricist begins by asking the question 'How can we 
decide whether we do know?'
Nicholas Wolterstorff is an example of a modern writer who has written in 
support of this 'particularist' epistemic structure. Interestingly for this thesis, he also 
briefly makes the link between this system of thought and enthusiasm. He has a 
section on enthusiasm in one of his essays in which he contradicts enthusiastic claims. 
Wolterstorff says that his epistemology would not leave one 'speechless in the face of 
crackpots', but:
Rather than demanding evidence from the enthusiast, one offers him adequate reasons
for the falsehood of his belief.
In spite of this contention, a contradiction of enthusiastic claims does not follow on 
naturally from Wolterstorff s argument. In fact an epistemology of the sort he (or
32 Problem of the Criterion, page 19.
33 Wolterstorff, N. Can Belief in God be Rational! in Faith and Rationality, page 177. What he 
considers to be 'adequate reasons' will be discussed in more detail later.
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Plantinga) constructed would be attractive to enthusiastic belief because it has such a 
similar structure. The enthusiast claims that God has spoken directly to him, and that 
he knows 'as sure as he has being'. He could claim that his experience was a direct 
perception of God, and therefore a justifiable belief even in the absence of any 
external supporting evidence.
In order to make progress in these issues, we need to ask: (a) whether this 
form of (putative) fideism is quite so unassailable as it seems and (b) we need to 
determine if it really is so similar to the epistemic structure of enthusiasm.
We will explore the strength of this form of 'particularism' under two sections 
which cover the heart of the argumentation involved. The first is a discussion of 
belief as being 'innocent until proved guilty', and the second concerns what should be 
considered as a 'basic belief.
A. A REV ISE D  D E FIN IT IO N  O F 'R E A SO N A B L E  B E L IE F ’
(al The argument for revision
One example of a re-definition of 'reasonable belief can be found in the work of 
N.Wolterstorff. He suggests a reversal of the 'methodisf rationalist approach, and 
replaces this with a concept of knowledge which is 'innocent until proved guilty'. 
Wolterstorff rejects what he calls the 'evidentialist challenge' set by John Locke as 
being untenable; the only way to meet it is to contest it. This challenge could be 
stated as follows. According to Locke the certainty of one's belief should be in 
proportion to the quality of the evidence available in its support. Truth and falsehood 
are no 'infallible mark of praiseworthiness', but the rationality of one's belief is 
praiseworthy. The primary duty of the epistemologist is to govern properly his belief 
in the pursuit of knowledge.
The aim of this process is to get more in touch with reality, and this is done 
through the twin processes of believing true propositions, and not believing that 
which is false. Both of these processes are essential. A person is required to do as 
'well as can rightly be demanded' in fulfilling these obligations.
Wolterstorff, however, starts in a different place from Locke and presupposes 
a set of beliefs which are already held by a person. The search is for criteria which 
could separate those beliefs which are rational from the non-rational. In order to do 
this Wolterstorff s approach is to look for adequate evidence to cease believing, and 
to work on the assumption that beliefs are:
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innocent until proved guilty, not guilty until proved innocent.
This implies a 'credulity disposition'.35 One is rational in belief, only if one does not 
have good reasons to cease from believing. In Can Belief in God be Rationall this 
criterion is formalised, and then refined through five stages until it reaches the 
following form.
A person S is rational in an eluctable and innocently produced case of not believing p 
if and only if S does not believe p, and either:
(i) S neither has not ought to have adequate
reason to believe p, and is not rationally obliged to believe that he does have 
adequate reason to believe p; or
(ii) S does have adequate reason to believe p
but does not realise that he does, and is rationally justified in that.3^
Wolterstorff applies this criterion to orthodox religious belief, as well as to 
Enthusiasm. The believer is often brought up in a home and culture which teaches 
belief in God, and so he grows up accepting this along with many other beliefs. It is 
unreasonable to expect a person to rebuild all his beliefs from scratch in the manner 
of Descartes, and so if this system continues to 'nourish' him, then he has the best of 
reasons for continuing to adhere to it.
if a person lacks adequate reason to cease from some one of his beliefs, then he is 
rationally justified in holding it even if it was produced in him by an unreliableprocess.
A reasonable belief, is therefore one which is held because it has not been shown to 
be false, rather than one which has been demonstrated to be true.
Given their very different starting points, it is surprising to find that 
Swinburne agrees with Wolterstorff to some extent on this issue. Swinburne 
describes 'the principle of credulity':
I suggest that it is a principle of rationality that (in the absence of special 
considerations) if it seems (epistemically) to a subject that x is present, then probably 
X is present; what one seems to perceive is probably so. How things seem to be is 
good grounds for a belief about how things are. From this it would follow that, in 
the absence of special considerations, all religious experiences should be taken by 
their subjects as genuine, and hence as substantial grounds for belief in the existence
34 Ibid, page 163.
35 Ibid, page 163.
36 Ibid, page 168.
37 Ibid, page 166 (Part V ll).
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of their apparent object-God, or Mary, or Ultimate Reality, or Poseidon. This 
principle, which I shall call the principle of credulity, and the conclusion drawn from 
it seem to me correct. 3*
Swinburne's views should not be taken to be speaking of a form of incorrigibility, 
because they are only describing a presumption of truth. This is implicit in the 
phrase 'in the absence of special considerations' which implies that such a source of 
knowledge is capable of being questioned. It also leaves us to ask if there are special 
considerations which should be taken into account in the case of religious experience. 
Swinburne makes more restrained claims for experience than Wolterstorff as he gives 
greater prominence to other factors which limit the 'principle of credulity'.
(b) Some objections
The major difficulty with an ' innocent until proved guilty' conception of reasonable 
belief is in its application to reality where people hold many contradictory beliefs 
which are unable to be disconfirmed. This is the important objection for the purposes 
of this thesis, because this is the situation in the context of enthusiastic belief. As 
Swinburne mentions, such a method of belief formation could be used to support the 
existence of Poseidon as well as the Christian God.^^ If one has an epistemology 
such as the one suggested by Wolterstorff, where disconfirmation is the test of what 
is epistemically acceptable, then one is allowed an infinite number of hypothetical 
beliefs which would be beyond disconfirmation. It has the opposite problem to 
'methodism' in the sense that far too many potentially unreliable beliefs can be 
included in its epistemic structure.
Some examples will clarify the problems of this epistemology. One could 
mention the example of Russell's suggestion of a tea pot flying around Mars, as this 
would be a belief which would be practically beyond disconfirmation. However, this 
would be rather too easy, as well as being unfair. One would be hard pushed to find 
someone who really did hold such a belief. Better examples than this are needed 
because it is important to see that the eapacity to include potentially unreliable beliefs 
is not simply an abstract theoretical objection to 'particularism' in this form, but one 
which is evident in the real world and especially in enthusiastic epistemology. 
Different people do hold logically contradictory beliefs which are unable to be 
disconfirmed. They also do so in a manner which could be described as being basic.
38 The Existence of God, page 254.
39 Ibid, page 254.
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F irst  E x a m ple
A more useful example would be to apply this 'innocent until proved guilty' criterion 
to differing religious beliefs and see how it fares. In this context we could take the 
example of a Hindu who believed in reincarnation of the soul, a belief which would 
be virtually impossible to disconfirm. What evidence could be given which would 
demonstrate that this belief was unsound? On the other hand, a fundamentalist 
Christian would believe the antithesis of the Hindu's belief; that 'it is given to men 
once to die, and after that comes j u d g m e n t ' . H e  believes that there is no 
reincarnation.
This leaves us in the position where two groups of people hold their beliefs 
with sincere conviction, and neither set of beliefs are capable of disconfirmation. 
These beliefs are logically contradictory; but if we use the criterion suggested by 
Wolterstorff, both are justifiable epistemological positions. A criterion which leads 
to such contradiction must be suspect because it is unable to make a decision between 
the two opposing views. If one intends to avoid accepting logical contradiction, then 
one needs a criterion which is more selective in what it will include, than beliefs 
being 'innocent until proved guilty' can produce. It may provide a realistic starting 
point, but some other means of refining the beliefs included by this definition will be 
needed if one is to sift out that which should not be there.
S e c o n d  E x a m pl e
If we apply Wolterstorff s re-definition of reasonable belief to a current charismatic 
example, then we find the same inability to sift out varied beliefs.
For example, the use of 'tongues' would illustrate the problem. If we assume 
that there is such a gift, and that there will be both genuine and non genuine instances 
of its use, how could it be assessed by this epistemology? The people speaking quite 
sincerely believe that they are having a direct communication from God to their 
minds. There is however no rational content in the words which one could analyse 
and then demonstrate to be true or false. In the absence of a rational content which 
could have been assessed in the way that Wolterstorff recommends, one has 
considerable problems if one is not going to interpret this experience as being an 
encounter with God or a case of direct revelation through tongues and interpretation. 
In order to reject the words of the speaker, one would have to demonstrate
40 Hebrews 9:27.
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conclusively that a past, and subjective experience that the person believed to be a 
revelation from God, was not in fact caused by God.
This will be impossible:
(a) In principle, because if one is claiming that the God who is involved in 
these events is the omnipotent initiator and sustainer of every event in the universe, 
then how could one possibly prove that at some stage he was not the original cause of 
the happening?
(b) On top of this, it is also quite impractical to delve into the origins of a 
subjective experience, (even with lengthy psycho-analysis!) and if it is not possible to 
do this, then these convictions are all (using Wolterstorff s definition of rationality), 
rationally held beliefs because they cannot be disconfirmed.
The person ’speaking in tongues' has done what can rightly be expected of 
him if he is submitting himself to the contents of this 'revelation from God', because 
there is no way to demonstrate that his belief in the origin of this 'tongue' is false. 
Both the observer and the speaker would have an obligation to treat the words as 
being of divine inspiration.
The effect of all this is that if forming beliefs on the basis of 'speaking in 
tongues' can not be demonstrated to be unreliable, then believing the 'tongue' was a 
divine communication would have to be classed as an acceptable belief because:
(a) An unreliable process of belief formation may not require a person to give 
up those beliefs.
(b) In the absence of demonstrating that the belief is false, it should be 
assumed to be true.
(c) The people involved can claim the justification that it was also a direct 
perception, and therefore they ought to be believed.
This epistemology would force one to the uncomfortable conclusion that some 
chatter which was created by nothing but a person's own mind, should be classed as 
divine revelation. It has the same epistemic justification as the genuine article would 
have, because in both cases the person believes it to be a revelation, and in neither 
case is the content of the 'revelation' demonstrably false.
T hird  E x a m pl e
If we take some examples of enthusiastic conviction, we can see similar difficulties. 
The following quotes are from Seasonable Thoughts, by Charles Chauncey.
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they imagined Devils were about them, and ready to lay hold on them and draw them 
away into Hell.
Impulses and impressions, which have prevail'd among too many; their aptness to 
take the motion of their own minds for something divinely extraordinary, or to put 
those constructions upon common occurrences, which there is no ground for but in 
their own imaginations."^^
Chauncey is careless in his criticism; how could it be demonstrated that these 
experiences were just the product of an 'overheated imagination' rather than a real 
encounter with the supernatural? Chauncey has begun with a set of assumptions 
about what kind of experiences are genuinely religious or not. These assumptions 
are not stated, but they determine what he selects from the Bible in support of his 
argument, and his whole criticism of enthusiasm.
In what ways would Wolterstorff s definition of reasonable belief improve on 
Chauncey in an attempt to determine whether enthusiastic 'impulses and impressions' 
such as these were revelations from God or not?
Consistent with an 'innocent until proved guilty' view of knowledge, 
Wolterstorff suggests that the way to approach the enthusiast is not to use Locke's 
method, which was to argue that there was inadequate evidence in support of his 
belief. What should be done is to 'offer him adequate reasons for the falsehood of 
his beliefs', and show in this way that these beliefs are not a c c e p t a b l e . 4 2
This 'innocent until proved guilty' approach to the formulation of justifiable 
belief leaves a number of potential ways in which the enthusiast could be approached. 
We will apply this criterion in differing ways to explore its results.
(i) Would it be possible to point out that every sane person knows that it is 
unwise to take up irrational belief? The possibility of simply taking up irrational 
belief is mentioned in section XI of Wolterstorff s essay.
Frequently an objection of the following sort is lodged against the criterion I 
have proposed. Suppose a person takes a fancy to a proposition and just up and 
believes it. Suppose, further, that he neither has nor ought to have any adequate 
reason to give up that proposition. Then by our criterion he is rational in his belief.
But surely he is not.
The truth is that by our criterion he most assuredly is not rational in his 
belief. The "mechanism" operative in this imaginary case - one may well doubt 
whether there really is any such "mechanism'* and whether anybody really can 
believe in this fashion, but let that pass - the "mechanism" operative is that of 
believing what one takes a fancy to. But certainly any normal adult human being not
41 Chauncey, Charles Seasonable Thoughts on the State of Religion in New England (Boston, Rogers 
and Fowle, 1736). Page 180.
42 Wolterstorff s essay: 'Can Belief in God be Rational?’, in Faith and Rationality, page 177.
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only ought to know but also does know that this is a most unreliable "mechanism" of 
belief formation. Knowing this, he has a very good reason indeed for giving up tliat 
belief.
Wolterstorff s dismissal of this 'mechanism' is not developed, and is unjustified. 
People are capable of taking up irrational belief, and they do use 'unreliable' 
methods of belief formation, and do hold contradictory beliefs on such a basis.
Indeed section XI is the shortest section in the essay, and this is unfortunate, 
because it is precisely such a belief forming mechanism which is at the root of 
enthusiasm. The essence of enthusiasm is the ability to react against rational thought, 
dismissing it as 'carnal reasoning', or 'the arm of the flesh', or 'Saul's armour'; and 
to put in its place an experience of direct revelation from God which becomes the 
foundation of belief.
There is consequently a 'mechanism' at work in enthusiasm which does enable 
a person to 'take a fancy to' virtually any belief, i.e. the conviction that some 
message is a revelation from God, requires belief in the content of that 'revelation', 
whether that content seems rational or not. This process is therefore capable of 
allowing irrational belief to be simply accepted. If such a mechanism does exist then 
Wolterstorff s notion of justifiable belief is unable to refute it. This would leave 
Wolterstorff s criterion capable of including an infinite number of hypothetical 
irrational beliefs.
(ii) There is another pathway to assess enthusiastic beliefs that Wolterstorff s 
definition of reasonable belief would permit. This would be to demonstrate that the 
source of a historical experience of internal conviction was not caused by God. If 
one could do this, then one has given an adequate reason for the falsehood of a 
persons belief. If this could not be done, then, according to Wolterstorff, their 
claims ought to be believed.
As we have mentioned earlier, given an omnipotent and omnipresent God, 
such a demonstration is not possible in p r i n c i p l e . xhis means that Wolterstorff s 
definition does not provide a means of assessment at this point either.
(in) Could one demonstrate the falsehood of an enthusiastic belief by pointing 
out internal contradiction? Even this is more difficult than it might appear.
The enthusiasts have beliefs which have their own internal consistency. They 
are not built up on the basis of a reasonable argument, rather they are founded on a 
claim to divine revelation. Once a statement is considered to be a revelation, there is
43 Ibid, page 172. (My italics). NB. 'Ought'would be enough for Wolterstorff s argument.
44 Thesis, page 108-109, second example, (a).
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an obligation to submit all other ways of knowing, to it. If God has revealed 
something then it ought to be believed. If these 'revelations' appear strange, then the 
enthusiast can retreat into mysticism and claim that God's words are bound to be 
beyond limited human understanding. Consequently enthusiastic beliefs do have their 
own consistency, and so cannot often be ruled out on the grounds of internal 
contradiction. Even if one did find a discrepancy it is unlikely to be persuasive to 
the enthusiast because internal contradiction may be acceptable to a person who has 
rejected reason as the prime source of knowing. He can call it a paradox which is 
hidden in the mystery which is God's revelation, or else be even more extreme and 
rest content with logical contradiction.
(iv) Are there external means of 'demonstrating falsehood'? This is 
sometimes available, particularly when there is some didactic content, say if a person 
were to make a specific prediction about some future event such as the end of the 
world. This could be a way to provide adequate evidence of the falsehood of a 
person's belief. Perhaps this is the reason movements that allow themselves to be 
directed by prophecy rarely survive for long before they collapse. The truth of their 
claims is too easy to check.
In most instances of religious and enthusiastic experiences however, there are 
no external demonstrable grounds which could show that a belief based on a claimed 
encounter with God is false. The experience provides an internal conviction.
(v) Is it possible to demonstrate that the enthusiast has an 'unreliable 
'mechanism' of belief formation'? This is an important qualification on the concept 
of a belief being innocent until proved guilty, and would seem to be the most 
promising of Woltersorff's suggestions on how to approach the enthusiast. In 
Wolterstorff s terms, once a person knows that his beliefs are being formed in an 
unreliable way, then he does have an adequate reason to give up that belief. One 
would presumably provide a lesson in Church history and point out the many 
contradictory beliefs and problems which have arisen from the use of this method of 
belief formation.
Even this would be unpersuasive to the full blown enthusiast however. The 
enthusiast need not give up his claims to revelation. He can say that revelation does 
supply absolute authority, and where it has gone wrong in practice is at the times 
when people have made mistakes, they moved away from God, they did not listen 
properly to Him, their sinful lives clouded the channels of communication, etc. Even 
admitting that there are false prophets, as Jesus led us to expect, does not rule out the 
possibility of the genuine, indeed it implies that there will be real prophets. The
 :_______________________
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particular enthusiast, however, is certain that his own experience is a genuine
iiencounter with revelation from God.A more philosophical enthusiast could also point out that the 'mechanisms' of 
belief formation used by empiricism, rationalism, and Wolterstorff also appear as 
unreliable in their own ways. Why should he submit his 'unreliable' ways of 
knowing to another system which may be no more reliable?
All of this raises the question, 'what standard could determine the reliability 
of such a belief forming mechanism? The enthusiast assumes that God speaks, and
■that the Bible is infallible revelation. He therefore accepts the possibility of truth 
being revealed directly to him. He consequently concludes that he is within his rights 
to use a divinely appointed method of forming beliefs. Why should he test his 
method against fallen, sinful, carnal, human claims to be able to sift rational from 
irrational belief?
At this point we find an attempt to talk across conflicting paradigms. The 
enthusiast and the sceptical (say, atheistic) observer are separated by differing 
presuppositions, methods, standards, and ways of testing claims to knowledge. The 
way in which they question each other's beliefs is determined by their own separate 
system, and so even Wolterstorff s suggestion of a demonstration that the enthusiastic 
method of belief formation is unreliable, could not be achieved in the majority of 
circumstances.
If there is a mechanism which allows beliefs to be simply taken up, and there 
is no way to demonstrate that God was not the cause of an experience, and there is no 
way forward along the path of looking for internal contradiction, and no way of 
demonstrating that the mechanism of belief formation was false without begging the 
question; then one has been unable to sift enthusiastic belief by means of 
'demonstrating its falsehood'.
This pushes one back to the route taken by Locke, and to the attempt to sift 
beliefs by arguing that a person did not have good grounds for holding these beliefs 
in the first place.
To summarise, it is difficult to see that Wolterstorff s description of rational 
belief could be effective, because while the process suggested by him may increase 
one's stock of true beliefs, it is not sufficient reliably to eliminate beliefs which are 
false.
This is a particular weakness in the context of enthusiasm because (a) there is 
a mechanism which enables beliefs to be taken on in an irrational way, and (b) the 
subjective nature of these experiences of revelation (which are at the heart of
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enthusiasm) means that in most circumstances it is practically impossible to 
demonstrate that such experience did not come from God. Potentially, this could 
commit a person to a host of contradictory beliefs.
B. A R E V ISE D  D E FIN IT IO N  OF ’B A S IC A L IT Y '. 
tal The argument for re-defined basicalitv
A basic belief is a belief which can be accepted properly without external evidence or 
argument; T feel tired', or '1 feel pain' are examples. This much may appear 
straightforward, however the conditions which are necessary and sufficient for proper 
basicality are controversial.
Basicality is commonly determined on the grounds that a proposition is 
incorrigible, self evident, or 'evident to the senses'. There is an epistemic 
component, immediate understanding; or a phenomenological component, i.e. feeling 
a strong inclination to accept it. Some writers, such as Descartes, have wanted to 
add certainty to these conditions.
As we have discussed already, there is an unjustified dogmatism in treating 
these as the absolute criteria to define basicality, and thereby forming on them the 
foundations of knowledge. Some contemporary writers who are well aware of such 
weaknesses have re-defined what constitutes a basic belief in a form that results in the 
inclusion of theistic belief within the category of that which can be described as 
basic.
We will explore two good examples of writers who argue in this way.
F irst  E x a m p l e  -  A .P l a n t in g a
The first example is in the work of A.Plantinga, who rejects 'classical 
foundationalist' epistemology. He also argues that belief in God is properly basic, 
and that it is rational to start with belief in God as part of one's noetic foundation.
It is important to see how Plantinga justifies the claim that belief in God 
should be classed as a direct perception because this is the crux of his whole 
argument. If this issue is not argued effectively then, if theistic belief is to be
45 Precisely what kind of 'certainty' Descartes means is open to question. This could be logical 
necessity or perhaps phenomenological. 'Clear and distinct perception' implies a psychological 
certainty.
46 Plantinga's essay: 'Reason and belief in God' In Faith and Rationality, page 16ff.
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regarded as a justifiable epistemic position, it does demand external support from 
other evidence. As his whole argument hinges around defining belief in God as 
being basic we must ask: What has he put in the place of self evidence and
incorrigibility as the determinants of that which should be considered as basic? We 
also need to know the way in which these new criteria are to be justified.
Plantinga argues that the 'evidentialist' objection to theism is rooted in 
'classical foundationalism', yet this is a system which turns out to be 'both false and 
self-referentially incoherent' According to reformed thinkers such as Calvin, being 
self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses is not a necessary condition of 
basicality. Plantinga also takes this view.
Plantinga makes the general point that in normal perceptual conditions:
being appropriately appeared to, in the perceptual case, is not sufficient for 
justification; some further condition-a condition hard to state in detail is clearly 
necessary."**
However this 'further condition' is not defined by Plantinga.
Instead of using a 'foundationalist' argument, Plantinga attacks the problem 
from the opposite end:
the proper way to arrive at such a criterion is, broadly speaking, inductive. We must 
assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such that the former are obviously 
properly basic in the latter, and examples of beliefs and conditions such that the 
former are obviously not properly basic in the latter. We must tlien frame hypotheses 
as to the necessary and sufficient conditions of proper basicality and test these 
hypotheses by reference to those examples."*^
Plantinga offers belief in other minds, or that a person had breakfast this morning as 
examples of basic beliefs, even though they are neither self evident nor incorrigible:
Of course it isn't properly basic on the criteria offered by classical offered by 
classical(sic) foimdationalists; but that fact counts not against you but against those 
criteria.^®
Criteria should not be 'presented as ex Cathedra, but argued to and tested by a 
relevant set of examples.' The obvious question to follow this is which set of 
examples? It is difficult to imagine that everyone would agree on which examples
47 Ibid, page 90. This assertion is questioned by Tomberlin, James E. in Nous XX, (1986), page 
406. 'Classical foundationalism is no doubt reeling as a result of sustained attacks from Plantinga and 
others. But the assessment that it is self-referentially incoherent is abortively premature. '
48 Nous, vol XV, (Nous publications, 1981), page 46.
49 Ibid, page 50.
50 Ibid, page 50.
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are acceptable. Plantinga suggests that a person should take examples that are 'basic 
for him'.
The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is entirely proper and 
rational; if he doesn't accept this belief on the basis of other propositions, he will 
conclude that it is basic for him and quite properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell 
and Madelyn Murray O'Hare may disagree, but how is that relevant? Must my 
criteria, or those of the Christian community conform to their examples? Surely not.
The Christian community is responsible to its set of examples, not to theirs.^*
Plantinga seeks to defend this view against a number of accusations in Faith and 
Rationality:^'^
(i) The Great Pumpkin Objection.
If belief in God can be taken as basic, then why can any belief not be taken as basic, 
however irrational it may be?
Plantinga's answer to this is that adjusting the criteria to include theistic belief 
does not commit one to irrationality. Belief in the existence of the Great Pumpkin 
would still remain irrational because this is neither evident, nor basic to anyone. It is 
therefore of a different order to belief in God.
(ii) The Ground o fB e li^ in  God.
It does not follow from the claim that belief in God is basic, that such belief is also 
groundless. It is as justified as any other basic belief. The reformed epistemologist 
is consequently not forced to live with irrational beliefs. Belief in God is grounded 
reasonably, even though this grounding is without evidence.
(Hi) Is Argument Irrelevant to Basic Belief in God?
Accepting belief in God on such a basis does not commit one to living beyond 
rational argument. It is possible for such a belief to be challenged, perhaps if it came 
into conflict with other basic beliefs, or if conditions were to change in some way. A 
belief can be basic without being dogmatic.
51 Ibid, page 50. (My italics)
52 Faith and Rationality, page 74ff.
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(iv) Fideism.
Plantinga describes a spectrum of opinion within Fideism; having faith in preference 
to reason at one end, and a complete disparagement of reason at the other. The 
Reformers were not obliged to be extreme Fideists, but they were sometimes 
committed to a moderate form.
However, with regard to his belief in God the reformed epistemologist does 
not have a conflict between faith and reason, because he does not hold that we cannot 
attain this fundamental truth by reason; he holds, rather, that it is itself among the 
deliverances of reason.
S e c o n d  E x a m p le  - W.P. A l s t o n
A second example of an argument which is centred on the definition of basicality is 
provided by W.P.Alston in the context of discussing a practice of belief formation 
which is based on Christian experience of God. As we will see later his views are 
rather more cautious in his recent w o r k , 3^ in the early eighties he argued that 
Christian beliefs could be formed justifiably on the basis of experience. This was to 
the extent that (given the right circumstances) 'experience can provide justification 
sufficient for rational acceptance' (acceptance that the experience was an experience 
of God). The justification of this order of experience would be that:-
By virtue of having the experience the subject is in a position such that she will be 
adequately Justified in that belief unless there are strong enough reasons to the 
contrary, unless there are defeaters of sufficient strength. 54
Alston applies this form of justification to the idea that theistic belief should be 
classed as what he calls a 'direct perceptual practice'. He argues that belief can be 
formed directly on the basis of perception, and not as an explanation of it. The 
familiar form of this 'perceptual practice' is described by him as 'PP ', and the 
Christian parallel which includes theistic belief as CP' (Christian practice).
He explores objections which could lead to such a process of belief formation 
being regarded as unreliable.
(i) If one could ascertain that the outputs of a direct perceptual practice were 
generally incorrect, then this would discredit such a process of forming Christian
53 For example, Alston, W.P. Perceiving God, (Cornell 1991). Also cf. the essay 'Religious 
experience and Religious Belief, in Nous 16, (1982), page 3.
54 Alston, W.P. Essay: 'Reason and Christian Belief, in Faith and Rationality, page 112.
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beliefs. The difficulty, however, is that this would demand access to other 
information which is not available. It would only be possible to undermine a belief 
formed in such a way if one could, for example, demonstrate the non-existence of 
God, or discover hopeless internal inconsistency. Alston does not believe that the 
former is possible.
(ii) According to Alston, the main form of opposition to CP' is the argument 
that it does not have 'certain salient features' of PP'. These features are:-
(1) PP can check its beliefs.
(2) PP has predictability, and regularity.
(3) PP is a universal practice.
(4) All normal adults use the same basic conceptual scheme.
These features are then compared with CP'. The first of these features is commonly 
criticised because there is no set of checks and tests involved in a religious 
experience, and therefore no way of knowing if the experience represents a cognition 
of anything beyond itself. When it comes to regularity, God does not prove to be 
predictable. With CP', the experience is not universal, some people have no such 
experience, and with others it is fleeting, dim, lacking detail and vividness. With 
regard to the concept of God, differing traditions have radically different forms of 
objectification which are generally dependent on the dominant local theology.
Alston concedes that there are significant differences between PP' and CP', 
but argues that the lack of these four features in CP' is not enough to indicate its 
unreliability. He includes (1) as a subsection of (2). An experience may not be 
regular enough, or else be too complex to appear predictable; predictability depends 
on the situation and the subject matter. A truth may not be widely known or 
believed, and yet still remain true. Religious experience becomes objectified in 
radically different conceptual schemes in different religious traditions. Many people 
do not engage in 'CP' at all.
Alston concludes that:
when ail legitimate quibbles have been duly registered there will still be very
significant differences between the two practices in these respects.
55 Ibid, page 121.
56 Ibid, page 122.
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If the loss of characteristics 1-4 is not to be considered enough to indicate 
unreliability, then in what way can ’CP’ be considered as reliable without these 
features?
To answer this Alston suggests that if one were in touch with a reality which 
was very different from the physical world, then one ought to expect that the 
procedures which interpret that experience could be very different too. He goes on to 
suppose that, if God were wholly other, if we only had the dimmest understanding of 
him, and if he had decreed that a person would only become aware of him in special 
and difficult circumstances; then one could not expect features 1-4 to apply to the 
experience of such a God.
It would be quite compatible with such a picture of reality, that religious 
experience should have the unpredictable form that it does take. One would expect 
that it would have a measure of truth, but that there would be scope for refinement 
and correction within God's plan.
If this circumstance is in fact the case, then 'CP' can be regarded as 
trustworthy, with or without the four outlined features of PP'.
Christian experience of God is to be regarded as a 'direct perceptual practice', 
and therefore does not need any more justification than any other direct perception 
would. In other words, it can stand as basic knowledge without any external support.
One can see the attraction in the approach of Alston and Plantinga. It allows 
a person to support their own Christian understanding of experience without 
reference to any possible falsifying experiences. One's religious claims are placed 
conveniently beyond the range of philosophical criticism.
Again, as with the re-definition of 'reasonable belief, such a structure as this 
would also provide a significant support for enthusiastic belief. The enthusiast would 
be in the position to claim that his experience of God was a direct awareness of God 
which was communicated directly to the consciousness, the light being 'infused into 
his being', without the mediation of other senses. It could therefore be accepted as a 
reasonable belief even in the absence of other support, because it could be classed as 
a direct perception.
It looks as though this epistemology would enable enthusiasm to be classed as 
a justifiable belief because (in certain conditions) it classes internal conviction as 
sufficient to justify a claim to have had a religious experience. This appears 
strikingly similar to seventeenth century enthusiastic belief. Enthusiasm does go one 
stage further in that it claims certainty, but its method of justifying belief is the same.
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Locke compares enthusiastic justification of belief with the conviction that one 
is seeing the light of the sun, because neither demand justification from reason. 
Locke's phraseology is different, but the process he describes is essentially what 
Alston would describe as a 'direct perceptual practice'.
what they have a sensible Experience of admits no doubt, needs no probation.
Would he not be ridiculous who should require to have it proved to him, that the 
Light shines and that he sees it? It is its own proof, and can have no other. When 
the Spirit brings Light into our Minds, it dispels darkness. We see it, as we do that 
of the Sun at Noon, and need not the twilight of Reason to shew it us. This Light 
from Heaven is strong, clear, and pure, carries its own Demonstration with it, and 
we may as rationally take a glow-worme to assist us to discover the Sun, as to 
examine the celestial Ray by our dim Candle, Reason.
This is the way of talking of these Men: they are sure: and their Perswasions 
are right only because they are strong in them.^ '^
(b) Some objections to this definition of basicalitv.
There can be no doubt that there is a need for an alternative to 'classical 
foundationalism' because, as Plantinga points out, this has proved to be inadequate as 
a definition of what should constitute knowledge. It would also be difficult to 
disagree with the assertion that there have not been adequate definitions of 'basic 
belief. Neither has it been demonstrated that belief in God is not a properly basic 
practice. Plantinga offers some checks on the dangers of this system, such as that of 
adopting an irrational belief, such as the return of the Great Pumpkin.
Alston and Plantinga consequently offer an alternative to classical 
foundationalism which may be capable of avoiding the problems of excluding so
much from one's epistemology that one is forced into scepticism. This would allow 
the inclusion of knowledge which seem to be evidently justifiable, in spite of it being 
unable to fulfil the rigours of classical foundationalist criteria. There is a contention 
here which has an internal consistency, and would seem as arguably acceptable, in 
this respect, as are the alternatives.
Despite these useful points, however, there are some significant difficulties 
with this 'particularist' epistemology.
«
'
-------------------------------------------
57 Locke, Essay, book IV, chap XIX, sections 8-9. (My italics).
1 2 1
(i) Why should a claim to experience God need to be justified without evidence?
One needs to question the reason why there is a need to establish the rationality of 
religious belief in such a subjective way. If one is describing the activity of an 
omnipotent, omnipresent creator working in the universe; one who expects belief in, 
and obedience to that which He has revealed; what possible reason could there be for 
there being so little external evidence in support of his activity? If one has been 
forced into justifying a belief without empirical evidence, then it begins to appear like 
a last ditch attempt to preserve a belief which has ceased to be credible.
If we test this way of justifying a religious interpretation of experience in the 
same way that a hypothesis is appraised then it reveals significant weaknesses. It is a 
way of justifying religious beliefs which is constructed in the form of supplementary 
hypotheses. For example, if we ask 'why can God not be seen in the experience?' 
then the answer is that He is invisible. If 'CP' is a basic practice, then why is it so 
unpredictable in its occurrence and effects? The answer is that God is personal and 
unpredictable. If it is a basic practice then why is it not done by everyone? The 
answer is that God has set special conditions on how He can be experienced. The 
epistemic process used is to hypothesize a transcendent mysterious God and use this 
possibility as an 'explanation' for any failures in the original theory. This has 
removed one so far from the empirical evidence, that even the need for evidence is 
questioned.
On top of this weakness the religious experience is being justified with 
reference to itself, leaving no scope for confirmation or disconfirmation.
When regarded as an explanation it is also flimsy. Direct perception of God 
could be invoked as one possible explanation for the existence of subjective religious 
conviction, but what explanation could it offer for the lack of evidence which has 
created the need to justify religious experience in this way in the first place? This 
leaves it with a contradiction between external and internal evidence, and also a 
contradiction between the extreme varieties of internal conviction which point in 
opposing directions.
It also forces one into a strange image of a God, who seems primarily 
prepared only to reveal himself directly to the consciousness. He is a God who 
leaves no adequate experimental evidence for belief, and then demands belief as a 
condition of salvation from Hell. Why should He make these conditions, and then do 
such a thorough job of hiding himself from empirical enquiry?
The alternative explanations are simpler and more coherent. Let us assume 
for the moment that there was no God involved in a claimed 'religious' experience. 
The internal conviction of the person can be explained in terms of family
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background, conversion experiences, stress, varied psychological forces, etc. Such 
an explanation has the advantage over a theistic interpretation in that it can also 
explain the lack of external evidence which could verify the experience, because it 
does not demand the existence of an external being who is involved in the experience.
It predicts well, as it can expect that such processes will produce equally 
strong convictions for varied and contradictory beliefs; people have a capacity to 
believe for inadequate reasons. It remains in contact with the available evidence. It 
explains more of the facts than the theistic approach.
If the only support for a theistic belief were to be based on internal conviction 
without external evidence, then one would be forced to conclude that atheism would 
make better sense of the available evidence.
(ii) Is it logically impossible to justify a belief in term  o f self-authentication?
Antony Flew argued in 1966 that it is a logical impossibility to have a self 
authenticating experience which could guarantee the presence of some object beyond 
the senses. His discussion is in the context of addressing arguments by H.D. Lewis, 
and Farmer but is still applicable here as we are assessing the same issue of self 
authenticating experience.
The demonstration that there could not be any necessarily infallible and self- 
authenticating mark within our subjective experience guaranteeing the presence of 
some object beyond can be short and simple. In so far as the proposition E is x y z 
refers only to the characteristics of a subjective experience E, its assertion makes no 
claim about the universe around us, and so there can be no occurrence of non- 
occurrence there to show any part of that characterization to be false. Yet if any of 
the characteristics indicated by 'x' of 'y* or 'z* were the required infallible sign of 
the presence of something altogether different, then the absence of that something 
would be sufficient to show that E is not or was not really x or really y or really z; as 
the case might be. But now what was to have served as an infallible sign becomes 
either not infallible or not serviceable. For if we are to preserve its infallibility we 
can do so only by making it a matter of definition, and that will involve that we can 
only determine whether E was really whatever is by referring to something other than 
that experience in which we had originally hoped to find our inexpugnable 
assurance.^*
The argument is that if Christian Experience of God is self authenticating, then one is 
forced to conclude that there could be no such experience, because if it is experience 
which entitles one to believe in the existence of the actual object, then it could not be
self authenticating, while on the other hand, if it really is self authenticating, then it
58 Flew, A. God and Philosophy, (Hutchinson, 1966) page 132.
—  .....................................
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cannot demand a reference to an actual God. One cannot have one's cake and eat it. 
The problem is the desire to:
make a sort of assertion which would at one and the same time fulfil two logically 
inconsistent specifications: first, that of involving only their own experience, without 
any falsifiable reference to anything beyond; and, second, that of entailing the truth 
of the essentials of their religion.
(Hi) A problem with the relativity o f 'Basic Belies'.
One of the central problems in the justification of basicality is created by the context 
of varied beliefs. Plantinga is aware of this and endeavours to exclude wholly 
irrational belief, such as in the return of the Great Pumpkin. He argues that his 
rejection of traditional criteria which establish foundational belief, does not commit 
him to irrationality; and that such a belief would remain irrational because the 
existence of the Great Pumpkin is neither evident nor basic to anyone. It is therefore 
of a different order to belief in God.^^
However, the Great Pumpkin is too easy a target. In reality we are not 
dealing with such obviously irrational beliefs. Many of the alternative beliefs on 
offer have arguments to support them which are as compelling as Christian theism, or 
else have their own internal consistency. They are also held with a conviction that 
would qualify them for being 'basic', as far as the individual believer is concerned. 
Real beliefs such as Atheism or Buddhism would consequently present a far sharper 
problem for these criteria to assess than would belief in the Great Pumpkin.
If one is able to use such a method of justifying belief, then this creates the 
possibility that logically contradictory beliefs such as atheism, Islam, Hinduism or 
Communism, could be viewed as being equally justifiable. As these beliefs are 
logically contradictory, they cannot all be true. But as they can each be justified 
using Alston's and Plantinga's criteria, then one must conclude that there is a basic 
problem with the criteria themselves.
Depending on one's cultural conditioning, each of these could be construed as 
a basic belief, and under this definition each would be as acceptable as the other. In 
other words, the system is relativistic in character.
All one can do with such an epistemology is to examine empirically what 
basic beliefs different groups have, and then work out what criteria these people use 
for judging whether a belief is basic or not. It leaves basic beliefs as an assumption,
59 Ibid, page 133.
60 Ibid, page 74.
61 Cf. Nous XX, (1986). Criticism by Tomberiin, J.E. on page 401. The 'justification' which is 
intended here is to be taken as externalist rather than internalist. It is not a person who may be 
justified in holding a particular belief, but the beliefs themselves with which I am concerned.
________ .■'Ar:
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relative to a variety of communities. Justifiable belief means accepting the basic 
beliefs of the community to which one belongs. This is more akin to sociology than 
to epistemology.
(iv) The Subjectivity o f 'Basic Belief'.
One of the characteristics of a basic belief according to Plantinga is that it is one 
which the person is unable to disbelieve. He applies this to himself, and states that 
he is personally unable to disbelieve in God.^^
However, what one is unable to disbelieve and so class as basic, is intensely 
personal. The subjective inability to resist belief says little about whether such 
beliefs are in themselves objectively true or false. This could be no more that a 
demonstration of the human capacity to have beliefs. The reality is that this can be 
done at times irrationally, and with certainty.
What is 'basic for him' is another definition of basicality which is used by 
Plantinga. This is also a thoroughly subjective definition. It is so subjective that it 
is difficult even to see where the argument lies, or what the criteria on offer are. The 
empiricist criteria are criticised on the grounds that they are arbitrary, and are even 
described by Chisholm as being 'completely arbitrary' .64 This is overstating the point 
in regard to Empiricism, however it could be applicable to Plantinga's approach to 
the issue. His way of defining basicality is intrinsically arbitrary because, what a 
person claims is basic, should be considered to be basic.
Certainly, this inability to resist belief is the way in which many beliefs of a 
person will be generated, and it is a common starting point. However, these beliefs 
still need to be shaped and trimmed by a more critical epistemology. If a person 
leaves his beliefs in this unrefined initial state, it would constitute a defect in his 
intellectual obligations, rather than a satisfactory structure for his epistemic system.
(v) It is a d^n ition  o f reasonable b e li^  which could include irrationality.
According to Plantinga, a person holds a basic belief 'if he doesn't accept this belief 
on the basis of other propositions'. Belief in God is included in this category and 
classed as entirely proper and rational, even if it is a belief which is held without 
reason.
62 Faith and Rationality, page 34.
63 Nous, vol XV, (Nous publications, 1981), page 50.
64 The Problem of the Criterion, page 17.
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As we have pointed out, this would enable logically contradictory beliefs to be 
defined as being basic, and therefore acceptable to hold without other support.
At least with empiricism, or rationalism, one could be sure that anything that 
remained within one's beliefs after one had fulfilled one's intellectual obligations, 
had been rigorously sifted, (at least, if anything was left). There would 
(theoretically) be some beliefs that could be known to be true.
If one rejects such a structure, and replaces it with the kind of epistemology 
recommended by Plantinga and Alston, one has a system with a capacity to include 
error in a person's beliefs which is as large as that person's capacity to believe. 
Consequently, it is not possible to be sure that any beliefs supported by its structure 
are acceptable. They need further sifting, and therefore there is a need for some 
other standard to be imposed on them. Of itself it is not enough as a definition of 
rational belief.
A similar point is made succinctly by J.E.Tomberlin:
A query: since basic belief as so far characterised is any belief not accepted on the 
basis of other beliefs, is every basic belief rational? I should think not; it appears 
entirely possible that a person believes some proposition irrationally wliile 
nevertheless not accepting it on die basis of other b e l i e f s . 65
This leaves one with the question of how to distinguish the justified (rational) basic 
beliefs from irrational basic beliefs. In order to do this one needs 'something 
extrinsical to the perswasions', but this is not supplied if beliefs are justified on the 
grounds that they are basic beliefs.
While 'classical foundational ism' excludes so much error it has virtually 
nothing left, this approach is capable of including too much error. The former is 
good at excluding error, and the latter is good at including truth, but neither are 
adequate in themselves.
(vi) The existence o f varied explanation.
Alston's aim in the essay 'Christian Experience and Christian Belief, is to get away 
from the mode of interpreting experience which looks for the correct understanding 
from a variety of possible explanations.
In thinking about how to respond to this challenge we encounter a crucial fork in the 
road. On the one hand, we could play the game on the terms laid down by the 
challenger. We could admit that the only thing one knows directly from experience 
in these cases is that one is having certain experiences: the only real data are
65 Tomberiin, J.E. Nous XX, (1986), page 403. Criticism of Faith and Rationality .
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subjective. We could then pick up the gauntlet thrown down by our adversary and 
seek to show that the explanation of these experiences in terms of Christian theology 
is more adequate than any of its rivals.66
Instead of embarking on all that I shall explore another tack. I shall resist the 
bifurcation of Christian experience into psychological datum and theological 
explanation and defend the original claim that it is God Himself, or, if  you like, 
some activity or aspect of God that is directly presented of given to our experience in 
these transactions.67
Rather than such a search for the most coherent explanation of an experience from a 
variety of options, Alston's argument is that God is directly presented in experience. 
Instead of showing that God is 'behind', or 'responsible' for a particular experience, 
the contention is that it is God himself who is directly presenting. This may alter the 
epistemic requirements raised by the situation.
The most serious problem with Alston's argument on this issue, is that this 
suggestion is in itself one particular hypothesis concerning the nature of such an 
event. Indeed, in Part VI of the essay he is forced to return to this particular 'fork 
in the road'.6» The reason for this move is that, because what he describes as 
'Christian Practice’ turns out to have none of the features of normal 'Perceptual 
Practice', he is compelled to use the hypothetical model again in order to justify the 
claim that 'CP' can be equated with 'PP '. 'Suppose, then, ' a God of such and such a 
character; if this is how things are in reality then Christian experience is compatible 
with this actuality.69
Consequently he has not succeeded in taking the intended route because his 
road has looped back to the fork in the road which he intended to leave. Alston ends 
his discussion justifying the 'basic practice' of Christian belief formation by 
presupposing an explanation of the nature of God and reality. This is inconsistent. 
Either he has not accepted the 'evidentialist challenge' and can justify forming 
Christian beliefs in terms of basic practice apart from external explanation; or else he 
is still in the realm of theories which compete to give the most coherent explanation 
of a particular event. Alston ends up having to justify a 'basic practice' on the 
grounds that it is commensurate with a particular theory about the nature of God. 
The effect of this is that the concept of 'Christian practice' has become itself a 
complex hypothesis which remains in competition with other interpretations of 
experience.
66 Faith and Rationality, page 107.
67 Ibid, page 107.
68 Ibid, page 128.
69 Ibid, page 129.
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This forces one back to the situation of competing theory, where it is not only 
God who could potentially be the explanation for a religious conviction within the 
mind. This could be caused by, for example, hypnosis, or by a mistaken conviction 
about one's relationship with God' or by mental illness, or delusion, or wrong 
theology etc.
A belief forming mechanism which is built on a treatment of Christian 
experience as a direct perception has consequently not been justified by Alston. 
Theoretically one could have a direct perception of God, and such experience would 
make one’s Christian beliefs more justifiable than they would be if this experience 
was lacking.70 However, what has not been justified, is the formulation of Christian 
beliefs in this way, based on the choice of this 'crucial fork in the road'.7i This 
implies that a religious experience is still in the position where it has to fight for 
supremacy over a variety of interpretations.
(vii) Is belief in God groundless?
Plantinga is criticised by Abraham for the 'air of paradox in the claim that belief in 
God is held without evidence or reason, and yet it is not a groundless belief'.72
This is not a fair criticism, because the point at issue is whether belief in God 
is basic or not. If theistic belief is a basic perception, then one does not need to 
demand rational argument or other 'evidence' to hold such belief. It could however 
still have 'grounds' in that it has been defined as a direct perception. It could 
therefore be justified in the way that any direct perception would, even though this 
justification would not take the form of 'reasons'. This is not a paradox, but a 
difference in definition between 'grounds' and 'reasons'.
In spite of this however, there is still a difficulty due to the circularity of the 
argument. Because the belief is held without reason, it is being justified with 
reference to itself i.e. what I believe to be basic is basic and what I cannot disbelieve 
should be believed.
This could be unavoidable because an absolute source of authority may only 
be justified with reference to itself. However, this does not help one to distinguish 
between what is true and what is false. Even to say that it is 'basic', is not enough 
to justify it, as it is simply an admission that we cannot get beyond this point. One 
could therefore argue that, in this sense, justifying belief in God as a direct 
perception is both without reason and groundless.
70 Cf. 'Christian Experience and Christian Belief, in Faith and Rationality, page 103.
71 Ibid, page 107.
72 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, page 96.
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(viii) Should theistic beli^and  experience be classed as a 'basicperception'?
To regard belief in God as a basic perception is open to question. There are certainly 
many people who do not believe this to be the case, both within and without of the 
reformed tradition.
It is claimed that the experience is 'self authenticating', but what does this 
mean? Does it simply mean that the perceiver is entitled to believe something? Does 
it go further and imply that the individual cannot be mistaken in his understanding of 
experience? It is stated in such strong terms by Robert Oakes:
The experiences in question are of such a nature that I do not require any criterion to 
be certain that they are veridical. Rather, I have non-criterial certainty that such is 
the case. Alternatively, that ray relevant experiences constitute veridical 
apprehensions of God's presence is iraraediately apparent to rae since the experiences 
in question have the very special epistemic status of being self-authenticating, i.e. of 
guaranteeing their own veridicality to their epistemic subjects. Accordingly, every 
such experience provides rae with infallible justification for believing that it 
constitutes veridical awareness of God's presence.?3
Along with the main stream of Christian thinking, and the majority of contemporary 
writers, I see no way in which such a strong claim could be justified. Nothing in the 
experience itself is capable of distinguishing delusion from veridicality, and the 
reality is that there are always alternative ways of understanding such experience, for 
example, in physiological or psychological terms.
What is revealed in creation, for example, can be seen as the works of God, 
but this would not constitute a basic perception, because what is evident to the senses 
would be described as feeling wind, seeing sky, stars, rain, and so on. Even these 
terms are beyond a direct perception because all of these statements have implicit 
interpretation. If we express these statements in the way that Chisholm has 
recommended, I am being appeared to bluely' would be a more accurate way to 
describe a perception of 'sky '.
Chisholm argues that what is evident are 'sensible properties'.74
The characteristics include being blue, red, green or yellow; being hard, soft rough, 
smooth, heavy, light, hot or cold; and that of sounding, or making a n o i s e . 7 5
Chisholm draws a line between perceptual experience, and its interpretation by the 
subject. If this is how things are, then if one were to accurately describe a religious 
experience, one would not be able to say that one was talking to God or gazing at
73 Oakes, Robert Mysticism Veridicality, and Modality. In Faith and Philosophy, (1985), pages 
217-218.
74 Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, page 20.
75 Chisholm, Percept/ow, (Ithaca NY, 1957), page 83. Cited in The Existence of God, 251.
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ultimate reality. One would be for example, hearing various noises, and these are 
being interpreted as the voice of God.
Swinburne criticises Chisholm's approach on the grounds that:
no such line as the one which Chisholm attempts to draw, can be drawn between real
experience and interpretation. 7®
Swinburne is right in that there are practical difficulties in making this distinction. 
This line does still exist however, and if one is going to build up an argument that 
aims to justify belief on the grounds that it is a direct perception, then it is crucial to 
confine what one describes as direct perception to the correct side of this line. If it 
cannot be drawn, then beliefs cannot be justified on the grounds that they are basic 
because one can never know what is basic or not.
This is not to argue that all beliefs should be restricted to what is 
uninterpreted, but it does imply that such interpreted beliefs should not be described 
as direct perceptions. They have gone far further than this, and are laden with 
theory. This implicit theory must therefore be assessed by some other means than 
internal conviction because it cannot be justified on the grounds of self 
authentication. If it is not basic, then it requires a different epistemic justification.
For example, to see the external world as the creation of God is to present a 
theory about its cause, and one which is open to discussion with other plausible 
explanations. Looking at the heavens and simply 'knowing' that they were created 
by God is not enough. To use an analogy, one may feel a sense of awe on looking at 
Glasgow University, and be appeared to 'stonily' but this would not constitute a basic 
experience of its builder or architect. Any understanding of its creation demands 
interpretation. Similarly, a partieular belief as to the origin of creation being God is 
an interpretation of the evidence.
One could offer well thought out alternative accounts of the origins of such 
religious belief which could be compelling; or else give objections to theism, for 
example, on the grounds of the existence of evil.
Furthermore, belief in God is a very complex set of beliefs; including justice, 
holiness, omnipotence, omnipresence, love, anger, and so on. It is a big jump from 
'basic practice' to belief in such a God, and a jump which cannot be made without 
accepting some form of revelation. Granted, one could have an experience of God 
which could be classed as basic, but the moment one understood it and described it as 
theistic experience, then that understanding could not be classed as basic, nor could it 
be logically derived from only the basic perception.
76 The Existence of God, page 258.
 : : '       _
77 Quine, W.V. Theories and Things, (Harvard, 1981), page 2.
78 Ibid, page 4.
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The issue of basic belief is also addressed by Quine, who argues convincingly 
that all basic observation statements are theory laden. For a start all knowledge of 
external things is filtered through nerve endings.
Thus what I am saying applies in particular to what I am saying, and is not meant as 
sceptical. There is nothing we can be more confident of than external things-some of 
them, anyway-other people, sticks, stones. But there remains the fact-a fact of |
science itself-that science is a conceptual bridge of our own making, linking sensory ■
stimulation to sensory stimulation; there is no extrasensory perception. 7?
Even a word like 'milk' should be regarded as a one word sentence: 'it's milk'. It is 
also an occasion sentence, and a form of conditioned response to some appropriate 
stimulation. There is no call to read into this a reference to an object.
As long as the word 'milk' can be accounted for simply as an occasion sentence on a 
par with 'It's raining', surely nothing is added by saying that it is a name of 
something. Nothing is really said. Similarly for'sugar','water','wood'. Similarly 
for 'Fido' and 'Mama'. We would be idly declaring there to be a designata of the 
words, counterparts, shadows, one apiece: danglers, serving only as honorary 
designata of expressions whose use as occasion sentences would continue as before.7*
The picture becomes even more complex when 'individuative' words emerge: words 
like 'chair' or dog'. These differ from the example of milk because of the 
complexity of what must be mastered in order to learn them. The chairs and dogs are 
indeterminate in number and individually nameless, which means that there is not a 
simple one to one mirroring of each word and object.
Once these words are predicated with 'a ', the contrast with 'milk' becomes 
sharper.
Milk's being white comes down to the simple fact that whenever you point at milk 
you point at white. Fido's being a dog does not come down to the simple fact that 
whenever you point at Fido you point at a dog: it involves that and more. For 
whenever you point at Fido's head you point at a dog, and yet Fido's head does not 
qualify as a dog,79
Even such apparently simple statements imply complex theory, and this theory is 
being related to sensory stimulation.
The problem of relating theory to sensory stimulation may now be put less 
forbiddingly as that of relating theory formulations to observation sentences. In this 
we have a head start in that we recognise the observation sentences to be theory­
laden. What this means is that terms embedded in observation sentences recur in the 
theory formulations. What qualifies a sentence as observational is not a lack of such
1 3 1
terms, but just that the sentence taken as an undivided whole commands assent 
consistently or dissent consistently when the same global sensory stimulation is 
repeated.*®
This argument that even basic observation sentences are laden with theory seems 
convincing, but even if this were not so, 'God', or even 'The God' would still seem 
to be a particularly theory laden phrase. The moment one uses the term God' in 
relation to the experience one has added an immensely complex interpretation, one 
which is (perhaps deceptively) out of all proportion to the length of the noun. 
Plantinga offers examples of what he describes as basic beliefs:
(6) God is speaking to me
(7) God has created all this
(8) God disapproves of what I have done.
(9) God forgives me.
and
(10) God is to be thanked and praised.*^
If one defines a basic belief in the way that Plantinga does as being a belief which is 
(a) held without reason, and (b) one is unable to give up, then these could indeed be 
basic beliefs in the right circumstances.
However, I would argue that since this definition of basicality is capable of 
including such massively theory laden statements as those above, then there must be a 
fatal flaw in the way that basicality is being defined by Plantinga,
It is a huge jump from a directly perceived 'religious experience', to the 
conviction that what was revealed in this experience was God, the creator of heaven 
and earth who will judge the living and the dead, who is holy, who speaks to people, 
who is interested in their morality, who forgives, who deserves to be praised, the 
God of Abraham Isaac and Jacob. It is certainly too big a jump from 'direct 
perception' for belief in such a God to be described as a 'direct perceptual practice'.
(ix) Do Plantinga and Alston supply an adequate description o f basic perception?
What is needed is a careful re-assessment of the general issue of the nature of 
basicality, as this is the heart of the issue, but this can not be done satisfactorily only 
with reference to belief in God.
To seek to resolve the question of basicality only with reference to this 
particular belief is a dishonest approach, as it is the equivalent of changing the rules
80 Ibid, page 26.
81 Nous, vol XV, (Nous publications, 1981), page 47
 :  . . . .  . _ ..
1 3 2
in the middle of a game in order to get the result that one wants to achieve. In other 
words, one particular conclusion is used to determine which methods will give that 
specific result. It would be fairer, if the issue of basicality were resolved with 
reference to a far wider application, instead of exclusively with reference to theistic 
belief.
Plantinga states that it is not 'within my power to cease believing in God' , '*2 
which is revealing, because this is the starting point and the determining factor in his 
final conclusions, Basicality is used to describe a belief which one holds without 
external reason, but is unable to give up. There are conditions on justifying such a 
belief, but Plantinga is unable to define what these conditions are. But until these 
conditions can be defined, how could belief in God ever be justified on the grounds 
that it is a basic belief?
some further condition-a condition hard to state in detail is clearly necessary**
If this condition cannot be stated, then belief in God cannot be included in the 
category of direct perception, because this category has not been defined. Indeed 
Plantinga's views vary over his different books and it is unclear what he considers to 
be essential features of a basic belief. For example, his later writing seems more 
qualified and cautious:
How shall we think about perception? And do we have perceptual knowledge? Well, 
from the present perspective on warrant, a perceptual judgment-that there is a squirrel 
running across my backyard, for example-constitutes knowledge if  # d  only if 
(roughly speaking) that belief is true, sufficiently strong, and produced by cognitive 
faculties that are successfully aimed at truth and functioning properly in an epistemic 
environment that is right for a creature of my perceptual powers.*'^
As we have seen, in discussing what kind of examples can be used to determine what 
can be classed as basic belief, Plantinga takes the following approach:
The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is entirely proper and 
rational; if he doesn't accept this belief on the basis of other propositions, he will 
conclude that it is basic for him and quite properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell 
and Madelyn Murray O'Hare may disagree, but how is that relevant? Must my 
criteria, or those of the Christian community conform to their examples? Surely not.
The Christian community is responsible to its set of examples, not to theirs,**
82 Faith and Rationality, page 34.
83 Nous, page 46. (Cited more fully in foot note 47).
84 Plantinga, A. Warrant and Proper Function, {Oxioid, \993>), page 89.
85 Ibid, page 50.
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It could be argued that the criteria of the Christian community should also conform to 
other peoples' examples. If they do not, then one has an epistemological sieve which 
is excluding all examples which may be contrary to what one would prefer to believe.
This is similar to 'proving' a theory by using a method that ignores all 
experimental evidence which conflicts with the desired conclusion, and only 
including evidence that supports what the preferred theory would like to say. It is a 
misleading and dishonest method because it is not only out of touch with the available 
evidence, but is consciously distorting it by omission. This is not acceptable as a 
way to define direct perception.
There are similar problems with the way in which Alston relates what he calls 
'perceptual practice' to the Christian parallel of directly perceiving God. It also loses 
touch with the evidence. Alston concedes that 'CP' has none of the salient features 
of 'PP'.*6 In order to retain the concept that 'CP' can be classed as a direct PP' he 
is forced to retreat into mysticism, and argue that the object of such Christian 
experience is 'wholly other', beyond what humans could grasp, and therefore 
apparently irregular in behaviour. This means that 'we can only attain the faintest, 
sketchiest, and most insecure grasp of what God is like'.*7 One could therefore not 
expect the normal features of 'PP' to apply to the experience of such a God.
This may be a consistent move. However, there is no way that such a concept 
could be justified purely as a direct perception. Firstly because it creates a vicious 
circle. Secondly, to make this move involves developing an ad hoc theory which is 
being cited in order to explain the failure of the original hypothesis, i.e. that 'CP' is 
the same as PP', even though it has turned out to have none of the same features. 
Such a hypothesis is far more than a 'direct perception', and for that reason 
inconsistent with Alston's approach. It also is a step that has removed one from 
empirical evidence.
Of course, if one had established the existence of such a God on other 
grounds, then it would be a different matter, as the experience would be conforming 
to what other evidence was leading one to expect. This, however, would be a form 
of coherence theory, and not an argument which justifies a religious interpretation of 
experience on the basis of direct perception. It is not surprising that Alston should 
have adopted a form of coherence theory in his more recent works.
There is also a problem with a retreat into mystery itself. For one thing it is 
not an explanation, as it is rationalising mystery by postulating another infinite 
mystery. This has in effect explained nothing, but pushed the problem back a stage.
86 Faith and Rationality, page 122.
87 Ibid, page 129.
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Having done that however, there is another cost to pay. Even if we were to grant 
that this move provides a potential explanation, if the explanation being posited is 
hidden in a transcendent mystery which is beyond human comprehension, then there 
is no way that one could know that one's explanation is true or false. One has 
therefore said nothing of meaning.
The problems with the way that basicality is being defined by these two 
writers are powerful. They have not supplied an adequate description of basic 
perception.
(x) Has Plantinga avoided 'Fideism'?
Plantinga describes a spectrum of opinion within Fideism; having faith in preference 
to reason at one end, and a complete disparagement of reason at the other. He argues 
that the reformers were not obliged to be extreme Fideists, but that they were 
sometimes committed to a moderate form. In regard to their belief in God, however, 
the reformed epistemologist does not have a conflict between faith and reason, 
because he does not hold that we cannot attain this fundamental truth by reason; he 
holds, rather, that it is itself among the deliverances of reason.**
On this basis Plantinga rejects fideism as a description of his work. This does 
not seem to be entirely successful. His central claim is that belief in God does not 
require reasons for it to be rational, and this certainly raises suspicion because this is 
a fairly accurate description of the central tenet of Fideism. Abraham points out that 
Plantinga is sympathetic to writers such as Bavink, Barth and Calvin, who are 
generally classed as being fideist.*^
While it is true that Plantinga is sympathetic, this is partly because he seeks to 
defend these writers from the accusation that they are fideist. He argues that 'the 
reformed epistemologist is not a fideist at all with respect to his belief in God'.^® His 
argument to support this is that such theistic belief is basic, and so can count itself 
among 'the deliverances of reason'.
Effectively then, whether Plantinga should be described as fideist would 
depend on the success of the argument to include theistic belief in the category of that 
which is basic. If this is successful, then theistic belief is acceptable to hold without 
external or rational support because it can be classed as basic; but if it is wrong on
88 Ibid, page 90.
89 Abraham, William J. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, (Prentice Hall, 1985), 
page 93.
90 Faith and Rationality, page 90.
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this single issue and theistic belief is not basic, then one must describe such a system 
as fideist because such belief in God would be disconnected from empirical evidence 
and be rationally groundless. Since the argument here is that the description of belief 
in God as being a basic perception is not justified, then the conclusion must be that 
Plantinga has not avoided fideism.
(c) A summarv of the implications of philosophical 'particularism' for enthusiastic belief formation
It would seem that if accepted, the epistemology argued for by Alston, Plantinga, and 
Wolterstorff would also provide a justification for enthusiastic claims to knowledge. 
Firstly, this is because in most circumstances enthusiastic claims are beyond 
disconfirmation, and if beliefs are 'innocent until proved guilty' then they ought to be 
believed. Secondly the enthusiast can claim that his experience is a direct perception, 
and therefore a justifiable method of belief formation. Knowing 'as sure as that I 
have being' is a good description of a belief which could be described as basic, and 
such a belief would have to be considered as rational to hold even though it is held 
without evidence or reason.
It is found by abundant experience that those who are led away by impulses and 
imagined revelations are extremely confident; they suppose that the great Jehovah has 
declared these and those things to them; and having his immediate testimony, a 
strong confidence is the highest virtue. Hence they are bold to say, /  know this or 
that-I know certainly~l am as sure as that I have a being, and the like; and they 
despise all argument and inquiry in the case. 91
In spite of this claim, it could be argued that enthusiastic beliefs can not be assessed 
reliably by these 'particularist' methods for the following reasons:
(i) There are some differences between the structure of enthusiastic belief and the 
epistemology of Plantinga et al. Enthusiasm is more crude. It allows certainty, 
because it effectively treats its method of belief formation as being incorrigible and 
self evident. Such a claim would not be made by Plantinga, Wolterstorff, Farrer or 
Alston. All of these writers, to varying degrees, attempt to define the circumstances 
in which such beliefs can be classed as innocent or basic. It does not seem that this 
definition is fully achieved, but none of the above writers would want to support 
enthusiastic belief formation, and Wolterstorff argues against it directly.
91 Edwards, Religious Affections, page 102. (My italics).
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(n) The argument to treat theistic beliefs as basic has not been justified, indeed 
basicality in any context has not been defined clearly. Such an argument creates an 
epistemic system with significant problems. It is relative in character, as well as 
being subjective. It can include irrational beliefs. Logically, it may be impossible to 
justify a belief in an external object on the grounds of self authentication. There is 
always a variety of explanations which interpret experience. These writers have not 
completely avoided fideism.
Consequently enthusiastic beliefs have not been justified by 'particularist' 
writers, because the arguments in support of 'particularism' are unsuccessful.
(Hi) Plantinga's views on basicality have varied over different books, but he has 
retained the core concept that beliefs are 'warranted' when formed by experience.
Given an appropriate epistemic environment and given that the module of the design 
plan governing perception is successfully aimed at truth, such beliefs will have 
warrant; when held with sufficient firmness, fiiey constitute knowledge.
Alston, however, is more cautious in his later writings, and more distant from 
Plantinga. ^ 3 For example, in discussing the justification of a perceptual belief:
Any support that an experience gives to a belief about what is putatively experienced 
is subject to being overridden either by sufficient reasons to think the belief is false (a 
rebutter), or by sufficient reasons to think that in this instance the ground of the 
belief does not wield its usual justificatory force (an underminer). '^^
On the issue of self-authenticating experience, Alston states that:
It is not just the claim that the subjects of the experiences are completely convinced 
of their authenticity. It is the more objective claim that the experiences carry with 
them an adequate sign or mark of their authenticity, so that, as Oakes says, the 
experience itself provides a justification for believing that it is an awareness of God's 
presence.
Along with most other contemporary philosophers, I see no reason to accept 
such a strong claim. And,—I am at one with the main trend of the Christian mystical 
tradition in this. Delusory experiences can be phenomenally indistinguishable from 
veridical ones, in the mystical realm as well as the sensory. Nothing in the 
experience itself suffices to distinguish one from another. 9*
In the introduction to this book, Alston makes it clear that:
92 Plantinga, A. Warrant and Proper Function, page 99.
93 He is criticised by Plantinga along with other reliabilist' attempts to justify belief in: A Plantinga 
Warrant: The Current Debate, page 184ff.
94 Alston, W.P. Perceiving God, (Cornell 1991), page 79. (My italics)
95 Ibid, page 80.
   _  _
1 3 7
The thesis defended here is not that the existence of God provides the best 
explanation for facts about religious experience or that it is possible to argue in any 
way from the latter to the former. 9®
Rather than a justification of Christian belief based on Christian experience, Alston is 
arguing by using a different approach.
Thus I take the "cumulative case" and "mutual support" perspective on the grounds 
of Christian belief to be clearly superior to any story according to which the whole 
thing rests on some particular basis, a basis that will inevitably be subject to serious 
doubts that it cannot satisfactorily solve with its own resources a l o n e .  7^
Consequently, Alston’s writing should not be used in support of justifying beliefs 
only on the basis of a direct perception, because this would not represent his views.
Even though empiricist and rationalist criteria have also failed to provide a 
means of persuading the enthusiast or resolving the 'problem of the criterion', its 
description and criticism of the epistemic structure of enthusiastic belief formation 
still remains acceptable. And though it may prove extremely difficult to examine the 
truth of persuasions 'by something extrinsical to the persuasions themselves', this is 
nevertheless what is needed, because there are many occasions where such beliefs 
will clash with each other, and will therefore need some other standard to be imposed 
on them in order to distinguish between their respective claims to knowledge. One 
needs more than internal conviction, or claims to self authentication to justify a claim 
to know. Locke's description remains true, and applicable to Plantinga's, 
Wolterstorff s and Alston's thesis.
Every conceit that thoroughly warms our fancies must pass for an inspiration, if there 
be nothing but the strength of our persuasions, whereby to judge of our persuasions; 
if reason must not examine their truth by something extrinsical to the persuasions 
themselves, inspirations and delusions, truth and falsehood, will have the same 
measure, and will not be possible to be distinguished.^*
What the 'something extrinsical to the persuasions themselves' could be is an issue 
that still needs to be resolved.
In the application to a reality where true and false beliefs are mixed up, 
unable to be disconfirmed, and held with such conviction that they could be described 
as being basic; these definitions of basicality and rationality are (a) inadequate in 
themselves because they are ill defined, and (b) incapable of distinguishing that which
96 Ibid, page 3.
97 J&fW, page 307.
98 Ibid, page 433.
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is true from that which is false. They consequently do not provide the means to 
assess charismatic experience.
C. T heo lo g ic al  'P a r tic u la r ism '
Before we leave this section on 'particularism' it is important to consider the closely 
related arguments in theology which have also attempted to justify belief in God in 
the absence of rational foundations. They are related to the above philosophical 
views in the sense that they begin with what is putatively known (i.e. the existence of 
God), and so can be described as 'particularist'.
(a) The argument for theological particularism
Many reformed thinkers and theologians have rejected natural theology and its 
attempts to provide rational justification for the existence of God. What we must 
note is that it is argued, not only that the reasoning is unsuccessful, but that the whole 
process of justifying belief in God in this way is radically misguided. A. Plantinga 
argues that the reformed objection to natural theology is in essence an inchoate and 
unfocused rejection of classical foundationalism. 99
Calvin's claim is that God has created us in such a way that we have a strong 
inclination towards believing in him. This tendency has been distorted by sin, but 
still remains the natural and universally present human condition. 'The knowledge of 
God has been naturally implanted in the minds of men'.^®® Belief in God is revealed 
through Jesus and the scriptures; it is also declared by the heavens.^®  ^ This belief is 
certain, but it is not reached on the basis of reasonable argument. The believer 
simply knows that God exists. This knowledge of God and of the authenticity of 
scripture is not established on the basis of reason, but by the witness of the Holy 
Spirit, 1®^ and by its own authentication. ^ ®*
Such, then, is a conviction that requires no reasons; such, a knowledge with which 
the best reason agrees-in which the mind truly reposes more securely and constantly 
than in any reasons; such finally, a feeling that can be bom only of heavenly
99 Plantinga, A. The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, (Proceedings of the American 
Catholic Philosophical Association, 1980).
100 Calvin, J. Institutes of The Christian Religion, (Westminster Press, 1960), Book 1, chapter 3.
101 Ibid, Book 1, chapter VI, section 4.
102 Ibid, Book 1, chapter VII, section 4.
103 Ibid, Book I, chapter VII, section 5.
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revelation. I speak of nothing other than what each believer experiences within 
himself.
This experience is related to the doctrine of election:
Whenever, then, the fewness of believers disturbs us, let the converse come to mind, 
that only those to whom it is given can comprehend the mysteries of God.^®*
Apart from seeking to answer objections, demonstrating that belief in God has 
rational foundations has not been given much significance in theology since the time 
before the reformation, because of the reformers antipathy to this approach, and also 
in the wake of Immanuel Kant's work. This however leaves a gap between the 
evidence for God's existence and the conclusion that He does exist, which is filled by 
a variety of options which attempt to find refuge in 'faith'. So believing comes to be 
seen as an act of the 'whole personality', or to use Pascal's words it involves the 
'reasons of the heart'. Kierkegaard repudiated objective assurance for Christian faith 
in preference for the 'proof of the emotions'; William James suggested a 'will to 
believe' which tipped the scales in a way which was consonant with our emotional 
nature. Such approaches to faith imply a repudiation of natural theology; it is 
unclear how any of them could safeguard the rationality of religious commitment.
Further into the twentieth century, this rejection of foundationalism in the 
form of natural theology and replacement with fideistic structures has been argued by 
theologians such as Bultmann, Barth, and Niebuhr.
If you really reject natural theology you do not stare at the serpent with the result that 
it stares back at you, hypnotises you, and is ultimately certain to bite you, but you hit 
it and kill it as soon as you see it! ^ ®6
Barth was aggressively antagonistic to natural theology, (particularly as developed by 
Brunner) though his reasons for this are not always especially clear. He apparently 
sees it as being fundamentally dishonest in its approach, because to argue about the 
existence of God is to give the impression that one accepts unbelief, and to imply that 
faith comes at the end of an argument. Consequently, it assumes a set of 
propositions which can be appealed to in the assessment of the rightness of one's 
belief. The 'deliverances of reason' are therefore the ultimate commitment in such a 
situation, and the attempt to go through the process of rational justification is a
104 Ibid, Book I, chapter VII, section 5.
105 Ibid, Book I, chapter VII, section 5.
106 Barth, Karl, Natural Theology, (Centenary Press, 1956), page 76. Also cited in Chapter II, page 
76.
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manifestation of sinful human pride. The resultant dilemma is between 'bad faith' on 
the one side and unbelief on the other.
If we re-phrase the issues involved then what is argued is that belief in God 
need not, (and should not), be based on argument or evidence from other
propositions at all; that the believer is within his intellectual rights to go on with
theistic belief even in the absence of any convincing arguments in support of the 
existence of God. If this is so, then the position is indeed similar to Plantinga, 
Alston et al., in the sense that it is deemed acceptable to believe in God without this 
belief being supported on the basis of any other beliefs or propositions. In other 
words, belief in God is being treated as properly basic.
This way of thinking has also been applied to the doctrine of revelation. 
According to Karl Barth, absolute authority could not be verified except with 
reference to itself. A person who believes in God's revelation does so because he has 
experienced the Word, and the Word has created faith in him.
It is Jesus Christ Himself who speaks for Himself in it, [the word] and needs no 
witness save His Holy Spirit and is glad of the faith of His own in the promise 
received and grasped. ^ ®7
God's revelation has its reality and truth wholly and in every respect....within itself.
Only by denying it can we wish to ascribe to it a higher or deeper ground.
Obviously the adoption of revelation from the vantage of such a ground, different
from it and presumably superior to it; this can only be achieved by denying
revelation.
The Word of God becomes knowable by making itself knowable. The application of 
what has just been said to the epistemological problem consists in the fact that we 
hold fast to this statement and not one step beyond do we take. The possibility of 
knowing the word of God is God's miracle on and in us^ ®^
(bl Some Ob jections
If this Barthian argument is correct it would be a dismissal of the present thesis 
because it is attempting to assess religious understandings of experience, such as 
claims to have received revelation, through a rational process. It is therefore 
important to meet this objection.
The issue can be put in the form of a dilemma
107 Barth, K. Church Dogmatics, (T & T  Clark, 1960), I/I page 135.
108 Ibid, I/I, page 165.
109 Ibid, page 282.
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either revelation is totally immune from rational criticism, or it is subject to such 
criticism. If the former, it is wholly discontinuous with our ordinary standards of 
what is reasonable and right; if the latter, it can have no independent authority.
Mitchell usefully points out that the kind of argument used by Barth, which has been 
very persuasive in current theology, rests on a false dilemma which relies on a 
distrust of reason. The assumption underlying this dilemma being that when reason 
has been applied to revelation, the revelation has been deprived of having any 
independent authority
This argument can be taken a stage further than Mitchell. If this is done it is 
possible to take the opposite view to Barth and Niebuhr by arguing that the only way 
to truly submit to the authority of revelation which comes from God, is to be as 
critical as possible of every claimed 'revelation*.
If we use the analogy of a General in the army who sends orders to his troops, 
it is one thing to question the authority of the General, and then decide to ignore the 
orders which do not meet with approval. This would be mutiny and an attempt to 
undermine his authority. It is quite a different thing to question whether these orders 
did in reality come from the general or not. Indeed, if one was in a situation where 
there were counterfeit orders around, the only way to submit to the authority of the 
General, would be to be zealously critical of any claimed 'order'. If one were not to 
do this, then it is quite likely that one's commitment is given, not to the General, but 
to whatever the source of the counterfeit orders happened to be.
This is analogous to the situation in the religious context, where there are 
competing claims to be true revelation, between differing religions; but also within 
Christianity, and particularly within enthusiasm. In such a setting, to submit to the 
authority of God would demand that one were critical of every putative revelation, 
and that one did not accept the words on the strength of 'faith '.
Part of the confusion here is concerned with the object of faith. If one were 
certain on the basis of some independent grounds (a) that God did exist, and (b) that 
the Bible is His revelation; then the requirement for unconditional faith in him would 
make perfect sense. What must be noted, however, is that this requirement for faith 
has its place within the system of Christian belief, and cannot properly be interpreted 
as an obligation to continue to embrace the system itself, because the rationale for 
such faith depends on this being a true system. How a person chooses to believe this 
system is one issue, and how a person exercises faith in God within its framework is 
quite another.
110 The Justification of Religious Belief , page 144.
111 Ibid, page 144-145,
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What we must be careful not to confuse then, are (a) one's belief in the 
existence of God and revelation; and (b) assuming that he exists and has revealed 
truth about himself, trusting in unconditional reliance upon him. They have different 
requirements when it comes to a response of faith. The latter is necessary if the 
former is true, but the former is a contingent truth, and should not be treated as 
necessary.
If one exercises the kind of unconditional faith which is due to the person of 
God, and applies this to the issue of God's existence and revelation, then theology is 
cut off from all external support of criticism. It becomes fideist.
This step is taken by Bultmann.
Our radical attempt to demythologize the New Testament is in fact a perfect parallel 
to St. Paul’s and Luther's doctrine of justification by faith alone apart from works of 
the law. Or rather it carries this doctrine to its logical conclusion in the field of 
epistemology. Like the doctrine of justification it destroys every false demand for it 
on the part of man, whether he seeks it in his good works or in his ascertainable 
knowledge. The man who wishes to believe in God as his God must realize that he 
has nothing in his hand on which to base his faith. He is suspended in mid-air, and 
cannot demand a proof of the Word which addresses him. For the ground and object 
of faith are identical. Security can be found only by abandoning all security, by 
being ready, as Luther put it, to plunge into the inner darkness.
Bultmann's claim is that Christian theism must be accepted without rational support, 
and is an existential choice which is accepted without question or reason. This is a 
strange step to make because there is no logical reason to proceed from the doctrine 
of justification by faith, to the peculiar epistemological doctrine that faith admits no 
rational support; they are entirely distinct.
If we keep our analogy of the General, the unconditional obedience which is 
rightly given to him, assumes that (a) there is a General, and (b) that these are his 
orders. These two claims are, however, established independently of the soldiers' 
'faith', and should not be accepted on the basis of unconditional blind commitment. 
It is only after they are established and set within the framework of an army 
command structure, that unconditional obedience to the General has any meaning.
There is confusion here over the object of faith, one which arises from a false 
assumption. In reality, to submit to and endorse the authority of God and his 
revelation, demands that all claims to revelation should not be accepted on faith, but 
should be subject to criticism. This is directly applicable to enthusiastic belief 
because it implies that it is necessary to be critical of all the claims it makes to 
knowledge. Accepting a putative prophecy on nothing but faith, for example, is both 
irrational and an abdication of the requirement to put one’s faith in God.
112 Bultmann, R. Kerygma and Myth, (SPCK, 1964), pages 210-211.
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Interim Conclusions
To summarise:
(a) Many of the same criticisms as we made of Plantinga, Alston and Wolterstorf 
apply to the fideistic views of writers such as Barth and Bultmann.
(b) There are severe problems with the 'innocent until proved guilty' concept of 
faith, this implies that one needs some 'grounds' for theistic belief.
(c) The inclusion of belief in God in the category of basic perception is not 
effectively argued; it does not avoid fideism, and so it is a system which can include 
too much error.
(d) Therefore we need some other approach to the interpretation of charismatic 
experience.
Neither 'Methodism' nor 'Particularism' provides the ability to sift out what is 
false that we are seeking. The significance of this should not be underestimated. In 
epistemology, this is the heart of the difficulties it faces at the present time.
  _ _....
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4. Enthusiasm and Probability
Perhaps one could make progress at this point and relax one's demands by 
substituting probability for proof as the standard, in favour of a warranted belief 
about the nature of a claimed religious experience.
Even so, there are still difficulties.
It may be conceived, and often is conceived, that induction lends a probability to its 
conclusion. Now that is not the way in which induction leads to the truth. It lends 
no definite probability to its conclusion. It is nonsense to talk of the probability of a 
law, as if we could pick universes out of a grab - bag and find in what proportion of 
them the law held good.^^*
Swinburne attempts to justify belief in the existence of God by using probability, but 
meets significant difficulties and has to conclude that on the basis of probabilities, 
'theism is neither very probable nor very improbable'. The same problem arises 
when one attempts to determine the probability that one's interpretation of a 
'religious’ experience is correct.
For how could one estimate the degree of probability that an experience represents a 
genuine encounter with God when one is not in a position to compare the experience 
in question with others that are known to be experiences of God?^ *^
One would have a way around this problem if one had Biblical revelation as a 
presupposition, because one would have a large body of experience which could be 
relied on to represent experience of God, and therefore to act as a standard to which 
one can refer.
At this point, however, Mitchell is questioning whether the existence of God 
can be demonstrated to be probable, and what experience can contribute to this 
argumentation. It is therefore the theistic system in its entirety which is open to 
question. In the context of such a basic question, one could have no such reference 
points as 'revelation' which could be relied on for comparison, without begging the 
question.
Mitchell's conclusion is therefore that probability could not be used in 
justification of a religious interpretation of an experience.
113 Peirce, C.S. Collected Papers, vol 2 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard, 1932), pages 499-500.
114 Swinburne, R. The Existence of God, (Oxford, 1979), page 289. Cf. also the discussion by 
Adams, R.M. in Nous XIX, (1985), page 626.
115 The Justification of Religious Belief , page 31.
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It may be possible to explore this issue further, however, if we take medical 
diagnosis as an example of an epistemology which is based on probability. Could 
this provide a model for the assessment of religious experience?
Diagnosis is a process which leads to a testable hypothesis, but which does not 
rely on strict rational proof. It is still, however, a reasonable process. A system 
which attempts to determine the cause of a physical or mental 'experience' in the 
form of illness, could provide useful insights, because determining cause is our aim 
in the assessment of enthusiastic experience. It is also useful to study a system which 
is forced to decide on a course of action on the basis of its diagnosis. Such a 
practical aspect is useful for our purposes.
The procedure involved in diagnosis includes taking history of the patient, 
physical examination, and various technical diagnostic observations. The 
accumulated information becomes the data base from which conclusions emerge.
The history yields information concerning the patient's subjective sensations 
(direct perceptions), his emotional state, and alterations in his bodily appearance and 
function.
The physician will also look for clinical manifestations of particular symptoms 
in a physical examination.
The diagnostic process itself involves a systematic analysis of all information in the 
data base, utilising age-old methods of reasoning and logic. Study of the data 
includes: (1) identification of the abnormal findings; (2) localization of the abnormal 
findings in anatomical terms; (3) interpretation of those findings in structural and 
functional terms; (4) consideration of etiology; (5) subjection of data to method of 
hypotheses; (6) classification of the disease; and (7) formulation of a p r o g n o s i s .  ^^ 6
The process, then involves the selection of one or more hypotheses from a number of 
alternatives.
Differential diagnosis, like scientific research, is based on Üie method of hypothesis 
first described by Plato, not Hypocrates. He is the father of the reasoning process we 
use today in scientific investigation and in d i a g n o s i s . ^ ^ 7
It is a process which can become instinctive for the physician, but is (loosely) based 
on 'deductive reasoning'. One gathers information as correctly as possible, and 
comes to a judgment as to its significance and degree of abnormality, following the 
various clues until the correct cause is discovered.
116 MahlonH. Delp, M.D. (Editor) Major's Physical Diagnosis. (W.B. Saunders company, 1975. 
Eighth edition), pages 54-55.
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As with the assessment of religious experience, one is faced with a variety of 
alternative ways to understand the symptoms. For a physician to resolve this, the 
process involves dismissing the unlikely, and trying to establish which of the 
alternatives is the cause.
The clinician tests each hypothetical diagnosis in turn, trying to dismiss the unlikely 
and to verify the correct. He does this by asking two questions: Does the diagnosis 
explain all the findings? Are expected findings present?^
It is, then, a process which looks forward and attempts to see if the illness fits a 
certain class of disease, and then reverses its approach to examine if the 
characteristics of such a disease are consistent with the illness which is under 
examination. In this way one is attempting to verify one's findings during, or arising 
from the examination of the patient.
One problem in the diagnostic process is that the information given to the 
physician is often inadequate, irrelevant, and of varying accuracy and precision. 
Consequently, the diagnosis is not a strictly logical and watertight procedure, but a 
matter of judgment which will grade from the less certain to the more certain. One 
could have a first order certainty in the case of gross anatomical defects, for example 
leg fracture, hairlip, and genetic abnormalities. At the other end of the scale would 
be groups or collections of signs and symptoms which make up a disease picture, but 
the etiology remains obscure, examples given by Engle and Davis are of 'infectious 
mononucleosis, sarcoidosis, and systematic lupus erythematosus.
Observations consequently need to be assessed, because there is wide scope 
for error.
The possible error in every diagnosis arises from the fact that all knowledge of 
human origin is uncertain. The distinguishing characteristic of scientific knowledge 
is not that is more certain than non-scientific knowledge, but that the degree of 
uncertainty can be rather well determined.
This determination is made by deciding the probability that a particular illness is the 
cause of a set of symptoms in a particular person. A probability of 'O' would mean 
that an illness was quite impossible as the cause, and a probability of '! '  would be a 
certain diagnosis. The physician often finds himself in the situation of having a 
number of plausible diagnoses of an illness, and it is by ordering their relative
118 Ibid, page 56.
119 Ibid, page 59.
120 Ibid, page 59 One could question whether such 'knowledge', should be called knowledge if it is 
uncertain.
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probability that the solution is determined. An example of a collapsed 42 year old 
man is given:
Diagnostic list Credibility of Diagnosis
Myocardial infarction C =  0.5
Cerebrovascular accident C = 0.3
Cardiac arrhythmia C = 0.1
'Something Else' C = O.H^l
The 'something else' ensures that the list is all inclusive, and that the sum of the 
credibilities is equal to one. The physician continues to gather more information on 
the various symptoms, sometimes using text book tables which offer indications as to 
the probability that specific symptoms may indicate a particular disease. He 
continues to make progress in the same way throughout the whole process, however, 
by determining probability.
Thus the study of patients with specific diseases leads to the observation that specific 
signs and symptoms occur in such patients, and we should be able to appraise the 
frequency of occurrence of each sign or s y m p t o m ,  2^2
In essence this represents in a simplified manner the diagnostic function. Given a 
certain set of examination information that is consistent with a number of diagnoses, 
what is the most likely or most credible diagnosis? Logically, it is that diagnosis that 
has the greatest probability of association with the available information when 
compared to all the diagnostic p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  2^3
To explore the practicalities of such an approach in application, we will take an 
example of its use by a medic in the charismatic context which comes from the 
report: A social Anthropologist's Analysis o f Words o f Knowledge, Manifestations of 
the Spirit and the Effectiveness o f Divine Healing. ^ 4^ Part of this report relies on 
probability for assessment. It gives an example of a 'word of knowledge' spoken at a 
Wimber conference in Sheffield in the early eighties.
'There is a woman here whose name begins with L...She is thirty-two years old, has 
had a throat condition for eight years, and has taken medicine for it but it hasn't
helped h e r . '^ 25
The report excludes the possibility of prior information on those who attended the 
conference, and examines the possibility that this 'word' could have been a lucky
121 Ibid, page 63.
122 Ibid, page 65.
123 Ibid, page 69.
124 By Dr. David C.Lewis of the Religious Experience Research Project, Nottingham University and 
the Alister Hardy Research Centre, Oxford.
125 Appendix in Wimber, J. Power Healing, (Hodder, 1986), page 252.
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guess. When interviewed it turned out that the girl who responded was called Linda, 
and that the information was slightly wrong in that she would not be thirty two for a 
few more months.
In Linda's case we can estimate that if there were about 1,500 women 
present at the conference and if  there are about twenty common initials of women’s 
names (excluding initials like X,Z or Q) then about seventy-five women might have 
been expected to fit the first two specifications.
If most of those present were aged between twenty and sixty - but Wimber 
did have a discrepancy of one year (or a few months) in this detail - then we could 
allow thirteen age brackets of tiucee years each, allowing for an error of one year on 
either side. This brings us down to about six possible women.
It is difficult to estimate the total 'universe' of possible organs, especially as 
left and right sides may be specified or details such as the 'fifth cervical disc' and so 
on may be included. Doctors or those with medical training might be able to list 
hundreds of different parts of the body, but for the present purposes let us take a very 
conservative figure and assume there are only thirty principal organs of parts. Even 
with a choice of only thirty bodily areas, we are down to 0.2 people who would fit 
these criteria by chance alone.
Then there is the detail of eight years', which is considerably longer than 
the average length of time for a throat illness to persist in a woman of this age. If we 
take an arbitrary figure of one in fifty throat conditions lasting as long as eight years 
then we find that on the basis of chance alone 0.004 people in the crowd might be 
expected to have such a combination of traits. In other words, even by using very 
conservative figures such as a choice of only thirty organs in the body, the crowd 
would have to have been 250 times larger tlian it actually was for just one person to 
have bad such a combination of characteristics through chance alone.
How should one view this report? It may be possible to question the details of it, for 
example, one would need to know whether 'L' is a less common initial than say 'M*. 
It is also important to discover how frequent illness of the throat is, rather than just 
the number of organs in the body. One would also need to know how many of such 
'words of knowledge' were inaccurate. If one were allowed 250 guesses in this 
instance, then it would be probable that one of them would be correct.
This is beside the point at issue however. If one has shown that it is very 
unlikely to be the result of a guess, then one has still not shown that this 'word of 
knowledge' was a religious experience, one has simply ruled out one of the 
alternative explanations, i.e. pure chance was an unlikely cause. This still leaves 
alternatives, telepathy? fraud? an unlikely possibility that turned out to be true? a 
person's subjective feelings about their illness distorting their perception? a religious 
experience? some unknown explanation?
Probability has contributed something useful in the negative sense of making 
one particular explanation unlikely. What it has not done, and could not do, is to 
determine the probability of a Christian theistic explanation.
126 Ibidy pages 257-258,
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If one loosened up the kind of probability one allowed, and treated the 
assessment of religious experience in the way that, say historical research is done, or 
a decision taken in a court, then one is allowing probability to be 'determined', even 
though this is not in a precisely quantifiable way.
This could be a way forward, though it would be better described as a 
cumulative argument where on the balance of evidence, one decision is preferable to 
another. We will return to this possibility later, but in this section we are confining 
ourselves to mathematically definable probability.
How useful is probability in the assessment o f charismatic experience?
(a) Medical diagnosis is based on the mechanical predictability of physical functions, 
whereas, religious experience is the claimed interaction of a person with God. On 
the one hand, God is personal and free to disclose himself at will rather than 
according to some formula or pattern. On the other hand though, if He has made 
promises through Biblical revelation, then these provide the possibility of predictable 
behaviour in the right circumstances.
Even making allowances for promises, however, an encounter with God could 
never be so predictable that it could be assessed adequately by a medical model. In 
such an encounter, one has the subject of the experience, a person who is himself 
very complex; relating to a God who is not only infinitely complex, but almighty, 
mysterious, and transcendent. Inevitably, the results of this experience would be 
unpredictable. Indeed, it would be far more surprising, if an encounter with God 
was unsurprising and predictable.
The same difficulty would arise, for example, if a charismatic experience took 
the form of demonic oppression, as this would involve beings about which there is so 
little agreement or reliable information, that it would seem impossible to determine 
probability in such a setting.
Charismatic experience is more analogous to the interaction between two 
unknown people, one of whom may not exist, than to the interaction of the body with 
disease.
(b) Even more significantly at this point in the argument, there are difficulties in the 
use of the medical model because it is dependant on probability. This can be done 
effectively in medicine because there are clearly defined groups of illness and disease 
each with predictable associated symptoms which can be used to determine 
probability. Such a reference point would be essential if one were to determine
___________________ ______ _ _
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probability in respect of any experience, because one would need a known point of 
comparison in order to determine what proportion of such experiences could be 
described in a particular way.
(c) In medical diagnosis, there must have been a time when the probability of a 
particular illness could not have been known due to lack of accumulated information. 
This has not, however, prevented the process of diagnosis from becoming useful and 
accurate. Sufficient information has gradually been gathered until there is a strong 
enough data base to determine with some precision the probability that a particular set 
of symptoms indicates a particular disease.
This process of accumulating data, which is essential for the eventual 
determination of probability, is one which may, at least in principle, be a model 
which could be used to interpret religious experience. Certainly a 'diagnostic' model 
has been adopted by two current movements with enthusiastic traits; the Vineyard 
Fellowships, and 'Ellel G r a n g e '.127
Consequently, if one were to begin in a different place, and assume the 
existence of God, and that Church history did provide genuine examples of 
encounters with God or with the demonic, then one may have the theoretical potential 
to develop 'symptoms’ of such encounters which could be used to determine the 
relative probability of the nature of an experience in a particular instance. These 
examples would form part of the assumptions in an enthusiastic movement, and so 
probability in understanding an experience may well be internally consistent with 
such a system of thought.
One would also be in a position at least to determine the degree of 
abnormality of some experience in relation to the degree of probability that the 
experience had a non-supernatural cause.
It is important to note however, that there are theoretical limitations on its 
effectiveness
(a) Given the presuppositions of the above groups it may be consistent for them to 
proceed in such a manner. Perhaps an assessment of probability could be made, not 
by appealing to limited internal data, but by extending the scope to include as many 
possibilities as possible. This is attempted by Swinburne:
The phenomena which we have been considering are puzzling and strange. Theism 
does not make their occurrence very probable; but nothing else makes their
127 In the context of Vineyard Fellowships A diagnostic approach is suggested in ibid, page 209. 
’Ellel Grange is headed by Peter Horrobin, cf. Horrobin, Healing Through Deliverance, (Sovereign 
World, 1991).
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occurrence in the least probable, and they cry out for explanation. A priori, theism
is perhaps very unlikely, but i t  is far more likely than any rival s u p p o s i t i o n .  2^8
What judgements of probability can not do, however, is to justify the presuppositions 
of theism. They are contingent, not necessary.
(b) It is also true that Wimber and 'Ellel Grange' do not attempt to establish 
probability in the rigorous way that true medical diagnosis does, with a 
mathematically determined probability. They are simply making the best of the 
'symptoms' as they understand them, and so it is a 'probability' in the form which is 
used in historical research, or in legal judgement. They are not based on probability 
in a strict mathematical sense.
(c) One needs to avoid the false assumption that if an experience is 'improbable' in 
terms of chance, then it is therefore a genuine religious experience. This is logically 
flawed as well as being a 'God of the gaps' thought pattern, because there may be 
other options which could provide an explanation for some event, and some of these 
alternatives may be more probable than a theistic understanding.
It may be possible to use 'diagnosis' in this loose form, but this is not strictly 
based on probability. It yields no more than an unquantifiable likelihood. The more 
radical is one's questioning, the less it is possible to use probability in the assessment 
of experience. This is because 'diagnosing' probability depends on accepting a body 
of data against which the probability can be tested. If one is attempting, as is this 
thesis, to assess a system in its entirety, then it is difficult to see that mathematical 
probability can be used in the interpretation of religious experience, apart from the 
negative function of narrowing down the field of possibilities by ruling out some 
other explanation, such as pure chance.
128 The Existence of God, page 290,
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5. Enthusiasm and Scepticism
If it is not possible to argue the case that God has been revealed in an experience on 
the basis of strict rationality, nor possible to demonstrate the probability that one 
particular theory is the correct interpretation, nor to find a method which could 
establish knowledge, nor to have knowledge which can be believed with certainty; 
then can such experiences ever be interpreted in a reasonable way? Is one forced into 
scepticism?
A hypothetical sceptic would conclude that we do not know what (if anything) 
we know, nor is there a way of deciding whether we know in a particular case.
This would rule out enthusiastic claims to knowledge as being irrational 
because they have such an element of certainty in them. Such claims to knowledge 
would be quite unjustified if one were a sceptic. Beyond this, the sceptic would have 
little to say to the enthusiast, because his scepticism would imply rejecting the 
available criteria which may be used to assess a claim to knowledge. Consequently, 
he has no criteria with which to assess the enthusiast's claims. This would leave 
conflicting interpretations of experience, and no way to decide which, if any of them, 
represents knowledge.
There are, of course, many problems with scepticism; it leads to conclusions 
such that a person who accepts them will be unable to live consistently with that 
acceptance. It also rests on a meticulous argument to justify that we know so little, 
with the result that its conclusions are a denial of its premises and methods.
There may be an escape from such a sceptical cul-de-sac. It would be a false 
argument that because alternative explanations are possible, no single explanation is 
at least to be preferred. Neilsen is criticised by Mitchell for being over pessimistic 
on this point. Neilsen's approadR^(to mystical experience) is to pay close attention
to the actual experiences themselves, as distinct from interpretations put on them by 
varying traditions, (or at least in so far as they can be separated from interpretation). 
His conclusion is that they support no particular interpretation, and that they are 
'religiously and theologically neutral'. According to Mitchel:
'It is implied in his whole treatment of this question that the answer might have been 
different; the nature of mystical experience might, on investigation, have turned out 
to be such as distinctly to favour one interpretation rather than another. Unless this 
possibility was present, there was no need to attend carefully to the facts; their 
irrelevance could have been presumed in advance'
129 Justification of Religious Beli^, page 31.
130 Ibid, page 15.
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The argument from religious experience is consequently treated by Nielsen as being 
in principle legitimate. This is important, because if he is right then it allows a way 
forward with a careful study of the evidence to see if such experience concords more 
precisely with one interpretation, rather than with one of the alternatives. Though 
this will be difficult in practice, at least it is an approach which would not rule out, in 
principle, the possibility of being able to make a reasonable assessment of a religious 
experience.
Summary
If we are correct up to this point, then enthusiastic experience must be assessed 
because it is unacceptable to make a fideistic existential choice, unsupported by 
reasons, for or against an understanding of experience. The option not to assess is 
effectively the option taken by the enthusiast. He is utterly convinced of the truth of 
his interpretation of his experience, but has little if any desire to support this with a 
reasonable argument. The experience is enough in itself.
A claim which is supported with this kind of justification could not be known 
to be a genuine experience of God, nor defended in a rational way. Virtually any 
experience could be given the same justification, as could a host of contradictory 
interpretations. If one took this route, then one would have to concede a division of 
knowledge between normal rational thought, and acceptable religious argument, and 
admit that one’s faith is, in the end, unreasonable, blind, subjective, and existential. 
The potential to include error in such an epistemology means that this is not an 
acceptable epistemic position.
Religious experience must therefore be assessed. The difficulty is that such 
experience could not be rendered probable in any strict sense of the word; but neither 
could an interpretation of experience in itself be shown to be necessarily false or 
logically incoherent.
If we are to avoid a hopelessly sceptical conclusion, then we are pushed into 
exploring a route taken by Mitchell. This argues that it is, indeed, possible to make a 
rational case for and against a particular understanding of experience, but it is a case 
which does not conform to the ordinary pattern of deductive or inductive reasoning.
Could the means of assessing such experience be rational, though in a form 
other than strict argument or proof on the basis of probability? The aim at this point 
is not to provide such an argument, but to consider how, if at all, it might be 
provided.
- :   _______
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6, Enthusiasm and the cumulative case argument
One of the common philosophical and theological objections to a claimed religious 
experience, is that there can be no rational case in support of the belief that the 
particular experience was in fact an encounter with an objective God. This was the 
main objection of the Church to the Montanists, of Locke and Leibniz to the 
enthusiasts, and has remained a common criticism through to the present day. The 
assumption being that for an interpretation of an experience to be rational, it must 
conform to the requirements of proof or of strict probability. If a theistic 
interpretation is unsupported by such a form of reasoned argument, then it would be 
unjustified to claim that a particular experience should be attributed to God.
It is argued by Mitchell however, that this is a false assumption in relation to 
Christian theism. He makes the general point that in fields other than theology, we 
commonly, and justifiably, make use of arguments other than those of proof or strict 
probability; and that arguments in the realm of theology are also typically of this sort. 
If this is so, and such an approach to understanding experience is acceptable, then it 
could provide us with a useful way forward in the assessment of enthusiasm.
If we explore this route, then arguments that appear to be a series of failures:
(a) when assessed in terms of purely deductive or inductive content, and (b) in 
isolation from other support, could become more acceptable as contributions to what 
Mitchell calls a 'cumulative case'. When this approach is applied to an interpretation 
of enthusiastic experience, then one is arguing that one's own case is making better 
sense of all the available evidence than does any of the alternatives. The dispute 
would hinge around what Gilbert Ryle calls 'the plausibility of th e o r ie s ',r a th e r  
than around proof or probability in any strict sense.
Mitchell illustrates this approach using an example of the debate between 
theists and atheists.
the debate between theists and atheists is unlikely to make progress, so long as it is 
confined to a single argument, such as the cosmological argument, or, indeed, to a 
whole series of arguments, if these are to be taken piecemeal without at any stage 
being brought into relation to one another. Here, at least, the Cartesian strategy of 
"dividing the question" must be resisted. The debate, to be useful, must take the 
form of a dialogue in which, as John Wisdom observes (in relation to legal 
judgement), "The process of argument is not a chain of demonstrative reasoning. It 
is a presenting and representing of those features of a case which severally co-operate 
in favour of the conclusion. "^ 2^
131 Flew, A. God and Philosophy, page 40.
132 Justification of Religious Belief, page 45.
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Mitchell points out that this process forms the basis of two other disciplines, critical 
exegesis and history; in both areas such a process of cumulative argument is perfectly 
acceptable. It is a rational procedure, and one which produces results which are 
capable of being true or false. In both of these settings, there are cases where an 
argument which does not purport to be a proof or to rely on strict probability, is 
capable of providing reasonable grounds for a conclusion about a matter of fact. 
There is then, at least a possibility that theological argument could resemble such 
arguments in some of the relevant respects.
There is an obvious danger inherent in the idea of using cumulative rather 
than inductive argument. This is the danger that one's argument has degenerated into 
a last ditch attempt to salvage beliefs which have ceased to be credible because they 
are unable to stand up to the rigors of rational proof. One is consequently providing 
a weak appearance of rationality for beliefs which are rationally indefensible. This 
pitfall is noted by Flew.
Nor, incidentally, will it do to recognize that of a whole series of arguments each 
individually defective, but then to urge that nevertheless in sum they comprise an 
impressive case; perhaps adding a sop to the Cerberus of criticism that this case is 
addressed to the whole personality and not merely to the philosophical intellect. We 
have here to insist upon a sometimes tricky distinction: between, on the one hand, 
the valid principle of the accumulation of evidence, where every item has at least 
some weight in its own right; and, on the other hand, the ten-leaky-buckets-tactic, 
applied to arguments none of which hold water at all. The scholarly and the business 
like procedure is to examine arguments one by one, without pretending - for no 
better reason than that they have been shown to be mistaken - that clearly and 
respectably stated contentions must be other than they are.^ s^
This is no doubt true, but a cumulative argument is not undermined by this in 
principle. Such an epistemology does still remain a possibility; it is simply good to 
be aware of a possible danger inherent in the task.
Indeed one could take the offensive at this point and demand a justification for 
the view that all rational arguments must be formal and quantifiable if they are to be 
considered rational. Abraham provides a significant objection to this critical 
formulation.
The principal one is that it has not been defended in terms of its own rationality, for 
no one has produced either good deductive or compelling inductive arguments to 
establish that all arguments must be of this kind. In the absence of these, the critic’s
133 Flew, A. God and Philosophy, page 141.
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position is internally inconsistent. We simply have to accept the critic's requirement 
as a dogma or an article of faith or a personal opinion.
There is in fact increasing support for 'cumulative' reasoning, and this support is not 
confined only to a religious setting. Neither is it confined only to the writing of 
Mitchell, or indeed just to contemporary writers. Cardinal Newman's writing could 
also be classed in this way, at least in that he emphasises the significance of judgment 
in making the choice between a variety of factors.
It is plain that formal logical sequence is not in fact the method by which we are 
enabled to become certain of what is concrete: and it is equally plain, from what has 
been already suggested, what the real and necessary method is. It is the culmination 
of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and 
circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to 
avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too 
numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible. As a man's 
portrait differs from a sketch of him, in having, not merely a continuous outline, but 
all the details filled in, and shades and colours laid on arid harmoriised together, such 
is the multiform and intricate process of ratiocination, necessary for our reaching him 
as a concrete fact, compared with the rude operation of syllogistic treatment.
A Cumulative argument is also used by Swinburne for the existence of God. He 
attempts to demonstrate a 'balance of probability', but the form of his argument is 
also what Mitchell would call 'cumulative'.
I have argued that various occurrent phenomena are such that they are more to be 
expected, more probable if  there is a God than if there is not. The existence of die 
universe, its conformity to order, the existence of animals and men, men having great 
opportunities for co-operation in acquiring knowledge and moulding the universe, the 
pattern of history and the existence of some evidence of miracles, and finally the 
occurrence of religious experiences, are all such as we have reason to expect if there 
is a God, and less reason to expect otherwise.
Swinburne builds up an argument for the existence of God by examining the 
cosmological argument, teleological argument, arguments from consciousness and 
morality, providence, the existence of evil, and so on. What must be noted however, 
is that he does not claim that any of these individually provide 'proofs' or a good 
inductive argument for theistic belief, but that they combine to form a persuasive 
cumulative effect.
134 The Rationality of Religious Beli^, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987). Edited by Abraham, W.J. 
and Holtzer, S.W. Essay by William J. Abraham entitled 'Cumulative Case Arguments for Christian 
Theism', page 30.
135 Newman, John Henry, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, (University of Notre Dame 
Press, Notre Dame, 1979), page 230. Cited in The Rationality of Religious Belief, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1987). Edited by Abraham, W.J. and Holtzer, S.W. Essay by William J. Abraham entitled 
Cumulative Case Arguments for Christian Theism', page 26.
136 Swinburne, R. The Existence of God, (Oxford, 1979), page 277.
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One unfortunate feature of recent philosophy of religion has been a tendency to treat 
arguments for the existence of God in isolation from each other. There can of course 
be no objection to considering each argument initially, for the sake of simplicity of 
exposition, in isolation from others. But clearly the arguments may back each other 
up or alternatively weaken each other, and we need to consider whether or not they
d o .
Swinburne argues that the existence of God is the most probable explanation for the 
existence of a whole variety of factors. He attempts to determine the probability of 
this using Bayes's Theorem, but this does not seem to be possible.
as we have seen we just do not have the criteria for very precise estimation of 
probabilities in science or history or most other fields. However I now suggest that 
it is reasonable to come to the following qualitative judgement about the force of the 
evidence so far considered (i.e. all the evidence apart from the evidence of religious 
experience). Theism does not have a probability close either to 1 or to 0, that is, on 
the evidence considered so far, theism is neither very probable nor very 
improbable.
Swinburne's way around this problem is to suggest that one ought to choose the most 
plausible hypothesis available.
The phenomena which we have been considering are puzzling and strange. Theism 
does not make their occurrence very probable; but nothing else makes their 
occurrence in the least probable, and they cry out for explanation. A priori, theism 
is perhaps very unlikely, but it is far more likely than any rival supposition. Hence 
our phenomena are substantial evidence for the truth of t h e i s m .  ^ ^ 9
Swinburne uses the claims based on religious experience as the clinching evidence.
The experience of so many men in their moments of religious vision corroborates 
what nature and history show to be quite likely-that there is a God who made and 
sustains man and the universe.
The main difference between Mitchell's and Swinburne's cumulative arguments, is 
that Swinburne takes a more traditional philosophical approach to his questions by 
attempting to justify one particular belief at a time, i.e. the existence of God. 
Mitchell on the other hand uses a cumulative argument to provide the required 
justification of religious belief, but he is also attempting to justify a whole set of 
traditional Christian beliefs on this basis. Mitchell thus provides a doubly cumulative 
argument because both the Christian beliefs in question and the justification of those
137 Ibid, page 13.
138 Ibid, page 289.
139 Ibid, page 290. Also cited on page 151, foot note 128.
140 Ibid, page 291.
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beliefs, are contended to function together in a provision of mutual support for each 
other. This results in a dialectical relationship between the premises and the 
conclusions. Swinburne does not push the possibilities of a cumulative argument so 
far as is done by Mitchell.
I.M.Crombie is another writer who adopts a cumulative approach to 'theistic 
interpretations of our experience'
Those who so interpret need not be so inexpert in logic as to suppose that there is 
anything of the nature of a deductive argument which leads from a premiss asserting 
the existence of the area of experience in question to a conclusion expressing belief in 
God....All that is necessary is that he (the theist) should be honestly convinced that, 
in interpreting them (his experiences), as he does, theistically, he is in some sense 
facing them more honestly, bringing out more of what they contain or involve than 
could be done by interpreting them in any other way. The one interpretation is 
preferred to the other, not because the latter is thought to be refutable on paper, but 
because it is judged to be unconvincing in the light of familiarity with the facts.
There is a partial parallel to this in historical judgement. Where you and I differ in 
our interpretation of a series of events, there is nothing outside the events in question 
which can over-rule either of us. So that each man must accept the interpretation 
which seems, on fair and critical scrutiny, the most convincing to him.i'^^
This approach would see a theistic understanding of an experience as being a special 
case of metaphysical reasoning, in the sense that it attempts to provide an account of 
everything using intelligible principles, even though they are not the same as those 
employed in empirical inquiry.
W.P. Alston has also adopted a cumulative form of argument in support of 
religious beliefs. He does not develop this in detail, but when he discusses issues 
such as the epistemology of religious experience, he does so in the context of what 
this experience could contribute to an argument which is based on many different 
footings.
Perhaps it is a mistake to look for a foundation of one's faith that stands infallible, 
indubitable, and incorrigible, in no need of support from any other source. Perhaps 
no system of belief can be grounded in that way. Perhaps a more reasonable 
aspiration for the human condition is to have multiple sources of support such that 
although each can be questioned and none renders any of one's beliefs absolutely 
certain, they lend support to each other as well as to the beliefs they are invoked to 
support; so that in the way the whole assemblage fits together we have sufficient 
reason to take the beliefs to be true. Thus in order to answer the claim that one's 
putative experience of God is this-worldly only, one can appeal to the witness of 
others who are more advanced in the Christian life, to the revelation of God in His 
historical acts, and to general philosophical reasons for believing that God as 
constructed in Christianity does exist and rules His creation. Though each of these 
considerations can itself be doubted and though no single strand is sufficient to keep
141 Flew & MacIntyre, (ed.) New Essays in Philosophical Theology, page 112.
1 5 9
the faith secure, when combined into a rope they all togetlier have enough strength to
do the job
Thus I take the "cumulative case" and "mutual support" perspective on the 
grounds of Christian belief to be clearly superior to any story according to which the 
whole thing rests on some particular basis, a basis that will inevitably be subject to 
serious doubts that it cannot satisfactorily resolve with its own resources alone,
There is an impressive increase in support for the idea of a cumulative approach to 
the epistemology of religious beliefs. One could include all of the above writers, but 
also other figures as diverse as Charles Hartshorne, Elton Trueblood, J.R. Lucas, and 
Austin Farrer. All of these have, in one form or other, deployed a cumulative 
argument to support the rationality of religious belief.
There are variations in the ways in which these arguments are individually 
constructed by their authors; however the same principle applies to all. This is the 
idea that the patient accumulation of various pieces of evidence can work in 
combination to provide rational justification for a belief, or in Mitchell's case, for a 
whole set of beliefs. Such arguments are not a theological peculiarity and they are 
also used in several other disciplines.
Theoretically, a defence of charismatic experience could be constructed in this 
'cumulative' way. Often there will be a jumble of unusual physical phenomena to be 
assessed; healing, shaking, falling down, screaming, crying, jumping, etc. On their 
own these sensations are ambiguous, but they could be combined with a 
demonstration that the alternative explanations are less able to make sense of the facts 
than the hypothesis that they are caused by a direct intervention from God. There 
could be some Biblical justification given for a particular experience. There is also 
an inner conviction as to the nature of the experience, and so one is then forced to 
reckon with the claim some men make, that they are in the presence of God; that they 
have direct perception of Him. Such a claim should not be dismissed outright 
without good reason. Following this experience there is the possibility of an altered 
life in terms of transformation of character, continuing peacefulness, generosity and 
changes in patterns and devotion in worship, and so on; characteristics which are 
unusual.
The charismatic Christian has an explanation for all of this. Even though it is 
one which could be questioned and reinterpreted in each of its component parts. If 
one is to dismiss his understanding of this, then it is not enough to claim simply that 
other explanations are possible; it is necessary to (a) demonstrate the faults in the
142 Alston, W.P. Perceiving God, (Cornell University Press, 1991), page 306.
143 Ibid, pages 306-307.
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charismatic understanding, (b) to produce an alternative and (c) to provide a 
justification as to the reason the alternative understanding is preferable.
Alternatives to a charismatic understanding are provided in the form of purely 
psychological explanations of enthusiastic phenomena, sociological examinations of 
the whole situation, differing theological ways of understanding these events, 
philosophical questions about the enthusiast's claims to knowledge, and so on.
The way to resolve this issue therefore would be to examine the content of 
each conflicting interpretation, and ask how each theory attempts to makes sense of 
the experience. Which of the options could more adequately explain the occurrence, 
character and effects of a charismatic experience?
The question raised by this is how can such a decision between varying 
hypotheses be made? What we must now examine is the way in which one can make 
a choice between conflicting theories.
    _ _
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Chapter IV
Theories and Paradigms
Introduction
The thesis to this point has led us to an epistemic position where there are a number 
of competing theories which may be used to explain a claimed religious experience. 
The next issue that needs to be answered is how one can decide which of these 
hypotheses should be preferred. What criteria are on offer to assist in making a 
choice between conflicting theories?
This will become a more problematic issue than it may at first appear, and 
phrases we have been using such as 'making the best sense of evidence', or 
'interpreting the facts' can begin to take on a more evident questionableness. In 
order to clarify the significance of these problems, we will take the example of a 
claimed 'prophecy' and see how such an event could be interpreted by people of 
differing views.
(a) At the simple end of the scale one is assessing the claim to prophecy in a context 
where there is broad agreement on the existence of God, on the attributes and 
purposes of God, on His capacity to speak, and on the means He uses to do so. If 
two people agree that the Bible represents God's revelation, and agree on its 
interpretation, and agree that God communicates to the Church through prophecy; 
then one is asking a comparatively straightforward question, i.e. 'Is this prophecy 
from God?'
In such a situation one could find theoretically agreed methods which could be 
used to assess a particular claim to prophecy. The question could probably be 
resolved by appealing to the Bible which would be a mutually agreed source of 
knowledge. What is the character of the speaker? Does he have a reliable record in 
the past? What is the content of the prophecy? Is it in conflict with other revelation? 
Is it supported by other revelation? If there is prediction involved, does it turn out to 
be accurate?
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Many charismatic writers have written books with this internal level of 
questioning, for example, Discerning the Spirits, by Douglas Mcbain,i Come, Holy 
Spirit, by Bishop David Pytches,^ or Spiritual Gifts and the Church, by D.Bridge.^ 
These are books which aim to assess aspects of the charismatic movement. Indeed 
the subtitle of Discerning the Spirits is 'Checking for Truth in Signs and Wonders'. 
A claim to be able to determine what is 'true' in such a context would only be made 
from within the charismatic framework. This claim is only possible because the 
broader questions about authority, or interpreting religious experience, or what 
religious experience could contribute to the debate about the existence of God, are 
not at issue. These books are addressed to charismatic people by writers who share 
the same assumptions as their readers. Their scope and means of assessment are 
determined by the movement they aim to assess.
If we adopted the same assumptions and confined ourselves to such a level of 
difficulty, then we would have a resolvable and straightforward choice to make 
between possibly conflicting theories.
(b) A higher level of difficulty in theory choice would follow from an increase in the 
complexity of the issue, while remaining within a Christian context. Say for example 
that both of the people who are attempting to assess this 'prophecy' still believe in 
God and agree on the authority of the Bible, but one claims that God no longer 
speaks directly to the Church in this way since the completion of the New Testament. 
In order to resolve the issue of a disputed 'prophecy' in this context, one must ask, 
'Does God speak through prophecy?' before one can ask, 'Is this prophecy from 
God?' This is an increase in complexity because there are more issues that would 
need resolution before the two sides could reach agreement on what the events mean.
On the other hand, one could argue that this would make assessment easier. 
If both sides stick to their assumptions, then they have no problem in analysing the 
prophecy. One side does the contingent assessment we have just outlined, and the 
other disbelieves the 'prophet' on the assumption that prophecy does not happen.
This will not suffice however. Firstly because the two views share logically 
contradictory assumptions. One says that prophecy does occur, and the other says 
that it does not. One of them must therefore be wrong.
The second reason is more significant for this thesis. The assumptions of each 
side are not incorrigible or self-evident, and so each ought to allow their assumptions
1 Mcbain, D. Discerning the Spirits, (Marshall-Pickering, 1992).
2 Pytches, D. Come, Holy Spirit, (Hodder, 1985).
3 Bridge, D. Spiritual Gifts and the Church, (IVP, 1973).
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to be modified in the light of empirical evidence or of better theory. For example, 
experience can contribute something significant which could, in principle modify a 
person's assumptions about how the world functions. Say that the prophecy turned 
out to be startlingly correct and to include knowledge which could only have come 
from God. In this situation it would be wise for the dispensationalist to re-think his 
assumptions about prophecy.
It is at this level of theory choice that the discussion begins to heat up, 
because some of the suppositions of each side are being questioned by the other. 
People tend to be rather ticklish about their presuppositions. Again much of the 
literature falls into this category of theory choice. There are authors, such as Peter 
Masters in The Healing Epidemic,^ or B.B. Warfield in Counterfeit Miracles,^ who 
accept Dispensationalist presuppositions, and therefore rule out the possibility of 
current prophecy. Because the work of the Spirit is excluded as a possible 
explanation for a claim that an event is miraculous, or a prophecy genuine, then such 
authors tend to attribute dramatic events to Satan's work, or to deliberate deception 
on behalf of those involved. Where they are being more generous, they can ascribe 
the experience to psychological causes, or to mistaken beliefs.
Other writers defend charismatic experience from dispensational doctrine. 
For example John Wimber argues that the Church in the West needs to make a 
'paradigm shift' in order to function properly in its use of the gifts of the Spirit. 
Views such as dispensationalism are a distortion of scripture, and the result of 
submitting true Christian thought, which allows room for God’s supernatural 
intervention, to a Western rationalist strait-jacket. In order to recover the spiritual 
power of the New Testament, then the Church must break free from this unbiblical 
world view.
Interestingly, Wimber argues that this alteration in ideas constitutes a 
paradigm shift.
Western Christians must undergo a paradigm (or perception) shift to become 
involved in a signs and wonders ministry. This is a shift towards a worldview that 
makes room for God's miraculous intervention. It is not that we allow God's 
intervention: he does not need our permission. The shift is tliat we begin to see his 
miraculous works and allow them to affect our lives.^
A paradigm shift may be an acceptable description of this level of theory choice 
because it involves looking at the world in a different way, interpreting the 'facts' in 
ways that were not done before and effectively making what is analogous to a 'gestalt
4 Masters, P. The Healing Epidemic, (Wakeman, 1988).
5 Warfield, B.B. Counterfeit Miracles, (Edinburgh, Banner of Truth, 1918).
6 Wimber, J. Power Evangelism, page 89.
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sw itch '2. It also means accepting different methods of establishing what can be 
known, i.e. direct revelation in the place of reason.
It is still, however, a 'sub paradigm' shift because behind this alteration in 
views there remains a vast amount of agreement between the two sides over who is 
God, the person of Jesus, the Church, the supremacy of Biblical authority in 
resolving the dispute, and so on.
(c) The previous two levels of complexity in theory choice are still internal choices 
within a web of Christian beliefs. Both sides have vast areas of agreement on many 
issues which are crucial to resolving the dispute. The problems in choosing between 
competing theories increase to the point where they become potentially 
insurmountable when the distance between the two sides becomes so great that the 
objection to a claim to prophecy comes from someone outside of the Christian web of 
belief. In this situation one is not just asking 'Is this prophecy from God?', and 
'Does God speak through prophecy?', because the question, 'Is there a God?' needs 
to be resolved first. The distance between the two sides in this situation is so wide 
that they rarely address each other, because each has such differing presuppositions 
from the other. If these two sides are to reach agreement, then considerable 
modifications will be required in one or in both webs of belief.
Take the example of an explanation of a charismatic experience made by an 
atheistic psychologist. Once he had explored such issues as the psychological 
motivation behind a person's religious claims, or perhaps pointed out that this person 
had adopted the same beliefs as his parents, this would be the end of the questioning. 
To ask 'is this prophecy from God?' would be meaningless if one were thinking 
within a paradigm that excluded the existence of God. The assumptions which 
determined the shape of this person's paradigm, would also exclude the possibility or 
necessity of asking such a question. Consequently the prospect that this prophecy 
could have some true cognitive content which had been revealed by God would not 
even be an issue which would need to be addressed.
Because the truth of the 'prophet's' claim is not an issue, this tends to create a 
condescending attitude. One side assumes there is no God, and therefore these claims 
to be the receiver of revelation are of necessity false, and these religious people are 
deluded. Religious experiences have been understood in a variety of such 
psychological of pathological ways. They can be attributed, for example, to 
hypersuggestibility :
7 Ibid, page 89.
^  :   . .
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The present data support the conclusion that tlie existential phenomena which 
comprise the experience of conversion and salvation-and, by extension, perhaps other 
types of transcendental experiences-are in reality "hypnotic" phenomena, which occur 
without formal induction in response to implicit or explicit suggestions conveyed by 
the speaker, the setting, or the attendant ceremony.*
Deprivation and maladjustment may account for some forms of 'religious' 
experience, as may mental illness or abnormal physiological states, such as those 
induced by drug taking.^ Whatever, the proposed mechanism, the content of the 
'prophet's' message is not an issue which needs addressing.
Another feature of attitudes at this level of theory choice is mockery and 
invective. For example, Jonathan Swift wrote a satire on an enthusiastic preacher 
based on the analogy of a person attempting to reach heaven while sitting on an ass.
instead of the term. Ass, we shall make use of gifted, or enlightened teacher; And 
the Word Rider, we will exchange for that of Fanatic Auditory, or any other 
Denomination of the like import.
Even though Swift is a Christian believer, there is not even a possibility that an 
enthusiast may be correct in the mind of Swift because the assumptions behind his 
thoughts are so different. Consequently enthusiasts are not disturbing or threatening 
in any way; they are a joke.
This conceptual gulf has significant implications for groups who intend to use 
'signs and wonders' as a form of evangelism. Even if one does perform miracles, 
there is still a vast distance between world views which needs to be crossed in some 
way. In the context where Jesus performed his miracles, this gulf was not so large 
because these acts were done within a group of people who shared many significant 
beliefs with each other.
These three categories are arbitrary points along a gradation in the differences 
between theories. They do, however, help to illustrate the way that complexity in the 
choice between conflicting theories increases as the assumptions of the two differing 
views diverge. This reaches a point where the discussion is taking place across the 
gulf between two paradigms, and the contended issues are quite impossible to resolve 
until at least one of the two sides makes a major change in its web of belief.
8 Gibbons, D.E. and De Jamette, J. Hypnotic Susceptibility and Religious Experience (J. Sc. Stud, 
Rel, 1972), 11, pages 152-156. See also the discussion in Scobie, G. Psychology of Religion, 
(London:Batsford, 1975), chapter 7.
9 Cf. Davis, Caroline Franks The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989), page 203 ff.
10 Swift, Jonathan, A Discourse Concerning the Mechanical Operation of the Spirit, m A  Tale of a 
Tub, (Oxford, 1920), page 267.
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Consequently the way in which a person answers the question, 'if a person 
claims to be encountering God in his experience, how can you tell whether he really 
is?', depends on his situation within a web of belief. As it was put by C.S Lewis:
what you see and hear depends a good deal on where you are standing: it also 
depends on what sort of a person you are. ^  ^
This is significantly more complex than a straightforward choice between conflicting 
theories, because it also involves a choice between different paradigms. There are 
difficult issues to face up to at this point, because it is disputed (a) whether it is 
possible to talk meaningfully across differing paradigms, and (b) whether is possible 
to make a rational choice between them at all.
11 Lewis, C.S. The Magician’s Nephew, (Puffin, 1967), page 116.
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1. Making the choice between conflicting theories
We will begin with a discussion of simple theory choice before we go on to the more 
complex issue of the way in which the choice between paradigms can be made.
There are many writers who have made suggestions on how the choice 
between rival theories can be made. For example according to Kuhn, the 'only three 
normal foci for scientific investigation’12 are (a) accuracy and scope, (b) predictive 
capacity and (c) fruitfulness.
The following is a sample of three writers' criteria.
A. C h oo sing  betw een  th eo r ies a c co rd in g  to  K a r l  P o pper
Karl Popper's approach bears similarities to that of A.J.Ayer's in the choice of 
metaphysical theories, in that he gives primary importance to falsification. This 
follows in the path of Francis Bacon:
Truth emerges more readily from error than from confusion.
As early as 1935 Popper concluded that new theories in science are not established by 
positive confirmation or by corroboration from experience. A positive verification of 
universal scientific propositions is simply impossible. For example, 'all copper in the 
universe conducts electricity' would not be considered as a meaningful statement 
because it involves inductive reasoning.
Now in my view there is no such thing as induction. Thus inference to theories, 
from singular statements which are 'verified by experience' (whatever that may 
mean), is logically inadmissible. Theories are tlierefore never empirically 
verifiable.
A theory can be regarded as 'true' or rather 'corroborated' when it has withstood all 
attempts at falsification up to the present. This leaves science in a continual process 
of trial and error and therefore in a position of searching for the truth, but without the 
right to claim that it has the truth in its possession.
Popper responds to an inductivist methodology as follows:
12 Kuhn, Thomas s. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago Press, 1962), page 25.
13 Cited in Ibid, page 18.
14 The Logic o f Scientific Discovery, page 40.
 ; —  _
15 Ibid, page 419.
16 page 40-41.
17 Ayer, A J. The Concept of a Person and Other Essays, page 27. (My italics)
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As against this, 1 do not think that we can ever seriously reduce by elimination, the 
number of tlie competing theories, since the number remains always infinite. What 
we do - or should do - is to hold on, for the time being, to the most improbable of 
the surviving theories or, more precisely, to the one that can be most severely tested.
We tentatively 'accept' this theory - but only in the sense that we select it as worthy 
to be subjected to fufiher criticism, and to the severest tests we can design.
On the positive side, we may be entitled to add that the surviving theory is 
the best theory - and the best tested theory - of which we know,^^
When a test does prove negative, this may necessitate the rejection of an established 
theory, creating a crisis which clears the ground and allows the development of a new 
hypothesis.
These considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system 
is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation. In other words: 1 shall not require of a 
scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a 
positive sense; but 1 shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be 
singled out by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an 
empirical scientific system to be refiited by experience.!^ i
#One of the effects of such a view is that a theory could not be accepted as being true, 
approximately true, or even probably true, because it may be always theoretically 
possible for a theory to be refuted. I
B . C h o o sin g  betw een  th eo r ies  acco rding  to  A y e r .
A.J.Ayer suggests asking the following questions to aid in the choice of a 
philosophical theory. Ayer take the opposite approach from Kuhn, in that he 
suggests ways in which a particular thesis could be discredited, rather than rationally 
supported.
(a) Is it free of internal contradiction?
This is a very significant element for Ayer, perhaps central
Thus, so long as it is free from internal contradiction, it is hard to see how any 
philosophical thesis can be refuted, and equally hard to see how it can ever be
proved.! 2
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Internal contradiction would be the one clearly logical way to rationally disprove a 
particular thesis.
(hi) Are there anv convincing counter-examples to the particular thesis?
Let us take for example the thesis of physicalisra; that all statements which ostensibly 
refer to mental states or processes are translatable into statements about physical 
occurrences. The obvious way to refute it is to produce a counter-example, which in 
this case seems quite easy. There are any number of statements about people’s 
thoughts and sensations and feelings which appear to be logically independent of any 
statement about their bodily condition or behaviour. !*
Following this path still raises significant difficulties however:
But the adherent to physicalism may not recognise these examples: he may insist that 
diey be interpreted in accordance with his principles. He will do so not because this 
is the meaning that they manifestly have, but because he has convinced himself on a 
priori grounds that no other way of interpreting tliem is possible.!®
Ayer's approach to this problem is to attempt to show that theories are abandoned 
when their interpretations have become so 'strained' that the underlying assumptions 
are discredited. This would be the way, in principle, that such a thesis could be 
discredited and:
So long as we cannot find any convincing counter-examples, the thesis is allowed to 
stand.20
C . C ho o sin g  betw een  th eo r ies  acco rding  to  Q u in e ,
Hypothesis, where successful, is a two way street, extending back to explain the past 
and forward to predict the future. What we try to do in framing hypothesis is to 
explain some otherwise unexplained hap^nings by inventing a plausible story, a 
plausible description or history of relevant portions of the world. What counts in 
favour of a hypothesis is a question not to be lightly answered.^!
Quine suggests six 'virtues' which would be a feature (in varying degrees), as part of 
a successful hypothesis.
18 M d, page 27.
19 Ibid, page 27.
20 Ibid, page 27.
21 Web of Belief, page 66.
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(a) Conservatism
In order to explain the happenings that we are inventing it to explain, the hypothesis 
may have to conflict with some of our previous beliefs; but the fewer the better. 
Acceptance of a hypothesis is of course like acceptance of any belief in that it 
demands rejection of whatever conflicts with it. The less rejection of prior beliefs 
required, the more plausible the hypothesis-other things being e q u a l . 2 2
It is useful to keep one's moves as conservative as possible, on the whole, because 
this increases the probability of getting the next move right.
For a leap in the dark the likelihood of a happy landing is severely limited. 
Conservatism holds out the advantages of limited liability and a maximum of live 
options for each next move.23
(b) Modesty
This is not sharply distinct from conservatism, but is a way of cutting down the 
options, by assuming as little activity as possible in one's account of appearances.
One hypothesis is more modest than another if it is weaker in a logical sense: it is 
implied by the other without implying it. A hypothesis A is more modest than A and 
B as a joint hypothesis. Also one hypodiesis is more modest than another if it is 
more humdrum: that is if the events fliat it assumes to have happened are of a more 
usual and familiar sort, hence more to be expected. 2^
(c) Simplicity
This value continues from modesty, and sometimes overlaps with it. It could be 
accused of having a disturbing element of subjectivity; why should we expect nature 
to submit to our subjective standards of simplicity? In spite of problems such as 
this, however, the simpler of two hypotheses generally does stand the better chance 
of predicting events.
There is a premium on simplicity in any hypothesis, but the highest premium is on 
simplicity in the giant joint hypothesis tihat is science, or the particular science, as a 
whole. We cheerfully sacrifice simplicity of a part for greater simplicity of the 
whole when we see a way of doing so.2^
22 Ibid, pages 67-68.
23 Ibid, pages 68-69.
24 Ibid, page 68.
25 Ibid, page 69.
   _ . _
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(d) Generality
The plausibility of a hypothesis depends largely on how compatible the hypothesis is 
with our being observers placed at random in the world. Funny coincidences often 
occur, but they are not the stuff that plausible hypotheses are made of. The more 
general the hypothesis is by which we account for our present observation, the less of 
a coincidence it is that our present observation should fall under it. Hence, in part, 
the power of virtue IV to confer plausibility .2^
te) Refutabilitv
It seems faint praise of a hypotliesis to call it refutable. But the point, we have now 
seen, is approximately this; some imaginable event, recognizable if it occurs, must 
suffice to refute the hypothesis. Otherwise the hypothesis predicts nothing, is 
confirmed by nothing, and confers upon us no earthly good beyond perhaps a 
mistaken peace of m i n d ,  2 7
This point is illustrated later by Quine, in a discussion on the acceptability of 
attributing motives and character traits to people as a way of explaining their 
behaviour.
The particular danger in attributions of motives and character traits is the possibility 
of defending them in almost any circumstances without doing violence to our other 
beliefs. The danger, in short, is lack of virtue V, refutability. Where fiiis virtue is 
wanting, it becomes questionable how much content the attributions have. 
Characterological attributions to groups of persons as well as to individuals can be 
offered as deep truths and as justifications for attitudes and actions even when they 
are empty.2*
(f) Precision
The more precise a hypothesis is, die more strongly it is confirmed by each 
successful prediction that it generates. This is because of the relative improbability 
of coincidences. If a prediction based on a hypothesis just happens to come out true 
for irrelevant reasons, that is a coincidence; and, the more precise a hypothesis, the 
less room there is for such a coincidence.2®
Although there is no established and definitive list of criteria which automatically 
determine the selection of a particular hypothesis, when it is in competition with an 
alternative, there are broadly accepted 'values' which aid in the choice between
26 Ibid, page 74,
27 Ibid,p2Lgel9.
28 Ibid, page 123.
29 Ibid, page 98.
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conflicting theory. If there was a straightforward decision to make between theories, 
in assessing charismatic experience, then the process would be comparatively simple. 
One would apply the kind of values outlined above, and see which theory comes out 
as the most coherent on that basis.
Limiting ourselves to assessing enthusiastic claims from within the system 
itself, would leave us with relatively few difficulties to resolve. Such an assessment 
would in most situations be a Bible study which would be used to resolve the issues 
raised.
However, if we intend to face up to more complex levels of assessment, then 
the issue of paradigm and paradigm choice needs to be explored. The situation here 
is more problematic because the choice is not a simple two-theory choice within an 
agreed framework of values, facts and methodology. There are two or more separate 
systems of thought which underlie the differing theories, and which are in 
competition with each other to provide coherent understanding. Each has its own 
presuppositions and methods, and even its own definition of what counts as fact.
For example, one may be theistic understanding, and the other atheistic. 
These two paradigms provide radically different ways of looking at reality and 
compete with each other for supremacy in interpreting an individual experience.
The same sort of conflict also occurs outside the religious context for 
example, in the case of competing metaphysical systems, scientific paradigms, radical 
Marxist beliefs, or of Freudian and non-Freudian literary criticism.
This kind of situation creates particular problems when there is a dispute 
between such different paradigms. There can be profound conceptual differences 
between the two sides, each tends to accommodate any evidence and arguments into 
its own system, and to re-assess them in the light of its own principles. They tend to 
talk across each other and be lost in mutual incomprehension.
It is essential to the issue of assessing charismatic experience that we should 
see if it is possible to make a rational choice between different paradigms. If this is 
not possible, then in many circumstances one would be unable to make a rational 
choice between an enthusiastic interpretation of experience, and another competing 
explanation. This would imply that the possibility of assessment would be very 
limited indeed. One would not be able to say anything rational in support or in 
opposition to an interpretation of a claimed religious experience.
___________________
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2. The Nature of Paradigms
'Paradigm' is defined in A Dictionary o f Philosophy as:
In the philosophy of science, a central overall way of regarding phenomena, within 
which a scientist normally works. The paradigm may dictate what type of 
explanation will be found acceptable, but in periods of crisis a science may exchange 
paradigms. In its usual employment in the present context the term is both 
ambiguous and vague
The truth of this last sentence is soon evident when one examines the various way in 
which the word is used.
Depending on the w rite r,p arad ig m  differences can be a combination of 
different presuppositions, different aims, different attitudes, 'absolute 
p resuppositions ''basic  com m itm ents','b liks',^^ different concepts of truth, the 
'philosophic background' influencing the science of the time;^^ 'standards of 
rationality and intelligibility' which provide 'fundamental patterns of expectation' so 
that 'we see the world through them to such an extent that we forget what it would 
look like without them' ,^ 6 different stand-points, a gestalt switch, different views of 
reality, a different set of beliefs, a different model, or different methods. According 
to Hans Kiing, a paradigm is an ' interpretive model', an 'explanatory model' or a 
'model for u n d e r s t a n d i n g T h e  word has also found its way into computer science, 
psychology, sociology, theology and other disciplines who each adapt its meaning to 
their own purposes.
For example. Dr C.Kraft puts 'paradigm' into a sociological context, and 
defines it in terms of the worldview of a particular culture:
Cultures pattern perceptions of reality into conceptualizations of what reality can or 
should be, what is regarded as actual, probable, possible, and impossible....The 
worldview is the central systematization of conceptions of reality to which the 
members of the culture assent (largely unconsciously) and from which stems their
30 Flew, A. A Dictionary of Philosophy, (Pan 1979), page 261. (My italics).
31 These writers are not all people who use the word paradigm themselves, but there is some 
commonality between them. They are certainly used as examples of different concepts of paradigm by 
other writers.
32 Collingwood, R.G. Essay on Metaphysics, (Oxford University Press, 1940), chapter 5.
33 Braithwaite, R.B. An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief, Eddington memorial 
lecture, Nov 1955 (Cambridge, 1956) reprinted in: Mitchell, B.(ed.) The Philosophy of Religion, 
(Oxford, 1971).
34 Hare, R.M. 'Theology and Falsification', in New Essays in Philosophical Theology.
35 Koyré, A. From The Closed World to the Infinite Universe, (Baltimore, John HopHns press, 
1957), page 192.
36 Toulmin, S. Foresight and Understanding, (Indiana University Press, 1961), pages 56, 47, 101.
37 Kiing, H. & Tracy, D.(ed.) Paradigm Change in Theology, (T & T Clark, 1989), page 7.
.................... ......... ...................................................................................................................
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value system. The worldview lies at the very heart of the culture, touching, 
interfacing with, and strongly influencing every aspect of culture.^*
’Paradigm’ is being used in rather slippery ways, and so one needs care in 
interpreting a particular writer’s use of the word, because it seems to be defined by 
its context.
According to the Dictionary o f Philosophy and Religion,^^ it can be defined as 
follows.
From the Greek paradeigma ("a pattern, model, or plan").
(1) Plato (q.v. 1) used the term with respect to his Ideas or Forms, thus indicating 
their role in the world.
(2) In contemporary philosophy the centre of analysis and criticism is often a 
paradigm case, presented as exemplifying the issues which are at stake. Disposition 
of the paradigm case is thus presumed to be tantamount to a resolution of the 
argument. When Moore (q.v.2) raised his hand, saying "Here is a hand, and here 
another," he was presenting a paradigm case. The question is whether the principles 
of scepticism, holding we have no certainty, can deflate that presentation.
(3) Kuhn (q.v.l) holds that scientific theories are constructed around basic 
paradigms-e.g. the solar model of an atom-and that shifts in scientific theory require 
new paradigms.
The Oxford English D ic t io n a r y ^ o  also begins with its Greek root as a ’pattern' or 
'example'. A 'paradigm case' is representative or typical of something; a standard 
form, or a classic example. One example would be 'paradigms’ of regular nouns and 
verbs.
It gives some examples of its 20th Century use in philosophy, for example:
If one uses the word 'paradigm' as Witgenstein himself used it, to denote a logical or 
conceptual structure serving as a form of thought within a given area of experience.^^
The publication of Chomsky’s Syntactic structures provided a new paradigm for 
linguistics."^^
As for the periods between quantum leaps, Kuhn contends that each period of normal 
science in the development of a scientific discipline corresponds to one and only one 
methodological firamework or paradigm. In a nut-shell paradigms are 'universally' 
recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and 
solutions to a community of practitioners."^^
38 Kraft, C. Christianity in Culture, (Orbis, 1979), page 53.
39 Reese, William L. Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion, (Sussex Harvester press, 1980).
40 OED, (Second edition, 1989).
41 1964 Listener, 6 Aug 200/2.
42 1975 Language, LI. 1009.
43 Language LII286.
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This would leave us with two apparently distinct uses of the word, the first being the 
'classic example', or 'paradigm case'; and the second being the use of the word as 
begun by Kuhn which refers to a basic model of reality. One could consequently 
speak of 'pre-Kuhnian', and 'post-Kuhnian' uses of the word.^"^
Each of these meanings are connected however, in that they could both be 
described as a 'model'. In the way that Kuhn used it, this 'model' is that of a large 
scale pattern to which the physical world or its appearances are argued to conform. 
It is this later 'large scale' sense of the word with which we are concerned here. We 
will explore the concept of paradigm in the context of (A) scientific and (B) 
metaphysical systems of thought, and then see if it is applicable to (C) theology.
A. S cien tific  P aradigm s
We will begin with Kuhn as he is the originator of the use of paradigm in this large 
scale sense. The Kuhnian meaning of paradigm evolved out of the context of the 
empiricist accounts of science which were prevalent in the 1950's. These emphasised 
agreement with experiment as the main criterion for judging between rival theories. 
According to Barbour this emphasis on the objectivity of science was founded on 
three claims.
(a). Science starts from publicly observable data which can be described in a pure 
observation language independent of any theoretical assumptions.
(b). Theories can then be falsified by comparison with this fixed experimental data.
(c). The choice between rival theories is thus rational, objective, and in accordance 
with specifiable criteria.
During the late 1950's and early 1960's each of these assumptions was 
questioned, and counter-claims were advanced.
(a). All data are theory laden; there is no neutral observation language.
(b). Theories are not verified or falsified; when data conflict with accepted theories, 
they are usually set to one side as anomalies, or else auxiliary assumptions are 
modified.
44 'Pre-Kuhnian' is used by Emil Lakatos in the essay, History of Science and it's Rational 
Reconstructions. Found in Scientific Revolutions, edited by Ian Hacking (Oxford, 1981). Foot note on 
page 109.
45 Barbour, Ian G. Myths, Models and Paradigms, (SCM 1974), page 93.
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(c). There are no criteria which enable rational choice between rival theories of great 
generality, because the theories themselves are theory-dependent.
This attack on empirical scientific methods was taken a step further by Kuhn 
in The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions. He argued that the scientific community 
was dominated by paradigms. The word is borrowed from Wittgenstein, but 
developed and taken to refer to 'standard examples of scientific work which embody 
a set of conceptual, methodological and metaphysical assumptions'. A paradigm is:
an entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the 
members of a given community/^
Kuhn has received considerable criticism for some apparent inconsistencies and 
obscurity in the use of this notion of paradigm change, especially from Karl Popper.
The concept of paradigm is used to describe a complex mix of ideas by Kuhn, 
but the following points describe the major traits in his use of the word.
(a) The paradigm is an achievement, in the sense that it provides an accepted way 
of resolving problems which then come to be approved of and used by other 
scientists.
the paradigm has shown itself to be particularly revealing of the nature of things. By 
employing them in solving problems, the paradigm had made them worth 
determining both with more precision and in a larger variety of situations.
(b) A paradigm also refers to a set of 'shared values'. Kuhn uses this phrase to 
describe the methods, standards, and generalisations shared by those who carry on the 
work resulting from the achievements of the paradigm. This is what is meant by the 
'community' which is created by the paradigm. The paradigm is used to discriminate 
between problems that are posed for solution.
It consists of empirical work undertaken to articulate the paradigm theory, resolving 
some of its residual ambiguities and permitting the solution of problems to which it 
had previously only drawn attention. This class proves to be the most important of 
all.48
(c) Kuhn uses the word paradigm to refer to a scientific theory which has a 
dramatic degree of predictive power in a situation where older accepted theory has
46 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 175.
47 Ibid, page 25.
48 Ibid, page 27.
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become unable to keep up. It is important that it should be so striking that other 
scientists will attempt to develop further successes by modelling their own 
explanations and predictions on the same paradigm. Sometimes a paradigm can be so 
significant that it will create a whole field, such as celestial mechanics which was a 
product of the Newtonian paradigm.
(d) Kuhn also maintains that a paradigm has considerable immunity from 
falsification, and can only be overthrown by a new paradigm. A paradigm will not 
be given up simply because of awkward observational results, but only when a better 
all-encompassing theory is available.
(e) He argues that what are considered to be the 'facts' are not neutral because 
they are determined by the current paradigm. At this point he has been accused of 
being radically subjective, and even irrational.
(fy Following on from the previous point, by implication, is the most
controversial aspect of Kuhn’s idea of paradigm. This is his description of the 
process by which a paradigm is replaced. The choice between paradigms here is 
determined by such considerations as 'faith', 'elegance' and 'conversion', rather than 
by purely rational argument.
there is another sort of consideration that can lead scientists to reject an old paradigm 
in favour of a new. These are the arguments, rarely made entirely explicit, that 
appeal to the individual's sense of the appropriate or die aesthetic-the new theory is 
said to be "neater", "more suitable", or "simpler " than the old."*^
The importance of aesthetic considerations can sometimes be decisive.^®
His description of the process by which a paradigm is replaced is analogous to 
conversion. This 'conversion' can not be objectively assessed, because there are no 
neutral historical or methodological canons to which one can appeal. Kuhn describes 
this 'conversion' by using the analogy of a 'switch in visual gestalt'
Nevertheless, paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their research- 
engagement differently. In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what 
they see and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding 
to a different world....
What were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits 
afterwards Therefore, at times of revolution, when the normal-scientific tradition
49 Ibid, page 154.
50 Ibid, page 155.
   _ _
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changes, the scientist’s perception of his environment must be re-educated - in some 
familiar situations he must learn to see a new gestalt. After he has done so the world 
of his research will seem, here and there, incommensurable with the one he had 
inhabited before. That is another reason why schools guided by different paradigms 
are always slightly at cross purposes.
The accusations of extreme relativity would be denied by Kuhn, but at least in the 
first edition of The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, it is easy to see why he has 
been criticised in this way.
He does clarify his views in response to criticism, and in the postscript to the 
second edition of The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (1970), he gives more 
prominence (a) to the control that experiment has over theory; and (b) to the role of 
criteria which are independent of the particular paradigm.
Kuhn, however, suggests that there is an important difference between a 
switch in visual gestalt, and the change of a scientific paradigm, because an alteration 
in a scientific paradigm has even more variables. In the case of a gestalt switch, it is 
appropriate to say that the subject interprets the data differently when he sees, say, a 
duck or a rabbit. He can learn to direct his attention to the lines on the paper and can 
come to see these lines without seeing either of the figures. But this is not the case 
with a scientific paradigm. Here even the data are not unequivocally stable, and it is 
therefore more than a change in interpretation. A change in paradigm can also be a 
revision of the 'basic facts'.
But that interpretive enterprise  can only articulate a paradigm, not correct it.
Paradigms are not corrigible by normal science at all. Instead, as we have already 
seen, normal science leads ultimately only to the recognition of anomalies and to 
crises. And these are terminated, not by deliberation and interpretation, but by a 
relatively sudden and unstructured event like the gestalt switch. Scientists then often 
speak of the 'scales falling from their eyes' or of the lightning flash' that 'Inundates' 
a previously obscure puzzle, enabling its components to be seen in a new way that for 
the first time permits a solution. On other occasions the relevant illumination comes 
in sleep. No ordinary sense of the term 'interpretation* fits these flashes of intuition 
through which a new paradigm is bom. Though such intuitions depend upon the 
experience, both anomalous and congruent, gained with the old paradigm, they are 
not logically or piecemeal linked to particular items of that experience as an 
interpretation would be. Instead they gather up large portions of that experience and 
transform them to a rather different bundle of experience that will thereafter be 
linked piecemeal to the new paradigm, but not to the old.^^
The language here is obviously reminiscent of the way in which conversion is 
described. Indeed the establishment of the new paradigm even requires faith if it is 
to succeed.
51 Ibid, pages 110 &111.
52 Ibid, pages 121-122.
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The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must often do so in defiance 
of the evidence provided by problem-solving. He must, that is, have faith that the 
new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing 
only that the older paradigm has failed with a few. A decision of that kind can only 
be made on faith.
(g) When a paradigm is established, one is in a period of 'normal science'. This 
normality continues until it is superseded by a new theory which can more 
successfully deal with problems which have arisen under the old system.
B .  M e t a p h y s i c a l  S y s t e m s  a s  P a r a d i g m s
The same difficulties which were raised by Kuhn in respect of scientific paradigms 
would also seem to arise in the context of competing metaphysical systems:-
(a) Every metaphysical system prescribes criteria for what, in terms of the system, 
are to be regarded as the 'facts'.
(b) Every metaphysical system prescribes also what are to be regarded, in terms of 
the system, as legitimate criteria of assessment.
(c) It is difficult to overcome language problems which hinder communication 
between different metaphysical paradigms.
(d) Whether it is possible to make a rational choice between conflicting systems is 
questionable.
These problems are discussed by W.H. Walsh in his book Metaphysics. He 
argues that the first job of a metaphysical system is to cover all the facts of a given 
situation, and then continues as follows.
Unhappily these tests are more promising in theory tlian they turn out to be in 
practice. Take the first bare requirement to cover all the facts, and consider it with 
reference once more to materialism. Many people reject materialism on the ground 
that it brusquely dismisses whole areas of experience as illusory, but would a 
materialist agree that his philosophy has left anything out? Suppose it were said that 
he failed to take account of, say, the phenomena of religious experience or the 
compelling character of moral obligation. His comment would surely be that he not 
only mentioned these phenomena but explained them, and explained tiiem in tlie only 
way which could make them intelligible. In the case of religion, for example, he 
showed how it was, i.e. in what physical, psychological and perhaps social 
conditions, people came to have what are commonly called religious experiences and 
why they were disposed to put a certain construction on those experiences. And if it 
were suggested to him that this explanation simply omits what is of the essence of the 
matter, in so far as it says nothing about the cognitive content of such experiences, he
53 Ibid, page 157.
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would reply that it is an illusion to suppose that they have any such content. Having 
a religious experience is perhaps like being vividly aware of the presence of another 
person, with the difference that in this case there is no other person to be aware of. 
The important point, however, is that we can see how the illusion develops and what 
purpose it serves.
The trouble about testing a theory like that of materialism by its capacity to 
cover all the facts is that there is no general agreement about what "the facts" are. 
Facts exist, or perhaps we should say obtain, only from particular points of view, 
and here points of view are in dispute. The consequence of this is that the 
metaphysician is necessarily the judge in his own case, for though he must admit to 
an obligation to take account of all the facts as he sees them, it is in the last resort for 
him to say what is fact and what is not. His office confers on him the duty of giving 
an overall interpretation, but simultaneously allows him a veto on accepting anything 
which cannot be fitted into his scheme.
He goes on to argue that even reference to 'experts' in particular fields does not 
enable this factual relativity to be overcome.
Ayer, as outlined earlier, makes the suggestion that one could aim to make the 
interpretation of data appear to be so strained, that it would bring into question the 
assumptions on which the approach rests. The difficulties remain, however, because 
whether an idea is considered to be 'strained' may still be determined by the relevant 
paradigm.
Walsh makes an attempt to deal with such difficulties, drawing a similar 
parallel to that made by Mitchell between literary criticism and metaphysical 
argument. He discusses 'metaphysical truth and critical authenticity'.
I suggest that the problem of metaphysical truth and metaphysical argument gains 
more illumination if we pay attention to the activities like literary criticism than if  we 
concentrate, as has often been done in the past, on comparing metaphysics with the 
sciences or mathematics.^^
In assessing the work of a literary critic we look for qualities like depth, penetration, 
insight. We expect a good critic to reveal to us aspects of the writings under review 
whose significance is commonly overlooked, and so to enable us to look at what we 
thought we knew with fresh eyes. It is illumination or, in a special sense of the term, 
understanding which we hope to derive from such a critic. But these are of course 
the qualities and results we associate with metaphysics, according to the argument of 
the book. We find a writer like Aristotle or Hegel revelatory, not because he tells us 
facts with which we were previously unfamiliar (though he may remind us of facts 
we had forgotten or overlooked), nor yet because he offers limited explanations of 
the scientific type, but because he enables us to take a connected view of many 
different types of facts, and so doing to see them afresh and find in them new 
significance. And the procedure for authenticating a revelation of this kind is 
identical in the two spheres; in each case what we have to do is, first, make the 
interpretive principles clear, and then show that they provide genuine illumination 
when applied to the detailed facts. Argument can and does come in here, but in the
54 Walsh, W.H. Metaphysics, (Hutchinson University library, London. 1963), pages 177-178. (My 
italics).
55 Metaphysics, page 180.
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last resort it is a matter of inviting the reader to take the principles and see for 
himself.
Walsh's conclusion is:-
It appears from this that, so far from being the queen of the sciences, metaphysics 
cannot be a science at all. And the consequence has, in my opinion, to be accepted: 
we need to recognise plainly that metaphysical principles can no more be fixed in a 
scientific way than can moral principles. But it does not follow that principles of 
either sort are developed without reason. We have mentioned already that there are 
circumstances-failure to cover all the facts, or to cover them adequately-in which an 
honest metaphysician has no choice but to abandon his principles; and whilst it is true 
that this is more readily recognised in theory than in practice, the pressure of the 
facts is even so felt in this sphere. If the reasons to which metaphysicians appeal do 
not, as they themselves suppose, necessitate, they nevertheless incline. Despite the 
appearances, objections to a position formulated in full consciousness of what it 
amounts to cannot be indefinitely shuffled off.^^
Walsh's conclusion, is therefore that a system will in the end be exposed to 
objections which make it no longer viable.
The main problem at this point though, is that it is not possible to specify 
precisely what criteria will be used to do this. It is this fact above all which tempts 
philosophers to deny that there can be a rational choice between metaphysical systems 
at all.
For rational choice to be possible, they are included (sic) to insist, there must be 
some clearly formulable rules for making it, and such rules are not found outside the 
rival systems themselves.^*
This assumption that 'clearly formulable rules' are necessary for rational paradigm 
choice also emerges in passage by H. A.Hodges.
There are alternative patterns of life and thought, each of which is unintelligible from 
the stand-point of others, and there is no logical road from one to another. There is a 
road, but it is the road of choice, made as it must be by one who knows that he is 
moving in the dark, and that nothing less than himself, his future character and life, 
hangs on the venture. Life is like that, and the choice between fundamentally 
different attitudes and standpoints is like that. It is unpleasant to those who would 
like to work it all out as a theorem, or to present a clear and distinct solution to the 
problem; but it is tlie real predicament of man.^^
The assumption that the lack of a 'logical road' from one position to the other must 
mean that there is no possibility of rational choice, is what is criticised by Mitchell,
56 Ibid, page 181.
57 Ibid, pages 182-182.
58 The Justification of Religious Belief, page 88.
59 Hodges, H.A. Languages Standpoints and Attitudes (Oxford University Press, 1953), pages 59- 
60.
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in discussing the debate between Kuhn and his critics. He points out that this concept 
of reasoning involves following specified rules, and that is has two difficulties,
The first is that of ensuring that the rules have been specified correctly in the 
first place; this approach can easily be pushed into absurdity.
If this exercise of thought has itself to be rule governed, the question can in turn be 
raised whether these rules have been correctly specified, and so on ad infinitum.
The second difficulty is that, in any case, the rules have to be applied and, since not 
all cases are straightforward, judgement will be needed in applying them on at least 
some occasions. Unless the capacity to judge is used, then there is also an infinite 
regress at this point.
It would seem that the same issues which are raised by the concept of 
paradigm in the context of scientific theory are also met in differing metaphysical 
systems
C. Theological Paradigms
If we have been correct in our summary of the meaning of paradigm, and the way in 
which a paradigm shift functions in science and in differing metaphysical systems; 
then it does indeed bear a strong relationship to the kind of controversy that exists 
within theology and between theology and atheism, and between enthusiast and non­
enthusiast.
It would be possible to describe the major changes which have occurred in 
theology over the centuries as changes in paradigms. For example the systems of 
thought initiated by Origen, Augustine, or Martin Luther were radically distinct from 
previous systems of thought. Thé same could also be said of the post modernist 
theology in the current theological c o n t e x t . F i g . l  is an attempt by Hans Kiing at a 
diagrammatic representation of the major paradigm changes through the history of the 
Church.
60 The Justification of Religious Belief, page 89,
61 Kiing, H. & Tracy, D. (ed.) Paradigm Change in Theology, (T & T Clark, 1989). Argued by 
Charles Kannensgiesser in the essay 'Origen, Augustine, and Paradigm Changes in Theology' page 
113 ff.
62 Ibid, page 219.
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There are problems with the details of this representation; for a start it seems rather 
an arbitrary choice of 'paradigms'; It is difficult to see the 'community' that goes 
along with a paradigm. It is also questionable whether 'contemporary p' should be 
put on a par with the enlightenment. Küng goes even further, and treats this modern 
group as the apex of all theological thought, while all other theological paradigms are 
anachronistic backwaters. These criticisms apart, however, the point is that it is 
considered possible to view differing theological world views as being distinct 
paradigms.
Hans Kiing points out a number of parallels between theological and scientific 
paradigms.
Like natural science, the theological community has a 'normal science' with its 
classical authors, textbooks and teachers, which is characterised by a cumulative 
growth of knowledge, by a solution of remaining problems ( puzzles'), and by 
resistance to everything that might result in a changing or replacement of the 
established p a r a d i g m .  3^
The process of replacement by a new paradigm is similar in both theology and 
science.
As in natural science, so also in the theological community, an older paradigm or 
model of understanding is replaced when a new one is available.
According to Kiing, the subjective circumstances of a change between paradigms is 
similar in theology and science. For example, in both situations there is a crisis of 
faith which leads to the necessity of new ideas being formulated. Non-scientific 
factors are important, in terms of sociological aspects, personalities, nationalities, and 
so on. The switch between paradigms involves a conversion to a new way of looking 
at the world. In both science and theology the adherents of the new world view are 
at first few in number, and often made up of younger people.
John Watkins draws some interesting parallels between theological and 
scientific paradigms in Against Normal Science, H i s  summary of Kuhn's view on 
this issue is also one that is accepted by Kuhn himself as being accurate.
63 Ibid, page 14.
64 Ibid, page 23.
65 Essay in Lakatos and Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, (Cambridge 1970), 
page 25 ff.
66 Ibid, page 255.
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Consider a theological scholar working on an apparent inconsistency between two 
biblical passages. Theological doctrine assures him that the Bible, properly 
understood, contains no inconsistencies. His task is to provide a gloss that offers a 
convincing reconciliation of the two passages. Such work seems essentially 
analogous to ’normal’ scientific research as depicted by Kuhn; and there are grounds 
for supposing that he would not repudiate the analogy. For The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions contains many suggestions, some explicit, others implicit in 
the choice of language, or a significant parallelism between science, especially 
Normal Science and theology. Kuhn writes of a scientific education as a 'process of 
initiation' which prepares fire student form membership in the particular scientific 
community'. He says that it is a narrow and rigid education, probably more so than 
any other except perhaps in ortliodox theology'. He also says that a scientific 
education involves the re-writing, in text-books, of history backwards, and that this 
indicates 'one of the aspects of scientific work that most clearly distinguishes it from 
every other creative pursuit except perhaps theology'. In other places the suggestion 
of a science-theology parallelism, though less explicit, is no less obvious. For 
example, he says that Normal Science 'often suppresses fundamental novelties 
because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments. And when Kuhn 
discusses the personal process of repudiating an old paradigm and embracing a new 
one, he describes it as a 'conversion experience', adding that 'a decision of that kind 
can only be made on f a i t h .  7^
There are then, many similarities between theological and scientific paradigms. We 
will explore these in more detail.
A paradigm could be summed up as follows:
(i) It is an extensively influential interpretation of reality.
(ii) It is such an essential part of a person's web of belief, that to alter a paradigm 
will create far reaching effects throughout other beliefs.
(Hi) It is widely accepted by a community.
(iv) Empirical evidence is interpreted by it, and it is only when it is nearing the end 
of its life that it is overruled by experimental data or an alternative paradigm.
(v) It is presupposed to be true.
(vi) The choice between paradigms is made on the basis of 'values'(the word used by 
Kuhn), as well as logical argument.
(vii) The switch to a new paradigm is a sudden 'conversion',
(viii) The differences between paradigms make it difficult to talk between them, 
without being at cross purposes.
(ix) Some 'facts' are determined by the paradigm.
(x) A paradigm is not a single theory, but a whole constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques and means of assessment shared by a given community.
67 Ibid, page 33.
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(a) Similarities
(i) A paradigm is an extensively influential interpretation o f reality,
A paradigm shift creates a large scale transformation in the individual’s world view.
To make the transition to Einstein's universe, the whole conceptual web whose 
strands are space, time, matter, force and so on, had to be shifted and laid down 
again on nature whole. Only men who had together undergone or failed to undergo 
that transformation would be able to discover precisely what they agreed or disagreed 
about. Communication across the revolutionary divide is inevitably partial.
This transition is certainly applicable to theistic belief, as it constitutes an alternative 
view of the nature of the whole of existence. It is the Christian version of the 
physicists attempt to discover the 'theory of everything'.
The same order of transformation is described by J. Wimber in an enthusiastic 
context.
Western Christians must undergo a paradigm (or perception) shift to become 
involved in a signs and wonders ministry. This is a world view that makes room for 
God's miraculous intervention.®^
Such a shift fundamentally alters how a person interprets what they experience, and 
also what they expect to see. It is all encompassing.
(ii) A paradigm is such an essential part o f a person's web o f beli^, that to alter a paradigm will create fa r  reaching effects throughout other beliefs.
These widespread effects are one of the implications of the first point made above. 
For example, the switch from Newton to Einstein had such broad reaching effects on 
the whole scientific community that it affected all areas of science.
The same conceptual disruption is created when a person adopts full blooded 
Christian theism; it affects all other beliefs such as ideas on the origin of the 
universe, its ultimate end, the purpose of existence itself, the person of Jesus, and so 
on. Indeed, its effects are even more extensive than a scientific paradigm, because it 
also determines morality with its obligations extending to what is permissible in 
action and in thought or belief.
In an enthusiastic context these extensive effects are even more notable. In 
addition to the more conventional beliefs of the church, there can be a conviction that
68 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 148.
69 Power Evangelism, page 89.
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God is speaking directly to the consciousness, or through some kind of external 
event. One becomes involved in what is seen as a battle between God and Satan 
which is being fought in the minds and lives of all people. Nothing is neutral; 
everything has 'spiritual' significance. This means that all kinds of what appeared to 
be normal events beforehand, have altered In meaning.
(Hi) The paradigm is widely accepted by a community,
Christian theism is a system of beliefs which has survived for two thousand years. 
Consequently, in terms of its durability within a community, it has exhibited this 
characteristic in a more extreme form than any particular scientific paradigm.
The same is true of enthusiasm, which has recurred with the same basic traits 
throughout the history of the church.
(iv) Empirical evidence is interpreted by a paradigm, and it is only when it is nearing the end o f its life that it is overruled by experimental data or an alternative conceptual system.
The ability of a paradigm to interpret empirical evidence is a significant (and 
criticised) part of Christian theism. For example, one could interpret illness as being 
the will of God, or alternatively, healing could be seen in the same light. If a plane 
crashes, this could be an act of God's providence, or else an attack of Satan; and if 
one is in the position of having survived, then this could be due to divine protection 
(if one conveniently ignores the fact of the original crash).
Indeed, it is so easy to interpret any evidence in a theistic way, that it is 
difficult to imagine an event which could possibly undermine such belief. This is 
because both the success and failure of any 'experiment' could be used to support 
belief in God.
This is particularly true of enthusiasm. At times the empirical evidence seems 
to conflict with theory, and this leads to attempts to defend the original position by 
using supplementary hypotheses.
For example, if one works with the kind of model used by such men as Colin 
Urquhart, then healing is a 'right' which all Christians can and ought to demand. 
God always intends to heal. If a person is healed, then it is a sign of the kingdom. 
If he is not healed, it is because of his lack of faith or hidden sin, or he is healed but 
still has the symptoms. Even if he dies, then death is the perfect healing. There is 
some dishonest re-definition going on here in mid argument, and some slippery use 
of supplementary hypotheses; but the point at this stage is not to evaluate, but to note
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that the empirical data is being interpreted by the paradigm, rather than the other way 
round,70 The paradigm itself is strongly resistant to being modified itself by such 
evidence.
(v) The paradigm is presupposed to be true.
Presupposing the paradigm is evident within Christianity because 'belief is 
considered to be the essential starting point of Christian involvement. By definition, 
to be a Christian is to be a Christian believer, which in turn implies that one 
presupposes certain beliefs to be true. In this situation, to question the truth of some 
Christian doctrine is to put oneself outside the community of Christian believers.
Such belief is held even more strongly than belief in a scientific paradigm, 
because more is at stake for the individual. In the way in which belief is often 
presented by the Church, it has a mental barb attached to it. When disbelief is 
considered to be the road to hell, then the individual fears losing his faith, and is 
therefore resistant to asking too many questions. Not to presuppose the truth of 
Christianity means condemnation by God.
Charismatic experience has its own presuppositions which are shaped by the 
paradigm. Wesley gives an example of presupposed beliefs specifically within the 
context of enthusiasm. He admits that enthusiasm can be internally consistent, but 
questions the presuppositions on which this consistency is based.
It [enthusiasm] may, therefore, well be accounted a species of madness; of madness 
rather than folly: seeing a fool is properly one who draws wrong conclusions from 
right premises; whereas a madman draws right conclusions from wrong premises.
And so does the enthusiast. Suppose his premises true, and his conclusions would 
necessarily follow. But here lies his mistake: his premises are false. He imagines 
himself to be what he is not: And therefore, setting out wrong, the farther he goes, 
the more he wanders out of the w a y . 7 l
Within the charismatic movement one may be required to believe with certainty, not 
just in the historic events which form the basis of Christianity, and in the words of 
Jesus; but also in a claimed revelation, or in healing that has (apparently) taken place 
in the present. The intellectual sin is 'not to believe', rather than 'not to reason'. To 
ask 'why do you believe' can create confusion and lead to such responses as 'I just 
believe'; 'where would be the need for faith if you could give reasons'; 'you are 
saved by faith'. Questioning this kind of belief is confusing because it is presupposed 
to be true.
70 For example, Urquhart, Colin Anything You Ask. (Hodder, 1978), page 117.
71 Wesley, John Sermons, Vol 1 'The Nature of Enthusiasm', (London, 1825), page 467, (1750),
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(yi) The choice between paradigms can only be made on the basis o f values, (the word used by Kuhn), rather than strictly logical argument.
As we have seen, the same way of choosing is applicable to Christian belief. All the 
attempts to 'prove' the existence of God have been severely questioned, and if one is 
to make a choice to adopt such a system, then it has to be on some other basis than 
on the provision of strict proof. However because proof has been ruled out in this 
context, as has strict probability, or 'methodism' and 'particularism', we are forced 
to use judgement as well as is possible. In the decision to adopt theistic belief or not, 
one is consequently required to argue that one's own view is making the best sense of 
the available evidence, that one is facing up to reality more honestly, that one can 
make better sense of more of the facts than can the alternatives. In other words, the 
values which assist in the choice between conflicting theory are being used.
As has been argued, when a community becomes more 'enthusiastic' it 
becomes more resistant to any form of 'human', 'carnal' reasoning, to the 'wisdom 
of the flesh'. It prefers to rely on direct inspiration, of which it is sure, and therefore 
(quite consistently) dismisses any evidence which conflicts with that which it 
putatively knows to be true as being of necessity misleading. Rational argument 
becomes comparatively insignificant, and experience becomes the central basis of 
choice.
This is not a choice which is always made on the basis of 'values' in Kuhn's 
sense of the word, but it does have the similar quality of not being made on the basis 
of strict logical argument.
(vii) To some extent, the methods o f assessment are relative to a particular paradigm.
Within theistic belief 'revelation' is given significance, and this allows the possibility 
of a whole new way of determining what is considered to be true and what is not; 
'Does it conform to what has been revealed by God?', being the main criterion. This 
is internally consistent, but relative to a particular theistic paradigm.
Within enthusiasm, this is taken one stage further, and what is considered to 
be true is determined by excluding rational argument as a means of assessment, and 
substituting in its place, claims to revelation. A reasonable justification seems 
unnecessary to a person who already 'knows' what is true. In other words, reason is 
a form of assessment which is not always acceptable within the paradigm.
If one were to ask an enthusiast, 'How do you know that what you believe is 
true?', his answer would perhaps be along the lines of, 'You ask me how I know he 
lives, he lives within my heart', or 'I just know deep down', or 'God told me', or I
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have the gift of discernment'. This could be seen as sufficient to justify the truth of a 
claim to himself, and with certainty. What should be noted is that it is a means of 
justification which is determined by the enthusiastic paradigm.
If one observes this process from outside the paradigm, it appears as a 
peculiar way of thinking. This is because the outsider does not agree as to the means 
of assessment and wants to ask: ' How do you know that God revealed this, or did 
that?' On the enthusiastic side it is a 'fact' based on direct perception or 
interpretation of Biblical revelation, that God has spoken and/or healed in a particular 
instance. The outsider wants to question the adequacy of such an assessment, 
perhaps because he would prefer to have 'adequate evidence'. In other words these 
beliefs are not justified under his terms.
The question then here is: how do I know that God is the revealer of this to me, that 
the impression is made on my mind by his Holy Spirit, and that therefore I ought to 
obey it? If I know not this, how great soever the assurance is that I am possessed 
with, it is groundless, whatever light I pretend to, it is but enthusiasm.72
As in scientific paradigms, the means of assessment vary within differing theological 
world views.
(viii) The differences between paradigms make it difficult to talk between them, without being at cross purposes.
Kuhn remarks that 'schools guided by different paradigms are always slightly at 
cross-purposes....They are bound to talk through each other...the proponents of 
competing paradigms will often disagree about the list of problems that any candidate 
for a paradigm must solve'.73
The point is made by Hodges in respect of theistic belief:
For this reason, arguments between adherents of such conflicting systems is usually a 
mere beating of air. Each participant remains at the end where he was at the 
beginning, only marvelling at die unreasonableness of his o p p o n e n t . 7 4
As we have seen, the same order of cross purpose misunderstanding exists between 
the enthusiast and the traditional church, as well as with those outside the church. 
There is not even agreement on the authority to which one could apply for a 
resolution of the confusion; the Bible, tradition, reason, or experience.
72 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, page 431.
73 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 110-111.
74 Hodges, H.A. Languages Standpoints and Attitudes, {OyAotdUmv&isiiypmss, 1953), page 58.
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The effect of all this is a history of confusion and aggressive opposition to 
enthusiastic movements which is as old as those movements themselves. Both sides 
parody and misunderstand each other.
(ix) Some 'facts ' are determined by the paradigm.
In both scientific and theological paradigms there are paradigm relative facts. Take, 
for example, the question of the reality of miracles in the New Testament. If one 
starts the examination of these events with a materialistic or Humean view of reality, 
then a report of a miracle should not be believed. That reported miracles ought not 
to be believed is assumed to be a fact, and therefore all evidence is interpreted in its 
light. Consequently, claimed 'miracles' must have some kind of mechanistic 
explanation, or are perhaps myths which have been added on to the story of Jesus by 
the early church. When such a paradigm-determined methodology is applied to, say 
for example, prophecy which seems to be accurate, it must have been written after 
the event. This is because it is assumed to be a fact that it is impossible for someone 
to know beforehand what is to occur. This will be given priority over the literary 
evidence as regards date or authenticity. From this point of view, for example, the 
predictions of the fall of Jerusalem in 70AD could not have been made by Jesus, and 
must have been added at a later stage by some editor of the material.
The evangelical fundamentalist, however complains at the unfairness of this 
approach to the evidence, and at the Humean assumption that determines the nature 
of the argument. He wants to ask 'Why should one's attitude to the miraculous not 
be modified in response to the facts of history, rather than the facts being adjusted to 
suit an assumption about what is possible?'
What to note in this argument, however, is that it is not a simple difference of 
approach to literary criticism, but a clash between two different views of reality. 
Because of this, what are regarded as the facts, are determined by the relevant 
paradigm.
Such systems are logically watertight; if you take up your position firmly within one 
of them, you can turn the edge of any objection that may be brought against it.
There is a Christian interpretation of the facts or alleged facts which may be brought 
as evidence against Christianity; just as there are several non-Christian interpretations 
of those facts or alleged facts which are brought forward as evidence in support of 
Christianity. To one who is a Christian, his own interpretations are bound to seem 
tlie natural and obvious ones, and the others will appear forced and unreasonable; 
while to one who is not a Christian, the reverse will appear to be the case.7®
75 Ibid, page 58.
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Within an enthusiastic movement, the same issue arises when experience is 
interpreted. If one takes as an example a claim to have been healed directly by the 
power of the Spirit, the enthusiast can be convinced beyond any doubt that this was 
performed by direct intervention from God. It is 'as sure as I have being', or 'as 
sure as some things you then saw with your eyes'.7®
You will doubtless say, you are in the right; you are sure of it: Your mind has been 
impressed by the Divine Spirit, and you act in this matter under his special influence.
But is this any more than every enthusiast may plead in vindication of his conduct, be 
it ever so wild?77
The effect of this certainty means that a 'direct intervention by God' is the 
unquestionable fact which is used to interpret all other evidence.
In these examples, what are regarded as the 'facts' of the situation are being 
determined by the operating theological paradigm.
(x). A paradigm is not a single theory, but a whole constellation o f beliefs, values, and techniques.
A 'constellation of beliefs' is the description Kuhn made of a scientific paradigm in 
his Postscript in 1970.7» xt is difficult to envisage any theory which would only 
include one single belief or concept; however a paradigm is a particularly complex 
mix of beliefs and values.
This concept is applicable to Christian theology because Christian 'belief 
includes a vast number of individual beliefs. For example, belief in the Christian 
God involves believing in a creator, sustainer of heaven and earth, a judge, an 
omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, perfect, holy, transcendent, imminent deity. 
To believe that the Bible constitutes God's revelation commits one to innumerable 
beliefs by implication. To believe in Jesus, affects the whole of life and the way in 
which the world is viewed. It commits one to many other related beliefs about the 
Father, Holy Spirit, historical issues, the resurrection, purpose of existence and so 
on. An apparently single Christian belief contains a whole constellation of beliefs, 
values and techniques.
There are, then, evident points of comparison between religious world views 
and scientific or metaphysical paradigms.
76 Chauncey, Charles; Letter to Mr. Davenport, pastor of the Church at Southold on Long Island, 
Now Boston. July 17th, 1742.
77 Ibid, page IV. (My italics)
78 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago Press, 1970), 2nd edition.
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(b) What are the differences?
(i) There is a difference in the conditions needed to formulate theory.
According to Mitchell, the alternative candidate theories in science have to be able to 
satisfy certain conditions, without which they would not be considered scientific 
theories in the first place. Such demands are not placed on competing religious (or 
metaphysical and philosophical) systems. Mitchell points out that to specify these 
conditions is a good deal less easy than is generally supposed.
Evans claims that scientific assertions differ from religious beliefs in being (i) 
morally neutral, (ii) comprehensible interpersonally, and (iii) testable by
observations. 79
In regard to (i) Mitchell points out that:
although membership of a scientific community involves commitment to an ethic of 
intellectual honesty, the scientist in putting forward a theory, however much he 
believes in it, is not thereby committed to a future pattern of conduct in relation to 
it. 80
On the claim that scientific assertions are 'comprehensible interpersonally', the point 
is made that such a distinction between sciences and the humanities is blurred in the 
social sciences.
For the social scientist may sometimes have to take account of the way in which an 
agent sees his own situation, and the capacity to do this involves a degree of 
imaginative sympathy which cannot be presumed to be universal. In this respect the 
social scientist resembles the historian so that the line between the sciences and the 
humanities becomes somewhat blurred. 81
When it comes to the third point, the requirement for testability and observation, 
what is emphasised is the extent to which non-observational criteria are relied on in 
the choice between paradigms.
It is clear that in the paradigm we find science in a form most remote from 
observational testing, from 'knock - down' falsification or 'conclusive' verification 
by means of specific observations. Paradigms are very different from restricted 
generalizations such as 'All the boys in tMs room right now have blue eyes'. 
Nevertheless, even Kuhn says that 'observations and experience can and must 
drastically restrict the range of admissible scientific belief, else there would be no 
science'. More specifically in his account of the anomalies' which force scientific 
revolutions he notes that a paradigm makes possible a precision of observational
79 The Justification of Religious Beli^, page 92.
80 Ibid, page 92.
81 Ibid, page 92.
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expectations which renders it specially sensitive to possible undermining by 
anomalous observational f i n d i n g s . 8 2
In the social sciences, that which is to be considered as credible evidence is strictly 
controlled, yet this is not true in the humanities, let alone in metaphysics or theology. 
These constitute important differences between scientific world views and religious 
paradigms.
(ii). Theological paradigm  have a different relationship to other conflicting 
paradigm.
What is meant by this is that in science there is a period of ’normal' science, 
followed by crisis, and the general adoption of the new paradigm which, according to 
Kuhn is ' incommensurable' with the old.»» This is not true of Christian belief, which 
has continued to co - exist through numerous fundamental changes in scientific world 
views. However this may not indicate a fundamental difference for two reasons.
Firstly the resolution of conflict between theories can be prevented by a lack 
of evidence. For example, in science, the reason for the extinction of the dinosaurs 
has been attributed to meteorites, a virus, rats who ate their eggs, climatic change, 
and so on. The numerous theories continue to exist in parallel, simply because the 
evidence needed to resolve the issue is not available.
The same applies to Christian belief, as there is not enough available 
empirical evidence to resolve the issue of God's existence one way or the other. This 
does not, however, indicate that theistic belief should not be described as a paradigm.
Secondly, the more radical nature of theistic belief alters the relationship it 
has with other paradigms. While Kuhn has been criticised for making extreme and 
relativistic statements in reference to radical paradigm change, this kind of language 
may well be justifiable if one is in the situation of a Christian theistic paradigm in 
conflict with atheism. The assumptions which determine the paradigm within which 
Christianity operates lie at a much more inaccessible part of the web of belief than 
those which define the difference, say between Newton and Einstein. The battle 
between them is therefore more drawn out and more difficult to resolve.
For example, the Christian has a belief about the origin of creation in terms of 
this being the product of an intelligent being. The technology which would be 
needed to examine such a claim by cosmology is so complex, that it is only just 
becoming possible to describe the beginning of the universe in scientifically
82 Evans, cited in ibid, pages 92-93.
83 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 102.
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acceptable terms. In this situation the two paradigms continue to co-exist until the 
conflict between the two is capable of resolution.
(iii) Christian theology is based on questions o f historical truth.
Hans Kung argues that for all its scientific character, Christian theology is essentially 
characterised by its historicity. It focuses on a question of historical truth.
Christian theology is quite decidedly a rational account of the truth of the Christian 
faith: that is, of the faith concerned with the cause of Jesus Christ....This Jesus 
Christ is neither an unhistorical myth nor a suprahistorical idea, doctrine or
ideology. 84
Kung argues that this characteristic makes Christian theology more like historical 
science, but it does not undermine the analogy between scientific and theological 
paradigms.
Conclusions
Although there are some differences between paradigms as the concept is understood 
in science, religious world views and competing metaphysical systems; the 
differences are not enough to undermine the acceptability of the analogy we have 
been drawing between them. There are practical differences in terms of the 
accessibility of the basic data, for example; but in principle they are all still 
paradigms and this analogy holds good in many significant ways.
This implies that the choice between religious and non religious interpretations 
of experience will have the same problems which are inherent in the choice of 
different paradigms in other contexts.
Within the paradigm of Christian thought there is a sub-paradigm called 
’enthusiasm’. It has its own communities, methodologies, means of assessment, and 
internal consistency. It manifests the cross purpose conversations which are typical 
of communication between paradigms, and it has its own constellation of beliefs. 
Enthusiasm has its own means of defining that which should be considered to be a 
fact and has its own ways of reaching knowledge. Consequently it is so different 
from traditional Christianity, that it is entitled to be described as a distinct paradigm.
Having established this, the next question which needs to be addressed is 
'How can one make a rational choice between conflicting paradigms?'
84 Paradigm Change in Theology, page 32.
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3. Difficulties in making a rational choice between competing paradigms.
Thus far we have reached a stage where enthusiastic belief is part of a clash between 
paradigms which appear so different that they would seem to be incompatible. Each 
claims to give an adequate account of the nature of experience in its own terms. As a 
consequence, it could be argued that it is not possible to judge between these 
paradigms by criteria all of which are entirely neutral. It also leaves us with the 
question as to whether it follows that it is possible to judge between them at all.
The general assumption in philosophy is that this can not be done. 
G.J.Warnock is cited by Mitchell in The Justification o f Religious Belief on this issue.
Much admirable philosophical work has been done upon the notion of 'ways of 
seeing', of angles of vision, of-to speak more ponderously-altemative conceptual 
systems. We have become familiar enough with the idea tiiat phenomena may be 
viewed in more than one way, comprehended within more than one theory, 
interpreted by more than one set of explanatory concepts. It has thus become almost 
impossible to believe that some one way of seeing, some one sort of theory, has an 
exclusive claim to be the right way; the notion of 'reality' itself, it would be 
commonly held, must be given its sense in terms of some particular theory or view, 
so that the claim that any such theory reveals or corresponds to reality' can be given 
circular justification which is also open, in just the same way, to quite other views as 
well. 83
If this is correct, then one is forced into a conceptual relativism. The enthusiast has 
his views, and I have mine, but there is no rational way to distinguish which is to be 
preferred.
To the historian, at least, it makes little sense to suggest that verification is 
establishing the agreement of fact with theory. All historically significant theories 
have agreed with the facts, but only more or less. There is no precise answer to the 
question whether or how well an individual theory fits the facts. But....it makes a 
good deal of sense to ask which of two actual and competing theories fit the facts 
better. Though neither Priestly s nor Lavoisier's theory, for example agreed 
precisely with existing observations, few contemporaries hesitated for more than a 
decade in concluding that Lavoisier's theory provided the better fit of the two.»^
But this, he confesses, oversimplifies the situation.
This formulation, however, makes the task of choosing between paradigms look botli 
easier and more familiar than it is. If there were but one set of scientific problems, 
one world within which to work on them, and one set of standards for their solution, 
paradigm competition might be settled more or less routinely by some process like 
counting the number of problems solved by each. But, in fact, these conditions are
85 The Justification of Religious Belief, page 67. Taken from, Warnock, G.J. English Philosophy 
Since 1900, page 144.
86 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 146.
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never met completely. The proponents of competing paradigms are always at least 
slightly at cross purposes. Neither side will grant all the non-empirical assumptions 
that the other needs in order to make its case....they are bound partly to talk through 
each other. Though each may hope to convert the other to his way of seeing his 
science and its problems, neither may hope to prove his case. The competition 
between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs.»7
In spite of these objections, choices between scientific paradigms are made, but 
according to Lakatos, Kuhn claims that ultimately it is only possible to give a 
sociological account of this choice, rather than a logical one.8»
It cannot be made logically or even probabilistically compelling for those who refuse 
to step into the circle. The premises and values shared by the two parties to a debate 
over paradigms are not sufficiently extensive for that. As in political revolutions, so 
in paradigm choice-there is no standard liigher than the assent of the relevant
community. 89
This difficult choice between paradigms is not restricted to science, as it must also be 
made in philosophy too. The issue is highlighted by Quine in relation to the choice 
between two differing conceptual systems.
Here we have two competing conceptual schemes, a phenomenalistic one and a 
physicalistic one. Which should prevail? Each has its advantages; each has its 
special simplicity in its own way. Each, I suggest, deserves to be developed. Each 
may be said, indeed, to be the more fundamental, though in different senses: the one 
is epistemologically, the other physically, fundamental.^®
The philosopher consequently has virtually the same task as does the scientist. He 
has to choose between 'alternative metaphysical systems',
A great deal of philosophical argument is concerned with the drawing of conclusions 
from premisses in a straightforwardly deductive way, but this cannot be the whole of 
it, since the philosopher has to satisfy himself as to the comparative merits of rival 
theories all of which are intenially consistent. In order to do this he must decide 
whether they yield conclusions which are true or false, intelligible or unintelligible 
when applied to the relevant subject matter".91
The difficulty is that if philosophical arguments are not deductive, they are not 
rigorous, and as a result, do not prove anything. The point is illustrated by Ayer.
There must always be some method of approach. The value of the method can be 
tested only by its results. Here however, there is the difficulty that the results
87 Ibid, pages 146-147.
88 This may be overstating the relativity of Kuhn's work, it is certainly a charge to which Kuhn 
objected.
89 The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, page 93.
90 Qame, From a Logical Point of View, (Oxford 1953), page 17.
91 The Justification of Religious Belief, page 71.
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themselves must be evaluated. If they are tested by the same criteria as are used in 
obtaining them, they are bound to be favourable so long as the method is consistent.
But then this whole proceeding lies open to the charge of begging the question. On 
the other hand, it is not to be expected that one should employ any other criteria than 
those which from the outset have been assumed to be correct. Thus, so long as it is 
free from inner contradiction, it is hard to see how any philosophical thesis can be 
refuted; and equally hard to see how it can ever be proved.
Ayer's approach to this difficulty is:-
Our only hope then is to make the interpretations appear so strained that the 
assumptions on which they rest become discredited. As for the proof of any such 
thesis, it rests on the absence of any refiitation of this sort. So long as we cannot 
find a convincing counter-example, the thesis is allowed to stand. In this respect the 
procedure followed in philosophy is like that of the natural sciences.
Ayer suggests two criteria which can be used where there is a choice to be made 
between competing systems. The first is to see if there are convincing counter­
examples to the particular thesis. The second is to see how convincing each system is 
when it has done all it can to accommodate all the relevant facts (also, of course, 
including the plausibility of the way in which it determines that which is considered 
to be a 'fact', and that which is considered to be 'relevant').
As we have seen, this decision could not be made by an appeal to strict proof, 
or to inductive probabilities. It is, however (at least in principle) possible to prefer 
one side to the other if it makes better sense of the available evidence than does its 
rival.
Even here, however, there are significant difficulties, because the basic 
presuppositions of each paradigm also determine that which will count as a 'fact', or 
as 'evidence', as well as which criteria are acceptable to use in assessment. As a 
result of this, it is not even possible to argue that one conceptual scheme makes 
'better sense' than another, without begging the question.
It is obvious that paradigm choice in any context is complex. There is a 
problem of language difference, problems of paradigm related facts, methodology 
and assessment. There is a lack of criteria which could be specified in advance which 
would determine the paradigm change. The choice is therefore sometimes considered 
to be a sociological issue, which would leave any paradigm choice as a relativistic 
and irrational conversion.
Can these difficulties be overcome?
92 Ayer, A.J. The Concept of a Person and Other Essays, (Macmillan, 1963), page 27.
93 Ibid, page 27.
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There are a number of problems which need to be overcome if a choice between 
paradigms is to be considered as rational.
A . I t  is  diffic u lt  to  d ec id e  betw een  co m peting  pa ra d ig m s  by  a ppea l  to  the
FACTS because  WHAT CONSTITUTES A FACT IS DETERMINED BY THE RELEVANT 
PARADIGM.
One of the problems which needs to be overcome if a rational choice is to be made 
between paradigms, is the issue of paradigm relative 'facts'. This issue is raised by 
Kuhn's description of a paradigm, which impugns the neutrality of facts. If he is 
correct, then it would imply that paradigm choice could not be made in the way that a 
normal theory choice can be made. This is because subjecting the hypotheses to the 
facts, and then abandoning those theories that fail the test is not possible, because 
what are considered to be facts are paradigm relative.
Such a concept is not unique to Kuhn, nor confined to scientific paradigms, 
but is a general problem in understanding reality.
But, as I have already tried to show, no record of tlie facts can be free of all 
interpretation. One's account of what happened is governed by one's idea of what is
p o s s i b l e .
For the scientist, however, this problem is particularly acute because he will have to 
choose between two unusually high level theories. When this situation occurs, then a 
decision has to be made, but this decision can not be determined simply by the 
'facts'. Some of the 'facts’, could also be seen as interpretive theories in relation to 
other 'facts', and it is therefore always possible in principle to call them into 
question.
Mitchell provides an example.
If a big radio star is discovered with a system of satellites orbiting it, scientists may 
wish to test some gravitational theory on it. Jodrell Bank provides, let us suppose, 
observations yielding space-time co-ordinates of the planets, and these are 
inconsistent with the theory. The scientist carrying out the research would normally 
accept the observations as falsifying the gravitational theory. But, as Lakatos puts it,
'these basic statements are not 'observational' in die usual sense, only ' 
"observational " '. They are arrived at by an experimental technique based on the 
well corroborated theory of radio optics. Radio optics is used uncritically, as 
background knowledge, but If our best gravitational theory is refuted by the 
experimental techniques of Jodrell Bank, why not interpret the result as the 
overthrow of radio optics?' In that case the gravitational theory would be regarded 
as providing the facts and the theory of radio optics as being falsified by them.^^
94 Ibid, page 26.
95 The Justification of Religious Belief, page 78-79.
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Another example of facts which could be considered alternately as paradigm relative 
theories comes from Quine.
That Neptune is among the planets is readily checked by anyone with reference 
material; indeed it passes as common knowledge, and there is for the most of us no 
need to check it. But only through extensive application of optics and geometry was 
it possible to determine, in the first instance, that the body we call Neptune exists, 
and that it revolves around the sun. This required not only much accumulated 
science and mathematics, but also powerful telescopes and cooperation among 
scientists.
In fact it happens that Neptune’s existence and planethood were strongly 
suspected even before that planet was observed. Physical theory made possible the 
calculation of what the orbit of the planet Uranus should be, but Uranus' path 
differed measurably from its calculated course. Now the theory on which the 
calculations were based was, like all theories, open to revision or refutation. But 
here conservatism operates: one is loath to revise extensively a well established set of 
beliefs, especially a set so deeply entrenched as a basic portion of physics.
How can this difficulty be overcome?
(a) While this confusion is true of some facts it is not true of all of them because
there are also neutral facts which are comparatively reliable as reference points. The
idea of 'paradigm relative facts' is only true up to a point.
It is true that the observations (of scientists) are usually reported in a language
which includes scientific terms that are relatively theoretical or interpretive as 
compared with the everyday language of common-sense. But the scientific terms are 
linked to common-sense terms though they are not reducible to common-sense terms.
If a non-scientist in a laboratory sees no spark or feels no tingling pain on touching a 
wire, file scientist's report concerning an electrical discharge may be undermined or 
even falsified.
Decisions are made within a framework of agreed facts, such as specified scientific 
language, and 'common-sense' facts of the sort that are presupposed in all scientific 
inquiry. It is important to emphasise this, because this idea of paradigm relative facts 
has been overstated at times. A particular paradigm has very many facts which are 
not wholly relative to that paradigm, and so the facts are not all paradigm relative,
(b) It is also important to note the historical point that a particular paradigm does 
not stand in total isolation from other systems of thought. In reality it will come to 
be preferred because it is able to make the best sense, not only of its 'own' facts, but
96 Quine and Ullian, The Web ofBeli^, (Random House, New York, 1978), page 77. (My italics).
97 Evans, D.D. Cited in The Justification of Religious Belief, page 79.
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also of the 'facts' which were part of the alternative paradigm. Its ability to do this is fj
indicative of a rational link between two separate systems.
A particular paradigm will have close connections with that which superseded 
it, and a large part of its theory and 'factual' content will be in continuity with other 
world views. This is described by Quine as the virtue of 'conservatism' in the 
decision to adopt a particular hypothesis.
Conservatism is rather effortless on the whole, having inertia in its favour. But it is 
a sound strategy too, since at each step it sacrifices as little as possible of the 
evidential support, whatever that may have been, that our overall system of beliefs 
has hitherto been enjoying.^®
There is always a significant element of continuity when a new scientific paradigm is 
appropriated. The new paradigm continues to use the same methods of observation, 
reason and hypothesis, and is adopted, not just because of its ability to comprehend 
its own 'facts', but because it offers a more coherent interpretation of facts which 
belonged to the previous paradigm.
The way in which the theory of relativity superseded Newtonian physics 
provides a good example of this process
The aftermath of the famous Michelson-Morley experiment of 1887 is a case in 
point. The purpose of this delicate and ingenious experiment was to measure the 
speed with which the earth travels through the ether. For two centuries, from 
Newton onward, it had been a well entrenched tenet that something called the ether 
pervaded all of what we think of as empty space. The great physicist Lorentz {1853- 
1928} had hypothesised that the ether itself was stationary. What the experiment 
revealed was that the method that was expected to enable measurement of the earth's 
speed through the ether was totally inadequate to that task. Supplementary 
hypotheses multiplied in an attempt to explain the failure without seriously disrupting 
the accepted physics. Lorentz, in an effort to save the hypothesis of stationary ether, 
shifted to a new more complicated set of formulas in his mathematical physics.
Einstein soon cut through all this, propounding what is called the special theory of 
relativity.^®
The theory of relativity is therefore adopted because it is better able to make sense of 
the facts which were observed under Newtonian science and of the anomalies which 
had arisen. It replaced a system which had become overburdened with supplementary 
hypotheses and unnecessary complication to the point where it was itself aware of a 
crisis. There is also continuity between theories in this paradigm change. What 
Einstein did not do was to claim that the 'laws' of physics associated with Newton 
were wrong. Rather, he showed that they implied something that had not previously 
been appreciated.
98 Quine, The Web of Belief, page 67.
99 Ibid, page 75.
2 0 2
While one can understand what he means, Kuhn is consequently being rather 
misleading when he says that 'What were ducks in the scientist's world before the 
revolution are rabbits afterwards’, a n d  that the new paradigm will
gather up large portions of that experience and transform them to a rather different 
bundle of experience that will thereafter be linked piecemeal to the new paradigm, 
but not to the old.
There has been no scientific revolution, at least not yet, which was radical enough to 
loose its links with what has gone before. Indeed, two of the features of a new 
hypothesis which would make it more likely to be of value, are (according to Quine) 
not just the virtue of 'conservatism', but also ' modesty
What is thus illustrated by Einstein's relativity is more modestly exemplified 
elsewhere, and generally aspired to: the retention, in some sense, of old theories in 
new ones. If the new theory can be so fashioned as to diverge from the old only in 
ways that are undetectable in most ordinary circumstances, then it inherits the 
evidence of the old theory rather than trying to overcome it. Such is the force of 
conservatism even in the context of revolution.
If we apply all of this to a paradigm shift, then we are viewing such a shift as being a 
change in hypothesis; one which functions in the same way as theory change would. 
Granted, the leap is greater, as is the extent of the implications and the risks, but the 
process is fundamentally the same. The confusion in the debate about the subjectivity 
of this change is partly a result of language, as paradigm shift is being used in an 
unrealistically absolute sense; one which does not seem to occur in reality. Paradigm 
is not an ontologically unique category, it is a particularly complex group of theories. 
Ironically, the more absolute one's concept of the change is, the more subjective is 
the decision to adopt it.
All of this implies that the facts of a particular paradigm have a substantial 
overlap with other systems of thought, and are only paradigm relative to a limited 
extent. The possibility of a rational choice between conflicting paradigms is 
therefore not undermined by the existence of some paradigm relative facts.
100 The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago Press, 1962) page 110.
101 Ibid, page 121. (My italics).
102 Web of Belief, pages 66-69.
103 Ibid, page 77.
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B . Th e  'ev a lu a tiv e  pr o c ed u r e s' characteristic  o f  'n o r m a l  s c ie n c e ' canno t
BE EMPLOYED IN MAKING A DECISION BETWEEN PARADIGMS BECAUSE 'THESE DEPEND IN 
PART ON A PARTICULAR PARADIGM, AND THAT PARADIGM IS AT ISSUE'.
Kuhn's second argument maintains that there is a difference in criteria by which the 
evidence is assessed.
the choice is not and cannot be determined merely by the evaluative procedures 
characteristic of normal science, for these depend in part upon a particular paradigm, 
and that paradigm is at issue. When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate 
about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own 
paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defence.
Kuhn freely allows that there can be good reasons for choosing one theory rather than 
another, and that these can be of a kind which is not dependent on any particular 
paradigm. There are 'evaluative procedures' which are not wholly paradigm-relative; 
such considerations as accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness and so on would fall 
into this category. The argument with Lakatos is consequently an argument about 
whether decisions based on these procedures can be regarded as being properly 
rational, or else as being 'irreducibly sociological'. Kuhn writes.
Scientists must, for example, decide which statements to make 'unfalsifiable by fiat', 
and which not. Or, dealing with a probabilistic theory, they must decide on a 
probability threshold below which statistical evidence will be held 'inconsistent' with 
that theory. Above all, viewing theories as research programmes to be evaluated 
over time, scientists must decide whether a given programme at a given time is 
'progressive' (whence scientific), or 'degenerative' (whence pseudo-scientific). If the 
first, is to be pursued; if the latter rejected.
According to Kuhn, whether such decisions should be described in the end as 
sociological or rational, depends upon whether one can specify applicable rules which 
can distinguish judgements of value.
What I am denying then is neither the existence of good reasons nor that these 
reasons are of the sort usually described. I am, however, insisting that such reasons 
constitute values to be used in making choices rather than rules of
choice Simplicity, scope, fruitfulness and even accuracy can be judged quite
differently (which is not to say that they may be judged arbitrarily) by different 
people. Again, they may differ in their conclusions without violating any accepted 
rule.^ ^^
104 Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 93.
105 Criticism and the Growth of knowledge, pages 238-239.
106 Ibid, page 262.
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In this section Kuhn is replying to his critics and rejecting the charge of irrationalism 
which resulted from this apparent sociological relativity. In order to do this he is 
outlining the objective criteria which he is recommending in the choice between 
paradigms. These are:
reasons of exactly the kind standard in philosophy of science: accuracy, scope, 
simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like. It is vitally important that scientists be taught 
to value these characteristics.^®^
In defence of Kuhn, the accusations of irrationality are unjustified. He seems to be 
presenting an approach to paradigm choice which takes an account of the 
personalities and nature of the scientific community, as well as of the reasons for 
taking on a new paradigm. He is describing the way in which this process actually 
functions, rather than how it ought to do so as defined by a rigidly detached rational 
system.
The criteria and methods of theory choice are, like the facts, substantially in 
continuity between conflicting paradigms. Kuhn is not arguing that all of the 
methods are relative to a particular paradigm. The process of paradigm change is not 
rendered irrational by the issue of paradigm relative evaluative procedures.
C . Is  THE CHOICE BETWEEN PARADIGMS AN IRREDUCIBLY SOCIOLOGICAL AND 
ILLOGICAL DECISION?
This is a progression from the previous point. It would be a false dichotomy to 
assume that if a decision between paradigms is not wholly based on strict logic, then 
it can therefore only be attributable to the psychological motivation or sociological 
circumstances of scientists. These are false alternatives because, as we have argued, 
it is possible to have a rational argument which is based on a cumulative case, rather 
than on strict logic.
This cumulative process does seem to be the mechanism at work in the choice 
between scientific paradigms. Kuhn describes the way in which the whole revolution 
operates in these terms.
At the start a new candidate for a paradigm may have few supporter’s, and on 
occasions the supporters motives may be suspect. Nevertheless, if they are 
competent, they will improve it, explore its possibilities, and show what it would be 
like to belong to the community guided by it. And as that goes on, if the paradigm is 
one destined to win its fight, the number and strength of the persuasive arguments in 
its favour will increase. More scientists will then be converted, and the exploration
107 Ibid, page 261.
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of the new paradigm will go on. Gradually the number of experiments, instruments, 
articles, and books based upon the paradigm will multiply. Still more men, 
convinced of the new view's fruitfulness, will adopt the new mode of practising 
normal science, until at last only a few elderly hold-outs remain. And even they, we 
cannot say, are wrong. Though the historian can always find men-Priestly, for 
instance-who were unreasonable to resist as long as they did, he will not find a point 
at which resistance becomes illogical or unscientific. At most he may wish to say 
that the man who continues to resist after his whole profession has been converted 
has ipso facto ceased to be a scientist.
This is clearly not an exercise in strict logic, but it could still consist of more than a 
description of the psychology of philosophers and scientists.
Kuhn explains why paradigm choice is not a purely logical process.
In a debate over choice of theory, neither party has access to an argument which 
resembles a proof in logic or formal mathematics. In the latter, both premises and 
rules of inference are stipulated in advance. If there is a disagreement about 
conclusions, the parties to the debate can retrace their steps one by one, checking 
each against prior stipulation. At the end of the process, one or other must concede 
that at an isolable point in the argument he has made a mistake, violated or 
misapplied a previously accepted rule. After that concession he has no recourse, and 
liis opponent's proof is then compelling. Only if the two discover instead that they 
differ about the meaning or applicability of a stipulated rule, that their prior 
agreement does not provide a sufficient basis for proof, does the ensuing debate 
resemble what inevitably occurs in science.
There was disagreement between Kuhn and Karl Popper on all of these issues. In 
one way, Popper's account of paradigm choice is simpler than Kuhn's, in that the 
extent to which the theory fits the facts is defined as the sole criterion for 
acceptability, rather than the more diverse criteria outlined by Kuhn. Popper assesses 
this fact/theory relationship by using falsifiability, testability, probability, and by 
simplicity.
Thus we are led back, by out concept of simplicity ....and especially to that rule or 
principle which restrains us from indulgence in ad hoc hypotheses: to the principle of 
parsimony in the use of hypotheses.
Popper differs from Kuhn in that he allows for a purely rational leap between 
paradigms.
Thus in science, as distinct from theology, a critical comparison of the competing 
theories, of the competing frameworks, is always possible. And the denial of this 
possibility is a mistake. In science (and only in science) can we say that we have 
made genuine progress: that we know more than we did before.
108 The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, page 158.
109 Cited in The Justification of Religious Beli^, page 83.
110 Popper, Karl The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (^\xic\àmon, 1959), page 145.
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Thus the difference between Kuhn and myself goes back, fundamentally, to 
logic. And so doçs Kuhn's whole theory. To his proposal: 'Psychology rather than 
logic of discovery , we can answer: all your own arguments go back to the thesis that 
the scientist is logically forced to accept as a framework, since no rational discussion 
is possible between frameworks. This is a logical thesis-even though it is 
mistaken.
Popper is critical of Kuhn in the essay in Criticism and the Growth o f Knowledge, 
and Kuhn responds to this in the same book, denying the charge of irrationality.
Nothing about this relatively familiar thesis should suggest that scientists do not use 
logic (and mathematics) in their arguments, including those which aim to persuade a 
colleague to renounce a favoured theory and embrace another. I am dumbfounded by 
Sir Karl's attempt to convict me of self contradiction because I employ logical 
arguments myself, What might be said is that I do not expect that merely because my 
arguments are logical they Will be compelling. Sir Karl underscores my point, not 
his, when he describes them as logical but mistaken, and then makes no attempt to 
isolate the mistake or to display its logical character. What he means is that, though 
my arguments are logical, he disagrees with my conclusion. Our disagreement must 
be about premises or the manner in which they are to be applied, a situation which is 
standard among scientist debating theory-choice. When it occurs, their recourse is to 
persuasion as a prelude to the possibility of p r o o f .
Kuhn seems to argue effectively, and the disagreement between Kuhn and Popper is 
centred around a false dichotomy, in that it does not follow that because Kuhn has 
argued that there is no strict logical path between paradigms, the only alternative to 
this is a psychological or sociological account of the process. The charge of 
irrationalism is unfair on Kuhn.
According to Mitchell:-
If this analysis of the situation is correct, it would seem that in this case the minor 
culture clash' occurs in the context of a major presupposition which is accepted by 
both parties to the debate: that a choice between theories (whether scientific or 
philosophical) is rational if and only if it is possible to specify in advance rules 
acceptable to both parties in accordance with which the choice is to be made. Kuhn 
is convinced (rightly) that neither in science nor in philosophy are choices of this 
kind characteristically made. He therefore allows the choices that are 
characteristically made to be rational only in the Pickwickian sense, of which in the 
last resort none but a sociological account can be given. Lakatos and Popper 
(rightly) reject this as irrationalism and in defence of the rationality of science feel 
compelled to repudiate (unnecessarily) Kuhn's perceptive account of the sort of 
reasoning that actually occurs.
The choice between paradigms is not therefore an irreducibly sociological or 
irrational decision. Neither is the choice rendered irrational by the issue of paradigm
111 Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, page 57.
112 page 261.
113 The Justification of Religious Belief, page 84.
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relative facts or paradigm relative evaluative procedures. We can conclude that the 
suggested difficulties in overcoming paradigm choice are in principle capable of 
being overcome, and that it ought to be possible to make a rational choice between 
conflicting paradigms.
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4. Some Implications and Analogies
We have argued that a theological system of thought can be considered as a 
paradigm, and in particular that enthusiasm is distinct enough in its characteristics 
that it is entitled to be called a paradigm. There are considerable problems in 
choosing between paradigms, but we have argued that the main objections to 
paradigm choice being a choice which can only be accounted for sociologically rather 
than evaluated epistemologically, can be overcome, at least in principle.
This is important, because this implies that it is also possible to make a 
rational choice between conflicting interpretations of charismatic experience, even 
when they are at the more complex level of theory choice where one needs to be able 
to make a decision between competing conceptual systems.
If this is so then it is not good enough to rely on one's own assumptions 
without facing up to the challenge that an alternative paradigm presents to them, 
because the issue of paradigm choice is, in principle, capable of rational resolution.
We will explore some analogies to see if they can clarify the process of 
paradigm choice.
(A) P aradig m s  as a  g r o u p  o f  circles
Perhaps it would be possible to describe a paradigm by using the analogy of circles 
drawn on paper. Some of the circles overlap others by various amounts, and others 
are concentric, thus taking the form of onion layers.
This helps to illustrate the way that paradigms relate to each other, as it allows 
for an overlap between aspects of distinct paradigms; such as acceptance of rational 
methods, use of empirical evidence, inductive reasoning, and so on.
For example, it would be possible for a cosmologist to work within the 
framework of relativity, and also hold a set of Christian beliefs. This could be 
thought of as three overlapping circles. Newtonian physics is part of the picture 
because of the large area of overlap which exists between these two systems. Our 
physicist may be doing this work motivated by a desire to understand the work of the 
Creator in His creation. This would provide him with a constellation of Christian 
beliefs with their own distinct character, as well as having additional areas of overlap 
with cosmology. If he is also a member of a particular denomination, then he may 
have a concentric circle within the overall system of Christian beliefs.
This is helpful, but not sufficient to cover all the aspects of paradigm we have 
discussed.
 : ■
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(B) P aradig m  in  th e  w eb  o f  b e l ie f .
The conception of a web of belief is an analogy which is attributed to Quine. I 
would like to develop the notion of this structure and use it to explore ways of 
describing the concept of paradigm. To adopt the idea of a web of belief is to imply 
that there is no need for an incorrigible foundation which functions in support of the 
beliefs contained within it. Rather, beliefs are acceptable because of the way in 
which they relate to the other parts of the conceptual scheme; beliefs, ’facts’, 
theories, methodology and, (most significantly for this thesis), experience. Placing 
the concept of paradigm into such a ’web of belief’ is useful because it provides a 
continuity with the 'cumulative approach’ we intend to take.
To consider the anatomy of this web we will begin, so to speak, at its 
periphery. In these outer edges of the web we have beliefs which are more willingly 
surrendered than the increasingly influential and firmly embedded beliefs which are 
encountered as we move towards the central areas. The outer edge consists of the 
most tentative beliefs.
For example, a person hears an engine roaring down a road behind him and 
thinks it is a motorbike. When it comes into sight, however, it turns out to be a car. 
The original guess was wrong, but insignificant in the sense that other areas of the 
web of belief are hardly influenced by the renunciation of the first idea. A belief in 
this outer edge of the web could really be little more than a guess. It may be correct, 
but the believer holds his opinions in this part of the web in a very tentative fashion. 
Even if the original guess is wrong, it really doesn’t matter, (at least if the car 
doesn’t run the believer over!).
Moving into the depths of the web we begin to encounter a more significant 
realm of theories. These are held with more conviction than would be a mere guess. 
A guess may well be the first stage of developing a theory, but in this area of the 
web, the guess is potentially consequential, and so needs to be put to more rigorous 
empirical test.
Imagine a person who suspects that he has been adopted into the family that 
raised him, even though he was never told this by his acting parents. This suspicion 
leads him to do some research, and through this, the discovery is made that he was in 
fact left on the doorstep of the adoptive family. The confirmation of the original 
suspicion alters other parts of his web of belief in terms of the way those who were 
thought of as being blood sisters, brothers, and parents are related to him.
Further into the web we reach the province of 'laws’. These are still theories 
in essence, but they are more significant and firmly embedded. They are also applied 
inductively to the whole of the universe. An example of this would be the speed of 
light being 186,000 miles per second, which is a universally applied law. If it were
_____________________________________________ ____
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to be found unveridical, it would have widespread effects on many branches of 
science.
Deeper still we come to the domain of what is described as paradigm. It still 
has the same basic nature as the outer theories, in that it could be described as a 
’story' which is made to fill up the gaps in the empirical evidence, or as a particular 
understanding of reality. A paradigm is however, more significant than other 
theories because it is held with such conviction that it is presupposed; and so 
widespread in its implications, that to alter it would create upheaval throughout the 
rest of the system. The classic examples which are often given of two separate 
paradigms are Newtonian physics or Einstein’s relativity.
This means that as one moves deeper into the web there is a gradation in the 
extent of the theory's influence, and in the strength of conviction in the believer who 
accepts these increasingly consequential theories. When viewed in this way, rather 
than a paradigm being an ontologically distinct category, it is in continuity with all 
other theories. The words we are using; guess, theory, law, and paradigm are 
imposed on the web of belief in an artificial way in the sense that there is a gradation 
of consequentiality through the model. They do not, in reality, describe sharply 
defined areas within the web of belief.
As has been discussed, some writers, particularly Kuhn appeared to put quite 
extreme emphasis on the concept of paradigm by treating it as being absolute, or as 
an 'absolute presupposition’.
What were ducks in the scientist's world before the revolution are rabbits 
afterwards,
paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their research engagement 
differently. In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they see 
and do, we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a 
different world.
That the new paradigm will
gather up large portions of that experience and transform them to a rather different 
bundle of experience that will thereafter be linked piecemeal to the new paradigm, 
but not to the oMM^
114 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 110.
115 Ibid, page 110.
116 Ibid, page 121. (My italics). The lack of a link between die two paradigms is here being taken to 
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If paradigm differences were as absolute as these images imply, then there would be 
no logical road between paradigms. There would be no agreement on what are the 
facts, or on methods by which disagreement could be resolved. The choice would be 
a leap in the dark dependent on the scientific culture in which one's thinking has been 
shaped.
If we imagine a paradigm that was so different from its predecessor that it lost 
all the basic assumptions of the previous world view, it would be such an extreme 
change that it would be incomprehensible. It would use a different language in 
different ways, and have a different concept of what is rational. Indeed, it would be 
an implicit rejection of all that counted as knowledge before its arrival. It would 
accept none of any previous experimental 'fact* or theory, and would mean 
demolishing and rebuilding every method, fact and hypothesis used by science in the 
past. It could be internally coherent, but such a paradigm would be so unrelated to 
every other form of knowledge or pattern of thought, that it would appear as much 
like insanity as like progress in understanding. There would be no extrinsic means of 
testing which of these two appearances was correct.
The way to avoid such an unrealistic description of a paradigm change is to 
start with a less extreme definition of paradigm. This also has the benefit of being a 
more accurate description of the way it functions in reality. As we have seen, there 
are still many assumptions behind paradigms; ones which remain in continuity when 
the new world view is adopted. In principle changes in absolute presuppositions 
would be paradigm changes, but an 'absolute* change does not accurately describe the 
way that scientific changes have occurred in reality. Newtonian physics was never an 
* absolute * presuppos ition. ^  * ?
This leaves us with a gap between the degree of upheaval involved when 
paradigms alter in the real history of science or theology, and some of the extreme 
descriptions of what is involved in those changes. To clarify this situation we need a 
modification to the web of belief we suggested earlier. Paradigm is not at the centre 
of the web, because there are absolute presuppositions at a stage further in towards 
the centre. During a paradigm change these remain in continuity between the two 
world views and ensure significant lines of communication between them.
As we have already discussed, there is a vast amount of common ground 
between paradigms. For example, Newtonian physics shares with relativity a 
common scientific method, relativity is adopted because it makes better sense of the
117 What is meant by 'absolute presuppositions' here is not the sense in which the phrase was used by 
Collingwood, i.e. presuppositions that are relative to a specific community. What is meant are the 
most central parts of the web of belief; that which is beyond question from the point of view of any 
paradigm or community.
2 1 2
facts observed under the previous world view, it uses the same means of 
observation, and so on. This is very important, because it implies that there is a 
theoretical possibility that the adherents of differing paradigms can communicate 
coherently with each other because they share significant suppositions. In principle 
the two paradigms can work back through the web of belief until they find enough 
shared assumptions on which to base a discussion about which world view is the 
better description of reality.
A change in absolute presuppositions would be far more significant than such 
an alteration in a scientific paradigm.
Say for example, one moved from a paradigm which accepted that events 
needed causes, into a situation where a large community of people believed, as a 
presupposition, that events were wholly disconnected from causes. This would be 
much more basic an alteration that has occurred in any historic paradigm change.
Even more fundamental than a rejection of causation would be a rejection of the use 
of reason. If reason were to be replaced by a system which rejected all rational 
thought, then one would be in such a different world view, that all discussion that 
made a claim on anyone would be ruled out, because reasoning is a condition of any 
cognitively useful dialogue.
Such changes may be possible in principle, though the degree of upheaval 
within the web of belief that would be required to adopt them makes it very unlikely 
that we will ever see such a fundamental paradigm shift in reality. This is more basic 
than Collingwood's use of the phrase 'absolute presupposition', or Hare's 'Bliks'.
If the concept of paradigm is understood as being an area which is embedded 
deeply in a web of belief, then the word is to some extent vague in its use, because it 
describes a reality where hypothesis grades into theory which grades into law, on into 
paradigm, which in turn grades into absolute presupposition.
If one also assigns the more extreme 'absolute' descriptions of paradigm to an 
abstract realm at the furthest end of the spectrum from the guess, then they do make 
sense. One does need more moderation however, in describing the real history of 
scientific discovery, and real changes in theological paradigms. The element of 
continuity between real paradigms is stronger, the changes are not absolute in nature, 
and there is growth in knowledge as a result.
 : : :......................
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(C) P aradig m  as  an  arch  o f  b e l ie f .
Using the analogy of an arch holds good in a number of useful ways.
In the structure of an arch each of the stones in the arch is unable to hold up 
the entire structure alone. An arch does not preserve its shape because it has some 
' incorrigible' stone which creates a single span. It is an entire 'constellation' of 
stones which are arranged into a system which is capable of providing the necessary 
support. It has a cumulative strength created by stones which individually would be 
unable to support the structure as a whole. The arch exists because of the 
relationship the stones have with each other.
This description of the way in which an arch maintains its existence bears a 
resemblance to the way in which a paradigm functions. A paradigm has its own 
internally consistent relationship between the beliefs, assumptions methodology and 
experiences that make it up. The paradigm has a set of assumptions which can 
support a whole constellation of beliefs, and it is when these elements are functioning 
together in a proper relationship that the paradigm is strong.
In an arch the material supported by the arch contributes to the strength of the 
whole structure because the more weight that is put on it, the more tightly the stones 
are forced together. There is a complex set of internal stresses which contribute to 
the strength of the structure as a whole.
This is an interesting concept when compared with the structure of a 
paradigm, because this is also the situation there. What occurs is a constant dialectic 
between the assumptions of the paradigm, its 'facts', its theories, its means of 
assessment, its ability to predict, its experiences, and so on. The paradigm exists in a 
constant process of trial and error, where each part of the system is adding support to 
each other part.
What is crucial to note here is that this mutual support can also occur between 
paradigms. One has, in reality, numerous sub paradigms which operate on the basis 
of larger ones. For example, Newtonian physics and Relativity operate within a 
larger paradigm which would include the rationality of scientific method itself; in 
terms of experimental methods, induction and deduction, trial and error in the 
refinement of theories, and so on. The choice between two sub paradigms is made 
within the context of a more basic collection of beliefs. This is what makes mutual 
dialogue a possibility.
If we retain the analogy of an arch, then this may be compared with a 
situation in which there are smaller arches supported by a larger one. The ground 
could be compared with absolute presuppositions.
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The significance of the widespread mutual dependency that exists within, and 
provides support for, belief systems does not seem to be generally appreciated. For 
example, in Battle for the Mind by William Sargant there is an analysis of conversion 
and Pentecostal experience which explains these phenomena in terms of brain 
washing, hypnosis, and other psychological mechanisms. The book begins as 
follows:
It must be emphasised as strongly as possible that this book is not concerned with the 
truth or falsity of any particular religious or political belief. Its purpose is to 
examine some of the mechanisms involved in the fixing or destroying of such beliefs 
in the human brain.
If Sargant's point is simply that causal questions and evaluative questions are 
logically distinct from each other, then this would be quite acceptable. However, a 
total separation between these two factors is unrealistic in the context of a large scale 
conceptual system, such as Christian belief, because it envisages a set of almost 
incorrigible reasons for beliefs which exist in isolation from experience. The reality 
is of mutual interconnection between all the factors which support the particular set of 
beliefs. Consequently an inexplicable and dramatic conversion experience is 
something which contributes to a person's system of beliefs as a whole. He believes 
the Bible's account of conversion partly because it accords with his own experience, 
and he interprets his own experience in the light of what the Bible leads him to 
expect. Stated like this it is far too simple, and clearly circular. However, added to 
this simplistic account may be other supports in the form of historical evidence, a 
coherent philosophy, other people's experience, existential evidence in the shape of 
an unusual change in life and personality, a claimed direct perception of God, and so 
on. It is the entire accumulation of factors working together which supports the 
system of beliefs. This means that an alternative way of understanding a mechanism 
of experience can potentially have a significant effect on the system of beliefs as a 
whole.
Darwin faced the same issue when he published The Origin o f Species. His 
aim was not to undermine theistic belief, but rather to understand the works of the 
Creator:
There is grandeur in this view of life with its several powers, having been originally 
breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has 
gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning 
endless forms most beautiful and most wonderfiil have been, and are being 
evolved.
118 Sargant, William Battle for the Mind, (Heineman, 1957), page xi.
119 Darwin, Charles The Origin of Species, (London, John Murray, 1888), Vol II, pages 305-306.
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Although he did not intend to undermine Christian faith, the effect was that he 
weakened a part of the arch which was central to many people’s theistic belief, i.e. 
the argument from design. The loss of this was enough to call into question the 
entire system, because it created an intellectually credible explanation for the extreme 
complexity which is found in nature, whereas previously, the only available 
explanation for this was to attribute this apparent design to an intelligent creator. 
This is not a moral judgment; it is simply pointing out that a constellation of beliefs 
functions in mutual relationship, and that in practice individual parts of this do not 
separate out into neatly distinguished and logically distinct parts.
When a paradigm begins to collapse, each part of the system is calling the rest 
into question. Eventually, there is so much internal strain, that the supporting 
assumptions begin to collapse. Just as a weakened arch will need scaffolding to hold 
it up, so the paradigm uses supplementary support for its assumptions until it reaches 
the point of collapse. This can happen quite suddenly even when few stones are 
removed. It falls as an entire structure because the individual stones could not 
support the whole without each other.
Describing a belief system in this way has the advantage of being an accurate 
description of the way in which Christian beliefs fall apart in reality. When a person 
ceases to believe in Christianity, there are almost innumerable individual beliefs 
which are given up. However, this renunciation is not performed in an individual 
way where each of these beliefs marches before a person in a detached manner for 
assessment. More commonly a person will say ’it just fell apart', or perhaps 
someone close to them suffers, and they say 'I just can't believe in a good God any 
more'. The system then collapses in its entirety.
If paradigms do function in ways which are analogous to an arch, a collection of 
circles, or a web, then this implies that the way to assess a paradigm is with a 
constant dialectic between theories, facts, methodologies, experiences, and other 
paradigms. This is how such a complex system of beliefs is structured, and this is 
how its 'claims to know' are supported. We need a cumulative argument, and one 
which uses a whole group of criteria to examine a whole group of beliefs. Given the 
structure of a paradigm, any other approach will be inadequate. This is the way in 
which religious experiences need to be assessed. It is also the way in which the 
whole jumble of enthusiastic experiences needs to be appraised. These phenomena 
recur as a whole in history, and in the context of their own theories which attempt 
explanation. They need to be assessed as an accumulation and on the basis of a 
cumulative argument.
   . . ____
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Conclusions
(a) A religious world view can be described accurately as a paradigm.
(b) Enthusiasm is a sub paradigm within Christian belief.
(c) Each paradigm can give an account of the experimental evidence.
(d) Which of the competing systems gives the best account of the evidence is 
determined by 'judgement'.
(e) It is not possible to specify rules on which such a decision can be made; and one 
is forced to rely on 'values'.
(f) The criteria on which this judgement is based are not themselves all paradigm - 
relative.
(g) The issue of 'paradigm relative facts' and 'paradigm relative evaluative 
procedures' is sometimes overstated, as there are very significant elements of 
continuity between real, differing paradigms.
(h) Paradigm is not an ontologically unique category. It is a complex and especially 
consequential group of theories. The decision between two paradigms is therefore, in 
principle resolvable in the same way as is all theory choice.
(i) In reality, a conceptual system can be placed within another larger paradigm, or 
have significant areas of overlap.
(j) A choice between paradigms can be made in a rational way. No road in a strictly 
logical sense does not necessarily imply that there can be no rational discussion 
between two parties.
(k) There is more than an 'irreducibly sociological' choice to be made between 
differing paradigms, because it is possible to make a reasonable judgment which takes 
the form of a cumulative case argument. A variety of criteria can be balanced in an 
assessment of a new paradigm's beliefs, theories and methodologies. Therefore the 
choice between paradigms can, in principle, be made rationally, even though this will 
be without the provision of rational proof.
(1) Theological systems come into contact with reality at numerous points along their 
periphery, and one is therefore in a position to judge whether they have handled this 
contact effectively, without distorting the facts, by offering better explanation than 
the alternatives, making the data more intelligible, and so on. In other words, their 
epistemic acceptability can be established rationally using judgment in a 'cumulative 
case argument'.
(m) Charismatic beliefs and experiences must be assessed as a whole constellation, 
and by using a cumulative case argument.
_________________________________________
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Chapter V
Equivocal Criteria for Interpreting Charismatic Experience.
Introduction
The thesis aims to discover reliable means of testing the truth claims made on the 
basis of charismatic experience and is asking the question: Suppose a person claims 
that they have encountered God in their experience, how can we tell whether he 
really has? In order to answer this we have sifted through the possible 
epistemological options, and concluded that the best available way in which this could 
be resolved is by using an argument which takes the form of a cumulative case.
Interpreting such claims to have had a religious experience significantly 
increases in complexity because its resolution depends on making a rational choice 
between conflicting paradigms. It is questionable whether this is possible at all, but 
we have argued that it can be done by using a modified cumulative case. The 
modification is necessary because the decision involves more than just accumulating 
reasons to take up a particular belief in the first place, in the way that it is done, for 
example, by Swinburne. We are also considering 'fact', methodology, other 
paradigms, theory, and experience to be part of the process of justification. These all 
function together in a constant dialectic as they jostle to provide coherent 
understanding. An argument which takes this form is neither simple nor capable of 
rapid construction. This would lead us to expect that an attempt to interpret 
charismatic experience is unlikely to be successful if it is based on too few criteria, 
and even less so if it is based on a single criterion of assessment.
In spite of this however, there is a vast amount of contemporary literature 
which is written both in support of, and in opposition to charismatic experience with 
the assumption that assessment can be done in a simple way. Some literature takes 
into account more complex issues such as dispensational theology, but there is 
nothing in contemporary writing on the charismatic movement which would handle 
these issues with the kind of complex argument that would be needed if it is to 
provide an adequately comprehensive assessment.
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To explore this necessity for complexity, we will take a sample of the criteria 
which are in common use as means of assessing charismatic experience, and then 
demonstrate their ambiguity. For the moment we are seeing how these criteria 
function each on its own, which is how they are presented, rather that how they 
might contribute to a cumulative argument.
Because the aim of the thesis is not primarily to assess charismatic experience, 
but to show how this assessment could be done in principle, the list will not be 
exhaustive. Although it would be interesting to develop a comprehensive application 
of criteria which are used in assessment with reference to more examples, there is not 
space to do this. This is acceptable however, because the purpose of the thesis is 
rather to set out in general terms how a programme of epistemic evaluation of 
charismatic experience might look, and this can be achieved without covering every 
particular example.
A substantial portion of this section explores Biblical objections to the various 
criteria which are commonly used to assess the charismatic movement. It is 
important to do this, because even if one does not share the same presuppositions 
about Biblical authority, those whom we are assessing do treat the Bible as their 
premise. Consequently, if they do not conform to their own standards, then the 
result is internal contradiction. According to Ayer, this is the one logically certain 
way to undermine a particular thesis.
:6
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1. Does unusual physical healing signify that a person has encounteredGod in his experience?
There is an emphasis on healing which permeates the charismatic movement. It is 
also an emphasis which has increased significantly over the past twenty years, and 
has expanded from a straightforward Pentecostal 'laying on of hands' or 'anointing 
with oil', into more varied theologies and practices. There are claims for 'healing of 
memories', healing of bodies, 'deliverance', 'lifting curses' as a form of healing, 
psychological healing, leg lengthening, etc. Some behaviour which is traditionally 
thought of as sin, such as homosexuality, is also treated as sickness which needs to be 
healed. There are many books of 'testimonies', or systems of 'ministry' which 
address the issues raised by healing, along with conferences and a magazine 
specifically aimed at this area. ^
The following is taken from the information sent out nationally to advertise 
what is described as 'An Advanced Course in Healing'.
Workshops will explore the whole spectrum of healing: healing of sexual brokenness, 
healing of the homosexual, healing of memories, healing those with multiple 
personality disorders, healing of physical bodies, and deliverance.^
Given our analysis of the nature of charismatic experience, this emphasis on healing 
is quite predictable. Healing exemplifies many of the enthusiastic traits outlined in 
Chapter I, such as belief in the immanence of grace, expectation of the supernatural, 
anticipating the transformation of the personality, as well as a sense of status; God 
intends his people to be healthy, happy and wealthy.
The effect of these enthusiastic emphases in practice, is that the success of 
healing, (whether physical or emotional), has come to be one of the central criteria 
which is used to assess the spiritual status of the individual believer, as well as the 
success of particular Churches and the charismatic movement as a whole. The 
significance which is given to the question of healing has lead to a number of books, 
many written by medical doctors, which address the question, 'Is healing actually 
taking place?'^
1 For example; Kuhlman, K. I Believe in Miracles, (Lakeland, 1963). Burton, W.P.P.
Following, Coverdale, 1973). Stapleton, Carter Ruth, The Gift of Inner Healing, (Hodder, 1976). 
Dearing Trevor Supernatural Healing Today, (Logos, 1979). Wagner, Dr. C Peter How to have a 
Healing Ministry, (Monarch, 1988); Masters, Peter The Healing Epidemic, (Wakeman, 1988). 
White, John Wien the Spirit Comes With Power, (Hodder, 1988). Lewis, Dr. David, Healing: 
Fiction, Fantasy or Fact, (Hodder, 1989). Payne, Leanne, The Healing Presence, (Kingsway, 1990).
2 Healing 92; information from Vineyard conferences, 297 Chapel Street, Manchester.
3 For example; Masters The healing epidemic, Lewis ifea/mg.- Fiction, Fantasy or Fact. White 
When the Spirit comes with Power. Gardner A Doctor investigates Healing Miracles.
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Of course, if one is claiming that healing is taking place, then it is important 
to explore this question. And if one is simply asking 'Does miraculous healing occur 
today?', then this is a perfectly suitable approach. There is, however, more to it 
than this, because such healing is being presented as a 'Sign of the Kingdom'. When 
this happens the success of healing becomes a criterion which can determine whether 
or not it is justifiable to believe that God is working in a person. Church or 
movement. Just as in the life of Jesus, the authenticity of His message is evidenced 
through accompanying miracles, so current claims to experience miraculous healing 
are used to demonstrate that a person has encountered God in his own experience. If 
healing comes from God, and illness comes from Satan, then the success of healing 
becomes a criterion which is used both to justify a particular theology, and to justify 
the theological claims of a church or a person to have had an encounter with God. 
The converse is also applied, in that lack of healing becomes a sign of sin or 
unbelief.
Even writers who are opposed to the charismatic movement do not seem to 
question this assumption that healing is a criterion which could determine whether the 
Spirit is at work or not. Consequently Peter Master's book The Healing Epidemic, a 
book which is virulently opposed to the charismatic movement, includes an 
assessment of the effectiveness of claimed healing. He argues that if healing is 
taking place, then this is a sign that the charismatic movement is caused by the Holy 
Spirit, and if healing is not taking place, then the Spirit is not working within it.
The aim here is not to take this frequently trodden path and assess whether 
there really is healing taking place or not; but to question the significance of healing 
as a criterion for assessment.
There are some interesting historical differences of opinion on this issue. If 
we take the example of the New England Revival there was no particular expectation 
of healing, because the accepted sign that the Spirit was at work was not that a 
person was healed, but that he remained faithful through suffering until death.
The divine power of this work has marvellously appeared in some instances I have 
been acquainted with; in supporting and fortifying the heart under great trials, such 
as the death of children, and extreme pain of body; and in wonderfully maintaining 
the serenity, calmness, and joy of the soul in an immovable rest in God, and in sweet 
resignation to him.^
In Other words, if one asked the question 'Is the Spirit working in this ill person?' 
within the current charismatic movement, the inclination would be to look and see if 
they had been healed, whereas in Edwards' day, one would look and see if they were
4 Edwards, Thoughts on the Revival, page 375.
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being faithful. 'Though he slay me yet will I trust him’ was viewed as being a less 
ambiguous indicator of a work of the Spirit than healing. The same attitude to 
suffering and healing is also found in the work of Wesley and Whitfield.
Edwards could find a strong Biblical justification for his views. Such Biblical 
evidence should be considered here too, because if a movement is basing itself on the 
Bible, then it is important for it to be consistent with this in order to avoid internal 
contradiction.
In the Bible illness can come from God. Such an idea is unthinkable for a 
significant proportion of people within the current charismatic movement, because 
illness is considered to be caused either directly or indirectly, by evil forces. 
Sickness is part of the evil, sinful realm which belongs to the devil, and an area of 
life which is healed by Jesus. An entitlement to physical healing is sometimes 
included in the doctrine of the atonement, 'with his stripes we are healed'. Healing 
has consequently come to be seen as a 'right' which should be 'claimed' by faithful 
Christians who want to take up all that they have inherited from the Father.
If all of this were true, then effectiveness in healing would indeed be an 
accurate criterion to measure the work of the Spirit. The Biblical view, however, is 
rather more complex than this, and there are many examples of illness which are part 
of God’s plan. 'Who is it who makes men deaf, dumb and blind, is it not I the 
Lord';^ 'An evil spirit from the Lord tormented Saul',^ 'the angel of death' which 
was sent by God, along with all the other 'plagues', such as boils.^ There are also 
examples of the Israelite people being led by God to kill vast numbers of people in 
battle, which obviously involves physical injury.
It would also be difficult to dismiss these ideas as being merely an inferior 
stage in the development of man's religious awareness, because these same ideas also 
find parallels in the New Testament. Zechariah is struck dumb by an angel,* Jesus 
allows Lazarus to die by deliberately waiting for three days after hearing the news of 
his illness,^ Saul is blinded on the road to D am ascus,A nanias and Sapphira are 
struck dead for 'lying to the Holy Spirit',11 Herod was 'eaten with worms and died' 
as a judgement from God.^^ The Church at Corinth also faced this issue, in that 
some of its members were to be 'handed over to Satan for the destruction of the
5 Exodus 4:11.
6 1 Sam 19:9.
7 Exodus 12:29.
8 Luke 1.
9 John 11.
10 Acts 9:9.
11 Acts 5:1-11.
12 Acts 12:20-23.
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f l e s h ' . 1 3  The Corinthians also faced death and sickness as a result of their abuse of 
the Lord’s supper, 'this is why some of you are ill, and some have died'.i^
Therefore one can not assume on Biblical grounds, that it is always God's 
will to heal. Sometimes (according to the Bible) He will have a very different plan. 
Consequently the authenticity of a work of the Spirit can not be assessed solely on the 
grounds of a simple question such as 'was the person healed or not?' God could be at 
work in illness as well as in healing, and so the success or failure of healing is an 
ambiguous sign which does not point in a clearly defined theological direction.
Another ambiguity is encountered in the practical difficulties inherent in the 
attempt to assess claims to miraculous healing. If one takes the track trodden by 
current writers such as John Wimber, Dr. David Lewis, and many others, and 
depend on healing as a support for one's theology, then, apart from the Biblical issue 
one has to face considerable problems, both theoretically and practically. It is quite 
feasible to attribute 'healing' to Satan, or to God, or to purely physical processes, 
mistaken diagnosis, spontaneous remission, mental effects on the body due to stress 
etc. To demonstrate which of these, or other factors was the cause in a particular 
situation can be extremely difficult. The effect of this is that it is often difficult to 
demonstrate that unusual healing has taken place at all, and even harder to 'prove' 
that its cause was direct intervention from God.
The problem can be illustrated by using some of the books which analyse this 
theme in the context of charismatic healing. Two books, When the Spirit Comes with 
Power, and Healing, Fiction, Fantasy or Fact were written by a psychiatrist and a 
medical doctor r e s p e c t i v e l y .  goth examine the evidence of healing in meetings led 
by John Wimber, and both conclude that there is strong evidence that miraculous 
healing was taking place. A third book The Healing Epidemic has sections written by 
Professor Verna Wright, who is also a medical doctor. Though his training and 
methods of assessment are similar, and all three share Christian beliefs, Professor 
Wright's conclusion is that there is no evidence of healing in this context, and that 
psychological manipulation is a preferable explanation for the observed phenomena. 
Perhaps significantly. Professor Wright has a dispensational view of the Bible, and so 
his research confirms his view that miracles do not take place now. Dr. Lewis and 
Dr. White work from within the charismatic movement, and their research is 
consistent with their own particular ideas about what is possible.
13 1 Cor 5:5.
14 1 Cor 11:30.
15 When the Spirit Cornes With Power, Healing: Fiction, Fantasy or Fact
16 Masters, The Healing Epidemic.
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It appears to be the inevitable situation that an individual's beliefs interpret the 
empirical evidence in the light of his respective paradigms, rather than the paradigm 
being upturned by the 'facts' of the situation. The issue is put clearly by B.B. 
Warfield.
A Catholic believing first in the divinity of the church as the organ of the Holy 
Ghost, in which He is made a deposit for the whole world, and from which alone He 
can be obtained; and believing, next, in the truth of all the distinctive teachings of 
this church, as to monasticism and asceticism, relics and saints, transubstantiation, 
and the like, in honour of which the alleged miracles are performed - will naturally 
be predisposed to believe these miracles real. A Protestant, believing none of these 
things, but looking upon them as corruptions of the Gospel, will as naturally be 
predisposed to believe them spurious.
The same issue is illustrated later by Warfield in the context of 'Lourdes Superstition'
Even though we should stand dumb before the wonders of Lourdes, and should be 
utterly incapable of suggesting a natural causation for them, we know right well that 
they are not of God. The whole complex of circumstances of which they are a part; 
their origin in occurrences, the best that can be said of which is that they are silly; 
their intimate connection with a cult derogatory to the rights of God who alone is to 
be called upon in our distress,-stamp them, prior to all examination of the mode of 
their occurrence, as not from God. We are far more sure that they are not from God 
than we can ever be sure, after whatever scrutiny, of precisely how they are 
wrought.
What to note is that the possibility that there could be a miracle in this context is 
ruled out by Warfield's presuppositions. He goes on to discuss the way that the 
'miracle' relates to doctrine.
Of course as R.H. Benson puts it, "those who believe in God and His Son and the 
Mother of God on quite other grounds," may declare that Lourdes is not enough."
But this is not to make the miracles carry the doctrine, but the doctrine the miracles 
in accordance with J.H.Newman's proposition that it is all a matter of point of view, 
of presuppositions.
This does make clear that healing can not be used as an unambiguous criterion to 
assess a movement, or a person's individual claims to have encountered God, 
because it is the healing claim itself thM is in need of assessment. 'Did it happen'? is 
the first awkward question, and 'How did it happen'? being even more awkward. 
The elusiveness of hard evidence in such a context means that the judgment given in 
answer to these questions depends in which paradigm one is situated. It is 
consequently a criterion which cannot be applied in real situations with confidence.
17 Warfield, B.B. Counterfeit Miracles, (Banner of Truth, 1986), page 58.
18 Ibid, page 122.
19 Ibid, page 123.
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Perhaps there could be instances of healing which were so dramatic that they 
did provide good evidence of the miraculous; if one were to have an arm grow back 
for example. A clear case of mongolism which was healed would demand a change 
in the genetic structure of every cell in the body. Healing such as this would at least 
be the kind of sign which would indicate an omnipotent creator at work. In this 
situation the evidence could theoretically be so dramatic that it would force an upturn 
in a person's paradigm. According to Locke a true miracle which attested a claim to 
revelation would have a character, such that it 'can be performed by none but a 
divine power, and require the immediate hand of the almighty.
In practice, however, this less ambiguous kind of healing is not commonly in 
evidence. For example:-
John Wimber claimed to have prayed over more than 200 children with Downs 
Syndrome. To his genuine disappointment only one of the 200 have shown any sign 
of healing. This one child still has many of the symptoms of his problem (i.e. visual 
features), but has been able to reach 'the lower end of the normal range’ in 
educational attainments. John was careful to emphasize that it was the lower end, but 
within the normal range.
The healing rate for Down's syndrome is 0.5%, and the healing that did take 
place was only partial (unlike Jesus' healings). Why this disease is so resistant John 
has no idea. On further consultation with doctors working in this area, we have been 
assured that for a Down's syndrome child to be in the lower end of the normal range 
of academic achievement is not unusual or remarkable, let alone miraculous. From a 
medical viewpoint, John Wimber s 0.5% success rate with Down’s syndrome is less 
than is achieved through the efforts of health professionals.^^
The implication of this for claims to heal is rather devastating. If it is demonstrated 
that all the apparent healing is taking place in an area which can be caused by 
psychosomatic processes, or else fall within the range of normal remission then the 
most plausible hypothesis is that the healing taking place here is determined by the 
normal forces of nature. If this is so then there is no unambiguous 'sign' which is 
indicating the work of omnipotence.
It is even questionable whether one could ever justify a theological position on 
the basis of miraculous claims. Certainly Hume rejected the possibility that one 
should ever believe a person's claim to have witnessed a miracle, and his views have 
been extensively influential since then.^^ Even without accepting this sceptical view, 
though, the whole issue of claims to miraculous physical healing takes its place 
within the framework of the charismatic movement, and is part of that which needs to 
be assessed. It can contribute something in support of the system in its entirety, in
20 Locke, J. A Discourse of Miracles. Cited in Houston, J, Reported Miracles, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1994) page 40.
21 John Wimber: Friend or Foe?, (Mathias, 1990), page 7.
22 Cf. Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, (Oxford University Press, 1990), 
section X.
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the sense that if there were no healing when one's theology led one to expect it, then 
this would be a difficult anomaly which would put a strain on the credibility of one's 
thinking. It is also possible, in principle, for an example of healing to be so 
inexplicable, that it could have a significant effect on a person's whole web of belief. 
However, healing has a dubious over-emphasis in current thinking, and too much is 
being claimed for particular examples which turn out to be so ambiguous that they 
are of no use as a means of assessment.
As we would expect, on Biblical, theological, practical, and epistemological 
grounds, one could not normally assess whether the Spirit was at work on the basis of 
claims for the success of physical healing, when these claims are separated from 
reference to a broader context. Both healing and illness could theoretically be caused 
by the Holy Spirit, or by numerous other possible causes.
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2. Is an encounter with God in experience indicated by a Psychologicallevel of well being?
The issue of psychological well being is closely connected with the previous issue, 
because it is another form of healing, and consequently the same arguments apply to 
this area too. It is however, given such a prominent position within the charismatic 
movement that it demands separate treatment from physical healing.
There have been claims that an encounter with the Holy Spirit results in 
transformation of the personality. Such claims can be found right back through the 
Pentecostal doctrine of Baptism in the Spirit, and into the variety of enthusiastic 
movements discussed earlier. The names for the experiences vary, but one of the 
claims for its effects which remain in continuity through these enthusiastic 
experiences is that an encounter with the Spirit leads to a permanent alteration in 
personality and is indicated by the fruit of the Spirit; love, joy, peace, and so on.
This emphasis has diversified within the current charismatic movement and 
come to be evidenced in a variety of counselling styles, such as healing of memories 
and deliverance. All of them have à common assumption that God intends people to 
feel mentally calm and peaceful. Feelings such as these are therefore an indication of 
a genuine encounter with God.
For example, according to Kenneth Copeland, it is sinful to feel grief over 
anything such as bereavement:
As a believer, you've been redeemed from the curse of grief and sorrow by the blood 
of Jesus Christ. You don't have to put up with them any more than you have to put 
up with sin or sickness or disease.
So don't do it any more. When the devil tries to burden you with grief and sorrow, 
resist him.^^
In the case of Copeland, (and Urquhart), faith is being treated as a mental effort, 
really as a form of positive thinking, and one which is under the control of the 
believer. In practice this means that a mood which upsets this state of mind is 
damaging to faith, and so ought to be resisted.
Such extreme views are primarily representative of the 'prosperity movement' 
and are not held throughout the whole charismatic movement. However, what is 
common to all is the similar assumption that God wants all Christians to have a 
standard type of personality and an uninterrupted psychological smoothness.
23 Copeland, Kenneth, Voice of Victory, magazine. Volume 17, number 2.
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The effect of this emphasis is that the work of the Spirit in the believer has 
come to be assessed in terms of the level of psychological well being which he 
enjoys. Peacefulness, happiness, contentment, and so on are a sign of the Spirit, and 
anxiety, pain, grief, tension, etc, need to be 'dealt with', through prayer, or faith. 
To put it starkly, God always wants everyone to feel good.
As with physical healing, one can find strong strands within the Bible which 
can be drawn on to attempt a justification of this attitude to peace of mind. After all, 
Jesus did say that his followers were to 'be anxious for n o t h i n g ' ' L e t  not your 
hearts be troubled', He said.^^ Jesus promised peace, 'peace I leave with you, my 
peace I give unto you'.^^ The Holy Spirit is sent as a 'comforter' who will dwell 
with the disciples.27 St Paul says 'let the peace of Christ rule in your hearts',2» and 
describes Christian maturity in terms of 'the fruit of the Spirit'.29 Indeed, there is 
such a large body of Biblical material which can be used in support of the idea that 
God intends people to have a sense of peace that it is easy to see the reason why it is 
treated as an indication of the work of the Spirit.
However, there is more to be said about the Biblical view point on 
peacefulness than this. The Bible does state that one day there will be no more tears, 
sorrow or pain,3o but this is not be so until after death. One can see a typically 
impatient enthusiastic concept of Grace at work here. The problem with using 
psychological health as a means of assessment, is that this represents only part of the 
Biblical picture, and there are many examples of grief, sorrow and psychological pain 
which fit in with God's plan.
One example of this would be the experience of Jeremiah. He was afflicted 
with a morbid depression, wishing that he had been aborted,^! suffering physical 
i l ln e s s ^ 2  and b i t t e r n e s s . says that God 'seduced' him, 'raped' him, lied to 
h i m , 34 and that God is merely using him as target practice in a g a m e . 35 One could 
quote Jeremiah's misery extensively.
The interesting thing to note here, is that his personality would be 
unacceptable in many current charismatic Churches. The tendency would be to cast
24 Mth 6:34,
25 John 14:1.
26 John 14:27.
27 John 14:15.
28 Colossians 3:15.
29 Galations 5:16-25.
30 Rev 21:1-4.
31 Jer 20:17.
32 Lamentations 3:4.
33 mW, 3:15.
34 Jeremiah's 15:15-21.
35 Lamentations 3:12.
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out demons, as they could be seen as the obvious cause of his nearly blasphemous 
attitude to God; to lift curses, as they could be viewed as the reason for his consistent 
lack of success in ministry; to heal his memories, as he has such a low self image that 
there must have been a problem in his relationship to his parents; to criticise his lack 
of faith, as he is not healed himself, nor living in material or emotional prosperity.
None of these approaches would have worked however, because his 
personality was especially shaped by God for the specific job to which he was 
called.36 In fact, his whole genetic history has been shaped and supervised to fit this 
God given role. This is the reason why his temperament remained constant 
throughout his life. Jeremiah's last recorded words are, 'Or hast thou utterly rejected 
us?, art thou exceedingly angry with us?3?
According to the Bible, the reality of Jeremiah's encounter with God is not 
demonstrated by mental certainty, calmness, or good feelings towards God, nor in 
success in prayer or service; but in perseverance. In spite of all the difficulty, both 
internal and external, he remained faithful to a calling for around forty years. This 
is markedly different from the popular view of faith mentioned above, as Jeremiah 
certainly does not get all he wants; he is simply tested by fire, and yet survives. 
Mental well being is irrelevant to his primary role.
A second example of the ambiguity of psychological well being in the Bible is 
the parable of the tax gatherer and sinner in Luke 18:9-14. The Pharisee stands 
confidently before God, with no sense of guilt, and a very positive attitude towards 
himself. Psychologically he was A l, and yet he goes home 'condemned'. The 
opposite is true of the tax collector. He 'stands at a distance', feeling unworthy, 
beating his breast in an expression of bitterness, guilt and regret, and yet he goes 
home 'justified'.
The paradox is that the man who felt innocent was in fact guilty; and the man 
who felt guilty, was pronounced innocent. There is a distinction made here between 
guilt as a feeling, and the fact of objective guilt before God. The parable provides an 
example of self delusion. What must be noted, for our purposes, is the implication, 
that there are times when it is positively dangerous to feel 'good' or 'innocent', and 
one of those times would be if one were actually guilty before God. In this situation 
an encounter with God is indicated not by peacefulness, but by guilt.
This distinction between veridical and deluded feelings towards oneself, and 
towards God was one which was made clearly in the time of Edwards and of the 
Puritans. Indeed, this concern is one of the motivating forces behind writing The
36 Jeremiah 1:5.
37 Lamentations 5:22.
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Religious Affections, because it was seen as crucial to be able to distinguish between 
reliable and misleading personal convictions, particularly those which concern a 
person's status before God.
And it is the concurring voice of all orthodox divines, that there may be religious 
affections, which are raised to a very high degree, and yet there be nothing of true
religion. 3 8
And so it is ever likely to be in the church, (that Satan destroys the work with 
confiision) whenever religion revives remarkably, till we have learned well to 
distinguish between true and false religion, between saving affections and 
experiences, and those manifold fair shows and glistening appearances by which they 
are counterfeited; the consequences of which, when they are not distinguished, are 
often inexpressibly d r e a d f u l . 3 9
Feelings are an ambiguous indication of a religious experience, because one could 
easily be deluded, for example, about one's safety (in many contexts), and happily 
sail into danger on the strength of that conviction. A person can feel safe on the 
basis of an assurance which is quite fraudulent. Feelings of anxiety or depression 
could have organic causes. Hypnotic experience can create a sense of peacefulness, 
and so on. Vallium or antidepressants could create a feeling of calmness.
There is a need to distinguish genuine religious affections from non-genuine, 
but this is not a characteristic concern which marks out the current charismatic 
movement. The simple experience of 'feeling' peaceful, can be treated as being 
enough of a criterion to indicate a real work of the Spirit. Consequently, if a person 
thrashes around in anguish in a charismatic service, this would be attributed to Satan, 
whereas in the time of Wesley, or Edwards, they would be as likely to see it as a sign 
of deep conviction of sin. This is because they made allowance for unpleasant 
emotion being caused by God.^o Today, the aims of modern psychology seem to 
have been broadly accepted, even though these may not always be consistent with 
Biblical aims for personality. By contrast the scriptures often indicate that God may 
not want a person to 'feel good' all the time. While 'peacefulness' may occur in 
many instances, it is not the primary aim of a work of the Spirit.
One can conclude that the simplistic criterion which equates the work of the 
Spirit with psychological well-being is inadequate as a means of assessment. It fails 
because feelings of well-being, or otherwise are not necessarily caused by a religious 
experience. On top of this, according to the Bible there are times when it is not 
God's plan for a person to feel good. Again we are confronted with an
38 The Religious Affections, page 59.
39 Ibid, page 19.
40 For example. Thoughts on the Revival, page 377.
_____
2 3 0
inconclusiveness which undermines this criterion for assessment. Both mental health 
and mental anguish could theoretically be the result of an experience of the Spirit, or 
else come from some other source, spiritual or psychological.
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3. Does Material prosperity indicate an encounter with God?
It seems strange that this question needs to be asked, because this concept has little in 
the way of historical parallels. Perhaps the monasteries of Cluny in France came 
close to it with their elaborate rituals and expensive furnishings for worship, but to 
claim that God wants everyone to be materially wealthy is unusual. The major 
proponent of this view is the American Kenneth Copeland, but similar views are 
spread through parts of the English Charismatic movement as a result of other 
figures, such as Reinhard Bonnke.
leave foolishness behind and stir within you the faith to reach out and receive what 
you, as a redeemed child of the living God have a divine right to - not the curse of 
poverty, but the blessing of prosperity.41
The degree of one sided Biblical interpretation, and strained exegesis necessary to 
support such a view of wealth is blatant. 'My God shall supply all your needs'42 is 
taken to include such 'needs' as a new car. 'And if you be in Christ then you are 
Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise',43 is interpreted as meaning that 
every Christian should be as materially prosperous as Abraham.44 'He became poor 
that we might become rich',45 is interpreted to mean that Jesus intends all poor people 
to be materially wealthy.46
The whole idea is so badly supported that one is inclined to dismiss it 
outright, and yet the widespread influence of these views indicate that they must be 
taken seriously.
Copeland's 'ministry' is confined to wealthy western countries. It would be 
difficult for him to get beyond these areas because the poverty and starvation of much 
of the world would have to be attributed to a sinful lack of faith and expectation. 
One suspects that these concepts are more attributable to allowing Biblical exegesis to 
be filtered through an American cultural grid which imposes the aims of success and 
materialism onto the Church. Copeland's views are certainly not the result of 
anything resembling balanced Biblical interpretation.
Again, the heart of the issue is that wealth is inconclusive as an indication of 
the work of the Spirit. Jesus' teaching on wealth and poverty is sometimes difficult 
to apply, and part of it does include promises of having all one's 'needs' supplied and
41 Copeland, K. Voice of Victory magazine, volume 17, number 11.
42 Phil 4:19.
43 Galations 3:29.
44 Voice of Victory magazine, volume 17, number 11.
45 2 Cor 8:9.
46 Voice of Victory magazine, volume 13, number 2,
_____________________________________________________
2 3 2
of overflowing blessing/? There are also rich people in the Bible who are Godly, 
such as Abraham and Solomon. The fault comes in exaggerating this side of the 
argument, and in ignoring the other sides of this issue, or of reinterpreting theissues 
to suit a particular culture. There are also Biblcial strands which warn against riches 
as a 'snare' which will rob a person of the Kingdom of God; riches are 'unrighteous 
mammon';48 there is a warning not to 'store up treasures on earth','49 'the love of 
money is the root of all evil',^o and so on. There are many rich people in the world 
who have become rich through immoral means such as the exploitation of slaves, 
drug trafficking, organised crime, etc. Wealth in itself is no unambiguous indication 
of goodness nor of the work of the Spirit.
Taking the example and teaching of Jesus has more generally led to a stress on 
poverty as an expression of spirituality, rather than accumulation of wealth. The rest 
of the Bible describes many impoverished people who were faithful, as does the 
whole history of the Church. If one looks to the future, then the New Testament 
expectation seems to be for increasing hardship and persecution for Christians, rather 
than a comfortable material prosperity. According to Peter suffering is a calling 
which is part of Christ-likeness; 'do not be surprised when suffering comes
The effect of all this is that both wealth and poverty may or may not be signs 
of an encounter with God. We can conclude that since both wealth and poverty may, 
or may not, be part of God's plan, neither can be a useful single criterion to detect 
the work of the Spirit.
The previous three sections all illustrate the characteristic impatience of enthusiastic 
grace, as they are a variety of forms of prosperity, which are more traditionally seen 
as being reserved for eternity. The way of suffering, more commonly understood 
within Christianity, is that while God ultimately intends perfect health and wholeness, 
there is only a foreshadowing of this before death.
it is too much for us to determine that God shall never bring an outward calamity in 
bestowing a vastly greater spiritual and eternal good. 6?
47 Mth 6:25-34.
48 Mth 6 24.
49 MÜi6:19.
50 I Tim 6:10.
51 I Peter 2:21.
52 Thoughts on the Revival, page 368.
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Evidently this is a Biblical attitude, and yet there is still more to be said; it can be 
taken one stage further. There is an assumption in this argument that God ultimately 
intends 'a vastly greater spiritual and eternal good' for individual people. This must 
be questionable on Biblical grounds because the existence of heaven, is also balanced 
out with hell. One of the reasons there is such resistance to this doctrine of 
damnation in contemporary theology, is because it unpalatably envisages God doing 
something which is not ultimately to the benefit of those who find themselves in that 
situation. Hell provides no therapeutic element, nor a possibility that one would 
emerge as a better, reformed and more complete character at the end. It is pure 
judgement and retribution. A society that sees rehabilitation as the only justification 
for 'punishment', finds this a difficult concept to swallow.
Arguably such a concept upholds God's justice, holiness, and righteousness, 
and in that way is to His benefit. However, there is no benefit to those who undergo 
this fate. This is no doubt unpleasant for the inhabitants, and yet is consistent with 
the purpose of creation given in the Bible and taken up by the creeds. The chief end 
of man is to glorify God and serve him forever; it is not the chief end of God to serve 
man and to keep him happy forever.
If this understanding is correct it would provide an insight into the theological 
issues which are raised by issues of mental and physical healing, and prosperity. 
Enthusiastic grace is not only impatient, it is also short sighted, in the sense that it 
focuses on the 'nice' things that God will do for people, especially now. If one were 
to refocus one's theology into infinity, it would become evident that the purpose of 
all healing, and prosperity, indeed, the purpose of all creation, is to glorify God.
This glorification may be achieved through individual faithfulness, through 
miraculous healing, or else through suffering patiently until death. It may be 
achieved through Shadrach, Meshach and Abdednigo's deliverance, or through 
Steven's martyrdom. The glorification of God is the reason for healing, and for non­
healing, for illness which comes from God, for the intense psychological pain of 
Jeremiah, and so on. It is also the common unifying reason, for the existence of both 
heaven and hell. The glory of God is the purpose of existence itself.
We therefore have an ascending order of hypotheses on the issue of healing 
within theology. The enthusiastic understanding of events is (a) that God wants one 
to be well, and (b) that he wants it now. It is both short sighted, and impatient. One 
stage up from this is that God wants one to be well, though this may have to wait till 
eternity. It is only short sighted. Stage (c) is that God may not plan for one to be 
well at all, at least, where this is not glorifying to him. The 'greater eternal good' of 
any individual will not be allowed to take priority, if this will be at the cost of God's 
eternal righteousness or his justice.
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Of these choices it is only the latter hypothesis that is able to provide a 
coherent explanation for suffering, both in this life and the next. If one takes this 
view then non-healing, which is an uncomfortable anomaly for many charismatic 
writers, ceases to be a theoretical problem.
One can conclude on Biblical, moral, epistemological and theological 
grounds, that a claim to have encountered God in experience should not be assessed 
in terms of material, physical, spiritual, or emotional well being. Individually, each 
of these criteria is ambiguous.
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4. 'Peculiarity’ does not provide a means of assessing claims to have had areligions experience.
That an experience is 'peculiar' is not argued per se as an objection to charismatic 
experience, but one suspects that it does have a significant influence on the attitudes 
of those who object to the phenomena associated with enthusiasm. Enthusiastic 
experiences appear to be so strange and dramatic that they demand an explanation; 
one which is not always available. Because these experiences are out of the 
ordinary, they have created a strong reaction in people, both for and against 
attributing these phenomena to direct intervention from God. Consequently, the idea 
of their 'peculiarity' does need consideration.
There is certainly a variety of peculiar experiences which accompany 
enthusiasm, and these have always been highlighted by the opponents of a particular 
movement. They have been mentioned above, but they include falling over, shaking, 
shouting, crying laughing, jumping up and down, crawling on the floor, barking, and 
screaming. Through the 1980's Wimber has encouraged such phenomena by 
exhorting people to be free to experience whatever comes along, and to have the 
nerve to speak out the 'words' or 'pictures' that occur to them, however strange they 
may seem to the person at the time.53 The Toronto Blessing' has been associated 
with the same phenomena, but in a more extreme form
All of this can be picked up by those outside and dismissed as emotionalism, 
hypnotism, mass hysteria, or even insanity, and indeed these explanations may well 
be correct at times.
However, sheer peculiarity in itself is not, of necessity, a sign of a non 
genuine religious experience. It could equally well be the sign of omniscience, only 
appearing strange to us because of our lack of understanding. Indeed unpredictability 
is what one ought to expect. In Biblical terms God is transcendent, well beyond our 
complete understanding, and 'his ways are not our w a y  s ' .  4^ Combined with this 
mystery we have the awesome complexity of the human mind, which is also hardly 
understandable to us. If we suppose that there is indeed an interaction between God 
and man taking place in some event, then both sides of the interaction are complex 
and only partially understood. The results of such an experience must be frequently 
varied and unpredictable. The sheer oddness and peculiarity may be a sign of 
insanity, but this could also be the sign of a God who is almighty and mysterious, at 
work. Perhaps the only thing one could predict with any confidence in such a 
setting, is that the results of the encounter will be unpredictable.
53 Wimber, John Signs and wonders, tape 3. (Vineyard Ministries, date not availible).
54 Isaiah 55:9.
________________
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There is a distinct precedent for peculiarity on which to draw throughout the 
Bible; for example, Eziekiel's prophesies and actions, 5^ swimming axe heads, 6^ Jesus 
putting mud onto a blind man’s eyes,5? the burning bush,5» and Moses's staff turning 
into a snake/9
One could also argue that unpredictable experience is more in line with the 
character of God than, say, traditional Pentecostal doctrine which has the whole 
relationship between God and man pinned down to a set formula of conversion, 
baptism in the Spirit, and speaking in tongues. It would be surprising if God were so 
predictable in his action, and also that people were so uniform in their needs.
According to the Bible, God has made promises, which do provide 
commitments that he will behave in predictable ways. His behaviour could therefore 
be relied on in many circumstances, as could the motivation and consistency which 
would underlie his actions. However, these promises do not cover every particular 
eventuality, and there is still scope for a large amount of unpredictability.
The effect of all this is that peculiarity can point to the almighty and 
mysterious, as well as to emotional manipulation, insanity, or to a variety of 
psychological states. Oddness is consequently too ambiguous to be of use as a 
criterion to assess the work of the Spirit. It is the peculiarity which needs assessing.
55 For example, Ezekiel 1.
56 11 Kings 6:5.
57 John 9:15.
58 Exodus 3:2,
59 Exodus 7:8-13.
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5. That it works or does not work does not provide unambiguousjustification.
To put the issue in the form of a question: 'Does success justify a person's theology?' 
The assumption that it does, is prevalent throughout the charismatic movement, and 
revealed in phrases such as, 'I don't understand the theology of it but it works', or 
'Its success speaks for itself. If we take the example of Yonggi Chow's Church in 
South Korea, the reason its theology is taken seriously is, to put it crudely, by 
counting the hundreds of thousands of people who attend; the equivalent of the 
advertising slogan 'a quarter of a million people can't be wrong'. Whenever his 
books are introduced they include the a reference to the size of his c h u r c h .6 o There is 
a tendency to give more credence to all of the theological views of a person who is 
successful in terms of gathering numbers. If we state it blatantly, the assumption is 
that if all those people are affected in this way when an individual speaks, then he 
must know what he is talking about.
This would appear at first sight to be a useful criterion of assessment. After 
all, one of the marks of a good theory is that is 'fruitful' and that it has predictive 
capacity. When events are in line with what one's theology would lead one to 
expect, then this is a positive indication of its veracity
However, in isolation from the other marks of a good theory, such a criterion 
as predictive capacity can be misleading. The difficulty arises because one has 
omitted to develop the explanatory element of the theory.
Take, for example, a theory which stated that 'the movement of the moon is 
caused by the tides'. This would have mathematically precise predictive capacity, in 
spite of being entirely false. Or to take another example, if one supposed the 
existence of a little man in the fridge who turned the light on and off when the door 
was opened and shut, one could justify it by saying 'my theory works, when I open 
the door the light goes on, just as I predicted'. Mesmer justified his theory of the 
effect of the 'magnetic fluid' in the ether by pointing to the way people fell down 
when apparently exposed to it.
The problems come to light when one moves beyond the level of a guess, and 
attempts to provide a detailed explanation; at this point these original theories become 
strained to breaking point. Predictive ability must be combined with explanation 
where this is available, because in isolation from this, an ability to predict can be 
deceptively misleading as an indication that a theory is correct.
If we take the enthusiastic example of 'falling in the Spirit'. One side could 
justify its understanding of experience by saying 'this is a work of the Spirit, and I
60 For example. Wise, Robert et al. The Church Divided, (Bridge Publishing inc, 1985), page vii.
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know this because when I pray in a certain way, this happens. I don't understand the 
theology of it but it works'. The other side, however, could develop a theory which 
attributes the effects to hypnotic technique, and could also justify its explanation by 
arguing that 'it works’, in the sense that one is able to predict the experiences by 
using the particular theory.
The two alternatives will continue to be unresolved until a more detailed 
explanation of cause and effect is developed; in other words a justification, testing, 
and more thoroughly worked out explanation is needed. As stated above, we have 
two opposing guesses, and if one is content to rest with 'I don't understand the 
theology but it works', then that theory will always retain its inherently uncertain 
status. 'That it works' will be quite obvious, 'why it works' will be more elusive, but 
essential, and this is what must be answered if an experience is to be understood and 
interpreted in an accurate way.
If we continue to consider the same example of 'slaying in the Spirit', we will 
find that there are logical gaps in the discussions which have not been carefully 
bridged. Take Wesley and Whitfield as examples of this issue. Both had experience 
of people falling over in a dramatic way while they were preaching, but Wesley used 
this as justification of his arminian theology, whilst Whitfield interpreted the events 
as a sign that he was correct in his Calvinism. Such an attempt at justification 
contains a sizeable leap between the experience and the conclusion. The occurrence 
of falling down is taken firstly to be a mark of God's grace, and then secondly, to be 
a justification of a person's entire theology. Since the theology taken by each person 
to be justified by these events was in part contrary, one must suspect that there is a 
problem in these large jumps between experience and interpretation. Both Wesley 
and Whitfield distanced themselves from such thinking in later years. One is 
beginning with the experience of people falling down during a religious meeting, and 
moving from there to the conclusion that all one's theology must therefore be correct. 
This jump is not justified on logical or epistemic grounds. This is particularly so 
when a God of grace is presupposed, one who does not demand perfection as a 
precondition of blessing.
This is simply a particular issue which we are using to illustrate the point that 
because something 'works', this does not necessarily justify one’s theory regarding 
the reason why it works.
There are also significant moral difficulties with such an approach to 
justifying experience. Lots of things 'work'. Hypnotism works. Acupuncture 
works, voodoo works, Witch craft may be quite effective, 're-birthing' New Age
_________
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techniques may work, as does mass hysteria, positive thinking, and all kinds of 
psychological manipulation. The 'Children of God’ cult managed to grow in number 
using 'hookers for Jesus', and the Moonies are accused of exploiting brain-washing 
techniques. They are effective; they work. The Mafia is a suceessful organisation, 
as is the Mormon sect, and the Islamic religion. Arms dealing could make one 
successful in terms of monetary reward. Hitler was successful in persuading large 
crowds of people by using oratory
Consequently, 'that something works' is morally neutral, and one needs not 
only to ask the questions 'does it work?', and then 'how does it work?' (explanation), 
but also 'is it morally justified or not?' This latter question would be disastrous for a 
Christian to omit. If 'that it works' is a sign of divine approval, then some of the 
most apparently demonic ideas and movements in history have been approved by 
God. Success does not justify theology nor imply moral impeccability.
The Bible is also suspicious of the criterion 'that it works' as a justification 
for theological interpretation of experience.
For example, this same issue arose when Moses went to meet Pharaoh. In the 
context of seeking to justify their beliefs, both Moses and the court magicians were 
able to turn staffs into snakes; the implication being that success in this task was a 
justification of their differing views. In spite of their success, neither was successful 
in terms of persuading other people to adopt different views.
Jeremiah provides an example of a person who was called to be unsuccessful 
for an entire life. He was constantly in opposition, and ignored for his entire
ministry. He preached repentance, and the people did not repent, but preferred to
ignore him or treat him as a joke. If one applied the criterion 'did it work' to
Jeremiah, then he was wasting his time.
One would have the same problem with the life of Jesus. In comparison with 
other world religious figures, he comes off badly. Only three years teaching, always 
an outsider, deserted by his friends at the end, who even denied that they knew him. 
His death was in the form of a public execution, and at that stage he felt deserted 
even by God himself.
Many Biblical characters look like failures. Abraham giving up security in 
Ur, Nehemiah building a wall in the desert, Paul giving up a successful university 
life in favour of facing insecurity, imprisonment and death. Hosea's marriage could 
hardly be described as successful. The book of Job addresses the reasons why the 
innocent suffer while the ungodly are prosperous. The same issue recurs throughout 
the Psalms.
In the Biblical view of reality, success and failure can only be judged from the 
stand-point of eternity, and as a result one could easily be misled by drawing
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conclusions on an issue prematurely. Apparent success could be ultimate failure, and 
apparent failure could be ultimate success.
In the light of this, one is forced to differ with Gamaliel's defence of the 
apostles.
So in the present case I tell you, keep away from these men and let them alone; for if 
this plan or this undertaking is of men, it will fail; but if it is of God, you will not be 
able to overthrow them. 61
One feels sympathy for him as a tactful, diplomatic and impartial person who has 
cleverly secured the release of the apostles. However, even though his words sound 
generously liberal, they are based on the false principle we have been discussing, 
which is that theology can be justified by assessing whether it is evidently successful 
or not. This leads Gamaliel on to the position of neutrality in response to the 
apostle's message and to sit on the fence with a detached and 'academic' view of 
Jesus, 'Let them alone', says Gamaliel. He is urging appeasement and compromise. 
This is clearly not a response to which Jesus or the apostles would be sympathetic, 
'he who is not for me is against me'. Jesus uses absolute categories; sheep and goats, 
wide and narrow paths, hell and heaven, light and dark. Obviously, one would not 
expect a Pharisee to have his thinking determined by Jesus, but irrespective of this, 
Gamiliel's defence is based on a premise which is inconsistent for a person who 
believes in an inspired Old Testament. It is also a defence which Christianity could 
well do without; Jesus would not approve.
It is reasonable to conclude that, 'success' alone can not be used as a criterion 
to assess ones understanding of experience. On Biblical, moral, logical and 
epistemological grounds, both success and failure could point to a genuine religious 
experience, or to innumerable other causes. It is too ambiguous to use as a means of 
assessment.
61 Acts 5:38-39.
      ^ .............
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6 Does a mixture of good and bad indicate that an experience is notgenuinely religious?
This criterion of a 'mixture of good and bad' can operate on a number of levels and it 
is potentially applicable to individual experience, to a Church, or to the charismatic 
movement.
For example, this criterion can operate on a personal and irrational level. 
Someone says, 'I went to a charismatic Church once , and it was terrible'. On such a 
basis, the entire movement throughout the whole world is dismissed. Clearly it is 
unfair, but then people are not particularly fair and this is used as a means of 
assessment.
Another example of this process can be found in The Healing Epidemic, as 
people are lumped together under phrases such as 'charismatics believe that'. This is 
such a general statement that it is meaningless, but because Masters presupposes a 
homogenous unity which is either all correct or all incorrect, the effect on his 
assessment of the movement is to attribute extreme views to the whole spectrum of 
thought. The whole is then written off on the basis of abuses in parts.
This same presupposition also underlies other books. One example is John 
Wimber, friend or foe. Even the title has an implicit categorical assumption, i.e. 
Wimber is all right or all wrong, for or against, wholly right or wholly wrong:
John Wimber's teaching on "The Third Wave of the Holy Spirit" proposes 
that the Pentecostal movement at the turn of the century and the Charismatic 
movement of the 1960s were truly movements of the Holy Spirit. However, John 
Wimber thinks that sorhe of die central teachings of these two movements 
(concerning baptism in the spirit and the place of tongues) were wrong. So the 
movements which taught error were inspired by the Spirit o f truth!.
This kind of confusion of truth and error is reflected in his books. 62
The assumption underlying this criticism is that there are 'movements of the Spirit', 
and that such movements can contain nothing but truth, because they are inspired by 
the Spirit of truth. Error or sin signifies absence of the Holy Spirit.
Is this a fair assumption?
If we begin by assessing this assumption in Biblical terms, then one could argue that 
such criticism may have a cumulative force in that there could be a point where there 
is so much that is wrong with the claimed religious experience that the good is
62 Wimber Friend or Foe, page 10. (My italics).
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outweighed by the bad. However, this point may be further down the road to 
Antinomianism for many people to feel comfortable.
Consider as an example the Church at Corinth during the time of Paul. This 
was a 'charismatic' Church, but also one which needed to be warned against 
prostitution,63 incest,64 and drunkenness at the Lord's supper.65 Some groups were 
undermining marriage,66 there were extremists on the issue of charismatic gifts, and 
on celibacy.67 Parts of the Church had become 'partakers with demons',68 and there 
were also doctrinal heresies to the point of 'baptism on behalf of the dead',69 and 
even more significantly, denial of the resurrection of Jesus.?o This undermined 
Paul's gospel, as without the resurrection there is nothing from which to be saved, 
nor anything for which to be saved. The message thus becomes futile. It was a 
Church which was accommodated to the spirit of its age, with a love for 'the wisdom 
of the world’,71 and an idolisation of clever public speaking. There were also 
numerous internal divisions, notably focused around the personalities of Paul and 
Apollos,72 but also between rich and poor.?3
A Church with an accumulation of such excessive moral, doctrinal, and 
spiritual problems would be dismissed outright as a hopeless case by many traditional 
and charismatic Christians. In some ways it seems hardly Christian. Paul, however, 
never urges anyone to leave, and introduces his letter to them by thanking God for all 
the gifts that they have, and describing them as 'the Church of God, loved, called, 
sanctified in Christ Jesus'.?4
One has to conclude that if the Spirit could be at work in the Corinthian 
church, then the work of the Spirit can co-exist with some very strange people, 
doctrines, practices, and morality. According to Paul, none of these failings 
debarred these people from being a genuine church, nor from experiencing the work 
of the Spirit.
One is therefore on thin Biblical ice to argue that a Church or movement must 
be perfect in order to experience the work of the Spirit, and one would have to 
conclude that some ideal of perfection is consequently a dubious criterion for 
assessing such a work, because the Spirit could be active in spite of failure.
63 I Cor 6:15.
64 I Cor 5:1.
65 IC orll:17ff.
66 I Cor 7.
67 I Cor 7.
68 1 Cor 10:20.
69 1 Cor 15:29.
70 1 Cor 15:1-19.
71 lC orl:18ff.
72 1 Cor 1:10-17.
73 1 Cor 11:22.
74 1 Cor 1:1-2.
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Agreeing criteria could prove to be a complex task if theology, morality, and 
spirituality turn out to be equivocal.
Such a mixture can also be seen in a number of Biblical individuals. David 
was capable of sublime psalms, but also of committing adultery and murder.75 Peter 
could say 'you are the Christ the son of the living God', and yet shortly after, Jesus 
is forced to say to him 'get behind me Satan’.76 Paul the Apostle is capable of strong 
theology and powerful evangelism, but also quite capable of having a 'sharp 
disagreement' with Mark.7? Indeed, it is the claim that one has reached perfection 
that would indicate a denial of the work of the Spirit, 'He who says he has no sin 
deceives himself and the truth is not in him'.78
In Biblical terms one ought to expect that individuals and Churches will 
always be a mix of good and bad.
According to the New Testament one would be disappointed if one expects to 
find a perfect 'movement of the Spirit', a perfect Church, or a perfect believer, and 
this is demonstrated throughout Church history. The historical reality is of 
movements which are made up of people, and therefore of a complex mix of sin, 
holiness, mixed motives, lust, spirituality, etc. The movements with which they are 
involved may start comparatively well, but then commonly deteriorate. It is rare for 
a movement to retain the fervour of its founders as it moves into the next generation. 
This has been particularly true of enthusiastic movements which usually splinter into 
different groups, or else retreat into mysticism.
It is an ambivalent situation such as this which is assumed by Edwards in The 
Religious Affections, The circumstance he envisages is of a movement which 
contains a mix of good and bad, and in order that the movement should survive, it 
must learn how to sift out that which is unhelpful. This is more Biblical, more 
realistic, and also a better start to an assessment than an assumption that one could 
have a perfect theology or movement of the Spirit involving people. If the existence 
of imperfection in a believer or church or movement is enough of a criterion to 
determine that the Spirit does not operate there, then one is forced to conclude that 
there have been no individuals, churches or movements which have been inspired by 
the Spirit. Edwards observes:
I have had opportunity to observe many instances here and elsewhere; and though 
there are some instances of great affections in which there has been a great mixture of 
nature with grace, and in some, a sad degenerating of religious affections; yet there is
75 2 Samuel 11.
76 Mathew 16:16-23.
77 Acts 15:39.
78 1 John 1:8.
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that uniformity observable, which makes it easy to be seen, that in general it is the 
same spirit from whence the work in all parts of the land has originated.79
He ponders on this issue in later years in The Religious Affections:
There is indeed something very mysterious in it, that so much good, and so much 
bad, should be mixed together in the church of God; just as it is a mysterious thing 
which has puzzled and amazed many a good Christian, that there should be that 
which is so divine and precious, viz.: the saving grace of God, and the new and 
divine nature, dwelling with so much corruption, hypocrisy, and iniquity, in the 
heart of the same saint.®®
Edwards provides an example of balanced criticism on this issue because he does not 
allow an indication of abuse in a single part, to undermine the credibility of the 
whole. He is consequently freed from having to defend every experience and 
doctrine in order to justify the claim that the Spirit is at work. Consequently he is 
able to incorporate the best of Chauncey's harsh criticism in his own work on 'the 
religious affections'. It is a good assumption with which to start, and one that 
enables a balanced conclusion. The alternative black and white view which is often 
attempted, leads to outright and (misguided) acceptance or rejection of the whole 
mix.
There is no logical reason to suppose that because a person is correct on one 
issue, that he is always correct on all other issues. Nor that if a person is wrong in 
one instance he is invariably wrong on all others. Up to a point, each part of a set of 
beliefs and practices must consequently be assessed on its own merits. Eventually 
there will come a point at which the set of beliefs are so confused that one must judge 
that the entire system is called into question. However, under normal circumstances 
there are no grounds to assume that a mix of good and bad theology or experience 
would indicate that a movement was all wrong, or that this would exclude genuine 
religious experience.
79 Thoughts on the Revival, page 378.
80 The Religious Affections, page 16.
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7. Do Parallel experiences in other contexts imply that an experience is notgenuinely Christian?
There are some apparent similarities between enthusiastic experiences and those in 
other contexts. It is important to consider this issue, because such comparison is 
often used in assessment of such experiences, usually by its opponents, to undermine 
the nature of charismatic experience. One can find, for example, experiences which 
seem to parallel charismatic experiences in other religions and occult based sects; or 
discover parallels between a variety of alternative therapies, and forms of 
'miraculous' healing within the Church.
The aim of this section is to illustrate briefly some of these connections in 
order to demonstrate that the question is relevant. The primary issue here is not to 
explore them all in detail, but to determine their significance. The questions are, 
even if there are parallels, what do these parallels mean? How important are they? 
Do they provide a useful means of assessment?
We will take two examples of writers who base an argument on parallels in 
other contexts.
(a) H un t  and  M c m ah o n  - T h e  S ed u c tio n  o f  C hr istia n ity
One book that takes such a line of argument is The Seduction o f C h r is t ia n i ty This 
has been influential in its attack on the charismatic movement, and needs therefore to 
be discussed in this context. Hunt & Mcmahon assert that the charismatic movement 
is a form of apostasy, synchronism and idolatry. They place the mix of charismatic 
experience and theology into an American eschatological context where the 
movement is considered to be part of the work of antichrist in his attempt to seduce 
Christians away from the truth in the last days.
The main thrust of the book consists of pointing out a variety of parallels 
between charismatic experience and teaching, and a number of questionable areas of 
belief. For example, the use of hypnosis is dismissed on the grounds that it is used 
by the occult. ®2
Taking 'authority' over situations such as financial difficulties is discussed, 
and the book cites an example of this technique.
81 Hunt & Mcmahon, The Seduction of Christianity, (Harvest House, 1985).
82 Ibid, page 73ff.
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I began to see that I already had audiority over that house and authority over the 
money I needed to purchase it. I said, "In the name of Jesus, I take authority over 
the money I need. (I called out the specific amount.) I command you to come to 
me... .in Jesus Name. Ministering spirits, you go and cause it to come. "®3
The criterion used in opposition to this technique is that it 'promotes concepts that 
cannot be found in the Bible, but are found in occult literature and practice'.®4
Another practice called 'visualisation' is used in some sections of the 
charismatic movement; 'Healing of memories' is one example of this. The following 
passage comes from The Gift o f Inner Healing, by Ruth Carter Stapleton.
In your imagination allow your spiritual body, shining with light, to rise out 
of your physical body. Look back so that you can see y ourself.... and reassure your 
body that you will return momentarily....
Go deeper and deeper into outer space until there is nothing except the warm 
presence of the eternal Creator. Rest in his presence.
Listen quietly.... [to] any instruction given.®®
Such practice is used as a therapeutic technique. One imagines Jesus going back into 
one's past, perhaps even as far back as birth, and one then allows him to alter the 
experience which is seen as the cause of present day mental or physical illness.
Jesus, as Lord of time, is able to do what we cannot... [we] ask Jesus to walk back 
with us into the past....it is the inner child of the past who is being healed.®7
Richard Foster promises in 'Celebration of Discipline' that through visualisation we 
encounter the real Jesus Christ:
... .You can actually encounter the living Christ in the event. It can be more than an 
exercise of the imagination, it can be a genuine confrontation.
Jesus Christ will actually come to you.®®
This practice is dismissed in The Seduction o f Christianity on the grounds that Hindus 
use similar techniques,®^ and that visualisation is also used in the occult, particularly 
in Shamanism.90
83 Gloria Copeland, cited in Ibid, page 101.
84 Ibid, page 101.
85 Stapleton, Ruth Carter, The Gift o f Inner Healing, (Hodder, 1976).
86 Cited in The Seduction of Christianity, page 164.
87 Francs MacNutt, cited in Ibid, page 183.
88 Ibid, page 164.
89 Ibid, page 163.
90 Ibid, page 123.
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Yonggi Cho recommends the following method of prayer:
We should always try to visualise the end result as we pray....If you have not 
visualised clearly in your heart exactly what you hope for, it cannot become a reality 
to you....
We have taught our people how to  visualise success Through
visualising and dreaming, you can incubate your future and hatch the results.
Hunt & Mcmahon see this as an aspect of the original shamanistic religion of Korea, 
and having nothing to do with authentic Christianity.92 It is dismissed on the grounds 
of this parallel.
The view of this book is that because of the parallels between these techniques 
used by parts of the charismatic movement, and other sects and religions:
It should be clear now that what is being taught is a Christianised form of tlie mental 
alchemy that lies at the heart of shamanism. This is basic sorcery. 93
This is a book which contains much information, but little reasonable assessment. It 
is predominantly a list of who does what and where, generalisations about 
'charismatics’ and 'psychologists'. In the place of argument there are exclamations 
that a person 'should have known better', or quotes from 'authorities' in the form of 
orthodox ministers. It has one criterion for its argument, which is that a parallel 
practice in some dubious context undermines its use by Christians. It is heavily 
criticised in a response to the book called The Church Divided, particularly for its 
distortions of the writers it claims to be assessing.94 The aim here is not to defend 
the experiences and methods discussed or analyse this whole argument, but simply to 
point out that 'parallels in other contexts' is inadequate as a criterion of assessment. 
Apart from the exegetical inadequacies of The Seduction o f Christianity, its main 
argument is flawed in principle.
The readiness to attribute miraculous events to demonic forces should be 
challenged. It would have been questioned by Aquinas who argued that only God 
can bring about miracles:
Strictly speaking, a miracle is defined as an event that occurs outside the natural run 
of things. However, if some event should occur outside the ordinary course of things 
with respect to any particular thing in nature, this would not be enough to make it a 
miracle - otherwise, someone throwing a stone up in the air would be working a 
miracle, since this is outside the ordinary course of the stone's nature. God,
91 Ibid, page 145.
92 Ibid, page 150.
93 Ibid, page 184.
94 Wise, Robert et al. The Church Divided, (Bridge Publishing inc, 1985).
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however, is the only one who can do this, since whatever an angel or any other 
created thing does by its own power takes place in accordance with the ordinary 
processes of nature and so is not miraculous. Thus God alone can work miracles,
Aquinas accounts for Magic as being an exploitation of the 'hidden seeds' of nature, 
whereas only God is capable of performing actions which could not be brought about 
by ordinary natural powers. This would be a interesting issue to pursue because such 
a wide section of the charismatic movement consistently attributes miraculous action 
to evil forces. Demons seem to have powers ascribed to them which would have 
only been attributed to God by Aquinas or Augustine.
However, pursuing this issue would be a diversion from the main argument at 
this point, and it is possible to progress with the discussion whatever the conclusion 
reached on this problem.
The main point to make is that just because a practice finds its place in the 
occult or in other religions, this does not imply that it is wrong for a Christian to use. 
For example, Islam demands commitment and belief, Hindu's worship and pray, 
Buddhists meditate and write books, Jehovah’s Witnesses knock on doors, Mormons 
drive cars, the 'Children of God' do evangelism, etc. Once one has said all this, 
however, one is still left with the question, 'but is this practice right or wrong?'
The mistake is attempting to determine acceptable practice by looking in this 
negative way at what other religions do, and allowing them to become the standard of 
what is right and wrong for a Christian. Christian morality is traditionally 
determined by God's law rather than by the practices of a variety of sects and 
religions. It is a peculiarly perverted system of thought which allows the 'evil' side, 
not only to be viewed as being capable of the miraculous, but also to become the law 
giver, and therefore the determining factor in Christian morality.
That a practice such as visualisation is used in the occult, or in other religions, 
is consequently quite irrelevant to the morality of practising a particular technique. 
One may have good objections to it on other grounds, but parallel use is one which 
ought not to be used.
Hunt and Mcmahon also have a 'God of the Gaps' thinking which does not 
allow for a neutral psychological explanation of events and so every peculiar 
phenomena is either good and Christian, or used in other religions and therefore evil 
and sinful. Consequently in the assessment of ESP, the authors are left with no 
alternative but to name the occult as an explanation.
My point here is not to argue whether ESP or visualisation is a psychological 
technique or not, but to point out that its nature has not been argued either way in
95 Aquinas, Sumtna Theologiae, la, 110, 4. Cited in Houston, J, Reported Miracles, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1994).
96 Hunt & Mcmahon, The Seduction of Christianity, page 116.
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this book. It is simply assumed that because it seems to be used by the opposition, it 
is wrong for the Christian. This is a false assumption.
What is lacking is an assessment and explanation of the nature of the links 
between these different parallels. Are they examples of neutral psychological 
techniques?, are they manifestations of the occult in some form?, are they 
counterfeits of a Christian religious experience? These are large gaps in the argument 
which would need to be bridged if the issue were to be resolved one way or another.
Simply to point out that there is an alternative explanation for an experience is 
not enough. If the alternative is to be preferred, then one needs to demonstrate, not 
just that another explanation is available, but that the other explanation is preferable 
to the charismatic one; that it is making better sense of the evidence, and the evidence 
is being faced up to more honestly. The approach in The Seduction o f Christianity is 
to point out that witchcraft explains ESP as being a devilish technique, and then 
treating this as an explanation. This is thoroughly self contradictory, because it is 
using the explanations provided by people whose views are rejected, as the 
explanation for experience within the Christian community.
As a result of these problems, the parallels pointed out by Hunt and Mcmahon 
are of limited use as a criterion to assess charismatic experience. It is the parallels 
themselves that need assessing, and this needs to be done on some other grounds.
(b )  P e t e r  M a s t e r s  -  T h e  H e a l i n g  E p i d e m i c
Another opponent of the charismatic movement who uses a line of argument that is 
based on parallels is Dr Peter Masters.
Many in the charismatic fraternity have gone over to ideas and practices which come 
straight from pagan religions, and large numbers of young and impressionable 
believers have been spiritually corrupted in the process. Leading healers have arisen 
who unite the subtle tricks of the theatrical hypnotist with ancient occult techniques 
in their quest for results, and multitudes follow thera.®^
Masters asserts that Satan is using the charismatic movement to destroy true worship 
by reducing it from rational and intelligent appreciation to subjectivity and pagan 
emotionalism with its accompanying host of physical phenomena.
If he can reduce a congregation of bom again people to superficial emotionalism, 
mystical mutterings, trembling and weeping, experiencing of physical sensations,
97 The Healing Epidemic, page 12.
 .  ........
2 5 0
clapping and dancing and banal, repetitive singing, then he will rob God of worship 
and render the church offensive to him.^^
It is an argument based on parallels, with occult worship, and with hypnotic 
technique. These similarities are used to dismiss emotional worship within the 
Christian context.
Different religions may indeed have emotional forms of worship, but it would 
be irrational to argue on this basis that, for example, shaking, trembling, and 
shouting are therefore intrinsically wrong within Christian worship. One's initial 
response to such an attempt can be that there is extensive emotional expression in the 
Bible,99 and so a person attempting a Biblical assessment of such phenomena would 
be inconsistent with his premises to reject such manifestations outright.
The mistake is to look for an intrinsic moral content in an emotional or 
physical response. For example, what is immoral about tears? Should a widow 
repent of crying for her husband, or an explorer in the arctic cease to commit the sin 
of trembling? Obviously not. This would suggest that these reactions are separate 
from their differing causes, and so in order to determine what is right or wrong about 
them, one must look to the cause, and to the effects. They may have good or evil 
causes, and they may have good or evil effects. This is also the line taken by 
Edwards in arguing that such emotional phenomena are neutral psychological 
responses.
For example, tears may result from death, burglary, homecoming, onions, 
worship or fear. Laughter may be caused by disaster, insanity, a joke, nervousness, 
or the fall of an enemy. Trembling may be from fear, tension, or cold. Laughing 
may lead to offence, or to relief; tears may ease painful emotions. One may cry due 
to affliction from Satan, or cry with relief at deliverance from God. Either way, one 
cries; one may be 'good', and the other 'bad' but only in terms of cause and effect. 
If one is to assess what is good', or 'bad' then these are the areas to which one ought 
to look. The experiences themselves are morally distinct from the causes and the 
effects, and are human reactions to a variety of stimuli.
This does imply that they are not directly 'spiritual' phenomena, and that they 
cannot in themselves be dismissed as being either satanic or Godly, pagan or 
Christian, moral or immoral. One can say, however, that they are 'psychological'.
It is more coherent to argue that this is the reason why such similar 
experiences crop up in such a variety of contexts; in psychology, in the occult, as 
well as in church. Rather than experiences being examples of demonic influence, as
98 Ibid, page 17.
99 For example, Ps 84:2; Ps 63:1; Dan 10:8; Rev 1:17,
100 Edwards, The Religious Affections, Part II, Section II.
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The Healing Epidemic and The Seduction o f Christianity assume, it may well be 
because people in both pagan and Christian contexts have a similar psychological 
make up, reactions, and means of expression, and when deeply moved in some way, 
these are the responses that emerge.
We have done enough to indicate the inconclusive significance of these 
parallels, and this is adequate to demonstrate that they are unreliable as a means of 
assessment. Lack of emotional response could be an indication of unresponsiveness 
to the Spirit, and very emotional reactions could indicate the work of the Spirit, or a 
host of other causes. It is consequently the emotional reactions which need assessing 
on some other grounds, and what needs to be asked is 'to what is this emotion a 
response?' Edwards discussed this issue in discussing the extreme emotional and 
physical effects observed during the revival in his Church.
All affections whatsoever have in some respect or degree an effect on the 
body. As was observed before, such is our nature, and such are the laws of union of 
soul and body, that the mind can have no lively or vigorous exercise without some 
effect on the body.
Great effects on the body certainly are no sure evidences that affections are 
spiritual; for we see that such effects oftentimes arise from great affections about 
temporal things, and when religion is no way concerned with them. And if  great 
affections about secular things, that are purely natural, may have these effects, I 
know not by what rule we should determine that high affections about religious 
things, which arise in like manner from nature cannot have the like effect.
Nor, on the other hand, do I know of any rule any have to determine that 
gracious and holy affections, when raised as high as any natural affections, and 
having equally strong and vigorous exercises, cannot have a great effect on the body.
No such rule can be drawn from reason: I know of no reason why a being affected 
with a view of God's glory should not cause the body to faint, as well as being 
affected with a view of Solomon's glory,
An argument which includes parallels in other contexts is not ruled out by this 
ambivalence. What to notice is that a comparable experience in another context does 
not resolve the issue. One still needs to decide which is the best of the available 
explanations.
This is done more effectively than the above two writers by Sargant in Battle 
fo r  the Mind. This book was first published in 1957, and was seen by the evangelical 
community as a damaging attack on the nature of conversion. It is an examination of 
the processes which lead the individual to a rapid change of belief, and an 
observation of the way in which similar techniques are at work in animal behaviour,
101 The Religious Affections, pages 59-60.
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and also in a variety of human, religious and secular contexts. Sargant points out the 
comparison between religious conversion experiences and political systems of 
indoctrination, brain-washing techniques, and religious conversion experiences.
Sargant sites the example of the well known 'Pavlov’s dogs', who were 
almost drowned in their kennels. Although they survived, all the behaviour patterns 
that they had learned seemed to have been erased from their minds. He goes on to 
examine the relationship between animal and human psychology in terms of their 
physical and emotional reactions to extreme stress, using particular examples, such as 
the reactions created by battle fatigue in soldiers, or the physical and emotional states 
reached as a result of prolonged fasting.
tliough 'men are not dogs,' it would be foolish indeed to continue to disregard 
entirely experimentation on tlie higher nervous activity of dogs as irrelevant to 
human psychology, or to the question of how a man's thoughts and beliefs can be 
effectively changed.
The difference between Sargant's work, and the above writers is that Hunt & 
Mcmahon and Masters point to a parallel in some context which is considered to be 
unwholesome, and then assume that this settles the issue. Sargant, however, points 
out these parallels, but then he argues in detail that there is a psychological 
alternative which is a pr^erahle explanation to considering the events he discusses as 
being miraculous. The alternative explanation is not only available, but it is also 
preferable.
This is not a discussion on whether Sargant is correct or not, or on whether 
his argument is overstated. It is simply making the point that in principle, the issue 
was approached in the right way.
102 Sargant, William Battle for the Mind, (Heineman, 1957), page 41.
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Conclusions
There are many other examples that could be chosen to illustrate the inconclusiveness 
of using a single criterion of assessment. For example:-
The character of the preacher does not validate or invalidate a particular claim. 
Subjective states of mind, such as enthusiasm, sincerity, emotion or internal 
conviction do not validate or invalidate specific claims.
False or correct theology does not validate or invalidate experience.
Physical manifestations do not validate or invalidate connected theology 
That it seems reasonable or unreasonable does not validate or invalidate an experience 
That it can lead to a variety of dangers does not validate or invalidate an experience. 
That it leads to division, or unites in love does not validate or invalidate a claimed 
experience of the Spirit
Manifestations of spiritual gifts do not validate or invalidate a theology
Renewal in worship does not validate or invalidate all that is connected with the
'renewal'.
Outward expressions of godliness do not validate or invalidate the person's inner life 
or theology.
All of these would be useful issues to pursue in detail if the aim of the thesis 
was to assess the charismatic movement. However, we have made the necessary 
point already, and this is that we are correct to expect that a single criterion of 
assessment will turn out to be an ambiguous means of assessing charismatic 
experience. This is an implication of the necessity to use a cumulative case 
argument, which adds cumulative strength to the case for using such an argument. It 
accurately predicts that the above arguments would be inadequate in the ways in 
which they actually are. We have been able to illustrate that there are Biblical, 
theological, logical, and epistemological grounds why a single criterion of assessment 
is an inconclusive means of assessing charismatic experience.
This is a significant point to make because most of the contemporary literature 
which assesses charismatic experience does not take this into account. There are 
many arguments which oppose or support charismatic experience on the basis of a 
single criterion of assessment, and these arguments are based on a false assumption.
This leads us to the next issue, which is to explore more useful criteria and 
see how they could function together in a cumulative case.
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Chapter VI
Means of Interpreting Charismatic Experience
Introduction
The thesis has demonstrated that the way in which charismatic experience can be 
interpreted in principle, is by the use of a cumulative case argument. This demands 
judgment from the person who is attempting to make the best sense of the available 
evidence by using a variety of criteria to assist in the decision. Such an argument is 
not simple to construct, and does not easily justify claims to certainty.
Along the way to reaching this conclusion we have come across differing 
criteria which can aid in making an informed judgment on an interpretation of a 
particular experience. In this chapter we will draw these criteria together, and apply 
them specifically to examples of charismatic experience. None of these criteria 
individually could provide confirmation or disconfirmation, but they do create useful 
’building blocks' which can work together to construct a rational assessment of 
charismatic experience.
We will begin, so to speak, at the bottom with a discussion on some dangers 
which need to be avoided if one is to construct a useful cumulative case in this 
context. Following this we will examine some criteria which can contribute 
positively to an interpretation of charismatic experience
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1. Mistakes in assessing charismatic experience
A. J u s t i f y i n g  b e l i e f s  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a  s o l i t a r y  c r i t e r i o n
If Smith claims to have encountered a wallaby on his way home at night from a 
country pub, the claim may be defeated by the successful challenges that it was dark, 
he had had a lot to drink, and tlie alleged percept is a priori very improbable. If, 
however, it is learned that a wallaby has escaped from a nearby wildlife park, then 
Smith's claim becomes very probable, despite the challenges. Indeed, Smith's 
experiential report now becomes important evidence for there having been a wallaby 
on that road, evidence which may help people to track the animal down. We now 
have a 'cumulative argument'.^
This is a useful illustration of the interaction of the components of a cumulative 
argument, especially in that the experience becomes supporting evidence for an 
apparently improbable belief. What it also illustrates, however, is how easily one 
can be misled by putting too much stress on an isolated piece of evidence. Darkness, 
drink, and improbability would each be strong evidence against the truth of Smith's 
claim.
A mistaken reliance on a single criterion of assessment has just been 
illustrated extensively in the previous chapter because it is one of the most important 
implications of the necessity of using a cumulative case argument. Relying on too 
few criteria, or on a single criterion is a mistake which is often made in the 
assessment of charismatic experience. If a particular interpretation of any religious 
experience is picked out and isolated from its associated conceptual framework, then 
this interpretation will always be potentially misleading and capable of re­
interpretation in a different way.
Take for example, the charismatic claim that one's beliefs can be justified by 
a 'miraculous' event. As an individual piece of evidence the event will be ambiguous 
because there is a whole conceptual framework within which the putative miracle 
occurs, and this framework will need justifying by more than the original experience. 
Consequently seeing a 'miracle' will not necessarily force a person to accept a 
Christian theistic interpretation of this event, and (according to Hume) a report of a 
miracle will be even less convincing.
Even before Hume, however, Jesus was aware of this reasoning, and knew 
that the Pharisees would not respond to miraculous events because they had already 
made up their minds about what was occurring; 'Neither will they be convinced if 
someone should rise from the dead'.^ The fact that seeing a 'miracle' is not
1 Davis, Caroline Franks, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1989). Page 108-109.
2 Luke 16:31
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necessarily believing is also evident in the contemporary instances of people who 
have observed the same events in the context of charismatic gatherings, but reached 
contradictory conclusions on whether there has been a miracle or not. On its own a 
'miracle' is limited in its power to convince.
If, on the other hand, the 'miracle' is presented as part of a wider group of 
criteria and used as an element in a cumulative argument then it may demonstrate a 
claim more persuasively. Say that the event is so well reported and so unusual in its 
character that there is no other available explanation but direct intervention by God, 
and it never does become adequately explained in natural terms. Its forcefulness is 
such that it even calls into question the credibility of world views with which it 
conflicts. The effect of the event on the individual is that he becomes unusually, 
holy, loving, committed to fellowship, and over a lifetime demonstrates faithfulness 
even through suffering until death. He also claims to have had direct perception of 
God.
If one is in a situation where a strongly attested 'miracle' cannot adequately be 
incorporated into a body of secular beliefs, however much the antecedently held 
belief system is altered, then one may be justified in arguing that intervention from 
God was the best explanation of the available evidence.
In this example the putative individual proof that one's theology was correct 
was a claimed 'miracle'. It illustrates the difficulty of providing an individual 'proof 
which will, on its own, justify a particular interpretation of experience. The 
'miracle' needs to be incorporated into a cumulative case because beliefs can not be 
justified adequately on the basis of a solitary criterion.
B .  R e l i a n c e  o n  d i r e c t  p e r c e p t i o n
Direct perception should not be used as the sole justification of a claim to have had a 
religious experience. Whether direct perception is capable of providing warranted 
belief in other contexts is debatable, but when one's aim is to be able to choose 
rationally between competing theories, even when they form part of different world 
views, such an approach is not helpful. It is too subjective, and is too inclined to 
include error. To say that I know because I know is not a good enough reason to 
accept a particular theory.
Using direct perception as the basis of a claim to knowledge is the heart of the 
criticisms made against the enthusiasts in the days of Locke. The words used to 
describe this form of epistemic justification were different, but seventeenth century 
enthusiastic belief formation, and current claims that religious belief can be justified 
on the basis of direct perception, both share a similar epistemology. The enthusiasts
 : : ..............
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were quite certain of their beliefs on the grounds that they had a certain internal 
conviction which came from a claimed direct experience of God.
This justification of belief based on a claim to direct perception is also the 
central and determining feature of contemporary charismatic experience. For 
example, the acceptability of a particular experience, say for example a prophecy, is 
assessed on the basis of 'discernment'. In other words, an internal conviction is used 
to declare that the prophecy is real or false. The cognitive claims of the 'prophecy' 
are justified on the basis of direct perception.
For all the reasons mentioned in Part III, this way of claiming to know is not 
good enough when isolated from other values. It is unable to provide a warranted 
belief about a charismatic experience. Consequently one ought to be suspicious of an 
argument which justifies religious belief only on the basis of direct perception.
C. F id eistic  interpretatio ns o f  experience
The above example (B) is a particular instance of an interpretation of experience 
which is justified in a fideistic manner. The use of direct perception to warrant 
belief, results in that belief being held in spite of it being detached from supporting 
evidence, and this detachment is considered to be a justifiable epistemic position.
This fideistic point of view has a long history. According to Kierkegaard, for 
example, faith is a passion and commitment which is so intense that any objective 
assurance would be inadequate to support it. One should therefore not look for 
objective reasons to sustain faith.
Such views have been extensively influential in twentieth century theology. 
Buitmann also repudiated the quest for rational support for faith, denying that faith 
should have factual grounds. Barth rejected the possibility of support for revelation 
on grounds other than those which are given in Jesus, and thereby cut his beliefs off 
from objective basis'; 'Jesus loves me this I know, for the Bible tells me so'.
Plantinga and Wolterstorff et al have argued that direct perception alone can 
justify Christian belief. If this is so then belief in God could be held without 
evidence or reason. Whether this should be described as fideism is debatable because 
the 'grounds' of direct perception could be considered as 'reasons' even though they 
are of a non-propositional sort.
Plantinga is at the least fideistic end of the spectrum. However, his work 
could be described as being fideistic for two reasons. Firstly because if the argument 
to justify the use of direct perception in this context is unsuccessful (as argued in 
Chapter III), then this leaves a groundless internal conviction that there is a God.
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Secondly, even if this argument is successful, it still leaves theistic beliefs being held 
in detachment from evidence or reasons. This is effectively fideistic.^
Fideistic belief continues to be supported by 'post modern' theology of writers 
such as Lindbeck and Hans Frei.4
The above writers are in many ways diverse in character, and the only point of 
similarity which is claimed here is that in each case faith is detached in some way 
from reason or objective evidence. A theology which is cut off from objective 
support would have been described by Locke as enthusiasm. Its manifestations 
through history are different; for example in the case of Kierkegaard, faith is a 
passion which is turned inwards, and doesn't have the common enthusiastic 
trappings. What it considers to be acceptable belief is, however, similar to 
enthusiasm, in that faith is to be held without 'reason' or evidence.
This separation of faith from reason also links these apparently different 
theologies with contemporary charismatic experience. A connection with existential 
theology such as that of Buitmann's would be a horrific thought for many people 
within the charismatic movement, as they would consider themselves to be 
fundamentalist in their attitude to knowledge. However, in that the concept of faith 
in both areas is one which is disconnected from empirical evidence, then there is also 
a significant similarity. 'Beware of analysing what is going on with your rational 
mind' warned Wimber. Again from within the charismatic movement Bishop David 
Pitches describes the gift of faith as an 'irresistible knowledge' which comes from 
inside a person, and as:
a supernatural surge of confidence from tlie Spirit of God which arises within a 
person faced with a specific situation or need whereby that person receives a 
transrational certainty and assurance that God is about to act tlirough a word of 
action.^
If we put this concept of faith alongside that of Buitmann, we can see a similar 
detachment of internal conviction from external evidence:
For man is not asked whether he will accept a theory about God that may possibly be 
false, but whether he is willing to obey God's will.®
3 Discussed in Part III, Chapter 3, section B, (a),(vii) page 127.
4 Probably none of these people would accept the label 'fideist', as it has become something of an 
insult. I would argue that it is still a justifiable description of their theology.
5 Pytches, D. Come Holy Spirit, (Hodder, 1985), page 109. (My italics)
6 Buitmann, R. Existence and Faith. Cited in Houston, J. Is it Reasonable to Believe in GodH 
(Cambridge University Press, 1994), page 96.
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For faith cannot permit (as theology since Schleiermacher more or less definitely 
demands) the nature of its content to be dictated to it by a "scientific doctrine" or a 
"system of reason" 7
Faith is defined by Buitmann as 'the continual overcoming of u n b e l i e f ' ,8  and even 
more; true 'existence' 'believes only in the constant overcoming of unbelief.® It is 
not a faith which is determined by objective facts or reasons.
Kierkegaard's conception of faith is that faith is a costly infinite passion; an 
unconditional commitment which could never have sufficient objective assurance to 
do it justice. According to Kierkegaard one of the (many) reasons why it is 
inappropriate to look for objective assurance for faith is that the strength of passion in 
the man of faith is shown by its capacity to take risks which are beyond the available 
evidence.
The intensity of a passion will also be measured by the sacrifice made in persuance of 
the passion, by the passion's costliness; and a passion which lacks objective 
appropriateness will be more costly, in respect of anxiety and/or rational autonomy, 
than a passion which has some objective basis.
This is a conception of faith in which quality of faith is inversely proportional to 
objective evidence. The less grounds for faith implies that more risk is involved. 
This makes unsupported faith better than reasonably supported faith because it is 
more costly to hold.
Such an attitude to faith is similar to that which is held by some charismatic 
writers. According to Wimber, for example, faith is spelt R.I.S.K., and involves 
stepping out and playing one's hunches without being restrained by 'Western 
Rationalist' thinking. Another charismatic, Urquhart, writes about faith as follows:
If I had faith for my healing, my prayer would be different: "Lord, please heal me, 
according to the promise of your Word and I thank you for your faithful answer. "
After that it would be a question of continuing in thanksgiving; "Thank you. Lord, 
for my healing. " And I would need to persist in that faithful attitude until the 
healing was manifested in my life. That would mean continuing in thanksgiving 
through all the times when assailed by doubts, when the circumstances seemed 
unchanged or when it appeared that the prayer had made no difference
This manner of prayer involves thanking God for healing even though the symptoms 
of the illness are still there. If one were to exercise the right kind of faith for long 
enough then one has already been healed. The interesting thing to note at this point,
7 Buitmann, R. Faith and Understanding, (SCM, 1969), page 121.
8 Ibid, page 330.
9 page 331.
10 Reported Miracles, page 97.
11 Urquhart, Colin Anything You Ask, (Hodder, 1978), page 117. (My italics).
2 6 0
is that it is a conception of faith which is divorced from adjustment in response to
empirical evidence. To allow a belief that a person had been healed, to be
undermined by the fact that they are still ill, would be to show weak faith.
It is only fair to point out that there are also significant differences between 
theologians such as Buitmann, and charismatic enthusiasts. Buitmann, for example, 
would certainly have nothing to do with claims that demonic activity was a reality:
It is impossible to avail ourselves of modem medical and surgical discoveries, and at
the same time to believe in the New Testament world of daemons and spirits.
There is another difference, in that this kind of 'detached' faith is applied by
Kierkegaard and Buitmann to the foundations of Christian belief, whereas this is not
usually done by charismatic writers. Charismatic writers could have rational 
justification for Christian beliefs as a whole, but retain a readiness to 'step out in 
faith' because of having other reasons to believe that God will be faithful to his 
promises. This is less radical than Buitmann or Kierkegaard.
In spite of the differences, however, there is a significant similarity between 
the existential theology of Kierkegaard and Buitmann and charismatic thinking, at 
least in their conceptions of faith. What is argued here is only a single connection 
between these diverse writers. This is that they retain the possibility of exercising 
faith which is detached from objective/reasonable support.
We have already argued that although a fideistic attitude to belief has a 
capacity to include that which is true, it has too large a capacity to include that which 
is false for it to be useful for the purpose of choosing between competing systems of 
belief. Fideism is incapable of distinguishing between contrary beliefs, because it is 
justified by an internal conviction which must simply be accepted. It provides a 
certainty which is disproportionate to the available evidence. It produces beliefs 
which have conveniently detached themselves from external criticism. It is an 
unacceptable epistemic position.
There is also no good reason why religious experiences should claim the right 
to retreat behind a fideistic attitude that attempts to keep them cut off from rational 
criticism. Indeed, there is no reason why they should need to do this. If one has 
beliefs which are in fact true, then one has no need to fear rational criticism. If one 
feels the need to defend one's beliefs from methods which are attempting to exclude
12 Buitmann, R. 'New Testament and Mythology' in H.W, Bartsch (ed.) Kerygma and Myth, 
(London: SPCK, 1961), page 5.
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that which is false, and include what is true; then this reveals a distinct lack of 
confidence in the veracity of one's beliefs.
Consequently a fideistic justification of a belief should be treated as being 
suspect. Even if the faith is exercised within a framework of theistic belief that has 
been justified on some other grounds, one still requires some reasonable grounds for 
exercising strong faith in regard to a particular contingent claim within that system; 
the faith should be accountable to other factors.
D. A CONFUSION BETWEEN TWO WAYS OF KNOWING 
What is meant by confusing two ways of knowing here is:
(a) Using a method of assessment which is acceptable within a system of Christian 
belief, and assuming that this method is also capable of assessing the foundations of 
that belief system.
(b) Expecting a degree of certainty, which may be justified by the evidence available 
to support the system as a whole, to be given to a particular contingent claim which is 
made within the system.
An example of the former confusion (a) would be to extend the doctrine of 
justification by faith and apply it to belief in God, as done by Buitmann. One also 
finds this extension within evangelical or charismatic churches. For example, a 
person is asked why they believe, and the reply is that one does not need reasons 
because one is saved by faith; 'Where would be the need for faith if we had reasons 
to believe?' Effectively it is version of fideism, *I know because I know'.
The confusion is that if God is who the Bible says that He is, then
unconditional faith, even in the face of difficulties is justified. What is not justified 
is applying this kind of faith to the foundations of Christian belief, and assuming that 
the entire framework can be justifiably accepted on this basis. It could be seen as a 
confusion between necessary and contingent truth,
The second confusion is to offer the unconditional faith which may be
justified by the grounds one has for adopting a set of Christian beliefs, but then
giving the same strength of belief to a less certain contingent part of this system. 
Take, for example an enthusiastic person who would like to be healed by God of an 
illness. A prophet in the Church gives him a 'word of knowledge' which is that if he 
will only trust that he has been healed, then God will complete this in practice
13 This issue is argued more fiiliy in Part III, chapter 3, section C, (b), page 140ff.
_ _     .
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because He wants to heal him of this illness. The person tries as hard as he can to 
believe that God is healing him, dismissing the continuation of symptoms as 
temptations which could undermine his faith. Not to believe that he is healed is 
treated as though this is equivalent to doubting God Himself.
We will assume that God is as He is described in the Bible, and that He is 
capable of, and willing to, perform miracles today. Within the story above are 
hidden two different beliefs around which hinges a confusion. The first belief is that 
God is faithful and so His words should be trusted. The second belief is that God has 
spoken directly and declared that He intends to heal this person now. It is these two 
beliefs that have become confused in the mind of our person who would like to be 
healed.
If God is as He is revealed to be in the Bible, then there is a requirement for 
unconditional trust in a God who is just, righteous and omnipotent. This is a 
necessary requirement. What is also being asked, however, is that the person should 
believe that God has spoken and intends to heal in this particular instance. The 
second belief does not have the right to the unconditional acceptance that the first 
belief does, because to doubt it is not to doubt God's words, but to doubt whether 
this particular claim to be a revelation is genuine or not. Doubting the second belief 
is not to question God's words, but to question whether these particular words do in 
reality come from God.
If a person is in a situation where there are conflicting claims to revelation, 
and there is the possibility of making a mistake in deciding to accept a particular 
claim, then to doubt the claim is a necessity. If someone is too quick to jump into 
certainty he may well not be trusting in God, but in an illusion.
Giving a contingent claim unconditional commitment is not only an unjustified 
epistemic position, it is also an unbiblical response to a prophetic claim, 'test 
everything, hold fast to the good'.^^
This provides another useful criterion of assessment. One ought to be 
suspicious when unconditional commitment is given to a contingent claim to 
knowledge.
E , T h e  ad  hoc  u se  of  a  supplem enta ry  hypoth esis
An ad hoc hypothesis is one which is plucked out of the air as an attempt to explain 
the failure of one's original theory and provide for it some supplementary support. 
Such a hypothesis has the epistemic status of a guess, and while it may be a correct
14 IThes5:21.
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guess, one could never know whether it is correct until it has been tested in some 
way. It is the first stage in the formulation of a theory, but if the theory is to have 
any justifiable claim to be knowledge, it is crucial to carry on beyond this stage with 
the process of testing.
It is possible to illustrate this issue in a charismatic context. Say, for 
example, an ill person asks for prayer at the front of a Church after a talk on how 
God heals people today if they will only have enough faith. After praying, there is 
no evident change in his illness, and so the 'healer' says that God has told him that 
this failure to become well, is the result of hidden sin which needs to be dealt with 
first.
In order to preserve the original, but struggling, hypothesis that God always 
wants to heal ill people who ask to be made well, the supplementary hypothesis that 
hidden sin prevents healing is invoked. In fact this is a way of milking the failure of 
one's original hypothesis when the interpretation of the experience has lost touch with 
the empirical evidence; which is that nothing has happened. Virtually any belief 
could be justifiably held if such a method is acceptable.
When one becomes aware of this process, one begins to notice unusual 
theoretical gymnastics occurring, where, for example, absence of healing is ascribed 
to a lack of faith, to the influence of demons, to memories which needed healing 
before the physical body can be effected, to curses put on the family, to oppression 
over a town, to not enough prayer, and so on. Indeed, a significant portion of 
charismatic preaching consists of attempting to explain why what was expected has 
not yet occurred. These theories are often, however, ad hoc because of their loose 
connection with empirical evidence. They twist and develop into different forms 
while the actual situation remains unchanged.
Another recent example of this ad hoc justification of belief is supplied by the 
'mystic astronomer' Sofia Richmond who placed quarter page adverts in the national 
press. These predicted global destruction during the run up to Comet Shumaker 
hitting Jupiter in July 1994. According to her predictions a huge fragment would 
head towards earth, planes would stop flying, many people would die, governments 
would fall, there would be starvation and world wide destruction. Her basis for these 
claims are that 'God has placed a Prophetic Telescope inside her mind'.^®
This provides a curious contemporary example of full blown enthusiasm 
which is almost medieval in character. None of these events occurred on the 
appointed day. However, her enthusiastic belief system is too certain to modify itself 
in response to evidence, and it is revealing to see how these beliefs continued to be 
justified. The way that she coped with the situation was by using ad hoc theories.
15 The Independent Newspaper, Thursday 4th August, 1994, page 15.
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Sister Marie is very glad that all the prayers of people who asked God to stop any 
dangerous effects from the Comet/Jupiter Collision, were answered in July 944®
She predicted another collision with earth, because the 'cosmic day of judgment' now 
has two parts.
However the 2nd PART of THE COSMIC DAY OF JUDGEMENT refers to the
Comet now heading towards earth The second Part of God's COSMIC
WARNING will occur when HALLEY'S COMET APPEARS IN THE SKY IN A 
FEW MONTHS. 17
'Sister Marie' can continue to believe that her original predictions were correct by 
invoking two ad hoc supplementary hypotheses. The first is that God modified his 
original plans for judgement in response to the prayers of people, and the second is 
that the Jupiter collision was only the first part of the expected judgment day. The 
evidence remains constant; nothing has happened. However, the theories develop in 
an uncontrolled, ad hoc fashion.
Having said all this, the prophet Jonah faced this issue in Nineveh. He was 
annoyed with God for responding to the people's repentance, and for not destroying 
the city. Jonah was aware that this made him look foolish, because in fulfilment of 
his prophecy, nothing evidently happened.
Such ad hoc theories may be true, but:
(a) This process needs to be kept on a tight rein, because it has such a capacity for 
abuse in practice. All manner of fanciful beliefs are possible if they are not put 
under the constraint of relating them to experience.
(b) When a theory has become overburdened with supplementary hypotheses, then 
this calls into question its assumptions.
(c) A theory needs support from evidence if it is to be anything more than a guess. 
If one permits such a justification of belief, then one is allowing beliefs to exist in 
free-floating detachment from the world of experience. These beliefs must be forced 
to be answerable to other parts of a belief structure if they are to have any claims to 
constitute warranted knowledge.
Again this provides a useful criterion of assessment. If a theory is 'ad hoc' 
then it ought to be awarded the epistemic status to which it is entitled; it is a guess.
16 Ibid, page 15
17 Ibid, page 15
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F . B ew a r e  of  th e  g h o st  in  th e  m a c h in e .
The 'Ghost in the machine' is a concept which is attributable to Gilbert Ryle4* Its 
original meaning is as a description of a category mistake which is sometimes used 
when talking about the mind. It is a mistaken way of thinking about the human 
being. Here, what is being done is to use it as a description of an 'unnecessary 
entity' which is invoked when there is no need to look for an explanation beyond 
mechanical processes.
Say, for example, that a group of enthusiastic people are sent out by their 
Church to do evangelism in a town centre, who pray for them as they go. Travelling 
in their mini bus, however, they have a flat tyre. They conclude that this is the devil 
trying to stop them from doing the Lord's work, especially since they are now stuck 
beside the road as a result of having no spare in the van. They pray about this, and 
find that a nearby garage has exactly the tyre they need. This is interpreted as being 
God's protection, and so they rejoice at being protected from attack.
In order to explain the 'failure' of the original prayers made by the Church for 
their safe arrival, the supplementary hypothesis that the Devil is attacking them is 
invoked, even though there is no empirical evidence to support this particular 
explanation over some other. In other words a complex realm of supernatural beings 
is being used as an explanation for a course of events.
The most simple way to understand the events is that they ran over a sharp 
object on the road, and the bus was badly maintained, as evidenced by the lack of a 
spare tyre. The 'protection' needs be no more than the fact that garages sell tyres. 
While their interpretation of events may be true, there is no reason to suppose that it 
is. There is a ghost in the machine.
The same is true of the predictions made by Sister Marie mentioned above. 
The obvious explanation for there not being a 'cosmic day of judgement’ is that her 
predictions are nonsense. They are supported by imputing supernatural activity into 
this apparently natural event. There is a 'multiplication of entities', combined with 
an 'Ad hoc theory', which add up to an unnecessary ghost in the machine.
The criterion provided by this issue is that one ought to be wary of the ghost 
in the machine.
18 Ryle, Gilbert, 7%e Cowcep/o/MmJ, (Hutchinson of London, 1949).
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G. M eth o d s  w h ic h  are d epen d en t  o n  probability
If one uses 'probability' in a loose way in the sense of passing a judgment on which 
of two views is correct, then this can be a useful criterion in the right circumstances.
One could argue for example, that a person is 'probably' guilty on the basis of 
the available evidence. Or one could argue that there is a probability that if Great 
Britain had made peace with Hitler in 1940/41, Europe would have become 
Russianised. This is not, however, a mathematically determined probability. In this 
form it is a description of a cumulative argument. The balance of evidence falls in a 
particular direction.
If one uses probability in a strictly mathematical sense however, then there 
would be difficulties in its use in relation to religious experience. How could one 
estimate the degree of probability that an experience represents a genuine encounter 
with God when one is not in a position to compare the experience with others that are 
known to be experiences of God, without begging the question?
This could limit the use of medical diagnosis as a model in this context, as it 
is based on determinable probability. It is, however, commonly used as a means of 
assessing charismatic experience. One should be cautious of specific claims to have 
determined the 'probability' that an experience was a genuine encounter with God 
and ask how this probability was determined.
H . U n ju stified  c er ta in ty
Certainty has always been a feature of enthusiasm, and continues to be a significant 
trait of the charismatic movement. For example, there are claims to have a certain 
knowledge that God will heal in particular instances, and prophets who are willing to 
use the phrase 'thus saith the Lord'. This is an implicit claim to certain knowledge.
In epistemological terms, however, there are no grounds yet discovered which 
would justify a claim to know absolute truth, indeed all the systems which seemed to 
provide this, and the criteria which have been used to aid in the quest for truth have 
proved to be defective in some fundamental way. This does not necessarily preclude 
commitment to a course of action, even though one is not certain of the foundations, 
but it does mean that a claim to know truth with absolute certainty goes beyond that 
which is justified by evidence.
This certainty is not only disproportionate to the evidence, but unbiblical in 
the context of religious experience. For example, the point is effectively argued in 
the context of prophecy by Dr. Wayne Grudem in his thesis The Gift o f Prophecy in I  
Corinthians, He defines this Corinthian form of prophecy as being an intuitive
' ( . - - r -  V . t : :
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insight given by the Holy Spirit for public declaration, but possessing neither the 
nature nor the authority of scripture. The prophet was a person who tentatively 
offered his words to the Church who then tested them to see whether they were 
significant or not. Sometimes an accepted prophet was legitimately ignored, and 
sometimes what they said was wrong or only partially true.i®
Prophecy in I Corinthians is therefore quite different from prophecy in the 
Old Testament, where prophets did not submit their messages to the people to see if 
thy were acceptable or not, but declared them with the claim that they spoke with the 
authority of God.
In content, prophecy of the type found in I Corinthians will not include any claims to 
divine authority (such as "dius saith the Lord"), but will include material which 
would be thought to have come through a revelation and which will edify the 
congregation.^®
If this distinction between the nature of prophecy in the Old and New Testaments is 
not made, then this results in claims to certainty on the basis of prophecy. Such 
certainty is unjustified in epistemological or Biblical grounds.
This is just one application of a generally useful criterion, which is that claims 
to be certain about the interpretation of religious experience are usually unjustifiable.
I . T h e  lack  o f  a n  a v aila ble  a lter na tiv e  does n o t  n ec essa r ily  ju st ify  a  
supernatural  u nderstanding  o f  events
Not having an alternative theory could indicate a failure of understanding and an 
inability to find a coherent explanation for some event, rather than imply a miracle. 
The onus is consequently not on the critic of charismatic claims to find more 
plausible alternatives, although if he could it would be helpful. It is up to the person 
making assertions about an experience to justify his own theory by pointing out its 
strengths.
The point is made by B.B. Warfield
Nature was made by God, not man, and there may be forces working in nature not 
only which have not yet been dreamed of In our philosophy, but which are beyond 
human comprehension altogether. Simple inexplicability therefore, is not an
19 Cf. Luke 21:4-11, and Grudem, W. A. The Gift of Prophecy in I Corinthians, (University Press 
of America, 1982), page 79.
20 Grudem, W. A. The Gijt of Prophecy in I Corinthians, page 229. It is argued in the same thesis 
that it is the Apostle who has taken on this role in the New Testament, and that the reason for the 
change in description, was that in first century Greek culture, the understanding of the word 'prophet', 
would have been so ambiguous, that it would have been misleading.
^    : _
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adequate ground on which to infer miracle. There must be something else about an 
occurrence besides its inexplicableness to justify us in looking upon it as a direct act 
of God's.^i
Lack of an explanation could be a useful starting point, as it indicates an event which 
raises suspicion. One could also have the best available explanation at a particular 
time, and so this belief would be justifiable at that stage.
Historically however, claiming to have encountered a miracle because there 
was no available alternative explanation, has led to a significant degree of 
disillusionment, as it is the essence of a 'God of the gaps' mentality. There are 
innumerable 'inexplicable' events which have gradually become explained as 
scientific knowledge has increased. Consequently one is unjustified in assuming that 
the lack of an explanation implies the presence of a miracle. A claim made on such a 
basis should be treated with caution.
J .  P s y c h o l o g i c a l  m o t i v a t i o n s  p r e s e n t e d  a s  r e a s o n s  f o r  b e l i e f .
There is a need for more careful definition here. For example, a person may prefer 
to hold a set of beliefs because they are ingrained by his upbringing, or perhaps 
because they continue to provide a feeling of peace or security. These would be 
psychological motivations to believe.
However, such motivations to believe are misleading if the question one is 
asking is 'why should I be confident that these beliefs are true?' Indeed such a 
psychological motivation could be considered as a temptation which seduces a person 
into believing a proposition, even when this belief is not fully justified by the 
available evidence.
Once one has pointed out that this psychological motivation was the 'reason' 
to believe, one is still left with the question, 'but is this adopted belief true or not?' 
Such a process of belief formation describes a mechanism which could facilitate 
either taking up or disregarding a particular belief and so this motivation applies to 
both belief and to ' u n b e l i e f ' . '22
Consequently the presentation of psychological motivation needs watching 
because in the context of religious experience there is often confusion surrounding the 
meaning and significance of such 'reasons’. For example, in Battle fo r  the Mind, 
William Sargant describes a mechanism of belief formation which explains
21 Warfield, B.B. Counterfeit Miracles, (Banner of Truth, 1986), page 120.
22 By this I mean to refer to the ambiguity of the word 'unbelief. In reality this is a belief in the 
antithesis of a belief. For example, to say 'I don't believe in ghosts' is to believe that there are no 
ghosts. Perhaps 'non belief would be preferable.
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conversion and Pentecostal experiences in terms of brain-washing techniques. 23 He 
does not claim, however, that these explanations indicate the veracity or falsehood of 
the particular beliefs which are adopted. They are explanations of mechanisms, and 
not epistemic assessments of the cognitive claims of the new belief system.
K .  U n f a l s i f i a b l e  s t a t e m e n t s
An example of an unfalsifiable statement would be the Freudian claim that religious 
experiences are the product of sublimations of blocked sexual or aggressive impulses 
which cannot be expressed directly and which reactivate the repressed impulses of the 
Oedipal period. A theist could counter this by offering alternative explanations, and 
examples of subjects of religious experience who lead perfectly normal sex lives 
which show no indication of blocked sexual impulses. However:
Such counter-evidence is unlikely to impress those Freudians who see attempts to 
disprove their theories as merely further proof of the theist's repressed impulses.
Freudian theories thus often appear impossible to test empirically, for they can be 
stretched to explain any state of affairs (a charge more often levelled against religious
beliefs). 24
Charismatic examples of unfalsifiable statements would be a claim to know what God 
is doing in a person's life, imputing motives to people, or claiming that the reason 
why someone has not been healed was due to 'lack of faith', 'hidden sin', or some 
other 'failing'.
The difficulty with such statements is that a theory ought to be refutable in 
some way. If it is to be considered meaningful, then there should be some 
conceivable way in which the theory could be disqualified. This is particularly 
applicable to Charismatic healing, because if this criterion of refutablity is abused, 
the success or failure of virtually any 'experiment' could be used in support of one's 
thesis.
For example, if a person is healed, then it could be considered to be a 
miracle, if he was not healed then this was due to hidden sin, or unbelief; and if he 
dies then this is the perfect healing. One needs to question whether anything 
meaningful is being said in the first place, or whether anything has happened which 
related to the initial theory, when all possible outcomes support one's theory.
Another example of the need for refutability arises in the practice of 'healing 
memories' where it becomes questionable whether the 'memories' which are
23 Sargant, William, Battle for the Mind, (Heineman 1957).
24 The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, page 206.
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reclaimed in this process are real, or implanted by the imagination or, created by 
pressure from the counsellor. The nature of the situation means that it is usually 
impossible to perform an objective check on the past events, and so the theory is 
unfalsifiable. Consequently it is very difficult to sift out veracity from falsehood in 
the process.
This provides a useful means of assessing charismatic claims as it illustrates 
the dangers of (a) re-defining terms such as 'healing' in mid argument, and (b) the 
tenuous epistemic status of unfalsifiable statements.
L .  A n t i - r a t i o n a l i t y
For some writers, such as Popper or Ayer, anti-rationality would be synonymous 
with unfalsifiability. Even if this is not so, however, there is always a suspicion of 
reason at the core of an enthusiastic movement. The reason why enthusiasts were 
opposed by Locke was because they rejected reason in favour of claims to have 
received direct revelation.
However, it is impossible in practice to dismiss reason completely; if one 
were to reject reasonable thought, then it would not be possible to say anything 
cognitively meaningful. Consequently those who claim to reject reason as a basis for 
knowledge in an enthusiastic context do not escape the use of reason. What happens 
is that reason is rejected or retained wherever this suits the argument which is to be 
supported.
For example, a person argues that the Biblical view of creation can only be 
that the world was created in six days in 4004 BC. His opponent suggests reasons 
why this could not be so on the basis of the archeological record, geology, carbon 
dating, and so on. If our creationist finds himself stumped, then he can fall back on 
the argument that his opponent is relying on the arm of the flesh, trusting in 'Saul's 
armour', and that he should submit his fallen reason to God's revelation.
This example illustrates many issues which are discussed in this thesis, the 
relationship between reason and revelation, a confusion between necessary and 
contingent truth, and the relationship between the particular beliefs as they function 
in a large scale conceptual system. The point here, however, is that reason is being 
used or rejected selectively. There is an attempt at reasonable exegesis, but a 
rejection of a rational conclusion which is based on other evidence. The same 
creationist would be happy to accept a scientific finding which supported his view of 
the origin of the world, even though he prefers to dismiss the same kind of evidence
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where it conflicts with his already established conclusions about the origin of 
creation.
The issue here is not to justify the theory of evolution in preference to special 
creation, but to point out that as stated above, the argument illustrates a selective 
reliance on reason. It is the equivalent of only retaining experimental results which 
support the hypothesis that the experimenter would like to believe.
For a Bible-using enthusiast, a denigration of reason would also be 
inconsistent with his premises, because the use of a 'sound mind' is considered 
important, and reason is used in discussion throughout the Bible. The appropriation 
of Biblical concepts also demands rational reflection.
M . T h e  ex istenc e  o f  a  pa ra llel  in  a nother  c ontext  d o es  n o t  m ea n  th at  a  
pr ac tice  is n ec essa r ily  w ro ng  fo r  a  C hristian
There are a number of examples of this process cited in Chapter Seven of this 
thesis.25 Another example is provided by a discussion on the use of Hypnosis, 
written by Dr. M Bobgan. He written by Dr. M Bobgan. He argues
a central part of the argument is that:
Hypnosis has been an integral part of the occult. Therefore a Christian should not
allow himself to be hypnotized for any reason. 25
One may have other reasons for being wary of hypnotism but it is dubious to argue 
that because it is used in the occult it is ther^ore wrong for a Christian. People in 
the occult wear clothes, worship, cry, drive cars, sing, sleep, dance, etc. Once this 
has been pointed out one is still left with the question of the morality of each action.
It would seem feasible that hypnosis could be a neutral psychological technique which 
can be used or abused in many different contexts.
The Charismatic movement is often criticised on these logically flawed 
grounds of 'parallel use'. The thesis has cited examples of opposition to 'healing of 
memories', specific forms of prayer, and styles of worship which are based on this 
ground. It is a commonly used criterion in this context, but an unfair means of 
criticism.
25 Chapter V, section 7, page 245ff.
26 Bobgan, Dr. M & D. Hypnosis and the Christian, (Bethany, 1984), page 52.
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N. A CONFUSION BETWEEN THE SPIRITUAL AND THE PHENOMENAL
The charismatic movement along with other enthusiastic movements is replete with 
phenomena such as falling down, trance like states, feelings of ecstasy, sensations of 
electricity, screaming, and so on. These are commonly considered to be indications 
in themselves of the Spirit's power.
However, this is not the only way in which such phenomena can be 
interpreted. It is suggested by Nigel Wright, for example, that these 'supernatural' 
events may be natural psychic phenomena,27 Dr. Andrew Walker offers another 
possibility; that they could be the result of psycho-social effects created by the group 
dynamics of a crowd.28 Dr.Lewis assesses the possibility that these phenomena are 
the result of mass hysteria, or of learned behaviour, or the result of the power of 
suggestion.29 John White suggests four possible ways of explaining enthusiastic 
manifestations:
1. People do it to themselves. That is to say, the manifestations have a psychological 
explanation, or are consciously or unconsciously self-induced.
2. Preachers do it to suggestible listeners-producing a so-called mass hysteria or mass 
hypnosis.
3. The devil does it-the phenomena representing some form of demonic control.
4. Or else God does it.3®
In Appendix 11 the possibility is argued that hypnosis is a mechanism which could 
produce these effects.
Perhaps none of the above suggestions individually can explain all the 
phenomena that occur, but in combination they provide a significant erosion into 
claims that such phenomena should usually be considered as miraculous interventions 
from God.
The issue is illustrated by Edwards' experience of revival. In his earlier 
writing he was more ready to attribute these phenomena to the work of the Spirit. 
However, his interpretation is more cautious in his later work, The Religious 
Affections.
Great effects on the body are no sure evidences that affections are spiritual; 
for we see them oftentimes arise from great affections about temporal things, and 
when religion is in no way concerned with them. And if great affections about things 
purely natural may have tiiese effects, I know not by what rule we should determine, 
that high affections about religious things, which arise in like manner from nature, 
cannot have the like effect.
27 Charismatic Renewal: The Search for a Theology, page 82-84.
28 Ibid, page 129.
29 See appendix II.
30 White, John, When the Spirit comes with Power, (Hodder, 1988), pages 60-61.
31 Edwards, Thoughts on the Revival, page 176.
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Nor, on the other hand, do I know of any rule to determine, tliat gracious 
affections, when raised as high as any natural affections , with equally strong and 
vigorous exercises, cannot have a great effect on the body. No such rule can be
drawn from  reason. ^ 2.
It would seem that Jonathan Edwards was on the right track in refusing to consider 
these events as being a sure sign of the direct intervention of the Spirit. Rather he 
considered them to be neutral psychological phenomena. Given some strong 
emotional impetus, this is how people respond. Whether they are responding in this 
way to a work of grace is quite a different question.
This is just one example of the difficulty in separating the spiritual from the 
phenomenal. They are particularly difficult to distinguish in the setting of 
charismatic experience.
Consequently this leaves a useful indicator, which is to distrust claims that 
inexplicable or peculiar phenomena must be indications of the work of the Spirit.
32 Edwards, The Religious Affections, Part II, Section II.
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2 Some criteria to assess charismatic experience
A. L e a r n  f r o m  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  e n t h u s i a s t i c  m o v e m e n t s
Chapter I of the thesis has pointed out the significant links between the charismatic 
movement and those movements which were described as 'enthusiastic' in the 17th 
and 18th century. This provides useful insights into the assessment of charismatic 
experience.
It opens up a vast body of literature which is directly applicable to the 
charismatic movement. This work is often of a very high quality, because many of 
the best minds of the Enlightenment wrote pieces of work on enthusiasm. These 
provide insights which are directly applicable to the current charismatic movement.
One is struck by the force and intellectual quality of this literature when 
compared with much of what is written by many current writers. For example an 
issue such as 'is it acceptable to have weeping, shaking and laughing in a charismatic 
meeting?' is currently addressed by seeing if such phenomena occur in the Bible and
33 For example:
Sir William Temple, Essay Upon Heroic Virtue, (1690);
Dryden, translating St. Evermond's essays, (1692); Swift, The Mechanical Operation of the Spirit. 
George Lavington, The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compar'd.
George Eliot, Adam Bede, Scenes of Clerical life, Coleridge, The Friend, ed, Barbara books (1969),
1. 432.
Daniel Defoe, The Review, V l l l ,  94.
William Tong, The Nature and Consequences of Enthusiasm Considered, (1720).
Chauncey, A Caveat Against Enthusiasm.
Seasonable Thoughts.
Jolm Owen, A Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit, (1674)
Edwards, The Religious Affections.
Thoughts on the State of Religion.
John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
Richard Baxter, The Certainty of the World of Spirits, (1691).
Thomas Lndlam, Four Essays, (1797).
John Milton, Defensio Prima (1650-1).
Defensio Secunda (1653).
Henry Moore, Enthusiasmus Triumphatus.
George F. Nott, Religious Enthusiasm Considered, (1803).
T.E. Owen, Methodism Unmasked, (1802),
Joseph Priestly, Institutes of Natural Religion, (1782).
Alexander Pope, Letters, World Classics, (1960).
Shelley, Preface to the Revolt of Islam, (1817).
John Wesley, An Answer to the Rev. Mr Church's Remarks, (1745).
Journals.
Letter to the Author of the Enthusiasm of the Methodists and Papists Compar'd, (1750).
Sermon on Enthusiasm, (1750). Sermon XXXll in Standard Sermons.
Also cited in Chapter one page 23, foot note 16.
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can be considered as 'Scripture based m a n i f e s t a t i o n s Writers such as Edwards, 
Locke or Leibniz would not have spent the time on such a superficial question. 
Edwards argued that the odd phenomena of enthusiasm were merely symptoms of 
some emotional impact from a spiritual or human source. They were quite beside the 
point if one is aiming to determine whether an experience is a genuine or non genuine 
religious affection.
Using this literature has directed the thesis to ask questions which were raised 
by empiricism and rationalism. This leads to a concern as to whether what a person 
claims for their experience is true. The way in which the thesis attempts to resolve 
the issue is necessarily different from the solutions provided by empiricism or 
rationalism, but the questions of the 17th and 18th century still have the capacity to 
direct one's attention to the heart of the matter.
The detailed recurrence of enthusiastic movements provides a strong insight 
into the way in which the current charismatic movement is likely to develop. It 
provides useful leads in terms of how one may attempt to assess individual claims to 
have encountered God in charismatic experience, common traps into which 
enthusiasts are inclined to fall, examples of the strengths and weaknesses of such 
movements, how they develop and the ways in which they commonly deteriorate. 
There are powerful insights to be gathered from the charismatic movement's 
enthusiastic ancestry.
B .  B e  a w a r e  o f  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  c h a r i s m a t i c  e x p e r i e n c e
The context of charismatic experience is a significant factor in an attempt at its 
assessment because this context creates a bias against fair appraisal. Chapter 11 
argues that enthusiasm has always inspired fierce opposition because of its two tier 
concept of spirituality, because of its reaction against the institutional, because of its 
dramatic forms of worship and because of the fearfully powerful phenomena with 
which it is accompanied. The resultant opposition leads to defensive and threatened 
reactions on either side of the charismatic / non-charismatic divide, which does not 
tend towards fair and unbiased assessment.
Chapter 11 also argues that another issue which creates a bias against 
assessment is that enthusiastic thinking is characteristically credulous. This is due to 
the use of distorted definitions of faith which treat as a virtue, the ability to believe in 
the absence of evidence. Quality of faith is thereby made inversely proportional to
34 For example, Blake, David 'Is there Scriptural Evidence for the Toronto Blessing' (Direction 
magazine, March 1995, page 12ff.
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evidence. Enthusiasm has an inherent tendency towards credulity because it focuses 
primarily on experience rather than on the mind, or on theology. It can substitute 
reason in favour of a claim to have received divine revelation.
These factors create an inherent resistance to reasonable appraisal. They must 
be borne in mind when an attempt is made to understand charismatic experience, 
because the context creates significant difficulties.
C . L o o k  FOR COUNTER EXAMPLES
A more specific criterion of assessment would be to look for counter examples as a 
means of assessing the reliability of charismatics' claims to knowledge.
For example, enthusiasm has an epistemology which substitutes reasonable 
appraisal in favour of a claim to be the recipient of divine revelation. Such an 
experience tends to leave the perceiver with a certain conviction that God himself was 
the direct cause of this experience.
One of the difficulties with making claims to knowledge on such a basis is that 
it can justify the contradictory claims of different groups and individuals. 5^ The 
contradictory results of this epistemic practice provide a counter example which calls 
into question the acceptability of claiming certain knowledge on the basis of a claim 
to direct inspiration from God.
Another example of a useful counter example would be the claim that all 
Christians have the right to be healed on demand, and indeed have an entitlement to 
possess all that is of heaven in the immediate present, 'thy will be done on earth as it 
is in heaven'.36 One clear counter example to this is the fact that Christians die, and 
have been dying since the time of Jesus, and were indeed informed by the Bible that 
death ought to be expected; 'it is given to men once to die, and after that comes
judgment'37
In pointing this out one would need to look out for slippery re definition of 
'healing' so that one's enthusiast did not begin to define death as being 'the perfect 
healing' in mid argument. One would also have to persuade the individual that his 
beliefs ought to be accountable to experience, as he may not accept this.38 However, 
if this could be done, one would be forcing a person to face up to a significant 
counter example, ie. that the particular belief is being contradicted by empirical 
evidence.
35 Discussed in Chapter III, section 3, part A. Page 111.
36 Discussed in Chapter I, section 8. Page 41.
37 Hebrews 9:27.
38 For example, Urquhart, Colin Anything You Ask, (Hodder, 1978), page 117.
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D .  T a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  t e n d e n c y  t o  g i v e  e m p h a s i s  t o  c r i t e r i a  w h i c h  s u p p o r t
O NES O W N  PR EFER EN C ES
Constructing a cumulative argument demands the exercise of judgement, and so even 
when one has established acceptable criteria, one also needs to be aware of their 
relative significance, because the tendency is for one to attach significance to the 
criteria that suits one's own particular case. In the context of understanding 
charismatic experience, the individual sides have strong preconceptions, and so 
distorted arguments are to be expected.
Some writers simply consider observable physical experiences to be indicators 
of the work of the Spirit, such as falling, barking or shaking.39 Others may want to 
emphasise the character of the person associated with the event. *^9 The Roman 
Catholic theologian Karl Rhaner considers 'infused contemplation' to be the sign of a 
genuine visionary ex p erien ce .A cco rd in g  to Edwards, features such as Christ 
likeness and holiness with a focus on 'Divine things' are the primary indication of a 
genuine religious a ffe c tio n .O th e rs , however, consider that significant character 
change is equivocal, on the grounds that it is not possible distinguish a 'Godly pagan' 
from godliness in Christians.43 Others may prefer to emphasise mental and emotional 
features as being indications of an encounter with God.44
A preconceived emphasis can influence exegesis. For example the traditional 
arm of the Church will argue that what is important in I Corinthians 12-14 is the 
section on Love in Chapter 13. However, the charismatic expositor prefers not to 
suppose that because chapter 13 is of special significance, chapters 12 and 14 are 
therefore unimportant.
There is one feature of enthusiasm which creates an unusually strong 
preconception in the individual. This is that if a person believes that they have had a 
direct perception of God in an experience, then this conviction will often be given 
overriding emphasis above all other factors. Such is the history of enthusiasm.
39 For example, Blake, D. 'The Toronto Blessing' in Direction magazine, (Elim publication, Feb 
1995).
40 Canty, George The Practice of Pentecost, (Marshall Pickering, 1987).
41 Rhaner, Karl The Spirit and the Church, (Bums and Oats, London, 1979). Page 84.
42 Edwards, The Religious Affections, Part III.
43 For example, Hendry, G.S. The Holy Spirit in Christian Theology, (ftCM,lxm^on, 1951). Page 
68ff.
44 For example, Payne, Leaime The Healing Presence, (Kingsway,1991).
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As we have argued h o w e v e r ,45 this reliance on putatively direct perception is 
an unjustified basis for confidence. A general example of this is that the sensations 
of fear and elation are produced by the same hormonal system. This means that if a 
person does a parachute jump with a free fall, whether the experience is exciting or 
terrifying will depend on how the basic information is interpreted. At the time, 
though, it v^ iW feel like a direct perception of fear or elation, and one will be unaware 
of the interpretive processes involved. A person who has had a religious experience 
will respond in a similar way in the sense that he will be unable to distinguish aspects 
of the experience which are a consequence of interpretation, from the raw, or basic, I1
uninterpreted, subjective, emotional/physical sensations. Consequently he will have a 
tendency to give his own 'experience'/interpretation primary emphasis and claim that 
he knows because he has experienced. As Kierkegaard put it, 'How can it be that 
Christ does not exist since I know that he has saved me. '
Edwards may have a useful check against personal bias. One of the features 
of genuine religious affections suggested by him, is that 'they have a beautiful 
symmetry and proportion'.46 This symmetry will be evident in the whole character 
of a genuine Christian. For example, if a person discovers that he has an increase in 
his love for God, he ought also to have an increase in love for his neighbour. Holy 
hope will be combined with holy fear, joy with trembling, public religion with 
private devotion, and so on. Such a criterion does not have conclusive force in 
isolation from other features, but since 'elegance', and 'simplicity' are also indicators 
of a good theory, a search for proportion may provide a more widely agreed indicator 
which could check on the tendency to give special emphasis to one's own 
preferences.
The potential that individual preferences have to distort one's argument do not 
negate the possibility of constructing a cumulative case in principle, but there are no 
easy practical ways to resolve all of these questions of emphasis. The situation must 
be accepted as part of the complexity of attempting to assess charismatic experience, 
and one of the difficulties inherent in the process of constructing a cumulative case 
argument. At least if one is aware that preconceived emphasis is a potentially 
distorting factor, then it is possible to attempt to examine the situation with all the 
objectivity that one can muster.
45 Chapter III, Section 3, (B). Page 114.
46 Edwards, The Religious Affections, Part III, Section X,
__________ __
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E. An a ssessm en t  o f  internal  logic
It is important to assess the internal logic of a set of beliefs because internal 
inconsistency is the one generally accepted way of rationally undermining a particular 
thesis. It is a means of assessment that can usefully function across differing 
paradigms, because all of the paradigms share this presupposition that thought ought 
to be consistent.
For example, in the application to enthusiasm, assessing internal logic would 
demand considering the way in which the Bible is being treated, because it would be 
irrational for a movement to reach conclusions which were contradicted by its 
premises.
Beyond this it is more difficult to find examples of internal inconsistency than 
one may expect. Wesley considered enthusiasts to be consistent with their 
presuppositions, but to have begun with a false supposition.47 if a person is 
convinced that his message has been directly revealed to him by God, then he ought 
to submit his finite wisdom to this, however strange the content of the message may 
be. If this demands building an ark on dry land, then this is what he ought to do, and 
he would be quite consistent in performing such an action if it is a deed which is 
based on the orders of an omnipotent and omniscient God. Where there is logical 
inconsistency, however, this should be pointed out and corrected.4»
F. A ccur a c y  - How w ell  do es this th eo r y  f it  all  th e  a v aila ble  fa c t s?
If one states that 'God is love, and is in control of this world' for example, then one 
will have to work hard to reconcile this statement with the fact of suffering. 
Theologians talk about the 'problem of suffering', not meaning that it is a problem 
for those who suffer, but that suffering provides empirical evidence which calls into 
question either the love, or the omnipotence of God. If the theory is irreconcilable 
with the empirical evidence, then the theory should be rejected on the grounds that it 
is inaccurate; it does not make sense of the available facts. The point is not to pass a 
judgment on the issue of suffering, but to indicate that suffering is a significant 
problem, because coherence with the available evidence is an important quality of a 
good theory.
47 Wesley, Jolm Sermons, Vo l ï  ’The Nature of Enthusiasm' (London, 1825), page 467 (1750).
48 This is not to deny that God may appear paradoxical and beyond understanding. The discussion 
applies to logical contradiction.
’ ____
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A more specifically charismatic example would be the ’name it and claim it' 
style of prayer which works on the theory that if one asks in the right way, it is 
possible to get anything that is demanded from God. The theory runs into difficulty 
when what is asked for does not arrive, and so the theory has to be supported with 
supplementary hypotheses. These take the form of attributing failure to lack of faith, 
God sometimes says wait', not using the right words, the prayer was foiled by 
demonic activity, and so on. If one did run out of such explanations, then the theory 
is obviously not making sense of the available evidence.
Even with these qualifications, however, the theory is being called into 
question on the grounds that it is not making sense of all the evidence, and because it 
is in need of so much supplementary support. Testing whether a theory fits all the 
available facts is a useful criteria to assess charismatic claims.
G. P r e d ic t iv e  CAPACITY
Within enthusiasm an obvious example of a theory which can be tested by its 
predictive capacity would be the words of a prophet. If they contain some specific 
information about the future, and these events do come to pass, then one has an 
indication which provides positive support for the integrity of these words. This is a 
Biblical as well as an epistemological test.
This would apply to other areas of experience. For example, Article seven 
of the Assemblies of God Statement o f Fundamental Truth states that:
All believers are entitled to, and should ardently expect and seek the promise of the 
Holy Spirit and fire, according to the command of our Lord Jesus Clirist. This was 
the normal experience of the early Christian Church, With it comes the endowment 
of power for service and life, the bestowing of gifts and their uses in the work of 
ministry (Luxe 24:49; Acts 1:4-8; 1 Corinthians 12:1-31). This experience is 
distinct from and subsequent to the experience of new birth (Acts 8:12-17; 10:44-46; 
11:14-16; 15:7-9). With the Baptism of the Spirit come such experiences as an 
overflowing fullness of the Spirit (John:37-39; Acts 4:8), a deeper reverence for God 
(Acts 2:42; Hebrews 12:28), and intensified consecration to God and dedication to 
his work (Acts 2:42), and a more active love for Christ, for his word, and for the lost 
(Mark 16:20).49
If the doctrine of Baptism in the Spirit leads one to expect such specific changes in 
character, then its predictive capacity can be evaluated. If it proves to be accurate 
then it is an indication that supports its claims. If it does not deliver what it 
promised, then the doctrine is called into question.
49 A.O.G. publications, date not available. Also cited in Introduction, footnote 2, page 12.
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H . F ruitfulness
Fruitfulness is a useful test within charismatic experience, because it has a Biblical as 
well as an epistemological basis. One is asking 'how productive are the implications 
of a particular theory?' 'What kind of results does it yield?' The Bible also uses the 
image of fruitfulness in assessment and talks about the 'fruit' of the Spirit as an 
indication that a person has had a genuine experience of the Spirit.
In order to assess a claim to have had an experience which is caused by the 
Holy Spirit, then, one sees the kind of effects that it has in an individual life. One 
looks for unusual character changes, increasing Christ-likeness, a depth of devotion 
that was not there before, holiness, and the fruit of the Spirit. If this fruitfulness is 
not evident, then one would need to question the reality of the original claim to have 
encountered God in experience.
The same test could usefully be applied to an individual church, or to a whole 
'movement' of the Spirit by looking at the long term effects of, for example, the 
'Toronto Blessing'. In order to assess its 'fruitfulness' one would have to allow 
enough time to observe what kind of effects are produced by this phenomenon. 
There is not enough evidence at present even to describe it meaningfully as a 
'blessing. Perhaps one could give it the benefit of the doubt for a while, let its 'fruit' 
develop, and then prune it to remove the dross. Given enough time one would be 
able to determine if there are beneficial results. A yield of 'good fruit' could take the 
form of dramatic healing, unusual character change, increasing holiness, a concern 
for the poor and downtrodden, depth in worship, growth in the church, and so on. 
'Bad' fruit would consist of disillusionment, heresy, hollow emotionalism, 
superficiality, unfulfilled claims, divided Churches, etc..
As already discussed, some writers have considered the complications raised 
by paradigm relative facts, and paradigm relative evaluative procedures. The 
possibility of evaluating by using 'fruit' raises another issue which is that what is 
considered to be a positive result can also be paradigm relative. Consequently some 
of the 'fruit' which religious experiences produce may only be considered as 
beneficial within a religious framework; increasing prayer, or devotion to God for 
example.
Even with this proviso, other fruit, however, yields benefits which would be 
regarded as such by any paradigm's criteria. For example, benefits such as 
recognising the intrinsic worth of all human beings, expressing love and care for the 
poor and those who have been abandoned by society, would be broadly accepted. 
For sceptics, as Mitchell has pointed out:
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Conspicuous sanctity must inevitably pose a problem, associated as it is on [their] 
view, with manifest error.
Caroline Franks Davis argues that religious experiences may also be conducive to 
good mental health^i and to promote a healthy, positive attitude towards d e a t h . I f  a 
charismatic experience helps people to deal with crises, anxiety, sorrow, and guilt, 
and provide comfort, hope, courage, guidance and meaning then these 'fruits' offer 
support to the theory that the experience was the product of divine activity.
Of course, the converse is also true, and the destruction of a personality or 
church would be a fruit which would support an interpretation that attributed the 
experience to a psychological or pathological state.
I . G enerality
A theory which is applicable in more situations, is preferable to one which has a 
narrow relevance to a limited situation. The law of gravity, for example, is shown to 
be strong because it seems to be applicable to that which can be observed throughout 
the universe. It is comprehensive, and embraces a wide range of phenomena and 
applications.
One could apply this to the differing theories which are invoked to explain the 
phenomenon of being 'slain in the S p i r i t The normal charismatic theory is that it 
is a direct work of the Holy Spirit. However, one of the weaknesses in this is that 
this theory has difficulties in explaining why such similar phenomena are observable 
in different religious settings, or in the context of psychiatric treatment, or during 
stage hypnotism. In order to cover these possibilities it must postulate a different 
cause for these experiences and attribute them to the work of Satan counterfeiting a 
genuine work of the S p i r i t . 4^
If generality is a mark of a strong hypothesis, then the explanation for these 
phenomena as being ordinary human responses to a variety of emotional stimuli is 
preferable, because it offers a general explanation which could fit in with all the 
different situations in which these events occur.
Generality offers a useful criteria for assessment of charismatic experience.
50 The Justification of Religious Belief, page 41.
51 The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, page 209.
52 The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, page 207.
53 The available theories are outlined in more detail in Appendix II.
54 Bobgan, Dr. M. & D. Hypnosis and the Christian, (Bethany, 1984),
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J . E x planatory  po w er  o f  th e  th eory
The ability of a theory to explain all the facts is a useful indicator of its force, and so 
could provide a useful criterion. One point which does need care is that explanations 
can be confused with labels. For example, why do apples fall down? The answer is 
'because of gravity'. This is a good label and even a correct hypothesis, but as an 
explanation it is inadequate. The same is true of saying of a particular situation that 
some events were caused by God. This is inadequate, because it does not offer 
anything in the way of explanation.
There is an inherent problem with using this criterion with reference to a 
miracle, because by definition this is an event which does not have a natural 
explanation. This implies that the only way in which this could be used in the 
assessment of an enthusiastic experience would be to assess the quality of alternative 
explanations, and show the weaknesses of the alternatives on offer at the time. If one 
could do this it would not mean that miracle is therefore the best explanation, but it 
could contribute something to a cumulative argument.
This criterion is loaded against the miracle, as it can disconfirm, but rarely 
confirm. For example, the attempts to carbon date the shroud of Turin could have 
dated it to the first century. Even if it had turned out to be dated to the first century, 
this would not have proved that it was therefore the product of a miraculous event. 
What it did do was date it to the twelfth century, and exclude the possibility that it 
was genuine.
In the context of charismatic experience, the provision of an explanation can 
be a useful means of assessment. However a miraculous event such as God 
intervening in experience is, by definition, inexplicable by natural means, and so the 
provision of an explanation undermines a miraculous claim.
K . T ak e  acco unt  of  T h e  co m plexities involved  in  ch o o sing  betw een
COMPETING PARADIGMS
A cumulative argument is capable of producing complex and highly ramified 
religious beliefs. One could have a numinous experience of awe and reach a simple 
belief that there must be a God in this experience who is all powerful and 
magnificent. This much would be comparatively simple. However, the Christian 
concept of God moves well beyond this into significantly more complex beliefs. 
These beliefs have developed over the centuries in the context of theological debate, 
reaction against heresy, interaction with philosophy, claimed revelation, experience
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and new knowledge. Consequently most current doctrines are the product of so much 
reflection on experience, and are so embedded in a web of interlocking beliefs, that 
religious experience alone could not provide a rational justification for holding them. 
Doctrines such as the nature of the Trinity, for example, the person of Christ, the 
doctrine of the work and person of the Holy Spirit, or the Atonement require such a 
complex cumulative argument for their justification, that one could hardly begin to 
illustrate its construction here.
A particular understanding of experience is determined by such a conceptual 
framework, and, as we have already argued, the decision between such frameworks 
needs to be made on the basis of cumulative argumentation. In order to assess the 
acceptability of each way of explaining the experience, one needs to judge the entire 
framework. This is an extremely complex task.
The complexity is increased because this is not a situation where there are 
wholly separate areas of unquestionable theory assessing a factual experience and 
using incorrigible methods. There is a constantly shifting dialectic between theory, 
fact, methodology and other paradigms, as they all jostle together to provide the most 
adequate understanding. In this setting the religious experience is assessed within a 
particular paradigm, but is also capable of becoming a piece of evidence which can 
contribute to the justification of that encompassing world view. Arguments which 
underestimate the complexity of this process are inadequate.
L . T h e  USE OF O c k h a m 's R azo r
Ockham's razor would be a useful means of eliminating false theory. It also sums up 
a number of the above criteria. William of Ockham's intonation was, 'entia non 
multiplicanda sunt praeter necessitatem'. The original context of the statement was a 
repudiation of abstract objects, and the platonically conceived 'universals'. It is a 
version of nominalism which draws the line at the concept of properties, numbers, 
functions or classes, which he repudiated as being mere ’flatus vocus'.
Since then the general idea of this razor has been widely adapted and applied. 
Certainly within science one of the marks of a good theory is that it has an elegant 
simplicity, which avoids unnecessary complications. Even a paradigm can be 
overturned when it becomes overburdened by supplementary hypotheses to the point 
where the underlying theory becomes strained beyond credibility. This is using the 
original razor in ways not intended by Ockham, as the kinds of 'entities' being 
trimmed down are different, i.e. theories. However, this still involves a trimming 
down of possibilities to the most straightforward theory. In this sense, they are 
related.
— ______________________________________________________________________________________________
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If one is permitted to abuse Ockham's razor in this way, then one could apply 
it to theology. Essentially we are using it as a description of the simplicity, which is 
one of the marks of a good theory. 'God of the gaps’ thinking is a theological 
equivalent of a lack of simplicity. Throughout Church history there has been a 
tendency to ’multiply entities' by seeking a supernatural explanation for that which is 
beyond natural explanation at the time. Why do flowers grow?, because God makes 
it happen. Why do the planets revolve in the way that they do?, because God orders 
their paths. Why does this person exhibit such strange behaviour?, because he is 
possessed by a devil.
The difficulty with such thinking is that these gaps are gradually filled in with 
strong rational explanations, and so the apparently direct works of God are 
progressively squeezed out of the universe. This has reached the point where even 
creatio ex nihilo has a suggested explanation in terms of mathematics and physics. 
This would be the last foothold for a 'God of the gaps’ explanation of reality.
Perhaps God of the gaps' thinking should not even be called explanation. It 
does little in the way of defining how cause and effect work in a particular instance. 
It is resorted to when an event is unexplained; 'what else could it be but a miracle?' 
Consequently it functions as a label which is applied to some phenomena which have 
no explanation at the time. Indeed, it is also given to some phenomena which do 
have a perfectly good explanation. Though they are often confused, to give a 
phenomenon a label is not the same as offering an explanation, or of understanding a 
process. The Church is sometimes better at applying labels than at giving a full 
explanation.
The effect of this unwillingness to shave one's own theology is usually 
destructive. A good example of this would be the paradigm paradigm change 
initiated by the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species. The theory offered a 
natural understanding of the apparent design and complexity of the make up of all 
animals in terms of natural selection and evolution. As is frequently pointed out, ' it 
is only a theory, it hasn’t been proved yet’. This is true, but so obviously true that to 
point it out seems to qualify as flatus vocus. Scientific theories never can be 
'proved', because it is always possible in theory that they will be undermined by 
future experiment. At least according to Popper, science functions by working with 
the best available explanations until they become too strained to be useful. Evolution 
may well be disproved at some stage, this will always be true in principle.
However, as an (admittedly tentative) theory, it has much to commend it, it is 
universal in application, simple, elegant, offers accurate prediction, it is capable of 
being tested using empirical evidence and it fits well into the web of other beliefs 
within science.
:
____________
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Many within the Church have been less impressed though. It certainly didn't 
fit with ease into a theological 'God of the gaps' web of belief, indeed it caused so 
much upheaval that it destroyed the web that many Christians had been content with. 
The effect was of widespread disillusionment with the Christian understanding of 
reality. It would have been less painful if the Church had shaved itself properly 
before its overly hairy theories had been rather suddenly barbered by the strength of 
evolutionary theory.
When such a natural explanation turns up, the phrase which is sometimes used 
is not 'explaining', but 'explaining away'. This is curiously revealing. In superficial 
terms 'explaining away' means the same as 'explanation'; but the inference is that the 
person didn't like it. There is a sense that he has lost something which he would 
have preferred to keep; a grudging acceptance, and a distinct reluctance is implied. 
He would have preferred his original mistaken theory in preference to his new 
understanding. The mystery is gone, and what seemed like a supernatural support 
within the person's web of belief has suddenly been eradicated, or explained away.
Within charismatic experience a tendency to offer supernatural 'explanation' 
is a particular danger. Entities are multiplied as the demonic is conjured up as an 
explanation for sin, illness, homosexuality, lack of money, general problems in life, 
and so on. The same process is also at work where the direct intervention of the 
Holy Spirit is used as an explanation for phenomena such as shaking, falling down, 
emotional reactions, healing, and so on.
Claiming that an event has a supernatural cause may be the best theory on 
offer, however it is one theory in competition with other possible ways of 
understanding events, and it is important to be critical in one's thinking at this point. 
This is particularly so because the charismatic movement is often seduced into 
accepting a needlessly supernatural explanation by its desire to fill up the gaps in its 
understanding with certainty. In the short term this may be comforting and 'faith 
building', but in the long term it is a basis for disillusionment. The temptation not to 
doubt one's understanding of experience should be resisted wherever possible.
The Charismatic movement needs to use Ockham's razor. If there is no 
obvious natural explanation for some phenomenon, it should not be too quick to jump 
into a supernatural web of belief for a label. This implies that one should look for a 
terrestrial understanding of events first. And even if it is not possible to come up 
with one, this does not necessarily imply that one has seen a miracle. On the 
evidence of history, it is more likely that one's understanding and imagination were 
not up to the demands of providing a full explanation.
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The Charismatic movement is in need of a good shave. It can do this the easy 
way by borrowing Ockham's razor and doing this itself, or the hard and painful way 
by letting itself be barbered by alternative and more coherent theory.
M . T he  u se  o f  th e  CUMULATIVE ARGUMENT
If charismatic experience is either to be supported or to be opposed this can be done 
rationally by the force of a cumulative argument. A cumulative argument is not just 
an accumulation of evidence. The whole is greater than the component parts, and 
these 'parts', though individually weak as evidence can provide mutual support when 
functioning in conjunction. This is one of the ways in which an arch provides a 
useful analogy of a cumulative case.35
Such argumentation is not accepted by critics such as Flew; 'If one leaky 
bucket will not hold water that is no reason to think that ten can.'^^ However, the 
buckets could be arranged inside each other in such a way that the holes do not 
overlap. This would be to create a 'synergism' in which the interaction of the 
components exceeds the sum of the individual p a r t s . ^7 This is analogous to a 
cumulative argument in which beliefs, experiences, methodology and other types of 
evidence interact with each other to support a web of highly ramified beliefs; beliefs 
which would not be justifiable in isolation from each other.
All of the criteria suggested in this chapter are, by implication, leaky buckets 
which need to be combined into a relationship which offers mutual support. They are 
(questionable) guide-lines which assist in making a reasonable judgment, but do not 
individually provide grounds for certainty.
For example, a particular theory may be strong in one particular way, in that 
it can provide excellent explanation, but then be overly laden with supplementary 
hypothesis; it could be good at prediction, but poor in its fruitfulness and so on. 
One must therefore use these individual indications in a cumulative fashion in which 
each is providing a degree of support for a theory, though none of them individually 
is adequate to provide proof.
Another example of the danger of isolating one particular criterion would be 
the criterion of coherence. This can be inadequate when isolated from other factors 
which could be used in the construction of an argument. Notoriously, a belief system
55 Chapter IV, section 4, (C).
56 Flew, A. God and Philosophy, (Hutchinson of^London, 1966), page 63.
57 Cf. Davis, Caroline Franks, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1989), page 109.
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based on coherence will have difficulty when it encounters another belief system 
which is also self consistent. Consequently in order that a self consistent belief 
structure should be able to relate to other systems and to the world, it must use other 
criteria, such as making an attempt to reckon with experience.
A strong predictive capacity is another individual support for a theory, but 
one that must be balanced against other factors. In a charismatic context, for 
example, the phenomenon of 'slaying in the Spirit' could be predicted by using the 
theory that these events are the result of hypnotic techniques. One could also claim, 
however, that they are the result of direct intervention by God, on the grounds that it 
is possible to predict their occurrence in response to prayer. Both theories could be 
justified on the grounds of predictive capacity. Because of this other criteria are 
needed to make a decision between the two theories. On its own, 'predictive 
capacity' is not enough, and can be misleading if it is assumed to provide proof. 
Only when it is incorporated into an argument that includes explanation, fruitfulness, 
generality, and so on, can it be given its correct epistemic force.
All the factors in a cumulative argument interact. For example, one could 
provide an explanation of conversion in terms of a psychological process. This 
explanation does not, on its own, undermine the acceptability of beliefs which are 
adopted as a result of this conversion. Conversely, however, an inexplicable 
conversion experience can contribute some support to the adopted belief system as a 
whole, and therefore if it is removed the support for these beliefs has weakened to 
some extent. There is a dialectic between the different parts of the cumulative system 
of belief.
A cumulative argument ought to be used throughout the web of belief. It can 
be applied to internal assessment within a Christian paradigm, as well as to more 
radical questions.
Take I John as an example of a cumulative argument which is situated within 
a Christian paradigm. It is a book which is written to a group of people who were 
infiltrated by Gnosticism. John offers suggestions as to the marks of a genuine 
Christian and the authentic Christian message. This is similar to the quest of this 
thesis, as it demands some kind of criteria which could sift out that which should be 
rejected. In order to assess Christian belief and experience, John does not give one 
answer, but offers a combination of factors; moral behaviour, doctrinal correctness, 
(particularly about the person of Jesus), love for others in the fellowship, humility, 
an awareness of sin, a desire to be holy, a practical Christianity rather than one which
is just evidenced in words: 'he who says '. A love for God and not for the world,
and an internal conviction which gives confidence to approach God. Each of these on 
its own does not provide a proof that the person is a genuine Christian believer; after
":Ü
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all Christians are sinners A® However, when all these attributes are evident together 
in one person there is a strong cumulative indication that this is a person who is 
'walking in the light*.
A similarly cumulative approach is made by Edwards in his suggestion that 
genuine religious affections are indicated by a combination of distinguishing signs, 
rather than by individual proofs. 9^
Cumulative argumentation is also applicable to the more radical choices which 
must be made between a charismatic paradigm and those with which it competes. In 
such a setting the questioning will be more extreme, and may have to include issues 
such as the problem of suffering, the evidence for the resurrection, or the reasons for 
adopting theistic belief. However, the way in which the issue is resolved is in 
principle the same. It is on the basis of a cumulative case.
All of this implies a doubly cumulative argument, because the argument 
appraises an entire collection of beliefs, rather than isolating the belief system into its 
individual components, and (b) does this appraisal on the basis of an accumulation of 
the means of verification.
The cumulative argument appraises (a) an entire collection of beliefs. It is 
particularly useful to assess charismatic experience as a whole 'constellation' of 
beliefs, experience, and means of verification because, as we have a r gu e d , t h i s  
enthusiastic pattern is one which recurs through Church history as a whole jumble. 
As with any large scale system of beliefs, the individual tenets of a religious 
paradigm rely on each other for mutual support, and are unable to stand up to 
epistemic evaluation when isolated from the rest of the conceptual system. It is 
therefore only fair that each should be assessed within the context of its interlocking 
web of belief.
As well as a whole set of beliefs, there are (b), cumulative means of 
verification. As pointed out earlier, there is a difficulty in choosing rationally 
between conflicting paradigms because there are paradigm relative evaluative 
procedures .Al though difficult, this is a problem which is resolvable in principle 
because not all of the evaluative procedures are relative to a particular paradigm; 
there are usually significant areas of overlap between different large scale conceptual 
systems.
This overlap exists in the conflict between charismatic interpretations of 
experience and those understandings which are rooted in different paradigms. Some
58 1 John 1:8
59 Edwards, J. The Religious Affections, Part III.
60 Chapter I.
61 Chapter IV, section 3, (B), page203ff.
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means of assessment are internal; for example the use of 'the gift of discernment’ is 
only possible if one presupposes many charismatic claims, including the reality and 
availability of the gifts of the Spirit. This may be a useful contingent means of 
assessment as far as a charismatic believer was concerned, but is of limited use to a 
dispensationalist, even less so to an atheist.
Other means of assessment could provide the possibility of making a rational 
assessment even when the opposing interpretations of experience are situated in 
different conceptual systems. How this is done would depend on the type of claim 
that is being made. If one makes a historical statement, say that Jesus was born in 
Bethlehem during the time of King Herod, then this can be assessed by the methods 
used in historical research. A claim that a religious experience has been indicated by 
an unusual personality change could be assessed, to some extent, by means which are 
used in psychology or psychiatry. A claim that a person has been healed could have 
supporting evidence in the form of medical diagnosis. The same principle is true of 
literary interpretation, verdicts in a court of law, the use of induction or deduction to 
corroborate a scientific claim, existential evidence and Biblical interpretation. The 
way in which a statement is assessed should be appropriate to the kind of statement 
that is under scrutiny.
The accumulation of such means of assessment could contribute to the 
construction of a cumulative case and thus provide an interpretation of a particular 
charismatic experience which is generally accepted as being rational.
In this way one is able to use means of verification which are accepted by 
different paradigms. This would allow a rational defence of a religious world view 
by showing that it made better sense of the available evidence even when assessed by 
using an opponents criteria of verification.
Ï
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Conclusions
The thesis has travelled a long road since setting out to determine how the cognitive 
claims made on the basis of charismatic experience could be evaluated. It has linked 
charismatic experience with enthusiasm, and because of this been pushed into the 
conclusion that it is a distinctive epistemology which determines the shape of the 
charismatic movement. To assess this epistemology it has sifted through the 
epistemic options and concluded that the best available way in which this could be 
doné is by the use of a cumulative case argument. The complexity of the question is 
magnified because the opposing interpretations of charismatic experience are the 
expression of conflicting paradigms. Even though it is a complex task, it is still 
possible to decide rationally between paradigms by the use of cumulative 
argumentation. Having established the way in which the question should in principle 
be resolved, the thesis criticises much contemporary literature which relies for its 
means of assessment on too simple, or too few criteria of assessment. The final 
chapter has drawn together criteria from throughout the thesis which could be 
helpful, and suggested ways in which they could be incorporated into a cumulative 
case.
The question throughout the thesis has been Tf a person claims that he has 
encountered God in his experience, how could it be known that this claim describes 
what has really occurred?' The question is not abstract in the sense it is detached 
from the realities of life in the Church during the second half of the twentieth 
century. It is a question of both relevance and significance to the charismatic 
movement. There are strong historical grounds to suppose that if it does not sift 
ruthlessly its claims and experiences, then it will be destroyed by being pulled into 
confusion. Consequently in order to preserve that which is worth retaining, one 
needs to be ruthless in sifting that which should not be there. If this is so, then both 
those who are committed to this movement, and those who oppose it ought to be 
united in seeking criteria which can interpret charismatic experience reliably.
This is not just a pragmatic issue for a Christian, it is an issue of holiness and 
of integrity. If one concedes that there is a genuine experience of the Holy Spirit, 
then such experience ought to be protected as rigorously as possible from 
fraudulence, superficiality, and shoddy assessment
As the Bible says, 'test everything, hold fast to the good’. Or as it was put by 
Jonathan Edwards:
And by what is seen of the terrible consequences of this counterfeit religion, when 
not distinguished from true religion. God's people in general have their minds 
unhinged and unsettled in things of religion, and know not where to set their foot, or
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what to think or do; and many are brought into doubts, whether there be anything in 
religion; and heresy and infidelity and atheism greatly prevail.
The conclusion of the thesis as to how this filtering may be achieved, can be 
summarised in one sentence. The way to assess charismatic experience is by the use 
of a cumulative argument. In practice the construction of such an argument is multi­
faceted and has wide implications.
Each chapter of the thesis has reached its own conclusion, and these have 
determined the content of each succeeding chapter. Chapter VI is the conclusion in 
the sense that it draws together criteria from the whole thesis and applies them 
specifically to examples of charismatic experience. Finding these criteria is what the 
thesis set out to achieve.
The argument could be taken further forward, particularly because there is a 
need to examine the relationship between the tentative results of a cumulative 
argument, and the way in which Christian belief functions with such certainty in 
practice, and has thereby such a capacity to alter the life of the believer.
Alongside the road which has been taken by the thesis are many areas which 
are interesting and worthy of exploration. These include the insights of Sociology, 
Psychology, Church History, Medicine, and Theology. Appendix II points out how 
fruitful it may be to explore the relationship between hypnotic techniques and 
enthusiasm. There are other possible avenues of exploration. For example, the 
barking and shaking which is associated with Turettes disease bears a remarkable 
similarity to the observed phenomena of the 'Toronto Blessing'. The thesis has 
suggested how in principle charismatic experience could be assessed; with a 
cumulative argument. This needs to be applied to specific examples of charismatic 
experience.
The only way in which the integrity and direction of the central argument of 
the thesis could be maintained and completed within limited space was to keep rigidly 
to that which is directly applicable to the main question. This has made it quite 
impossible to illustrate the argument with reference to all of the available examples, 
nor to dialogue with every writer along the road who has a comment to make on 
charismatic experience. This does not negate the main argument.
To use another analogy, the thesis has drawn an outline sketch of the 
epistemic structure of the charismatic movement. A sketch is a useful way to begin a 
painting, but such a sketch could always be criticised on the grounds that each of its 
component parts is not detailed enough. In spite of this incompleteness a sketch does 
provide a helpful framework within which an artist is able to place the detail in its 
correct relationship to the other parts of the picture.
62 Edwards, J, The Religious Affections, page 20.
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One should not underestimate the amount of detail which is needed to paint in 
the details of a cumulative case argument. Such a system of belief is extremely 
highly ramified, and will be too complex for any individual to complete. There are 
limitations on human understanding, even in the simple fact that life is not long 
enough for a person to explore thoroughly all of his beliefs. One is forced to rely on 
a long history of thought.
The argument constantly makes reference to God, and He is considered to be 
transcendent, infinite, dwelling in unapproachable light, beyond understanding. 
Consequently much of the data which is needed to complete the picture may be 
hidden in eternity. One needs a Kantian humility which recognises the limits of 
human reason. Or as St Paul put it, we see through a glass darkly. To some extent 
we must end with the words of The Tractatus:
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silen ce .63
63 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. 
McGuinness, (Routiedge, 1993), page 74.
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Appendix I 
An Outline of Wimber*s thesis.
I. A Summary of Wimber's Theology
Wimber's thesis can be summarised briefly as follows:
1. The New Testament example of Jesus' life is the norm for the Church in all 
generations.
2. Jesus is the bringer of the Kingdom of God into the world, what Wimber 
describes as the 'power encounter'.
3. Exorcism and healing are a sign of the coming kingdom.
4. Jesus authorised his disciples to perform acts of healing and exorcism, expected 
them to perform these acts, and rebuked them when they failed.
5. In the early Church the Apostles and the Church carried on the same healing 
ministry as Jesus.
6. During the history of the Church there have been times of similar effectiveness.
7. On the contemporary mission field there is dramatic Church growth as the result 
of using 'signs and wonders' to back up the message. The reason why this is possible 
in such a setting, is because the people involved have a different world view from 
those in the western world.
8. The Church in the West needs to break out of its western, rationalist strait-jacket 
and recover spiritual power. Instead of 'programme evangelism' (such as Billy 
Graham, tracts, etc.), she needs 'power evangelism'.
9. In order for this to be effective she must learn to live in dependence on the Spirit; 
faith is spelt RISK. She must be prepared to step out and perform exorcism and 
healing. When this happens the Church will recover her early effectiveness.
Wimber has a denomination which has built up around him, 'Vineyard 
fellowships'. These are predominantly American, but also to be found in Britain. 
He is best known in England as a result of his books,^ tapes, and 'Signs and 
Wonders' conferences during the eighties. He has had a wider influence than many 
charismatic leaders among traditional Churches such as the Church of England,
4:1.11
1 wimber, John Power Evangelism, (Hodder, 1985). Wimber, John Power Healing, 
(Hodder, 1985). Wimber, John The Dynamics of Spiritual Growth, (Hodder, 1990).
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because his theology is more coherently thought out than many charismatic leaders, 
with roots in the work of George Eldon Ladd. The 'Airport Church' in Toronto 
which is considered to be the origin of the 'Toronto blessing' is also a Vineyard 
Church.
In practice this theology demonstrates itself in a distinctive method of 
'ministry' which is to be used when praying for people. This takes the following 
form.
(a ) T h e  interview
This is where the people who are doing the praying ask the person what it is that they 
want. This stage involves discovering the history of the person to aid in a decision 
about what needs to be done.
(b ) Th e  DIAGNOSTIC DECISION
This is the point at which the cause of the illness is established. Is it a 
straightforward need for healing? Should there be healing of memories? Is exorcism 
required? Does the person need to repent?
(c) P rayer  selection
For example, is it to be an illness which should be addressed directly and rebuked? 
Jesus had a variety of methods; rebuking illness, simply healing, casting out demons, 
putting mud on eyes, etc. What is the kind of prayer that the Father would like on 
this occasion?
(d) P rayer  eng ag em ent
The normal Vineyard pattern of prayer is to stand with eyes open, either laying hands 
on the person, or else letting the hands hover near the persons body. The person is 
encouraged to relax and receive the Spirit, as well as being told that he may 
experience some unusual sensations, but that this is nothing to worry about. The 
initial prayer is generally 'come Holy Spirit'. After this, one waits to see where it 
should go from there, responding to the prompting of the Father at each stage. The 
golden rule is essentially to do what the Father wills. One also looks for the physical 
symptoms of the presence of the Spirit; heat, fluttering eye-lids, falling to the
'     .....
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(e ) P o st  prayer  dir ec tio ns
Should there be another time for prayer if the job is unfinished? Does the person 
need counselling? What should he expect to happen after this time of prayer?.
Unless one has seen the effect of all this, it is difficult to appreciate how 
powerful the experience is, particularly in a large group of people, though it also 
works on an individual basis too. One is praying, and expecting that this prayer will 
make an immediate difference to the situation, and then finding notable physical 
effects as one does so.
II A brief assessment of Wimber's theology
(1) The practice of ministry outlined by Wimber is essentially simple, i.e. listen 
before you pray so that when you pray this will be in line with the Father's will. The 
purpose of prayer is in order that His will should be done, not ours. When one does 
pray, expect God to work and He will. In theory this is not particularly dramatic, yet 
in practice it is quite radical.
(2) Wimber's theology is Biblically based, in the sense that what determines action 
and faith is not the current experience of the believer, but what Jesus said ought to be 
expected in terms of healing and prayer.
(3) The peculiarity of the effects could be a good sign that this is a genuine religious 
experience. Rather than the rigid traditional Pentecostal model where everyone is to 
believe, be baptised in the Spirit, then speak in tongues, in that order; there is more 
flexibility in each situation. This is more how one would expect God to work in a 
situation where, on the one hand there is a transcendent God whose 'ways are not our 
ways'; and on the other there are people in all their confusing and varying 
complexity. It would be very surprising if such an interaction between two 
unknowns were unsurprising and predictable. The sheer oddness and unpredictability 
could be the sign of a God who is almighty and mysterious at work.
iground, any strange sensations or movements, demonic manifestations, tears, 
laughter, shouting, etc.
:i
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(4) Wimber takes the Bible’s teaching on healing and the miraculous seriously 
without avoiding the passages which contain the miraculous on the grounds that they 
do not concur with present experience. It also avoids imposing a dispensational grid 
on the Bible which allows one to reject large sections as being inapplicable.
(5) The existential evidence of those who have been involved is that it has been of 
benefit, deepening faith, worship and expectancy.
(6) Wimber aims to take the focus away from himself, which is unusual in a person 
who performs a ’healing ministry’. The thrust of his approach is to enable the 
Church to function in the supernatural realm, and it is for all the members to be 
involved in seeing dramatic answers to prayer, not just some special individuals. 
This is why his approach to healing uses 'workshops’, where groups of people try 
praying for each other in order to learn how to do so more effectively.
There are also, however, a number if difficult questions which need to be
faced.
1. How valuable are signs?
(a) There was an extra dimension to signs in the time of Jesus, in that He preached to 
the poor, oppressed and the homeless. A sign in such a context has a different 
meaning to the same sign in the rich western countries of today. Rich Californians 
getting their psychological problems sorted out is rather different from healing lepers 
or AIDS victims.
(b) Signs are not always convincing as a back up to the gospel, as discussed in the 
main thesis. This is evidenced in the New Testament in, for example the response of 
the pharisees to Jesus. Such signs are invariably equivocal, and this problem will be 
even more noted in the western world which will have many alternative 
interpretations of a particular 'sign'. Consequently, 'signs and wonders’ may have a 
limited effectiveness when used in evangelism.
(c) Signs may be off-putting. Certainly in Acts 2, people were afraid to join the 
Church because of what was going on in it. In the present day, they could allow the 
Church to be considered as being merely one of many alternative therapies.
_______________
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(d) According to the Bible signs say little about the person doing them. Certainly, 
Jesus and the disciples did miracles, but then so will the Anti-Christ,^ and so did 
Judas.3 They are consequently of little value in assessing a person's sincerity or 
spirituality.
2. Why should faith and reason be mutually exclusive?
Wimber epitomises a reaction against western rational ways of thought, in favour of a 
world view which can include that which is beyond human understanding. This 
could be seen as being necessary if one's mind is not to be the limiting factor in what 
God is able to do, and thus open a person to see more of what God is, and can do. 
However the negative side is that it is a self contradictory thesis which uses reason as 
the basis for undermining rational thought. It also leads naturally to superstition and 
a credulity which can interpret any impulse or physical phenomena as being a work 
of the Spirit. In effect, there is no way to distinguish faith from stupidity or to sift 
out the dross. The strong historical precedent of enthusiasm suggests that such an 
attitude is eventually destructive to a movement.
Unless one remains critical of both experience and theology, one will be led 
very quickly up some experiential and theological cul-de-sacs. There consequently 
needs to be a way of holding faith and reason together.
3. The lack of significant organic healing
There are many 'wonders' associated with Wimber, but few unambiguous 'signs'. 
There is a big gap between the words and the reality. If one includes 'inner healing', 
there is a great amount of healing occurring, but unambiguous organic healing is 
rare. This is important because if one is dealing with the creator, then one ought to 
expect acts of re-creation such as, new legs or healed mongolism. The reality is 
more in the area of sore backs, memories, and pain being eased.
2 Mth 7:22-23
3 Mth 10:1-4
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4. The lack of a theology of non-healing
A theology of non-healing is important for pastoral care, as one needs a concept of 
non-healing which is not rooted in lack of faith. It is also difficult to help someone 
to die, while at the same time he is expecting to be healed.
This lack is also a deficiency according to the Bible, because (as discussed in 
the main thesis) there are examples of illnesses which come from God. It is 
therefore too simplistic to attribute all healing to the Kingdom of God and all illness 
to the Kingdom of Satan.
5, The lack of a theology of suffering
A theology of suffering needs to be combined with a theology of healing, because not 
to do so produces a theology which promises people everything, then leaves them 
with less than they started with, i.e. disillusioned.
The New Testament has expectations of suffering, 'don't be surprised when 
suffering comes upon you', said Peter.^ The modern charismatic Christian is 
surprised to suffer, and this is because Jesus has been presented as a kind of vallium 
tablet which will provide full health, wealth, and a sense of well being. It is the 
modern equivalent of a rice Christian, except that a few psychological inducements 
are substituted for the rice.
The New Testament includes suffering through from the Gospels, where Jesus 
had a strong emphasis on taking up the cross; to Revelation which pictures increasing 
cycles of persecution through to the end of history, to the point where all that is 
visible to show that the Church even exists, are the bodies of the martyrs in the 
streets.
In I Peter 2 suffering is an honour, but to the modern charismatic Christian it 
is a sign of lack of faith.
6. The use of words of knowledge
These are spoken from the front in large meetings in a way which would be difficult 
to justify for people with Biblical authority as a premise. The frequent vagueness of 
these 'words' makes them unverifiable.
4 I Peter 4:12
■'1.
______
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7. God of the gaps thinking
God of the gaps thinking is particularly significant in Wimber's thesis, as there is no 
neutral area. The whole world is a battle between God and Satan, and so 
inexplicable experience is put down to one of these two causes. It is a 'devil of the 
gaps’, as well as a 'God of the gaps'.
Many Church members are particularly susceptible to Wimber's confidence 
that these events are supernatural, particularly if they are used to years of dry 
rationalism and decline. Here is someone who claims that the message actually 
works, and does so immediately when one prays. Their world view will make them 
keen to believe that all the peculiarities which occur really are supernatural. It is 
important to stand back and analyse such experiences more carefully, particularly as 
they are being presented as signs and wonders. It is easy to confuse the phenomenal 
with the spiritual.
8. An existential form of Christianity
There is an existential emphasis to Wimber's thinking in the sense that a person 
involved tends to look for differing experiences, and also to assess the reality and 
power of ministry in terms of the experience and phenomena with which it is 
accompanied.
It is even more existential than this, however, because the gospel is being 
presented as being justified by the 'signs following', which means in effect that the 
'signs' become the basis of a person's faith. Consequently, if one is persuaded on 
the basis of a 'sign', and yet this sign proves ultimately to have been a psychological 
peculiarity, then one has sown the seeds of disillusionment in the presentation of the 
gospel. A person's faith is founded on an illusion.
The same tendency has always been a part of main stream evangelicalism, 
'You ask me how I know he lives, he lives within my heart', but as a basis of faith it 
is still inadequate, and does not do justice to the historical nature of the Christian 
faith.
9. A danger of 'prostitution with the spirit of the age'
The word 'prostitution' here is meant in the sense used by Jeremiah in Jer 23. In this 
context it referred to the false prophets whose words did not have their origin in God,
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but instead came from two other sources, (a) they made some ideas up for 
themselves, and (b) then copied the rest from each other. Another mark of their 
message was that it was all comfort, 'peace peace', they said, while the true message 
was one of judgement. The false prophet was easy to listen to, it was comfortable.
This is, of course, a constant danger for the Church. In a permissive age she 
comes round to the idea of homosexuality; in an authoritarian age, she is dogmatic; 
in a revolutionary age she teaches liberation theology; in a rational age becomes an 
intellectual; in a mystic age a Guru. Where the age is tolerant she asserts that all 
religions lead to God.
This danger of merely echoing the spirit of the age, (or to put it another way 
copying from each other), may well be why Jesus said 'beware when men speak well 
of you'. If one has an unchanging message in a changing culture, then it will more 
often than not, be abrasive and out of step with contemporary society.
Although it is not inevitably true, one should consequently be cautious when a 
movement fits too smugly into the prevailing culture. This could be true of the 
Wimber approach. It claims to be a radical paradigm shift away from Western 
thought, however, this backlash against rationalism can be seen throughout the 
culture. It is evident in the ignorance surrounding scientific research, the credulity 
and superstition of much thought, the thriving of new cults, and in the developing 
alternative therapy scene.
Aims, such as material prosperity, positive thinking, or mental health, seem 
absorbed into the Church. One particular example is 'healing memories'. This is 
constituted of a mixture of ideas and techniques culled from psychological practice, 
but with Biblical texts tacked on to them in order to provide credibility in the eyes of 
fundamentalist believers. Perhaps they are useful techniques in their own way, but 
they are hardly a central part of the New Testament Gospel. In Biblical terms the 
danger in flirting with the 'God of this world', is that it gets out of hand and leads to 
'spiritual adultery'. The ethos of Wimber's approach may sail too close to this for 
comfort.
_____________________________________
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Appendix 11
Enthusiastic Phenomena
Introduction
This appendix briefly explores some of the interpretations which are placed upon 
common enthusiastic phenomena; 'slaying in the spirit', tingling, screaming, crying, 
barking, laughing, etc. This is helpful because these phenomena have accompanied 
enthusiastic movements throughout the centuries and become a common part of 
contemporary charismatic experience.
We will take a specific instance of these events; its occurrence in meetings led 
by John Wimber. This is useful for the sake of clarity, of relevance, and because 
there are some comparatively substantial books written in assessment of these events.
1, Healing: Fiction, Fantasy or Fact
Dr. David Lewis wrote an extensive report on a Wimber conference held at 
Harrogate on 3-6th November 1986. This report was published in the form of a 
book, Healing: Fiction, Fantasy or Fact.^ One chapter of this report is on 'Physical 
and Spiritual Phenomena'. A questionnaire which he distributed asked the 
respondents to indicate which of the following phenomena they had experienced. 
1,890 were returned.
a) Tingling in your hands
b) Hand or arm shaking
c) Stiffening of your body
d) Weeping
e) Laughing
f) Fluttering of your eyelids
g) Falling over
h) Screaming or shouting
i) Hot areas on your body
j) Changes in your breathing 
k) Behaviour resembling 'drunkenness'
1) Other (please specify)^
1 Lewis, Dr. David C. Healing: Fiction, Fantasy or Fact, (Hodder, 1989).
2 Ibid, page 169-170. Also cited in Chapter I, section 14, (page 50), foot note 112.
-  ________________________________________________________________
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The first possible explanation examined by Dr. Lewis is that these phenomena are the 
result of mass hysteria. In order to determine susceptibility to hysteria it is necessary 
to determine personality types because;
more hysterical individuals would rank high in both extroversion and neuroticism.^
A full test to determine personality type by using the 'Eysenck Personality Inventory' 
would involve about a hundred questions, and so in order to save time. Dr. Lewis 
used an abbreviated personality test with just twelve questions, the 'short version of 
the MPI'. His conclusion is that among those who experienced the above 
phenomena, there was no particular psychological 'type' who would be more prone 
to such hysterical experiences than others.
The second possible explanation covered by Dr. Lewis is the possibility that 
the phenomena are the result of learned behaviour. By this it is meant that 
individuals have (subconsciously) adapted to new expectations, and their behaviour 
has become 'internalised'. The possibility of expectation-determined responses is 
widely accepted by those involved in the charismatic movement. Dr. Lewis mentions 
the example of a lady who had experienced healing on three separate occasions (her 
leg reportedly growing two and a half inches).^
In order to test the theory that charismatic phenomena are the result of learned 
behaviour, Lewis looked for those who had experienced the phenomena in the past, 
and found that 69% of those who had did not repeat this behaviour during the 
conference. 7 % of the sample who had not fallen over in the past did so for the first 
time at Harrogate.
One point noted is that there tends to be a progression from the more to the 
less dramatic phenomena in the experience of individuals. Again the repetition of 
phenomena does not seem to be linked to personality types, except that those who fell 
over were more likely to be low on the neuroticism scale. Some dramatic behaviour 
such as screaming and shouting are almost never repeated, whereas the more gentle 
experiences of tingling, alteration in breathing or shaking often recur.
The third explanation considered is the possibility of suggestion. What is 
meant by this is a view that certain physical phenomena are predicted in advance and 
that certain 'suggestible' people respond accordingly.
One indicator that this was not the cause of the experiences, was that the box 
entitled 'Other: (please specify)' brought in over two hundred different
3 Ibid, page 167.
4 Ibid, page 172, I
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5 Ibid, page 185.
6 White, John When the Spirit comes with Power, (Hodder, 1988), page 60-61.
7 This is a weak argument. If it was an unconscious urge, then how could he be aware that this was 
the source of the experience? To apply this inductively to all experience of the phenomena is sloppy 
thinking.
classifications. These included Electricity over the head, Electricity in the legs, a 
forcefield running up and down the body, an aura of tremendous power, waves of 
cold, sensations of weight in parts of the body, the head being pushed back, out of 
the body experiences, visions of Angels, and experiences that seem to be demonic.^ 
Stigmata were reported by both an Anglican minister, and an Anglican who had been 
baptised into the Roman Catholic Church.
Dr, Lewis does not argue clearly at this point, but presumably the reason for 
including these phenomena is that the variety of experiences indicates that these 
particular experiences are not all suggested behaviour, because there was no 
suggestion given that they should behave in these particular ways.
2. When the Spirit comes with Power
Another book which addresses the phenomena of enthusiasm is When the Spirit comes 
with Power by John White, who is both a psychiatrist and an ex-missionary. The 
book is based on a year which was spent following Vineyard teams around the world.
John White suggests that there are four possible ways of explaining the 
manifestations.
1. People do it to themselves. That is to say, die manifestations have a psychological 
explanation, or are consciously or unconsciously self-induced.
2. Preachers do it to suggestible listeners-producing a so-called mass hysteria or mass 
hypnosis.
3. The devil does it-the phenomena representing some form of demonic control.
4. Or else God does it.®
(A) In respect of the first possibility, that people do it themselves White argues 
that too many people are taken by surprise by what happens to them for it to be the 
product of the discipline which would be needed to self-induce a trance. It is 
possible, however, that there is a degree of attention seeking at times. This has been 
a problem in the revivals in the past, and was addressed by Wesley.
White argues that the phenomena do not come from 'unconscious urges', on 
the grounds that he himself experienced a compulsion to pray and weep for Northern 
Ireland, which he says, was not the product of an unconscious urge.?
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(B) White's second suggested explanation is that the manifestations are preacher- 
induced. The form of preacher-induced manifestation discussed by White is brain­
washing, which he describes as follows:
Brain-washing teclmiques major on the following elements: (1) physical exhaustion;
(2) changes in perceptual levels; (3) cognitive dissonance; (4) inducing a sense of 
guilt and/or inadequacy and failure; (5) inducing fear; (6) inducing a sense of 
hopelessness; and (7) crowd effect. *
White concludes that these techniques are not being used by Wimber, and also that 
they were not used by Wesley or Whitfield.^
(C) On the third issue of whether the observed effects are due to demonic power, 
White suggests that the experiences associated with Wimber do not have the kind of 
features one would expect if this were so. They should be considered as indications 
of a good source on the grounds that they give honour to Jesus, oppose Satan's 
kingdom, lead people to value scripture, create an awareness of eternity, and result in 
love for other people.
John White does not keep rigourously to the thread of an argument, but one 
must assume that he considers that, by a process of elimination, it is justifiable to 
conclude that the experiences associated with Wimber are the result of the direct 
intervention by the Holy Spirit. In order to support this he cites a number of 
examples of people whose lives have been effected positively by their experiences of 
'signs and wonders'.
3. Signs and Wonders and Hypnotic Techniques
Another possible explanation is that enthusiastic experiences can be the result of 
hypnosis. Although it is not argued in any detail, 'The Healing Epidemic' asserts 
that John Wimber's techniques are based on Hypnosis. The same assertion is made by 
Prof. V.Wright in an article assessing a signs and wonders conference in England. 
The connection is not argued by him in any detail, but the suggestion is intriguing 
and warrants some exploration. Is hypnosis a plausible explanation for the 
phenomena of enthusiasm?
8 Ibid, page 66.
9 This is an incomplete argument if it is intended to rule out all possible psychological explanations.
10 Masters, Peter The Healing Epidemic, (Wakeman, 1988), page 202-227.
________________
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There is a vast amount written on hypnosis, and there are many theories 
which offer explanation of the phenomena. Hypnosis even has its own journal, The 
International Journal o f Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis. Consequently this 
appendix is by no means an attempt to comprehensively cover the relationship 
between hypnosis and enthusiastic experience, because to do so would be a thesis in 
itself. All that it does is indicate that there are evident similarities between these two 
areas of experience. It is argued by Martin H.Katchen in Brain-washing, Hypnosis 
and the Cults^^ that there is a lack of investigation into the link between 
hypnotizability as a possible variable which could predict successful cult recruitment. 
This lack is attributed by him to acceptance of the brain-washing model of coercive 
persuasion, and the preference for other sociological and psychological models. I 
would suggest that an exploration into the possiblity that some charismatic experience 
could be attributed to hypnotic technique would also be a useful area of research.
The roots of hypnosis in Europe go back to Mesmer (1734-1815), and his 
method of induction was to use a tub full of magnets which supposedly focused the 
'magnetic fluid' in the ether which allowed 'animal magnetism'll to enter the body 
and produce the various phenomena. People stood around this in a circle, or 
'seance',13 then Mesmer would come in and touch people in the group. Some 
recovered from illness after collapsing into a state of delirium called 'the crisis'. 
Physical illnesses such as skin rashes would disappear, or appear, people shook, 
screamed and experienced sensations of heat and cold.i^
The idea of a 'magnetic fluid' was undermined, although hypnosis continued 
to work. 13 It became evident that it can be induced by a variety of methods; all that 
is needed is a conducive atmosphere with the right kind of psychological suggestion 
and stimuli. 1®
This is significant for our purposes, as it suggests that:
(a) It is possible to hypnotise a person without understanding the process one is 
using, and that it is also possible to be hypnotised without realising that this is what is
11 Article by Martin H. Katchen: 'Brainwashing, Hypnosis and the Cults' in The Australian Journal 
of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, (November, 1992), vol 20 (z), page 78-88)
12 Essay by Gordon, Pattie, Frank A. 'A brief History of Hypnosis' in (Ed.) Gordon, Jesse E. 
Handbook of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, (Macmillan, 1967), page 14.
13 The word 'seance' should not be confused with spiritualism, as Mesmer pre-dates the development 
of spiritualism in the 1840's. It straightforwardly describes a circle.
14 Gordon, Pattie, Frank A. 'A Brief History of Hypnosis' in (Ed.) Gordon, Jesse E. Handbook of 
Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, page 13.
15 Ibid, page 19.
16 Ibid, page 21,
 ; : : :_____________________________________________________________________________
3 0 7
occurring. It would be conceivable that a person could use these simple techniques 
unintentionally in many different contexts.
(b) The particular method of induction is of secondary importance, psychological 
force is the key.^? This important point is confirmed by an experiment which 
explored the effectiveness of differing methods of inducing hypnosis. The 
experiment controlled for suggestibility between four groups of subjects. Hypnosis 
was induced by using (a) traditional hypnotic induction, (b) alert induction, (c) 
relaxation technique, and (d) goal-directed imagery. Assessment of the depth of 
consciousness was gauged by self-report method and expert evaluation. The outcome 
of the study showed that the hypnotic state of consciousness was indistinguishable 
between the four groups, giving a clear indication that traditional hypnosis is just one 
method of altering thought patterns.
This is significant because it indicates that hypnosis can be induced without 
using traditional formal hypnotic induction, and also that it is possible to induce a 
level of hypnosis by using comparatively 'cold' techniques. The possibility of 
hypnosis being induced by informal methods in the context of a charismatic gathering 
is supported by these findings.
If we compare the methodology of Wimber's 'signs and wonders' with 
hypnotic techniques, one finds that there are significant points of comparison.
(i) Both stage hypnosis and 'signs and wonders' can induce individual
responses within a crowd of people.
(ii) Heightened expectation increases the effect of hypnosis.
Expectation about the nature of hypnosis, for those who have not been hypnotized, 
tend to correlate with their subsequent hypnotic scores.
This heightened expectation is evident in Signs and Wonders conferences. Wimber's 
reputation for producing the dramatic means that one goes with the expectation of
17 Essay by London, Perry 'The Induction of Hypnosis' in (Ed.) Gordon, Jesse E. Handbook of 
Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, (Macmillan, 1967), page 49.
18 Kirsch, I; Mobayed, C.P; Council, J.R. and Kenny, D.A. Expert Judgements of Hypnosis from 
Subjective State'. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, (November, 1992, vol 10).
19 Essay by Barber, Theodore Xenophon 'Suggested ("Hypnotic") Behaviour: The Trance Paradigm 
Verses and Alternative Paradigm' in (Ed.) Fromm, Erika and Shor, Ronald E. Hypnosis Research 
Developments and Perspectives, (Paul Elek, 1972), page 132 ff.
20 Essay by Hilgard, Ernest R. Individual Differences in Hypnotizability', in Handbook of Clinical 
and Experimental Hypnosis, page 430. See also essay by Barber, Theodore Xenophon 'Suggested 
("Hypnotic") Behaviour: The Trance Paradigm Verses and Alternative Paradigm’ in Hypnosis 
Research Developments and Perspectives, page 168.
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seeing a powerful effect on people. The leaders of the gathering will claim verbally 
that you will see God at work directly and evidently during the 'ministry' time.
(in) In order to induce hypnosis it is helpful if a person believes that something is 
going to happen to them. This is why scathing scepticism would make one 
unresponsive to hypnosis. It is consequently important not to implant negative ideas 
when inducing hypnosis because these can undermine the effectiveness of the 
p r o c e s s . F o r  example, one should not say 'Did you feel the prick of the pin?; but 
rather 'Will you let me know when the pin begins to feel blunt? '22
A positive expectation is also encouraged by Wimber. The necessity for belief 
and faith can be tapped into by a leader in an evangelical context or charismatic 
meeting, because the ability to believe is considered to have intrinsic virtue. This 
applies particularly in situations where faith is considered to depend for its strength 
on excluding negative suggestions by which it could be undermined.
(iv) Suggestion is a mechanism which is arguably the main force in the production 
of hypnotic states. 22
Suggestion is also in effect in a Wimber meeting. The participants are 
normally aware beforehand of the kinds of responses which will occur at the end in 
the ministry time. There is also the non-cognitive suggestion which is caused by 
being surrounded by many people who are responding to 'ministry' in dramatically 
physical ways.
(v) It is important to have confidence in the hypnotist. Hypnotic effect can be 
speeded up where there is a strong confidence in the hypnotist, a confidence which 
can be produced by the right kind of m a n n e r .24
This process is also at work in a Wimber meeting, as he is a warm and 
likeable 'charismatic' character, who approaches the issues in a gentle way, seeming 
to present an academic credibility along with a relaxed confidence in dealing with the 
supernatural. Someone who was a part of the signs and wonders movement would be
21 Barber, Theodore Xenophon 'Suggested ("Hypnotic") Behaviour: The Trance Paradigm Verses 
and Alternative Paradigm' in Hypnosis Research Developments and Perspectives, page 133 ff.
22 Ambrose and Newbold, A Handbook of medical hypnosis, (London, 1980. 4th edition), page 41,
23 Essay by Levitt, E. Eugene and Chapman Hennessy 'Hypnosis as a Research Method' in Hypnosis 
Research Developments and Perspectives, page 93.
24 Essay by London, Perry 'The Induction of Hypnosis' Handbook of Clinical and Experimental 
Hypnosis, page 51.
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aware of his powerful record and believe that here is someone who can handle 
charismatic phenomena with authority.
(vi) It is important to feel safe for hypnosis to be effective.
The hypnotist establishes or reinforces some desultory conversation to put the subject 
at ease and allow time to adjust to the s u r r o u n d i n g s . 2 3
Wimber introduces the ministry time with words such as 'don't worry about the 
dramatic phenomena', 'feel comfortable', 'just watch if you prefer'. Any response is 
permissible, and people are encouraged to feel safe during the ministry time.
(vii) Relaxation,
A dramatic tense sort of atmosphere is all right for a novel or film. In practice a kind 
of casualness as if the treatment were the most ordinary everyday affair in the world - 
is better. 26
Wimber talks about the 'natural supernatural'. When it comes to the 'ministry time' 
he will encourage people to relax, stretch their legs, feel comfortable. It appears to 
be less hyped up, but in reality it is the perfect climate for hypnosis.
(yiii) People respond best to hypnosis if they are led rather than pushed, and so the 
best manner is gentle and undomineering.
Under most circumstances, therapeutic hypnosis is now carried out in an atmosphere 
of mutual co-operation, the hypnotist assuming the role of a teacher who can help his 
student to achieve a mutually sought goal.2?
This non-authoritarian technique is also an element in signs and wonders 
methodology. The approach is that here are some things we have learned, but we're 
all learning together. People split into groups and try things together, and learn by 
seeing how it works out as they lay hands on each other.
25 Ibid, page 59.
26 Weatherhead, Dr. Leslie D. Psychology, Religion and Healing, (Hodder, 1963), page 127. See 
also Ibid, page 60-61.
27 Ibid, page 119.
..
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28 Ibid, page 119.
29 Various Authors: John Wimber, Friend or Foe, (St. Matthias Press, 1990), page 20.
(ix) 'Suggestions are best in the indicative rather than the imperative, instead of 
'lift your hand'; your hand is lifting.' One encourages a 'passive attitude in which 
the subject neither strives to help nor hinder'
In a Wimber ministry time the same passivity is encouraged. 'You just relax, 
you don't have to do anything, we will pray for you. Just open your hands to receive 
from God. ' The person is encouraged not to strive, but to accept passively . i
(x) The essence of hypnotism is a capacity to bypass the critical mind in order to 
influence the subconscious, and so it is far easier to hypnotise if the 'critical 
threshold' is low.2*
This is the essence of hypnosis, and also the central facet of enthusiasm and of 
signs and wonders, i.e. to detach a person from the 'western rational paradigm', and
allow an acceptance of the realm of the supernatural.
God wants to woo us from our minds to our spirits...watch out for evaluating what is 
going on with your mind.^^
This is significant as both hypnotic techniques and signs and wonders share the same 
central tenet, which is that the rational mind needs to be by passed in order that each 
should be effective.
' I
■(xi) Shared experiences are a part of inducing hypnosis.
As the subject begins to respond the hypnotist often behaves as if he shares the
subject's unusual experiences.
{'ill
This has the effect of reinforcing the unusual state of consciousness.
It is possible that in signs and wonders people do simply fake this agreement 
about experience, but knowing many of those involved, this is unlikely to be 
common.
However, there is a situation where all kinds of phenomena are being
interpreted as being a sign of the work of the spirit, heat, cold, fluttering eyelids, and
so on. Those with experience in signs and wonders would claim to be able to see 
such phenomena as a demon sitting on a persons shoulder, even though this will be 
invisible to people who are still 'limited by a western paradigm'. It is also a situation 
where the participants do sincerely want to see God at work, and will be willing to
----------
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believe that all kinds of effects are caused by the Spirit. This is what all involved 
want to happen, and so there is a mutual conformation, in that both sides will have a 
tendency to interpret experience in the same 'spiritual' way.
(xii) A common side effect of hypnosis is a reduction of fear, and this is relatively 
easily achieved by hypnosis.3o It also corresponds to the feelings of a person who has 
been 'slain in the spirit'.
(xiii) Memory can be distorted under hypnosis, and for this reason it is often used 
to enable an adult to regress and to re-experience events as a child.3i
Closely allied to the recall of buried memories is the phenomenon of age regression.
In the somnambulistic state it is possible to take the subject back step by step to 
earlier periods in life.32
This is a distinct parallel with signs and wonders, particularly when it is combined 
with 'healing of memories'. Both have the same aim and effect, i.e. to dig up and 
reinterpret past traumatic events.
(xiv) A sense of time-distortion is associated with hypnosis, with little or no 
awareness or care of time having p a s s e d .  33
The same experience can accompany being 'slain in the spirit'.
(xv) Physical changes can occur during hypnosis, particularly where a symptom is 
the result of emotional distress, eg. cold sores, feelings of heat and c o l d , 34 warmth in 
particular limbs, changes in heart rate and respiration, fluttering of eyelids.
The same changes are also associated with 'ministry'.
30 Essay by Levitt, E. Eugene and Chapman Hennessy 'Hypnosis as a Research Method' in Hypnosis 
Research Developments and Perspectives, page 94.
31 See also ibid, page 96.
32 Medical hypnosis, page 28.
33 See essay by Barber Theodore X. ' "Hypnotic" Phenomena: A Critique of Experimental Methods', 
in Handbook of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, page 453.
34 For example, a sensation of coldness is common under hypnosis. This is attributed by Wallace and 
Kokoszka to an association between numbness and coldness which lead to this experience. Wallace, B, 
and Kokoszka, A. 'Experience of Peripheral Temperature Change during Hypnotic Analgesia' : 
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, (July, 1992, vol 40 [3]), page 180-193.
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(xvi) Posthypnotic suggestion is used in order that someone will respond in a 
particular way after hypnosis, but is only largely effective where 'the posthypnotic 
suggestion is congruent with the individual's distress.'
The same condition applies to 'ministry', where there is a mutually sought 
goal, and it is emphasised that one must want God to do whatever is being suggested, 
as He would not force His will onto people.
(xvii) Feelings of 'heaviness, warmth and relaxation' are associated with both Signs 
and Wonders and hypnosis.
(xviii) There is a variation in hypnotic susceptibility, and consequently hypnosis 
induces varied responses in different i n d i v i d u a l s .33 For example, some people seem 
hardly affected during hypnosis, yet show substantial alteration afterwards.
It is also true that in a given congregation practising 'signs and wonders', one 
will soon be able to predict the separate ways in which different individuals are likely 
to respond.
(xix) 'Hypnosis is not, as often thought, a power which is confined to some 
mysterious individual, but is a technique which needs little training and skill, and is 
easily taught'.
It fits well into the signs and wonders 'workshop' setting where people learn 
from each other.
(xx) It is difficult to hypnotise a person with a mental illness. Indeed, it is normal 
people in good mental and physical health who respond most positively to hypnotic 
suggestion.
Those who have tried to hypnotise die insane and mental defectives have found that 
in practically every case it has been impossible to influence mental defectives and the 
same difficulty may arise with certain types of insanity.3®
From my own experience as minister of a Church with four psychotic members, this 
is also true of 'signs and wonders'. I have been unable to track down an instance of 
a psychotic person responding well to a Signs and Wonders ministry time.
35 Essay by Hilgard, Ernest R. Individual Differences in Hypnotizability', in Handbook of Clinical 
and Experimental Hypnosis, page 400.
36 Ibid, page 25.
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(xxi) Hypnosis effects illness which is of the more apparently psychosomatic
variety, and the same is true of the effects of signs and wonders. Wimber is
criticised that, in spite of the claims, there is a distinct lack of evidence for significant 
organic healing. Both 'signs and wonders' and hypnosis have the same kinds of 
effects on the same kinds of illness.
(xxii) In hypnosis there is a technique called the 'confusional technique' which is
reserved for those who retain a critical mental attitude and are consequently unable to 
accept suggestions of a straightforward nature.3? For example, if it is suggested that 
the right arm is becoming heavy, then the person may think that there is no reason 
for it to do so, and so remains unaffected. To overcome this critical response, one 
may offer suggestions such as the following:
Your right arm is becoming heavier. At the same time your left arm feels lighter and 
the right foot feels numb. Now your right arm feels lighter still while the left is 
becoming heavier and heavier and begins to fall. The left hand is also feeling numb 
and cold. At the same time you notice how warm your left foot is getting, while 
your right arm is becoming so heavy that you cannot lift it without considerable 
effort. All this while your left hand continues to feel warmer and, as it does so, it 
gets lighter and begins to lift in the air. 3*
Eventually the effort of trying to be critical towards all of the conflicting suggestions 
is too much, resistance is given up and criticism suspended.
Perhaps no one within the charismatic fraternity deliberately uses such blatant 
methods, however there are similar underlying mechanisms of confusion at play. 
The effect of a large group of people where individuals respond in dramatic ways can 
be disturbing, and create confusion as one struggles to make sense of what is going 
on. The requirement to believe in a way that is disproportionate to the evidence 
creates a confusing mental double think as people try hard to believe. If one suggests 
that an argument doesn't make sense the reply may be, that God is mysterious and 
beyond our understanding, or that one is at fault for being limited by a western 
rational world view. Logic is answered with a denial of logic as a means of 
assessment and the argument retreats into mysticism. Such an argument makes 
irrational belief seem rational, and the switches between logic and illogic are both 
subtle and confusing. There seems no way to sift through the confusion.
37 See also essay by London, Perry 'The Induction of Hypnosis' Handbook of Clinical and 
Experimental Hypnosis, page 67.
38 Ibid, page 47.
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(xxiii) Fiexibilitas cerea
Another curious phenomena is what is known as fiexibilitas cerea (waxy fiexibility). 
In this condition a limb may be moulded into certain rather bizarre positions at the 
joints because of the great increase in relaxation of the surrounding muscles. There 
is also an apparent increase in the strength of some muscles. This may be because 
any conscious restraint normally imposed upon muscular activity is removed during 
hypnosis so that the muscles are able to contract with their full force and to the 
maximum extent. 39
We can compare this with phenomena reported to have occurred during charismatic 
meetings. In one instance people were:
Moving backward and forward or from side to side, and their arms and sometimes 
even their legs flailing in the wake of their moving bodies. I doubt that any ballet 
dancer or gymnast could reproduce the movements.4®
Sometimes the bodily shaking is on a vertical axis, the body leaving the ground in a 
series of bounces. Since the body remains more or less rigid, it looks like someone 
bouncing on a pogo stick.
The physical energy used must be considerable, especially when one 
considers that pogo-sticking is no respecter of persons."*!
The bodily rigidity mentioned above is also a feature of hypnosis:
One of the most striking phenomena is catalepsy; a limb may be made perfectly rigid 
by suggestion and held for a long time in a given position without apparent effort or
fatigue  Not only may an arm or leg be thus affected, but the process can be
extended to other muscles of the body; in extreme cases the subject's whole body can 
be made so rigid that he can be supported quite well by supports placed only under 
his head and heels, just as if  he were a plank of w ood .42
Conclusions
In the light of all this, one can conclude that there are significant parallels between 
’signs and wonders', and hypnotic technique. In terms of physical, psychological, 
and after effects, the same phenomena occur in the same atmosphere. It is most 
unlikely that such close parallels could be co-incidental.
One does not need to conclude that Wimber is therefore consciously practising 
hypnotic techniques. As has been pointed out, hypnosis is a simple technique which 
can be done without realising how the process is working. Wimber developed his 
approach by trying things out and seeing what worked, if it was effective he retained
39 Ibid, page 27.
40 When the Spirit Comes with Power, page 92.
41 Ibid, page 94.
42 Medical hypnosis, page 26.
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it. Rather than insincerity, it is just as likely that he has accidentally stumbled on 
these old techniques which have been understood as hypnotic.
How should all this be understood? We are left in a situation where there are 
three currently available alternative theories to chose from.
1. Hypnotism is an occult technique, and the effects are due to evil forces. 
This is what is tapped into by those who practice signs and wonders.
2. Signs and wonders are a pure work of the Spirit
3. Both the occult and the charismatic movement have (intentionally or 
unintentionally) tapped into a psychological technique.
As we have already argued, while it is theoretically possible, there are no 
good reasons to assume (1). In respect of (2), one would have to be prepared to 
attribute these same effects to the Spirit acting directly on a person who is in the 
psychiatrist's chair, or part of the occult, or visiting the theatre to see a stage 
hypnotist. The parallels are too close for the parallels to be simply coincidental. One 
would need to start on the supplementary hypothesis road, and attribute the 
similarities to satanic counterfeit. The Spirit creates these effects in Church, and 
Satan counterfeits the same phenomena on command everywhere else.
This leaves us with the third option. As a theory it has much to commend it. 
Significantly, it allows a detailed explanation to be constructed; it can predict the 
kind of responses, e.g. influence on psychotic illness, why there are more 
peculiarities in the 'signs and wonders' scene, than the dramatic healing one would 
expect if this was the Creator at work. It has an elegant simplicity that makes sense 
of all the available evidence in differing contexts, and it avoids an unnecessary 
'multiplication of entities'. It is also quite congruent with both a Christian and 
atheistic paradigm. Certainly there is no Biblical reason why such phenomena should 
be attributed directly to the Spirit.
It is, of course, an unprovable argument, but if one applies the criteria which 
select the best of different theories, then this is the option which should be chosen.
What can we conclude about the significance of all this?
(a) Certainly, to describe the phenomena occurring in a Wimber meeting as 'signs 
and wonders' is dubious. As signs, they are ambiguous, and pointing more in the 
direction of the hypnotist or psychologist, than to the creator. There are wonders,
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but even these seem to be more explicable than at first sight. Even if they are helpful 
in themselves, they should not be described as 'signs of the Kingdom'.
(b) The best of the options is to see what is occurring as the result of psychological 
forces, which does not necessarily undermine their use. 'signs and wonders' are as 
acceptable as any other form of hypnosis.
(c) The question which would need to be resolved is consequently whether hypnosis 
is acceptable for a Christian. In the current charismatic movement, hypnosis is more 
generally viewed as being dangerous as it is considered to potentially open a person 
up to evil forces which can get direct access to a person's mind, it is quite 
unacceptable, (in spite of being practised unintentionally by the same people). Other 
Christians have recommended its use.
(d) If we treat such experience in the way that it was by Edwards, it becomes a 
neutral psychological irrelevance. This is the way that people sometimes react to 
particular stimuli, and so to determine whether this is 'good' or 'bad', one needs to 
ask, 'to what is the person responding?', and 'in what way are they affected?' It is 
one thing to be so overwhelmed by the truth and by the Spirit, that one falls to the 
ground in wonder; it is quite another to respond to a lie or to the occult in this way. 
If hypnosis is indeed a means of bypassing the conscious mind to get access to the 
subconscious, one needs to ask 'what has been placed in the mind when it was in this 
state?'
The argument that the physical phenomena associated with Signs and Wonders 
have a parallel with hypnosis is a strong one, however, as a means of assessment it is 
still questionable. It does demand that the term 'sign and wonder' should be used 
with caution, but if a person responds in a strongly physical and emotional way, then 
one still has to ask, 'to what are they responding?' In other words, the phenomena 
themselves need to be assessed because on their own they could indicate the work of 
the Spirit, or some other force. Consequently, one should not say that because a 
person has fallen down or shaken during prayer that this is a sign of the Spirit. Such 
experience is too ambiguous to be a reliable criterion of assessment.
 : :______________________
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